The government took action through pursuing Assadist officers and officials in villages within western Syria. The clashes were triggered by the proliferation of videos on social media showing footage of an attack on the Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi shrine in Aleppo, which occurred in November. The incitement of violence and civil unrest among Alawite communities by Assadist elements has led to the formation of Alawite insurgent groups in Western Syria.[17]
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, there have also been reports of revenge attacks against Alawite figures across parts of Western Syria.[18] UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights group also reported numerous attacks against mainly Alawite civilians and former security personnel in the region, carried out by unidentified gunmen, resulting in the deaths of more than 344 civilians, 147 of whom were confirmed to have been killed in sectarian violence.[19][20][21][16][22]
On 29 December 2024, a pro-Assadist group named the Syrian Popular Resistance announced their opposition to the HTS-led government and threatened to attack HTS forces in response to the civil unrest since the toppling of the Assad regime.[2]
After the fall of the Assad regime, escalating tensions were reported in Western Syria, particularly in regions with significant Alawite populations, with riots and civil unrest emerging in multiple locations including Tartus, Latakia, and Bashar's birthplace of Qardaha.[24][25]
On 15 December 2024, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that pro-Assad insurgents were meeting with village elders in Latakia Governorate, instructing them to resist actions from the newly implemented Military Operations Administration in order to defend "the Alawite sect".[26]
On 22 December 2024, SOHR reported that civilian demonstrations erupted in the Al-Bahluliyah district east of Latakia, following allegations of misconduct by the transitiobal government's security forces, demanding for the complete withdrawal of security forces from the village. SOHR said that the incident involved armed individuals claiming affiliation with the new government forcibly entered the residence of Al-Bahluliyah'sMukhtar. The intruders reportedly brandished weapons at young residents in the neighborhood and committed various acts of misconduct, including verbal and physical abuse against family members and a girl. SOHR reported that protesters chanted "Death rather than humiliation" in response.[27]
On 23 December 2024, hundreds of Christians and their supporters marched through Damascus after foreign fighters set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, a Christian town near Hama. Protestors urged the HTS authorities to protect minorities and for foreign fighters to leave Syria. HTS later said they had detained the arsonists.[28][29][30]
Catholic News Agency reported on 31 December 2024 that that some Muslim residents who were displaced from the town of Maaloula by the Assad regime, were threatening and harassing some Christian residents who were accused of collaborating with pro-Assad militant groups.[31]
Attack on Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi shrine and circulation of its videos
On 25 December, tensions inflamed amongst segments of the Syrian Alawite population in response to online circulation of videos showing footage of an attack on the Alawite shrine of Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi in Aleppo. Though the incident had occurred weeks earlier, disinformation campaigns spread the footage as recent, aiming to incite discord and violent riots.[32] The footage depicted attackers killing five shrine attendants, mutilating their bodies, damaging the site, and setting fire to the structure.[24][33] The video provoked outrage among sections of Syria's Alawite population.[34]
The demonstrations erupted across multiple Alawite neighborhoods in Homs, including Al-Khudari, Wadi Al-Dhahab, Al-Zahraa, Al-Sabil, Al-Abbasiya, and Al-Muhajireen. Protesters expressed outrage over the shrine attack through sectarian chants and public demonstrations, with religious and community leaders denouncing it as an attack on Alawite religious heritage and identity while calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. Protesters also demanded greater security be granted to the community by the government, and for it to remove all of the extremist and foreign elements from its military. Several protesters were arrested in Homs, Tartus, and Jableh.[35] The Syrian General Security Service, operating under the new government's Military Operations Department, opened fire to disperse the crowd in Homs, resulting in one protester's death and five others sustaining injuries from gunfire.[33]
