Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assoc. | |
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Argued January 10, 2007 Decided June 14, 2007 | |
Full case name | Gary Davenport, et al., Appellant v. Washington Education Association |
Docket no. | 05-1589 |
Citations | 551 U.S. 177 ( more ) 127 S. Ct. 2372; 168 L. Ed. 2d 71; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 7722 |
Case history | |
Prior | Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington |
Holding | |
It does not violate the First Amendment for a State to require that its public-sector unions receive affirmative authorization from a nonmember before spending that nonmember's agency fees for election-related purposes. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Scalia, joined by unanimous (Parts I and II–A and the second paragraph of footnote 2); Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg (remainder) |
Concurrence | Breyer (in part), joined by Roberts, Alito |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. I; Washington Fair Campaign Practices Act § 760; National Labor Relations Act |
Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 (2007), is a ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that it does not violate the First Amendment for a state to require its public-sector unions to receive affirmative authorization from a non-member before spending that nonmember's agency fees for election-related purposes.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, allows unions to require that non-union members pay agency fees to cover collective bargaining costs and prevent free rider problems. The Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that requiring non-members to pay agency fees is both constitutional and legal, provided a number of conditions are met. In Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). [1] [2] the Court held that the agency shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act were constitutional, [1] [3] but withheld judgment as to "the validity or enforceability of a union or closed shop agreement if other conditions of union membership are imposed or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First or the Fifth Amendment." [3] [4] Five years later, in Machinists v. Street , 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the Court held that the Railway Labor Act "denies the authority to a union, over the employee's objection, to spend his money for political causes which he opposes." [5]
The high court also confronted the issue of remedy (how can non-members challenge the calculation of agency fees) in Machinists v. Street, and outlined several options which unions and employers might adopt (as well as rejecting remedies which the district court in the case had chosen). [1] [6] Making its first private sector ruling in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the Court held that agency fees equal to dues are not prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act. [7] [8] Nonetheless, in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963), the Court questioned whether an agency fee set at a level equal to member dues was unfair because it set collective bargaining fees higher for non-members than for members. [9] After reargument, however, the Court in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963), did not reach the issue again and instead decided the case on narrow procedural grounds (concluding that Florida's right-to-work law outlawed the union shop provision at issue). [10] [11] The Court further elaborated on the issue of remedies in Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963), allowing agency fee payers to opt out of all political expenditures rather than enunciate specific examples, but refusing to allow non-members to act as a class. [1] [12]
The Supreme Court extended its constitutional and equity analysis to public employees in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education , 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (since overturned in 2018, see Janus v. AFSCME ), holding that, where public employee collective bargaining exists and agency fee clauses are clearly authorized by law, public employee agency fee mechanisms also are constitutional. [1] [3] [13] [14] In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984), the Supreme Court concluded that the agency fee may only cover those activities directly related to the union's role as a collective bargaining representative. These included national conventions (where dues levels were set and union programs debated and established), social activities (which enhanced union solidarity, especially during negotiations), grievance handling, contract negotiation costs, and union communications, but excluded union organizing activities. [1] [11] [15] [16] [17] The Court in Ellis also wrestled with the issue of rebates, and concluded that a union could not simply rebate agency fees to workers for that would essentially constitute a forced, interest-free loan from the worker to the union. [11] [16]
In 1985, the Court held in Pattern Makers v. NLRB , 473 U.S. 95, that a union member may resign at any time without notice. [18] Pattern Makers further undermined the union shop by giving workers the right to resign from the union at any time and incur no penalty (such as termination). The Court also crafted additional rules regarding agency fees in Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). In Teachers, the union had failed to minimize the risk that agency fees might be used for impermissible purposes and had failed to provide agency fee payers with adequate information about how the agency fee was calculated. [11] [16] [19] Now the Supreme Court imposed a third requirement, that agency fee payers must be offered a timely, fair, and objective mechanism for challenging the computation of agency fees. [11] [16] [19] The Court did uphold, however, the use of interest-bearing escrow accounts for holding disputed dues. [20]
In 1992, voters in the state of Washington approved a ballot initiative that requires unions to receive permission from non-union members to use their fees to support political campaigns. [21] This included getting each person's approval even for soft money expenditures, an issue not previously covered in Supreme Court rulings. [21] Gary Davenport, a non-union member and state worker, and other state employees sued, contending that the union failed to secure their approval before spending their agency fees on political efforts.
