Azerbaijan–Turkey relations

Last updated
Azerbaijan–Turkey relations
Turkey Azerbaijan Locator.svg
Flag of Turkey.svg
Turkey 		Flag of Azerbaijan.svg
Azerbaijan
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of Turkey, Baku Embassy of Azerbaijan, Ankara

Relations have always been strong between Azerbaijan and Turkey, the only two predominantly Turkic countries located west of the Caspian Sea. Former Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev often described the two as being "one nation, two states." [a] [1]

Contents

Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence on June 4, 1918 (Treaty of Batum) and the first to recognize Azerbaijan's restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, Turkey has been a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate its independence, preserve its territorial integrity and realize its economic potential arising from the rich natural resources of the Caspian Sea. The two countries share a 17 kilometres (11 mi) long international borderline, with the Aras River separating Turkey from the Nakhchivan exclave of Azerbaijan.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

A war between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia broke out shortly after the parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous oblast in Azerbaijan, voted to unify the region with Armenia on February 20, 1988. The Armenian demand to unify Karabakh with Armenia, which proliferated in the late 1980s, began in a relatively peaceful manner; however, as the Soviet Union's disintegration neared, the dispute gradually grew into a violent conflict between the ethnic groups in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in ethnic cleansing by all sides. [2] The declaration of secession from Azerbaijan was the final result of the territorial conflict regarding the land.

Following a UN Security Council resolution on April 6, 1993, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani district of Kelbajar, Turkey joined Azerbaijan in imposing a full economic embargo on Armenia, and the border between the two states was closed. [3] [4] The border subsequently remained closed, as Turkey demanded the withdrawal of Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan. Turkey made the demand a condition for establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia. [5]

Turkey supported Azerbaijan politically, supplied arms, and held joint military drills to improve combat interoperability since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. In September 2022, at a United Nations news conference, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar reiterated Turkey's support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. [6]

Negotiations and economic co-operation

Location of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline Baku pipelines.svg
Location of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

Turkey supports the OSCE Minsk Group, as a mechanism for resolving the territorial dispute and views it from the principle of Azerbaijani integrity. Turkey did not recognize the previously de facto independent republic of Nagorno-Karabakh that emerged, otherwise known as Artsakh. [7] Turkey has supported various indirect bilateral talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia and initiated trilateral dialogue in Reykjavík in 2002 and the Istanbul Summit, 2004 among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict, but its diplomatic efforts are hampered by its own tensions with Armenia over the claim of Armenian genocide and its ongoing border blockade against Armenia, which has resulted in subsequent infrastructure projects bypassing Armenian territory.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have subsequently built upon their linguistic and cultural ties to form a very close economic partnership that sees Turkey negotiating to buy natural gas from Azerbaijan and the two co-operating, along with neighbouring Georgia, in such infrastructure projects as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline, Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway and the proposed Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline [8] all of which bypassing Armenia despite a recent thawing in diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan, which make them key players in European energy security. As BBC correspondent Chris Morris states, in The New Turkey (Granta Books, 2005), "Turkey lacks the great natural resources of the industrial age – oil and gas – and it has to import nearly all its energy supplies. But its proximity to Azerbaijan, the Caspian, and Central Asia, as well as to the Middle East, has allowed it to cultivate a new strategic role: the ‘missing link’ in a chain connecting these new producers of vast mineral resources with the consumer societies in Europe, America and beyond." [9]

İlham Aliyev visited Turkey in 2003 shortly after first entering the Azerbaijani political scene at the behest of his ailing father Heydar Aliyev in a move that was interpreted at the time as an indication of political support from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. [10]

STAR

The opening of the STAR oil refinery, owned by the Azerbaijani State Oil Company SOCAR, was held in the Turkish city of Izmir on October 19, 2018. The foundation of STAR was laid on October 25, 2011, with the participation of Azerbaijani and Turkish Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The consortium consisting of Técnicas Reunidas (Spain), Saipem (Italy), GS Engineering & Construction Corp (South Korea) and Itochu (Japan) built the plant. [11] [12] [13] [14]

TANAP

The TANAP project was envisaged on November 17, 2011, at the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum in Istanbul. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project on December 24, 2011, in order to establish a consortium of the project with 20% (twenty percent) in accordance with the share of Turkey and 80% (eighty percent) in accordance with the share of the Republic of Azerbaijan. [15] [16] [17]

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ilham Aliyev, and Georgy Margvelashvili officially met in the city of Kars in Eastern Turkey to lay the foundation of the pipeline on March 17, 2015. The construction of the gas pipeline began in 2015 and completed in June 2018. [18]

On November 21, 2018, the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) joined the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) at the Turkish-Greek border near Meric River. Through the TAP, the Azerbaijani gas will be transported to Europe from the Shah Deniz field. [19] [20]