It was soon discovered that the attack had occurred weeks earlier during clashes between Syrian opposition and Assad regime forces in Aleppo, and that the Alawite religious site had only been partially damaged, contrary to numerous social media posts that claimed it had been demolished.[36] Verify Syria, a fact-checking organization, reported that a co-ordinated disinformation campaign was launched to circulate misleading posts related to the shrine attack through social media networks of Assad loyalists, who aimed to exacerbate sectarian tensions and provide cover for Assad regime officials fleeing Syria.[32] In response to rising tensions, the new government enhanced its security presence in Alawite-dominated regions. Public Security Forces implemented a curfew across Homs, Jableh, and Banias, while military reinforcements established security perimeters around the Akrama and Al-Nahda neighborhoods to stop further unrest. They also established military checkpoints for civilians to hand over their weapons, and set up loudspeakers in mosques instructing them to do so within 24 hours. Many, especially commanders and officers associated with the Assad regime, refused to do so.[24][37]
Pro-Assad disinformation campaign
Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has experienced a surge in disinformation on social media, targeting both Syrian and international audiences. DW News reported that the flood of online disinformation and inflammatory social media posts has had destabilizing consequences on the ground, such as triggering Alawite riots after the widespread online circulation of misleading posts of a shrine attack that occurred in November.[38][32]
Fact-checking organizations, like Verify-Sy and Misbar, have attributed these campaigns to social media accounts associated with Assad loyalists, as well as state propaganda outlets of Russia and Iran. Ba'athist Syria had maintained an extensive state propaganda apparatus, and its collapse created an information vacuum. Researchers have noted that Russian and Iranian disinformation networks remain active in social media, deploying fake accounts to stoke tensions amongst minorities, particularly the Alawite community, and incite sectarian clashes. Accounts linked to far-right groups in the West have also been amplifying Islamophobic posts labeling the HTS as terrorists.[38]
On 18 December, the Military Operations Administration conducted several raids in Hama and Homs Governorates and in several coastal areas to seek out Assad-associated figures and war criminals.[39]
Calls for resistance by Assad loyalists in Western Syria have resulted in the formation of Alawite insurgent groups in the region. Iran has also been accused of sponsoring the insurgency against the Syrian transitional government.[17] On 6 February 2025, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed that it killed 9 fighters of the Syrian security forces, including a former HTS commander and an Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria commander.[40]
Tartus governorate campaign
On 25 December, unidentified armed groups conducted synchronized assaults on multiple security checkpoints in the western Hama countryside with RPG launchers and heavy machine guns, killing one Syrian government troop and injuring another.[41] On the same day, a contingent of the General Security Service – a police unit loyal to the new government – made their way to the Khirbet al-Ma'zah village in the southern Tartus Governorate. They intended to arrest Major General Mohammad Kanjo Al-Hassan who had headed the Military Justice Administration and Field Court during the rule of the Assad regime; he was regarded as one of those responsible for the mass murders in Saydnaya Prison. Upon entering the village, the General Security Service were ambushed by militants, with 14 policemen and three attackers being killed. According to SOHR, loyalists of Mohammed Kanjo Hassan and another former Ba'athist officer, Suhayl al-Hasan, were responsible for the ambush.[11] The militants were led by Mohammed Kanjo Hassan's brother and expelled the security forces from the village.[42] The transitional government described the ambush as an attack by Assad loyalists. A curfew was declared at several cities.[34]
The government's Military Operations Command subsequently ordered the arrest of the attackers and sent reinforcements to secure Khirbet al-Ma'zah.[11] By 26 December, the Military Operations Command was conducting a large-scale campaign across Tartus Governorate, searching homes and securing the countryside. Major General Mohammad Kanjo Al-Hassan was reportedly captured in Khirbet al-Ma'zah.[42][43] Three gunmen associated with al-Hassan were also killed in the gunfight.[44] On 26 December 2024, the Syrian Transitional Government announced that it had arrested Mohammed Kanjo Hassan, former head of the military judiciary under the Assad regime and a Ba'athist prison officer at the Sednaya prison.[24][45][46]
Other villages in the Tartus Governorate saw an "mass escape of former regime members".[42] Two armed individuals from the village of Al-Zarqat, identified as regime loyalists or "shabiha," were killed after engaging in armed conflict with General Security Service. The security campaign prompted many former regime officials implicated in crimes against Syrian civilians to flee from several villages, including Al-Zuraiqat, Khirbet al-Ma'zah, and surrounding areas.[43] In addition, four Syrian government troops were killed during a raid on a pro-Assad holdout containing trafficking ringleader Shujaa al-Ali in Balqsa, western Homs Governorate.[47]