A lawsuit was filed against the Washington Education Association by Washington Attorney General Christine Gregoire. The Thurston County, Washington Superior Court ruled that the union had to pay $590,375 in fines for intentionally violating the Washington statute. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled 2-1 that section 760 of the Washington Fair Campaign Practices Act had violated the First Amendment of the Constitution by placing the speech of union members as more valuable than teachers. However, the case was then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the union stating that the law was unconstitutional because it placed too large of an administrative burden on the union. Therefore, non-union members could not prevent the union from using their money for political campaign purposes.
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Oral argument was held on January 10, 2007, and the Court reached a decision on June 14, 2007. [22]
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the decision for a unanimous Court, and overturned the previous Washington Supreme Court's ruling. Justice Scalia outlined two reasons why the Court believed that the Washington statute was constitutional:
- Using the Court precedents established by Abood and Teachers, the Court argues that the Washington Supreme Court misinterpreted the Supreme Court's reasoning in those previous rulings. The Washington Supreme Court argued that the clause "dissent is not to be presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee." in Hudson demonstrates First Amendment partiality to one group (the petitioners) and marginalizes the unions understood freedom of expression. Justice Scalia argues that the Court misinterpreted the ruling, and in fact, voters can limit the entitlement that unions have to collect and use non-members funds.
- The Washington statute was not unconstitutional because of the distinction between public and private sector unions. The unions violated the extent of the non-members free speech because they were using tax-payers dollars to fund political election campaigns. This limitation of the union's free speech protection is not content based, argues Justice Scalia. The voters of Washington passed a law that prevents the government from "acting in a capacity other than as regulator." Therefore, it does not threaten the "marketplace of ideas" that the First Amendment seeks to protect.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer agreed with all aspects of Justice Scalia's opinion except for the respondent's arguments that had not been raised in lower courts. This criticism is one of procedure and not content. Justice Breyer believed that the lower courts should have addressed these arguments before they were heard by the Supreme Court.
The Davenport ruling was moot the moment it was issued, for the Washington state legislature had, before the ruling was handed down, changed the law to make it far easier for unions to comply with its provisions. [23]
Nonetheless, legal scholars have been highly critical of the Supreme Court's ruling in Davenport. As one legal scholar (who is highly critical of the agency fee), has said, "Correctly understood, this decision promises little and delivers even less because it fails to deal decisively and comprehensively with the issues that both earlier private sector and public sector union dues disputes illuminated but failed to settle." [24] Other legal scholars have criticized Justice Scalia's judicial reasoning in Davenport, concluding that he should have ruled solely on First Amendment grounds and overturned the agency fee law entirely. [23] [25]
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is an independent agency of the federal government of the United States that enforces U.S. labor law in relation to collective bargaining and unfair labor practices. Under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the NLRB has the authority to supervise elections for labor union representation and to investigate and remedy unfair labor practices. Unfair labor practices may involve union-related situations or instances of protected concerted activity.
In the context of labor law in the United States, the term right-to-work laws refers to state laws that prohibit union security agreements between employers and labor unions which require employees who are not union members to contribute to the costs of union representation. Unlike the right to work definition as a human right in international law, U.S. right-to-work laws do not aim to provide a general guarantee of employment to people seeking work but rather guarantee an employee's right to refrain from paying or being a member of a labor union.
In labor law, a union shop, also known as a post-entry closed shop, is a form of a union security clause. Under this, the employer agrees to either only hire labor union members or to require that any new employees who are not already union members become members within a certain amount of time. Use of the union shop varies widely from nation to nation, depending on the level of protection given trade unions in general.
A union security agreement is a contractual agreement, usually part of a union collective bargaining agreement, in which an employer and a trade or labor union agree on the extent to which the union may compel employees to join the union, and/or whether the employer will collect dues, fees, and assessments on behalf of the union.
United States labor law sets the rights and duties for employees, labor unions, and employers in the US. Labor law's basic aim is to remedy the "inequality of bargaining power" between employees and employers, especially employers "organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association". Over the 20th century, federal law created minimum social and economic rights, and encouraged state laws to go beyond the minimum to favor employees. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 requires a federal minimum wage, currently $7.25 but higher in 29 states and D.C., and discourages working weeks over 40 hours through time-and-a-half overtime pay. There are no federal laws, and few state laws, requiring paid holidays or paid family leave. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 creates a limited right to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in larger employers. There is no automatic right to an occupational pension beyond federally guaranteed Social Security, but the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 requires standards of prudent management and good governance if employers agree to provide pensions, health plans or other benefits. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 requires employees have a safe system of work.