Military cooperation

Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey first emerged in 1992, with an agreement signed between the two governments on military education and weapon equipment and deals to help strengthen the bond between the two nations. [21] Since then, the Azerbaijani and the Turkish governments have closely cooperated on defense and security. The Training and Education Center of the Armed Forces was established in accordance with the protocol which was signed between Azerbaijan and the Turkish Armed Forces on 5 April 2000. [22]

In June 2010, Azerbaijani military company Azersimtel announced that it had reached an agreement with the Turkish Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) on launching a joint military facility. [23] [24] According to Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, Turkish military assistance to Azerbaijan has exceeded $200 million in 2010. [25] In the first stage of production, the company is expected to produce military arms venture for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

In December 2010, both countries signed a range of treaties that makes each other a guarantor in case of an attack by foreign forces. [26] The Treaty would enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification and valid for 10 years. In addition, the term extended for another 10 years if in the last 6 months, there is no notification to terminate the treaty. [27]

More than 20 Turkish defense industry companies have co-operative and commercial relations with Azerbaijan. [28]

On January 29, 2013, TAKM (Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status) was formed as an intergovernmental military law enforcement (gendarmerie) organization of three Turkic countries (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey) and Mongolia.

Nakhchivan Military Base

The Azerbaijani military doctrine adopted in 2010 allows for foreign military bases in Azerbaijan, and that action opened the way to speculation that Turkey could quarter its troops in the Nakhchivan region, an Azerbaijani exclave surrounded by Armenia and Turkey. [29] Azerbaijan maintains a base in Nakhchivan that has received heavy Turkish support in the past, but no official information is available about the current scope of military cooperation between the two countries in the exclave. [30]

Recent relations

Armenian–Turkish diplomatic progress

On the eve of the April 2009 official visit to Turkey by US President Barack Obama, sources in Ankara and Yerevan announced that a deal may soon be struck to reopen the border between the two states and exchange diplomatic personnel. [31]

That prompted concerns from both Baku and Turkish nationalists that the ongoing negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute would be adversely affected by the lifting of the longstanding blockade. Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry spokesman Elkhan Polukhov initially stated that it was "too early" to discuss what steps his country might take in retaliation," [32] Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev failed to take part in the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) meeting in Istanbul on April 6–7, which was claimed to be a protest. There was a speculation in the Turkish press that Azerbaijan had received distorted information on the content of the Armenian-Turkish talks through Russian channels. [33] Further developments proved those claims to be groundless.

There was also heated debate in the Turkish Parliament with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader, Devlet Bahçeli, who shared the Azerbaijanis' "rightful concerns" in warning the government: "Your approach to Armenia harms our dignity". The Republican People's Party (CHP) leader, Deniz Baykal, asked, "How can we ignore the ongoing occupation of Azerbaijan?" [34] Both parties were dispatching delegations to Baku and hosting Azerbaijani politicians in Ankara.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attempted to ease those concerns by announcing, "Unless Azerbaijan and Armenia sign a protocol on Nagorno-Karabakh, we will not sign any final agreement with Armenia on ties. We are doing preliminary work but this definitely depends on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem". [35] Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan clarified that "we want a solution in which everybody is a winner" in a statement prior to the April 15 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Foreign Ministers Council in Yerevan: "We don't say, 'Let's first solve one problem and solve the other later.' We want a similar process to start between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We are closely watching the talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia". [36] Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mahmud Mammad Guliev responded that the solution to both countries' problems should be tied to the solution of the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia and that Azerbaijanis believe that Turkey will protect their interests.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report on the normalisation: "The politicized debate whether to recognize as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. ... The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia. ... Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate". [36]

Armenian-Turkish provisional roadmap

When the announcement of the provisional roadmap for normalising Armenia–Turkey relations was made on April 22, 2009, there was no mention of the dispute, which is no longer believed to be part of the agreement. [37]

According to a statement from the office of Turkish President Abdullah Gül, he initiated a phone conversation with Aliyev following the announcement to stress the importance of "solidarity and cooperation" between their nations for regional stability, and speaking to the press on April 23, he reaffirmed commitment to finding a solution to the dispute: "There has been unprecedented intense diplomacy [that] does not only involve Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia [but also] Russia, the United States, the EU, are all involved.... If all these efforts produce a positive outcome, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the entire region will benefit." [37]

Azerbaijani Ambassador to Turkey Zakir Hashimov has confirmed that there is no crisis in his country's relations with Turkey following the announcement and welcomed the reassurances from Turkish President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan but expressed his state's position that the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia would be unacceptable if unless Armenia evacuates five of the seven districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (including the strategically important land corridor in Lachin) and subsequent discussions are agreed on for the evacuation of the remaining two and the eventual status of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. [38]

