California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. | |
---|---|
![]() | |
Argued January 16, 1980 Decided March 3, 1980 | |
Full case name | California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al. |
Citations | 445 U.S. 97 ( more ) 100 S. Ct. 937; 63 L. Ed. 2d 233; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 86 |
Case history | |
Prior | 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757 (affirmed) |
Holding | |
California's wine pricing system constitutes resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act, since the wine producer holds the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by wholesalers. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinion | |
Majority | Powell, joined by unanimous |
Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. XXI, Sherman Antitrust Act |
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court created a two-part test for the application of the state action immunity doctrine that it had previously developed in Parker v. Brown .
A California statute required all wine producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State. If a producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule and are prohibited from selling wine to a retailer at other than the price set in a price schedule or fair trade contract. A wholesaler selling below the established prices faces fines or license suspension or revocation.
After being charged with selling wine for less than the prices set by price schedules and also for selling wines for which no fair trade contract or schedule had been filed, respondent wholesaler filed suit in the California Court of Appeal asking for an injunction against the State's wine-pricing scheme. The Court of Appeal ruled that the scheme restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, and granted injunctive relief, rejecting claims that the scheme was immune from liability under that Act under the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, and was also protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which prohibits the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors into any State for delivery or use therein in violation of the State's laws.
1. California's wine-pricing system constitutes resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act, since the wine producer holds the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by wholesalers. And the State's involvement in the system is insufficient to establish antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown . While the system satisfies the first requirement for such immunity that the challenged restraint be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," it does not meet the other requirement that the policy be "actively supervised" by the State itself. Under the system the State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties, and it does not establish prices, review the reasonableness of price schedules, regulate the terms of fair trade contracts, monitor market conditions, or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program. The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement. Pp. 102–106.
2. The Twenty-first Amendment does not bar application of the Sherman Act to California's wine-pricing system. Pp. 106–114.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair monopolies. It was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman, its principal author.
The Robinson–Patman Act (RPA) of 1936 is a United States federal law that prohibits anticompetitive practices by producers, specifically price discrimination.
In the United States, antitrust law is a collection of mostly federal laws that govern the conduct and organization of businesses in order to promote economic competition and prevent unjustified monopolies. The three main U.S. antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. These acts serve three major functions. First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits price fixing and the operation of cartels, and prohibits other collusive practices that unreasonably restrain trade. Second, Section 7 of the Clayton Act restricts the mergers and acquisitions of organizations that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Third, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization.
The list price, also known as the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP), or the recommended retail price (RRP), or the suggested retail price (SRP) of a product is the price at which its manufacturer notionally recommends that a retailer sell the product.
Anti-competitive practices are business or government practices that prevent or reduce competition in a market. Antitrust laws ensure businesses do not engage in competitive practices that harm other, usually smaller, businesses or consumers. These laws are formed to promote healthy competition within a free market by limiting the abuse of monopoly power. Competition allows companies to compete in order for products and services to improve; promote innovation; and provide more choices for consumers. In order to obtain greater profits, some large enterprises take advantage of market power to hinder survival of new entrants. Anti-competitive behavior can undermine the efficiency and fairness of the market, leaving consumers with little choice to obtain a reasonable quality of service.
Resale price maintenance (RPM) or, occasionally, retail price maintenance is the practice whereby a manufacturer and its distributors agree that the distributors will sell the manufacturer's product at certain prices, at or above a price floor or at or below a price ceiling. If a reseller refuses to maintain prices, either openly or covertly, the manufacturer may stop doing business with it. Resale price maintenance is illegal in many jurisdictions.
The three-tier system of alcohol distribution is the system for distributing alcoholic beverages set up in the United States after the repeal of Prohibition. The three tiers are importers or producers; distributors; and retailers. The basic structure of the system is that producers can sell their products only to wholesale distributors who then sell to retailers, and only retailers may sell to consumers. Producers include brewers, wine makers, distillers and importers. The three-tier system is intended to prohibit tied houses and prevent "disorderly marketing conditions."
