On 15 May 1941, the Air Corps Specialized Flying School at Eglin Field was replaced by the Air Corps Proving Ground.[3] It was redesignated Proving Ground Command on 1 April 1942,[4]:15 and disbanded on 1 June 1945. In 1946, the Army Air Forces Center moved to Eglin, where it took its place, becoming the Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command.[5]
On 27 October 1942 the United States Army Air Forces established the Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics at Orlando Army Air Base, Florida. The next year, it was redesignated as the Army Air Forces Tactical Center, on 16 October 1943. On 1 June 1945, it was redesignated the Army Air Forces Center and added the testing functions of the AAF Proving Ground Command as it took control of Eglin.[6]
The Air Force Center was the planned USAF unit for the development of tactical policy and procedures. The Air Force Center was to be the succeeding unit to the Army Air Forces Center,[4]:335.[4] Instead, the center became the Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command on 8 March 1946 and moved to Eglin.[5] The command was redesignated the Air Proving Ground Command on 10 July 1946.
The command conducted realistic testing of new weapons as an independent organization, reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and advocating a "fly-before-buy" approach to acquiring new systems. Such a shift, however, remained a challenge, for the Air Force continued the "buy-fly-fix" process that had grown from the demands of the Second World War and undervalued the importance of timely independent operational test and evaluation.
It attempted to simulate combat conditions during its tests. It also grew in size as it acquired the systems it tested. By 1956, Air Force regulations outlined an eight-phase test and evaluation process that did not include the comand until phase seven. By that point in the acquisition cycle, the Air Force had often already fielded units with new systems that APGC had not yet tested. Not surprisingly, operators often experienced serious problems with these new, untested systems. This led to a misperception about the value of operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and the command. Had OT&E taken place before production decisions and fielding new systems, there likely would not have been any question about the added value of independent OT&E.
As a result of the doubts about the value of the command and cuts to the defense budget, in 1957 the Air Force stripped it of its major command status, reduced its budget and authorized personnel, and redesignated the Command the Air Proving Ground Center, and assigned it to the Air Research and Development Command. This action meant the Air Force no longer had an independent organization that specialized in impartial operational test and evaluation.
Decentralized operational testing at the major commands occurred from 1958 to 1973. Major command emphasis was often on quick deployment rather than thorough testing and impartial evaluations. Although the Air Force streamlined OT&E from eight to three phases during this period, OT&E still came at the end of the acquisition process. In addition, as systems became more complex, and the Air Force moved to acquire systems quickly, the "fly-before-buy" approach fell by the wayside. The consequences became clear when a Department of Defense study found that 21 of 22 major weapons systems used in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1970 suffered severe operational deficiencies. These results strongly stated the case for independent OT&E in the Air Force.
The Air Armament Center was a focal point for the acquisition of advanced weapons systems. The center carried out scientific research, system management, production, operational performance, business management, requirements definition, customer and engineering support, technology planning, materiel identification, and field support activities.
While "fly-before-buy" has repeatedly proven its worth in thorough testing of systems and avoidance of later problems, the Air Force even in the twenty-first century remains severely hampered by a "buy-fly-fix" approach. Literally billions of dollars have been spent in making weapons systems operational after they have entered squadron service. For example, the Rockwell B-1B Lancer suffered repeated such problems. When declared operational, apart from nuclear weapons, the only conventional weapon the B-1 could use were free-fall bombs.
To accomplish its mission the Air Armament Center commanded three wings through 2010.
The 46th Test Wing conducted test and evaluation of all air-delivered weapons, navigation and guidance systems, command and control systems, and Air Force Special Operations Command systems. The 46th Test Wing was inactivated 18 July 2012. Effectively merged to become 96th Test Wing.
The 96th Air Base Wing provided installation support for all Eglin Air Force Base tenant units. The 96th Air Base Wing was redesignated 18 July 2012. Effectively merged to become 96th Test Wing.
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