Diplomatic tension

On April 25, 2009, reports quoted SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev as saying that the current deal for the supply of natural gas by Azerbaijan to Turkey was outdated and that talks on a new price deal were underway. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan responded, "I don't have information on that. However, if it [Azerbaijan] increased prices, then according to which facts did it do this? Such a rise in natural gas prices during a period of time when oil prices in the world are on the decline will, of course, be thought-provoking. These [facts] will be assessed and steps will be taken accordingly." [39] When Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler finally emerged from the talks, he stated, "These reports are not true; I have been holding meetings with the Azerbaijanis for two days. No such thing has been said; there is no rise. We have a contract, so they cannot do it." [40]

On May 4, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Arza Azimov traveled to Ankara to meet with the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, his first official engagement since taking office on May 2, and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ertuğrul Apakan for discussions reported to have been timed to ease diplomatic tensions and highlight the importance of bilateral relations. [41]

On May 6, the new Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yıldız, stated, "Energy will play the role of a catalyst in bringing the relations among Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey to a more positive level. ... There are no plans to delay the projects with Azerbaijan," [42] as BOTAŞ President Saltuk Düzyol lead a delegation to Baku to discuss gas prices and future infrastructure projects and request an additional 8 billion m³ of Azerbaijani gas to meet Turkish domestic requirements. [43]

Following a reportedly tense May 7 OSCE Minsk Group-mediated peace summit between Armenian President Sargsyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev at the residence of the US Ambassador in Prague, on the sidelines of the EU's Eastern Partnership conference, [44] which resulted in "no serious progress" [45] Turkish President Gül met separately with the two leaders to propose four-way talks on the conflict to include Russia when they next met at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in July. [46]

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan confirmed during a live 9 May TRT broadcast that no problem exists in bilateral relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan and that the provisional roadmap with Armenia was tied to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: "There is a causal link here. We closed the [border] gate. The reason was the occupation and the result was our closing the gate. If the reason disappears—then let's open the gate." [45]

In a 24 February 2010 meeting with US Undersecretary of State William Burns, Azerbaijan's president Aliyev "made clear his distaste for [Turkey's] Erdogan government." Aliyev reportedly saw "naivete" in Turkish foreign policy, especially Turkey's "hostility to Israel." Aliyev also related his opposition to Turkish support for "Hamas and Gaza." [47] [ better source needed ]

2009 Turkish prime ministerial visit to Baku

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan made a 13 May visit to Baku with a delegation that included Energy Minister Taner Yıldız, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Trade Minister Zafer Çağlayan, Transportation Minister Binali Yıldrım and Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay to reaffirm the strained ties between the two countries. [33] [41]

In a press conference with Azerbaijani President Aliyev, Erdoğan reaffirmed, "There is a relation of cause and effect here. The occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh is the cause, and the closure of the border is the effect. Without the occupation ending, the gates will not be opened." Aliyev responded, "There could be no clearer answer than this. There is no doubt anymore." On the subject of gas prices, Erdoğan stated, "I cannot say that the price is fair. We will have talks to make sure the price is a fair one." [48]

In a speech to the Azerbaijan Parliament in which he reaffirmed that Turkey and Azerbaijan were "one nation with two states," Erdoğan stated, "Some reports said Turkey gave up on Nagorno-Karabakh in order to normalize relations with Armenia. This is an outright lie. I dismiss it once again here. Our stance on Nagorno-Karabakh is clear, and there has never been any deviation from this stance. We want the problem to be resolved on the basis of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. We have never taken any steps that could harm the national interests of Azerbaijan and will never take such steps. There will be no normalization unless the occupation of Azerbaijani territory ends." [48]

Turkish opposition parties responded positively to the visit with MHP Deputy Parliamentary Group Chairman Oktay Vural stating that, "The visit has been extremely positive because it reversed an erroneous policy." [49]

Erdoğan flew on to Sochi, Russia, for a 16 May "working visit" with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at which he stated, "Turkey and Russia have responsibilities in the region. We have to take steps for the peace and well-being of the region. This includes the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Middle East dispute, the Cyprus problem." Putin responded, "Russia and Turkey seek for such problems to be resolved and will facilitate this in every way. ... As for difficult problems from the past – and the Karabakh problem is among such issues – a compromise should be found by the participants in the conflict. Other states which help reach a compromise in this aspect can play the role of mediators and guarantors to implement the signed agreements." [50] [51]

2009 Turkish foreign ministerial visit to Baku

Swiss Foreign Secretary Michael Ambühl updated Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, on the ongoing Armenian–Turkish normalisation negotiations, at an 18 May meeting in Baku. Mammadyarov stated, "The latest developments showed that it was impossible to achieve progress in the maintenance of stability and security in the region without taking Azerbaijan's position into consideration and without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict." [52]

Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu met with Mammadyarov on the sidelines of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Council of Foreign Ministers 23 May session in Damascus, with Davutoğlu subsequently announcing, "We will head to Baku together on board the same plane. This has turned out to be something like 'one state, two nations'; 'one nation, two delegations'. ... It is not possible to disagree with [Azerbaijani President] Aliyev's remarks concerning the performance of the Minsk Group. Because no progress has been made, it is now necessary to rescue this issue from being in the status of a frozen conflict. Turkey will continue its efforts." [53] [54]

Davutoğlu announced, at a 26 May joint press conference in Baku, "Turkey and Azerbaijan are not two ordinary friends, neighbours and brother countries, they are at the same time, two strategic partners. One of the fundamental foreign policy priorities which is embraced by everybody in Turkey – no matter what political thought [they] have – is the existing strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. ... Our message intended for actors in the region, particularly intended for Armenia, is very open and clear. The region should now be cleansed of occupation, stresses and high tension." Mammadyarov added, "We also discussed cooperation in the fields of energy, economy and culture. Our countries have signed around 150 documents in total, but we don't have to stop at what has been achieved." [55]

Failure and cancellation of proposed Azerbaijan–Turkey visa-free regime

Turkish President Abdullah Gul meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, 16 August 2010 Ilham Aliyev and President of Turkey Abdullah Gul held a one-on-one meeting 01.jpg
Turkish President Abdullah Gül meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, 16 August 2010
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, 25 February 2020 Recep Tayyip Erdogan 2020 visit to Baku with Ilham Aliyev 16.jpg
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, 25 February 2020

Azerbaijan agreed to a visa-free regime with Turkey while Iran also demanded the same visa-free regime with Azerbaijan. Iran had threatened to cut off the critical supply line between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic if Azerbaijan lifted visa requirements for Turkish citizens but not extend the same privilege to Iranian citizens. [56] According to Azerbaijani diplomats, a visa-free travel regime proposed by Turkey in 2009 had fallen victim to Iranian pressure on Azerbaijan, prompting the last-minute cancellation of the deal between Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijani diplomats also said the national interests of Azerbaijan did not allow for an open-border policy with Iran since political instability in Iran may trigger a huge influx of Iranian ethnic Azeris refugees to Azerbaijan and did not want the proposed Turkey-Azerbaijan Visa-Free Regime to be reciprocal with Iran as well. [57] Azerbaijan lifted visa requirements for Turkish citizens from 1 September 2019.

Strategic partnership

In June 2010, Azerbaijan and Turkey have signed key agreement on a package of Shah Deniz gas issues in Istanbul. [58] [59] The agreement also will open the way for securing supplies to the EU's flagship Nabucco gas pipeline project. [60] On 16 September 2010, countries signed a treaty to establish Strategic Cooperation Council in Istanbul. [61] [62] In December 2010, National Assembly of Azerbaijan ratified on strategic partnership and mutual assistance between Azerbaijan and Turkey. [63] [64] The agreement consists of 23 articles and five chapters: Military-political and security issues, military and military-technical cooperation, humanitarian issues, economic cooperation, and common and final provisions. [65] [66]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a written statement that the 2019 Turkish offensive into north-eastern Syria will serve to eliminate the terror risks, return of the refugees to their homes, solution of the humanitarian problems, and providing peace and stability within the territorial integrity of Syria. [67]

Support in Turkey's tensions with Greece

Amid the tensions between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean which sparked in the summer of 2020, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev vowed to "stand with Turkey under any circumstances without any hesitation." Aliyev made these remarks while accepting the credentials of Greece's newly appointed ambassador to Azerbaijan, Nikolaos Piperigos, at an event in the capital Baku in September 2020. Aliyev said "we support Turkey on all issues, including the issue of intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean." [68]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Ankara will too continue to support Baku and that the friendship between the two countries is eternal. [69]

Energy relations

As of August 2020, Azerbaijan has become Turkey's major gas supplier which fits into Turkey's efforts of the past several years to diminish its dependence on Russian gas. [70]

Economic relations

On 11 September 2020, Turkish Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan said that Turkey aims to sign a Free Trade Agreement with Azerbaijan and increase trade turnover between the two countries. Noting that the trade turnover between the two countries in 2019 amounted to $4.4 billion, she said that this figure does not reflect the real potential of the two countries. Earlier in the year, on 25 February, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Preferential Trade Agreement that aims to step up efforts to bring their trade volume to $15bn. [71]

High-level visits

On August 11, 2020, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Jeyhun Bayramov paid his first visit to Turkey after being appointed for the position of Azerbaijan's new foreign minister. [72]

Resident diplomatic missions

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Azerbaijani: Bir millət, iki dövlət, Turkish: Bir millet, iki devlet

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline</span> Oil pipeline

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is a 1,768 kilometres (1,099 mi) long crude oil pipeline from the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli oil field in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It connects Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan and Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, via Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. It is the second-longest oil pipeline in the former Soviet Union, after the Druzhba pipeline. The first oil that was pumped from the Baku end of the pipeline reached Ceyhan on 28 May 2006.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Heydar Aliyev</span> President of Azerbaijan from 1993 to 2003

Heydar Alirza oghlu Aliyev was an Azerbaijani politician who was a Soviet party boss in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic from 1969 to 1982, and the third president of Azerbaijan from October 1993 to October 2003.