The duty of fair representation is incumbent upon Canadian and U.S. labor unions that are the exclusive bargaining representative of workers in a particular group. It is the obligation to represent all employees fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination.
Financial Core refers to a legal carve-out that permits workers opposed to participating in a labor union to be employed under the benefits of a union's contracts without compelling them to be a member of that union.
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), deals with First Amendment rights and unions in public employment.
The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, established in 1968, is a nonprofit organization that seeks to advance right-to-work laws in the United States.
The National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE) is an American labor union which represents about 100,000 public employees in the federal government.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), is a United States labor law case of the Supreme Court of the United States which held that workers who strike remain employees for the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Court granted the relief sought by the National Labor Relations Board, which sought to have the workers reinstated by the employer. However, the decision is much better known today for its obiter dicta in which the Court said that an employer may hire strikebreakers and is not bound to discharge any of them if or when the strike ends.
Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009), is a court case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Constitution permits the local chapter of a labor union to charge a "service fee" to non-members to cover non-local litigation expenses if (a) the expenses are "appropriately related to collective bargaining" and (b) there is a reciprocal relationship between the local chapter and the national union. The case expanded on and clarified the earlier Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, which permitted such service fees for non-political activities but did not reach a consensus on whether "national" expenses were chargeable.
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that, in a union security agreement, unions are authorized by statute to collect from non-members only those fees and dues necessary to perform its duties as a collective bargaining representative. The rights identified by the Court in Communications Workers of America v. Beck have since come to be known as "Beck rights," and defining what Beck rights are and how a union must fulfill its duties regarding them is an active area of modern United States labor law.
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939), is a US labor law case where the US Supreme Court held 5-to-2 that the National Labor Relations Act required decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to be based on substantial evidence. The Supreme Court overturned a ruling of the Board for not being based on substantial evidence. The Court also held that only the representative of the workers could issue collective bargaining proposals under the law, and that proposals transmitted by a third party did not trigger the Act's protections or duties.
John Cushman Truesdale Jr. was an American lawyer and civil servant who served two terms as executive secretary of the National Labor Relations Board, four terms as a board member, and one term as board chair.
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), was a US labor law case where the United States Supreme Court upheld the maintaining of a union shop in a public workplace. Public school teachers in Detroit had sought to overturn the requirement that they pay fees equivalent to union dues on the grounds that they opposed public sector collective bargaining and objected to the political activities of the union. In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed that the union shop, legal in the private sector, is also legal in the public sector. They found that non-members may be assessed agency fees to recover the costs of "collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment purposes" while insisting that objectors to union membership or policy may not have their dues used for other ideological or political purposes.
Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), is a US labor law case of the United States Supreme Court regarding provisions of Illinois state law that allowed a union security agreement. Since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibited the closed shop, states could still choose whether to allow unions to collect fees from non-union members since the collective agreements with the employer would still benefit non-union members. The Court decided 5–4 that Illinois's Public Labor Relations Act, which permitted the union security agreements, violated the First Amendment. A similar case was decided by the Court in 2018, Janus v AFSCME, overturning the Court's unanimous decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) which the appeals court had upheld in Harris.
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, 567 U.S. 298 (2012), is a United States constitutional law case. The United States Supreme Court held in a 7–2 decision that Dianne Knox and other non-members of the Service Employees International Union did not receive the required notice of a $12 million assessment the union charged them to raise money for the union's political fund. In a tighter 5–4 ruling, the court further held that the long-standing precedent, the First Amendment requirement that non-union members covered by union contracts be given the chance to "opt out" of special fees was insufficient. Setting new precedent, the majority ruled that non-members shall be sent notice giving them the option to opt into special fees.
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), is a United States labor law case that came before the Supreme Court of the United States. At issue in the case was whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) should be overruled, with public-sector "agency shop" arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment, and whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions, rather than requiring employees to consent affirmatively to subsidizing such speech. Specifically, the case concerned public sector collective bargaining by the California Teachers Association, an affiliate of the National Education Association.
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, No. 16-1466, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), abbreviated Janus v. AFSCME, is a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on US labor law, concerning the power of labor unions to collect fees from non-union members. Under the Taft–Hartley Act of 1947, which applies to the private sector, union security agreements can be allowed by state law. The Supreme Court ruled that such union fees in the public sector violate the First Amendment right to free speech, overruling the 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education that had previously allowed such fees.