On 16 January 2025, General Security Administration (GSA) busted an effort by pro-Iranian trafficking networks to smuggle weapons from Tartus region to Lebanon.[48]
On 28 February 2025, unidentified gunmen on two motorcycles threw grenades on an outpost in Safita town in Tartus countryside, before clashes erupted with members of the Military Operations Command stationed at the outpost. As a result of the clashes, a member of the Military Operations Command was injured and a civilian was killed after being caught in the crossfire.[49] On the same day, a civilian and a member of the Military Operations Command were found dead in the former Russian base of Al-Su’ayrah, after having gone missing in Kaaf village in Al-Qadmous area in Tartus countryside.[50] As a result, a curfew was imposed on the village and clashes took place between the Military Operations Command and local gunmen, which led to the injury of 10 people and the deaths of a member of the Military Operations Command and a local gunman.[51]
Latakia governorate campaign
On 14 December, pro-Assad gunmen ambushed Sham Legion fighters in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside, killing or wounding fifteen troops.[12]
On 14 January, soldiers of the Military Operations Command were kidnapped and taken as hostages by the Assadist commander Bassam Nasir al-Din in Latakia Governorate. Bassam demanded Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces in a video to withdraw from the area within 24 hours or else the soldiers taken hostage would be "slaughtered". Later that day, HTS located Bassam's location using a drone and sent reinforcements to the area to rescue the units taken hostage, and surrounded him in his hideout, ultimately leading to him ending his life by suicide bombing himself. Seven Assadist militants were killed in clashes following the incident, and all kidnapped units were rescued safely and unharmed without any casualties.[52]
On 19 January, Syrian security forces captured and destroyed a massive Captagon shipment belonging to drug trafficking networks linked to Maher al-Assad. The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that roughly 100 million Captagon pills were seized in warehouses near the port of Latakia.[53]
On 22 January, pro-Assad gunmen targeted a checkpoint of the Military Operations Command with machine guns and grenades in the industrial area at the entrance of Jableh in the Latakia countryside. The attack left two members of the Military Operations Command dead and two other members injured.[54]
On 24 January, a group of pro-Assad militants attacked a security checkpoint in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside. The General Security Service repelled the attack and confiscated a vehicle and several firearms from the gunmen who attacked the security checkpoint.[55][56]
On 1 February, members of the Military Operations Command were ambushed by the Syrian Popular Resistance on the Latakia-Aleppo highway near Al-Mukhtariyah in Latakia countryside. As a result, one member was killed, two others were injured and a fourth one went missing.[57][58]
On 23 February, a member of the Ministry of Defence was killed due to the targeting of a pick-up near Al-Jumhoriya Street in Latakia by gunmen. The vehicle deviated from the road as a result and injured a civilian and children.[59]
On 27 February, a member of the Military Operations Command was killed due to injuries sustained in an attack on his vehicle carried out by pro-Assad gunmen near Al-Joumhouryah Street in Latakia.[60]
On 4 March, two members of Internal Security Forces were kidnapped by pro-Assad gunmen in Latakia, who were later found dead. Later during the day, pro-Assad gunmen attacked a patrol of Internal Security Forces near Al-Azhari roundabout in Latakia, where the two sides traded heavy gunfire.[61]
Western Hama governorate campaign
On 14 December, a raid on Al-Mazra’a in Hama Governorate, regarded as a significant Hezbollah stronghold, was launched by the Syrian Military Operations Administration, resulting in the arrests of "dozens of young men accused of committing previous violations against the people of the area".[62] In an act of sectarian violence, on 1 February, Sunni gunmen killed 10 Alawites including a child and an elderly woman in the village of Arzah.[63]
On 15 February 2025, a new group called "Saraya Ansar al Sunnah" emerged after it stated that it's fighters attacked the town of Arzah and killed 12 Alawites and another 5 people it claimed were affiliated with the former Ba'athist government in Tell Dahab.[1][64] The group stated that it would continue their attacks until the Alawites and Shia were "eliminated" or displaced from the region, it also stated that the group is decentralized with no formal headquarters, It is not clear who formed Saraya Ansar al Sunnah. The group also opposes the interim government's efforts to pardon former Ba'athist Syrian members.[64]