The State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan, largely known by its abbreviation SOCAR, is a fully state-owned national oil and gas company headquartered in Baku, Azerbaijan. The company produces oil and natural gas from onshore and offshore fields in the Azerbaijani segment of the Caspian Sea. It operates the country's only oil refinery, one gas processing plant and runs several oil and gas export pipelines throughout the country. It owns fuel filling station networks under the SOCAR brand in Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, Switzerland, and Austria.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nagorno-Karabakh conflict</span> 1988–2024 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians until 2023, and seven surrounding districts, inhabited mostly by Azerbaijanis until their expulsion during the 1990s. The Nagorno-Karabakh region was entirely claimed by and partially controlled by the breakaway Republic of Artsakh, but was recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan gradually re-established control over Nagorno-Karabakh region and the seven surrounding districts.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Armenia–Turkey relations</span> Bilateral relations

Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey are officially non-existent and have historically been hostile. Whilst Turkey recognised Armenia shortly after the latter proclaimed independence in September 1991, it has refused to establish diplomatic relations. In 1993, Turkey reacted to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh by closing its border with Armenia out of support for Azerbaijan, which remain closed to this day despite sporadic negotiations regarding possible opening.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Iran relations</span> Bilateral relations

Official diplomatic relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were established following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991). Iran and Azerbaijan share, to a large extent, the same history, religion, and culture. The territory of what is now called the Republic of Azerbaijan was separated from Iran in the first half of the 19th century, through the Russo-Persian Wars. In the area to the North of the river Aras, the territory of the contemporary Republic of Azerbaijan was part of Iran until it was occupied by Russia. Iran and Azerbaijan are both majority Shia Muslim nations. They have respectively the highest and second highest Shia population percentage in the world, as well as the history of Shi'ism which is rooted in both nations from exactly the same moment in history, whereas the majority of the population of both their neighboring nations are either predominantly Christians or Sunni Muslims. However, there are some tensions between the two countries as its political alignment may vary by degree. The Republic of Azerbaijan has become increasingly pro-Western aligned, and is an ally of Israel, Turkey and the United States while the Islamic Republic of Iran is largely pro-Russian and pro-Chinese aligned due to its hostility towards the U.S. and has been targeted with sanctions. Iranian politicians, like Mohammad Hosseini, have called Azerbaijan an Israeli proxy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Georgia relations</span> Bilateral relations

Foreign relations exist between Azerbaijan and Georgia, two neighboring small nations which were former Republics of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan has an embassy in Tbilisi and Georgia has an embassy in Baku. Both countries are full members of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The two countries are among the four founding members of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development along with Ukraine and Moldova.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–European Union relations</span> Bilateral relations

The Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union (EU) have maintained a positive relationship through the years and have become more closely linked since 1991. Azerbaijan is currently part of the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Council of Europe. The EU is the largest foreign grant donor to and investor in Azerbaijan, both in the government sector and civil society, making available over 600 million EURO of bilateral EU assistance since 1992.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Russia relations</span> Bilateral relations

Russia and Azerbaijan are de facto and de jure allies in many different aspects, including military. Bilateral relations exist between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. The Embassy of Azerbaijan is located in Moscow, Russia. The Embassy of Russia is located in Baku, Azerbaijan.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Switzerland relations</span> Bilateral relations

Foreign relations exist between Azerbaijan and Switzerland. Azerbaijan has an embassy in Bern as does Switzerland in Baku. Both countries are full members of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Belarus relations</span> Bilateral relations

Relations between Azerbaijan and Belarus are at very high level that Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko describes Azerbaijan as a "saver" of independence and sovereignty of Belarus and adds that "there's not anything close" in Azerbaijani-Belarusian relations. Both countries were part of the Russian Empire until 1918 and before 1991, they were part of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan has an embassy in Minsk and Belarus has an embassy in Baku. Both countries are full members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Azerbaijan is a full member of the Council of Europe, Belarus is a candidate. Both Azerbaijan and Belarus are full members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). There are more than 6,000 Azerbaijanis living in Belarus.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan relations</span> Bilateral relations

Foreign relations exist between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan has an embassy in Astana and a consulate in Aktau. Kazakhstan has an embassy in Baku.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Foreign policy of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government</span> Overview of the foreign policy of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government

The foreign policy of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government concerns the policy initiatives made by Turkey towards other states under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his tenure as prime minister from 2003 to 2014.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline</span> Turkish natural gas pipeline