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) is an Act of the Parliament of Australia. Prior to 1 January 2011, it was known as the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). The Act is the legislative vehicle for competition law in Australia, and seeks to promote competition, fair trading as well as providing protection for consumers. It is administered by the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) and also gives some rights for private action. Schedule 2 of the CCA sets out the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). The Federal Court of Australia has the jurisdiction to determine private and public complaints made in regard to contraventions of the Act.
A liquor store is a retail business that predominantly sells prepackaged alcoholic beverages, including liquors, wine or beer, usually intended to be consumed off the store's premises. Depending on region and local idiom, they may also be called an off-licence, off-sale, bottle shop, bottle store or, colloquially, bottle-o, liquor store or other similar terms. A very limited number of jurisdictions have an alcohol monopoly. In US states that are alcoholic beverage control (ABC) states, the term ABC store may be used.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), was a court case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in a 5–4 decision that ruled that laws in New York and Michigan that permitted in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers but prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing the same were unconstitutional. The case was unusual because the arguments centered on the rarely-invoked Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1933, which ended Prohibition in the United States.
Alcoholic beverage control states, generally called control states, less often ABC states, are 17 states in the United States that have state monopolies over the wholesaling or retailing of some or all categories of alcoholic beverages, such as beer, wine, and distilled spirits.
The Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, formerly the Washington State Liquor Control Board, is an administrative agency of the State of Washington. The Liquor and Cannabis Board is part of the executive branch and reports to the governor. The board's primary function is the licensing of on and off premises establishments which sell any type of alcohol, and the enforcement and education of the state's alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis laws.
A liquor license is a governmentally issued permit for businesses to sell, manufacture, store, or otherwise use alcoholic beverages.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the law that fixing a maximum price was illegal per se. This rule was reversed in 1997 by State Oil Co. v. Khan, which held that maximum price-setting was not inherently anti-competitive and not always a violation of antitrust law, and should therefore be evaluated for legality under the rule of reason rather than a per se rule.
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that an agreement among competitors in interstate commerce to fix maximum resale prices of their products violates the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The Parker immunity doctrine is an exemption from liability for engaging in antitrust violations. It applies to the state when it exercises legislative authority in creating a regulation with anticompetitive effects, and to private actors when they act at the direction of the state after it has done so. The doctrine is named for the Supreme Court of the United States case in which it was initially developed, Parker v. Brown.
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982), was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court involving the preemption of state law by the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held, in a 9–0 decision, that the Sherman Act did not invalidate a California law prohibiting the importing of spirits not authorized by the brand owner.
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), was a 1960 decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the so-called Colgate doctrine, which substantially insulates unilateral refusals to deal with price-cutters from the antitrust laws. The Parke, Davis & Co. case held that, when a company goes beyond "the limited dispensation" of Colgate by taking affirmative steps to induce adherence to its suggested prices, it puts together a combination among competitors to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the Court held that when a company abandons an illegal practice because it knows the US Government is investigating it and contemplating suit, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to hold the case that follows moot and dismiss it without granting relief sought against the illegal practice.
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 574 U.S. 494 (2015), was a United States Supreme Court case on the scope of immunity from US antitrust law. The Supreme Court held that a state occupational licensing board that was primarily composed of persons active in the market it regulates has immunity from antitrust law only when it is actively supervised by the state. The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners had relied on the Parker immunity doctrine, established by the Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown, which held that actions by state governments acting in their sovereignty did not violate antitrust law.
A hub-and-spoke conspiracy is a legal construct or doctrine of United States antitrust and criminal law. In such a conspiracy, several parties ("spokes") enter into an unlawful agreement with a leading party ("hub"). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained the concept in these terms:
In a "hub-and-spoke conspiracy," a central mastermind, or "hub," controls numerous "spokes," or secondary co-conspirators. These co-conspirators participate in independent transactions with the individual or group of individuals at the "hub" that collectively further a single, illegal enterprise.