On 6 February 2025, Syrian border security forces launched a large-scale security operation in the Western region of Homs, along the Lebanese border to dismantle smuggling networks and armed groups linked to Hezbollah, resulting in violent clashes, arrests, and the rescue of two kidnapped Syrian soldiers.[65][66] The crackdown was part of the Syrian transitional government's broader campaign to expel Hezbollah militants, dismantle trafficking activities in the Syrian border regions with Lebanon and eliminate Assadist insurgent groups.[65][66]
By 10 February 2025, the Syrian military forces had established control over several border villages which were affected by the activities of smuggling networks linked to Hezbollah.[7]
On 18 January 2025, a commander in the Military Operations Command was killed during clashes with pro-Assad gunmen in the Talkalakh area in the western Homs countryside.[67]
On 23 February 2025, a member of the Military Operations Command died from injuries sustained during a combing operation a few days earlier in a village in the western Homs countryside.[68]
Targeted attacks on civilians and other casualties
On 14 December, UK-based Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR) NGO reported that the brother of the imam of the Great Prophet Mosque in Masyaf, Hama, was executed with three bullets by masked assailants who pursued and abducted him, after the imam was accused of being associated with Iranian and Shia militias and conducting funerals for regional civilians.[69] Two civilians were kidnapped in Al-Zahraa, Homs. Their bodies were discovered in a cooling unit three days later.[70]
On 15 December, SOHR reported that three civilians were killed in separate instances by unknown gunmen, one of whom was accused of being an Assad loyalist and tortured before being executed in Halfaya, Hama.[71]
On 16 December, SOHR reported that a former Syrian Arab Army soldier and his brother were kidnapped by unknown assailants in a military vehicle as they were in line at a settlement center meant for resolving their security status in the new state. The two were killed, with their bodies disposed of in a forest Wa'er.[72] Masked assailants kidnapped a civilian at gunpoint in Al-Shajar, and executed him near an al-Ghab agricultural research center northwest of Hama.
On 17 December, SOHR reported that one civilian was killed by gunmen in Al-Qusayr. Two more civilians were killed by unknown gunmen in Al-Suwaydah, Masyaf.[70] An armed group attacked civilians in Al-Shajar, and kidnapped a farmer who was later found dead with signs of having been tortured beforehand.[73]
On 18 December, SOHR reported that a man in al-Tuwaim in the western Hama countryside was killed by two unidentified gunmen after he had tried to stop them from stealing his sheep.[74] On 21 December, SOHR reported that a young man was abducted from his home in Tartus by an unknown armed group after they promised to help him with resolving his security status in the new state, who executed him and mutilated his corpse.[75] On 22 December, SOHR reported that a young man was kidnapped near Homs, taken to Baniyas, and executed in a field by unknown gunmen.[76]
On 23 December, SOHR reported that a man and woman were killed in Wadi Al-Nasara by unknown perpetrators.[77] A Yahmour, Homs resident was killed by unknown gunmen after being accused of loyalty to the Assad regime.[78] An unidentified man was found killed by a "field execution" near the Ras Al-Shamra roundabout in Latakia. After one group of unknown gunmen raided and left Hadidah, a second group entered and killed two civilians for unknown reasons.[79]
On 24 December, three Alawite judges were executed by unknown gunmen while travelling in the western Hama countryside.[80] The judges, who handled administrative cases related to land ownership, had traveled for discussions with officials of the new government. Photographs of their bodies were circulated online. Their widows stated that the judges were optimistic about their professional prospects and had been in talks about continuing their work under the new administration.[81] According to SOHR, several gunmen attacked and looted the residents of seven houses in the Alawite-majority village of Jidrin.[82]
On 25 December, SOHR reported that a medical student was shot dead by an unknown gunman in Latakia.[83] One civilian was found dead on the M4 Motorway in Ariha, Idlib, having been killed by a "field execution". Three more were killed by unknown gunmen in Tal Sarin, Hama.[84] An information engineering university student was executed in the countryside of Jableh by unknown gunmen.[80]
On 26 December, SOHR reported that an armed group raided the western Hama Governorate village of al-Aziziyah located in the Ghab Plain, and executed a civilian before arresting eight others and taking them to an unknown location.[85]
On 5 January 2025, it was reported that six bodies of workers belonging to the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine were found. The pro-Assad Syrian Popular Resistance accused the HTS-led government of killing the workers.[13]