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is a natural gas pipeline in Turkey. It is the central part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which connects the giant Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe through the South Caucasus Pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. The pipeline has a strategic importance for both Azerbaijan and Turkey. It allows the first Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe, beyond Turkey. It also strengthens the role of Turkey as a regional energy hub.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Zurich Protocols</span> 2009 failed attempt to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey

The Zurich Protocols refer to two bilateral protocols signed in 2009 by Armenia and Turkey that envisioned starting the process of normalizing relations between the two countries. The Protocols included provisions for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, and the establishment of a joint historical commission on the Armenian genocide issue. The agreement, which later proved to be ineffectual, had been brokered by the United States, Russia and France.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict</span> April 2016 conflict in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh

The 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, also known as the Four-Day War, April War, or April clashes, began along the former Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact on 1 April 2016 with the Artsakh Defence Army, backed by the Armenian Armed Forces, on one side and the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on the other.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Azerbaijan–Organization of Turkic States relations</span>

Relations between Turkic Council and Azerbaijan started from the year of 2009 until present. Taking into account of the establishment date of the organization, Azerbaijan continues relations as a member of the founding country.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Second Nagorno-Karabakh War</span> Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (2020)

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was an armed conflict in 2020 that took place in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding occupied territories. It was a major escalation of an unresolved conflict over the region, involving Azerbaijan, Armenia and the self-declared Armenian breakaway state of Artsakh. The war lasted for 44 days and resulted in Azerbaijani victory, with the defeat igniting anti-government protests in Armenia. Post-war skirmishes continued in the region, including substantial clashes in 2022.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Baku Victory Parade of 2020</span> Military Triumph Parade in 2020

2020 Baku Victory Parade was held on 10 December, in Azadliq Square, Baku, capital of Azerbaijan. It was held in honor of the Azerbaijani victory during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war, officially described as the Patriotic War in Azerbaijan. The parade was held with 3,000 military servicemen who distinguished themselves during the war marched alongside military equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft, as well as Armenian war trophies, and Turkish soldiers and officers, while navy vessels performed maneuvers in the nearby Bay of Baku, and jets and helicopters flew above the city. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a key ally of Azerbaijan in the war, also attended the military parade as part of a state visit to Baku.

This is a list of individuals and events related to Azerbaijan in 2023.

References

  1. ↑ "Joint press statements of Presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey". Archived from the original on 16 June 2018. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  2. ↑ Rieff, David (June 1997). "Case Study in Ethnic Strife. (Nagorno-Karabakh)". Foreign Affairs. 76 (1997). Council on Foreign Relations. doi:10.2307/20047941. JSTOR   20047941. Archived from the original on 2008-07-20. Retrieved 2008-08-14.
  3. ↑ Morris, Chris (2005). "Chapter 5: Open Wounds: The Greeks and the Armenians". The New Turkey . London: Granta Books. pp.  111–132. ISBN   978-1-86207-865-9.
  4. ↑ Hale, William M. (2000). Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 . Routledge. p. 273. ISBN   978-0-7146-5071-5.
  5. ↑ Libaridian, Gerard J. (2004). Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State . Transaction Publishers. p.  245. ISBN   978-0-7658-0205-7.
  6. ↑ "Turkey backs Azerbaijan, says Armenia 'should cease provocations'". Reuters. 2022-09-13. Archived from the original on 2022-09-13. Retrieved 2022-09-14.
  7. ↑ "1993 UN Security Council Resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh". 2001-2009.state.gov. Archived from the original on 2020-12-24. Retrieved 2017-06-09.
  8. ↑ Zulfugar Agayev (2011-12-28). "Socar to Ship Caspian Natural Gas to EU Using Own Pipelines". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on September 4, 2012. Retrieved 2011-12-28.
  9. ↑ Morris, Chris (2005). "Chapter 9: Crossroads". The New Turkey . London: Granta Books. pp.  203–227. ISBN   978-1-86207-865-9.
  10. ↑ "Turkey and Azerbaijan: Sister countries becoming Eurasian powerhouses through projects". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-29.
  11. ↑ "Azərbaycan STAR zavodu ilə həm özü qazanacaq, həm də Türkiyəyə qazandıracaq - RƏY". Report İnformasiya Agentliyi (in Azerbaijani). Archived from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  12. ↑ "SOCAR signs loan agreements as part of constructing Star refinery in Turkey". Trend.Az. 2014-06-06. Archived from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  13. ↑ "SOCAR's Star Oil Refinery to contribute to economy of Azerbaijan and Turkey". CBC.AZ. Archived from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  14. ↑ "Giant refinery opens in Turkey's İzmir for $6.3 bln investment". Hürriyet Daily News. 19 October 2018. Archived from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  15. ↑ Debord, Jean-Guy. "WorleyParsons: Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) EPCM Contract". www.euro-petrole.com. Archived from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  16. ↑ "SOCAR President: Implementation of TANAP project within schedule". Archived from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  17. ↑ "Host Government Agreement" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2018-11-22. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  18. ↑ "Aliyev, Erdogan Sign Inter-Governmental Agreement on Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline to Europe - Jamestown". Jamestown. Archived from the original on 2018-06-13. Retrieved 2018-11-22.
  19. ↑ "TANAP, TAP pipelines interconnect at Turkey-Greece border". Daily Sabah. Archived from the original on 2018-11-26. Retrieved 2018-11-26.
  20. ↑ "TANAP, TAP p/lines interconnect at Turkey-Greece border". Archived from the original on 2018-11-26. Retrieved 2018-11-26.
  21. ↑ Öztarsu, Mehmet Fatih. "Military Relations of Turkey and Azerbaijan". Strategic Outlook. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 25 August 2011.
  22. ↑ "MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN". MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN. Archived from the original on 2021-04-14. Retrieved 2021-03-14.
  23. ↑ Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul: "The military assistance we offered to Azerbaijan exceeded 200 million US dollars" Archived March 11, 2012, at the Wayback Machine
  24. ↑ Азербайджан и Турция подписали два контракта по производству военной техники (in Russian) Archived March 4, 2012, at the Wayback Machine
  25. ↑ "Turkey-Azerbaijan Military Cooperation Deepens to the Tune of $200 Million - GENERAL NEWS - NEWS - ARTSAKANK - GIBRAHAYER MONTHLY NEWSPAPER -". Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 22 March 2015.
  26. ↑ "Azerbaijan becomes guarantor of Turkey from an attack by third forces". abc.az. Archived from the original on 3 October 2011. Retrieved 23 December 2010.
  27. ↑ Elchin, Veliyev. "В регионе может быть создан новый альянс". Archived from the original on 27 December 2010. Retrieved 23 December 2010.
  28. ↑ "Turkish defense industry office to open in Azerbaijan". news.az. Archived from the original on 8 May 2014. Retrieved 1 June 2011.
  29. ↑ "Turkey, Azerbaijan Agree To Joint Military Arms Venture". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Radio Free Liberty. 4 November 2010. Archived from the original on 5 November 2010. Retrieved 5 November 2010.
  30. ↑ Abbasov, Shahin. "Turkey Steps Up Support for Strategic Azerbaijani Exclave of Nakhchivan". Eurasianet.org. Archived from the original on 4 November 2010. Retrieved 5 November 2010.
  31. ↑ Paul Richter (2009-04-03). "Turkey, Armenia are likely to ease conflict". Los Angeles Times . Archived from the original on 7 April 2009. Retrieved 2009-04-03.
  32. ↑ "Q&A: Does Turkey-Armenia deal affect European energy security?". Today's Zaman . 2009-04-25.
  33. 1 2 "Erdoğan in bid to mend fences with Baku". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-13.
  34. ↑ Yanatma, Servet (2009-04-15). "Armenia gives assurances on border recognition". Today’s Zaman. Archived from the original on 2009-04-18. Retrieved 2009-06-01.