On 8 January 2025, SOHR reported that three civilians of one family were killed in a field execution by unidentified gunmen in Latakia. Another civilian was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in his agricultural land in Hama. Four more people, including three brothers from Tasnin Village near Talbiseh were shot dead by gunmen, while working on the field. It was also reported that the bodies of six civilians were found, two of which were from Khirbet al-Hamam and four from al-Ghazila, where they were reported missing a few days ago in mysterious circumstances while heading to their work and visiting their relatives in Homs countryside.[86]
On 10 January 2025, UK-based SOHR reported that a young man from Qardaha in Latakia countryside was killed by unknown gunmen in Hama, where his body was moved to Hama National Hospital. Additionally, a young man, who a student at the College of Engineering, was killed with several gunshots to the head by unknown gunmen, after which his body was thrown into an irrigation canal and later moved to the hospital in Al-Zahra’a neighborhood in Homs.[87]
On 13 January 2025, SOHR alleged that two gunmen claiming to belong to the Military Operations Command kidnapped a young man in al-Samiya Village in Latakia countryside, whose body was later found with gunshot wounds, showing signs of a field execution. Meanwhile, the body of another young man, who had been kidnapped from al-Mazra’a Village in the Homs countryside four days earlier, was discovered with gunshot wounds.[88]
On 14 January 2025, SOHR asserted that Alawite civilians of Tasnin Village in Homs countryside were assaulted by gunmen who presented themselves as members of the Military Operations Command. According to SOHR, an arrest campaign was launched in the village, which lasted from the early hours of morning to the afternoon of 16 January, during which suspects showed resistance. Moreover, the attackers set fire to seven houses and killed six civilians from the village. Residents and elders of Tasnin Village and other neighbouring villages attempted to communicate with security and political officials and police command in Homs, but received no responses regarding the violations.[89]
On 16 January 2025, SOHR reported that a young man was killed in indiscriminate gunfire in Jableh in Latakia countryside, while he was celebrating his release from the grip of a group of gunmen.[90] Additionally, two civilians from Al-Majdal village in Mahradah area in the north-western countryside of Hama were kidnapped and shot dead by unidentified gunmen.[91] On 21 January, SOHR asserted that four civilians were killed by local gunmen in a town in the north-western countryside of Homs, during a security operation initiated by the Syrian transitional government. Residents of the town confirmed that troops of the transitional government treated them fairly and were not involved in the killing.[92]
On 23 January 2025, SOHR reported that a large-scale security campaign was launched by the Military Operations Command with the participation of local gunmen in the villages of al-Ghozaylah, al-Gharbiyah and al-Hamam in the western countryside of Homs, during which four civilians were extrajudicially executed, ten civilians were injured, and five others were arrested. Several additional assaults and abuses against civilians, such as forcing them to bray and bark, as well as the destruction of tombstones were also documented.[93][94]
On 30 January 2025, SOHR reported that 10 civilians were executed by unknown gunmen in Arzah village in the north-western countryside of Homs. The gunmen knocked on the doors of several houses in the village and opened fire on civilians, using guns with silencers, and then fled.[95]
On 16 February 2025, an Alawite civilian was kidnapped in the Al-Bayadah neighborhood of Homs according to SOHR. His body was found 48 hours later at Karam Al-Louz hospital in Homs.[16]
On 18 February 2025, SOHR reported the death of a Shia civilian who had previously been arrested by the General Security Service during a security campaign in the town of Ghawr Gharbiyah in the north-western countryside of Homs and jailed, whose body arrived to Homs Hospital showing signs of torture.[96]
References
1 2 "Iran update". Institute for the Study of War. 14 February 2025.
1 2 "Iran update". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 1 January 2025.
↑ "Alawites live in fear as Syrian rebels hunt members of Assad's regime". Washington Post. 1 January 2025. But there have been surging calls for retribution against figures from the old regime, as former rebels and other Syrians return to their homes with relief and resentment — to cities and towns that became sites of trauma, filled with wretched memories for those exiled during the war, as well as for those who stayed.
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Syrian transitional government 
Saraya Ansar al Sunnah [1] 
Suhayl al-Hasan [ citation needed ]