  35. ↑ Yanatma, Servet (2009-04-13). "Turkey-Armenia deal to refer to Karabakh solution". Today's Zaman .
  36. 1 2 "Is tough test waiting for Erdogan?". Present World. Archived from the original on 2021-01-12. Retrieved 2021-01-13.
  37. 1 2 "Turkey and Armenia expect gradual normalization in ties". Today's Zaman . 2009-04-25.
  38. ↑ "Azeri envoy denies crisis in ties with Turkey". Today's Zaman . 2009-04-25.
  39. ↑ "Ankara denies Baku planning gas price hike". Today's Zaman . 2009-04-27.
  40. ↑ "Turkish energy minister says no rise in natural gas prices". Today's Zaman . 2009-04-26.
  41. 1 2 i (2009-05-05). "Erdoğan to visit Azerbaijan, Russia to discuss Caucus peace". Today's Zaman .
  42. ↑ "'Armenia efforts won't harm energy projects with Baku'". Today's Zaman . 2009-05-07.
  43. ↑ "Turkey sends BOTAŞ team to Baku". Today's Zaman . 2009-05-05.
  44. ↑ "Aliyev, Sarksyan hold peace summit in Prague". Today's Zaman . 2009-05-08.
  45. 1 2 "PM says border linked to Nagarno-Karabakh issue". Today's Zaman . 2009-05-11. Archived from the original on 2016-01-17.
  46. ↑ "Gül seeks four-way summit to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh row". Today's Zaman . 2009-05-08.
  47. ↑ "Palestinian rights don't factor into Israel-Azerbaijan relations". 28 March 2011. Archived from the original on 7 May 2015. Retrieved 8 September 2015.
  48. 1 2 "Erdoğan puts Baku's Armenia concerns to rest". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-14.
  49. ↑ "Yerevan to Erdoğan: Don't interfere in Karabakh row". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-16.
  50. ↑ "Erdoğan to visit Russia next month, report says". Today’s Zaman. 2009-04-25.
  51. ↑ "Erdoğan seeks Russian backing in Karabakh peace effort". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-16.
  52. ↑ "Report: Switzerland informs Baku of Turkey-Armenia talks". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-20.
  53. ↑ "Davutoğlu heads to Baku with Mammadyarov aboard his plane". Today's Zaman. 2009-05-25.
  54. ↑ "Minsk Group not able to make progress". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-26.
  55. ↑ "Davutoğlu declares Azerbaijan 'strategic partner' in Baku visit". Today’s Zaman. 2009-05-27.
  56. ↑ "Azerbaijan Says Visa-Free Regime With Turkey Fell Victim to Iranian Pressure". Archived from the original on 2011-10-07. Retrieved 2011-07-21.
  57. ↑ Azerbaijan says visa-free regime with Turkey fell victim to Iranian pressure Archived December 22, 2015, at the Wayback Machine
  58. ↑ "TURKEY AND AZERBAIJAN MOVE TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON SHAH DENIZ GAS". Archived from the original on 29 February 2012. Retrieved 22 March 2015.
  59. ↑ "News.Az - Turkish-Azerbaijani gas deal welcomed". Archived from the original on 8 May 2014. Retrieved 22 March 2015.
  60. ↑ "Azerbaijan, Turkey Agree on Gas Price, Supply, and Transit Terms". Archived from the original on 22 January 2023. Retrieved 22 March 2015.
  61. ↑ "Azerbaijan, Turkey To Sign Treaty To Establish Strategic Cooperation Council Today". 1news.az. Archived from the original on 16 July 2011. Retrieved 16 September 2010.
  62. ↑ "Turkey, Azerbaijan establish Strategic Cooperation Council". www.worldbulletin.net. Archived from the original on 19 September 2012. Retrieved 16 September 2010.
  63. ↑ "Milli Majlis ratifies Joint Declaration on "Establishment of Azerbaijan-Turkey High Level Cooperation Council"". Apa.az. Archived from the original on March 25, 2012. Retrieved 22 December 2010.
  64. ↑ "Обнародован текст военного соглашения между Азербайджаном и Турцией Подробности". regnum.ru. Archived from the original on 5 April 2012. Retrieved 22 December 2010.
  65. ↑ "Azerbaijani Parliament Ratifies Azeri-Turkish Defense Pact". azerireport.com. Archived from the original on 2 January 2011. Retrieved 22 December 2010.
  66. ↑ "Türkiye İle Azerbaycan Arasındaki Güvenlik Ve Yardımlaşma Anlaşması Onaylandı" . Retrieved 22 December 2010.[ dead link ]
  67. ↑ "Azerbaijani MFA released a statement on military operations conducted by Turkey Army in Northern Syria". apa.az. October 11, 2019. Archived from the original on April 29, 2021. Retrieved October 21, 2019.
  68. ↑ Azerbaijan's president lends Turkey unwavering support Archived 2020-09-03 at the Wayback Machine , Anadolu Agency, 2 September 2020
  69. ↑ Erdogan says friendship with Azerbaijan eternal, AzerNews, 14 September 2020
  70. ↑ Azerbaijan Becomes Turkey's Top Gas Supplier Archived 2020-09-24 at the Wayback Machine , Modern Diplomacy, 21 August 2020
  71. ↑ Azerbaijan, Turkey aims to sign free trade deal, boost trade turnover, AzerNews, 11 September 2020
  72. ↑ "Expanding ties with Turkey among Azerbaijan's foreign policy priorities [PHOTO]". AzerNews.az. 2020-08-11. Archived from the original on 2020-08-18. Retrieved 2020-08-18.
  73. ↑ "Azərbaycan Respublikasının Türkiyə Cümhuriyyətindəki səfirliyi". Archived from the original on 2020-05-13. Retrieved 2020-05-16.
  74. ↑ "Azərbaycan Respublikasının İstanbul şəhərindəki Baş Konsulluğu". Archived from the original on 2020-05-04. Retrieved 2020-05-16.
  75. ↑ "Azərbaycan Respublikasının Qarsdakı Baş Konsulluğu". Archived from the original on 2020-05-07. Retrieved 2020-05-16.
  76. ↑ "Baş Konsulluğun tərkibi" . Retrieved 2023-01-28.
  77. ↑ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Bakü Büyükelçiliği". Archived from the original on 2017-08-26. Retrieved 2020-05-16.
  78. ↑ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Nahçıvan Başkonsolosluğu". Archived from the original on 2017-09-18. Retrieved 2020-05-16.
  79. ↑ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Gence Başkonsolosluğu". Archived from the original on 2015-04-04. Retrieved 2020-05-16.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.