In United States patent law, the flash of genius doctrine was a test for patentability used by the United States Federal Courts for just over a decade, beginning circa 1940.
In United States patent law, the flash of genius doctrine was a test for patentability used by the United States Federal Courts for just over a decade, beginning circa 1940.
The doctrine was formalized by the Supreme Court's opinion in Cuno Engineering v. Automatic Devices (1941), [1] which held that the inventive act had to come into the mind of an inventor in a "flash of genius" and not as a result of tinkering: "The new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the public domain." [2]
The test was eventually rejected by Congress in its 1952 revision of the patent statute, now codified in Title 35 of the United States Code. Section 103 was amended to state the new standard of non-obviousness: "Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made."
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged this new language in its landmark opinion on obviousness, Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966), [3] noting that the language in Cuno establishing the doctrine had never been intended to create a new standard in the first instance. [4]
A person having ordinary skill in the art, a person of (ordinary) skill in the art, a person skilled in the art, a skilled addressee or simply a skilled person is a legal fiction found in many patent laws throughout the world. This hypothetical person is considered to have the normal skills and knowledge in a particular technical field, without being a genius. This measure mainly serves as a reference for determining, or at least evaluating, whether an invention is non-obvious or not, or involves an inventive step or not. If it would have been obvious for this fictional person to come up with the invention while starting from the prior art, then the particular invention is considered not patentable.
The software patent debate is the argument about the extent to which, as a matter of public policy, it should be possible to patent software and computer-implemented inventions. Policy debate on software patents has been active for years. The opponents to software patents have gained more visibility with fewer resources through the years than their pro-patent opponents. Arguments and critiques have been focused mostly on the economic consequences of software patents.
Neither software nor computer programs are explicitly mentioned in statutory United States patent law. Patent law has changed to address new technologies, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) beginning in the latter part of the 20th century have sought to clarify the boundary between patent-eligible and patent-ineligible subject matter for a number of new technologies including computers and software. The first computer software case in the Supreme Court was Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972. Since then, the Supreme Court has decided about a half dozen cases touching on the patent eligibility of software-related inventions.
The doctrine of equivalents is a legal rule in many of the world's patent systems that allows a court to hold a party liable for patent infringement if the infringing device or process does not fall within the literal scope of a patent claim but is nevertheless equivalent to the claimed invention. In the United States, Judge Learned Hand has described its purpose as being "to temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention."
The inventive step and non-obviousness reflect a general patentability requirement present in most patent laws, according to which an invention should be sufficiently inventive—i.e., non-obvious—in order to be patented. In other words, "[the] nonobviousness principle asks whether the invention is an adequate distance beyond or above the state of the art".
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950), was an important United States Supreme Court decision in the area of patent law, establishing the propriety of the doctrine of equivalents, and explaining how and when it was to be used.
The United States is considered to have the most favorable legal regime for inventors and patent owners in the world. Under United States law, a patent is a right granted to the inventor of a (1) process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, (2) that is new, useful, and non-obvious. A patent is the right to exclude others, for a limited time from profiting from a patented technology without the consent of the patent holder. Specifically, it is the right to exclude others from: making, using, selling, offering for sale, importing, inducing others to infringe, applying for an FDA approval, and/or offering a product specially adapted for practice of the patent.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), was a 1978 United States Supreme Court decision that ruled that an invention that departs from the prior art only in its use of a mathematical algorithm is patent eligible only if there is some other "inventive concept in its application." The algorithm itself must be considered as if it were part of the prior art, and the claim must be considered as a whole. The exact quotation from the majority opinion is: "Respondent’s process is unpatentable under §101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention." "The fact that the algorithm may not have actually been known previously and that, when taken in combination with other claim elements, it might produce an invention that is novel and nonobvious, plays no part in the analysis."
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified the nonobviousness requirement in United States patent law, set forth 14 years earlier in Patent Act of 1952 and codified as 35 U.S.C. § 103.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the issue of obviousness as applied to patent claims.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851), was a United States Supreme Court decision credited with introducing into United States patent law the concept of non-obviousness as a patentability requirement, as well as stating the applicable legal standard for determining its presence or absence in a claimed invention.
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court reaffirmed the validity of the patent exhaustion doctrine. The decision made uncertain the continuing precedential value of a line of decisions in the Federal Circuit that had sought to limit Supreme Court exhaustion doctrine decisions to their facts and to require a so-called "rule of reason" analysis of all post-sale restrictions other than tie-ins and price fixes. In the course of restating the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court held that it is triggered by, among other things, an authorized sale of a component when the only reasonable and intended use of the component is to engage the patent and the component substantially embodies the patented invention by embodying its essential features. The Court also overturned, in passing, that the exhaustion doctrine was limited to product claims and did not apply to method claims.
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), is a 1969 decision of the United States Supreme Court on the legal standard governing the obviousness of claimed inventions. It stands for the proposition that, when old elements are combined in a way such that they do not interact in a novel, unobvious way, then the resulting combination is obvious and therefore unpatentable.
The exhausted combination doctrine, also referred to as the doctrine of theLincoln Engineeringcase, was the doctrine of U.S. patent law that when an inventor invents a new, unobvious device and seeks to patent not merely the new device but also the combination of the new device with a known, conventional device with which the new device cooperates in the conventional and predictable way in which devices of those types have previously cooperated, the combination is unpatentable as an "exhausted combination" or "old combination". The doctrine is also termed the doctrine of the Lincoln Engineering case because the United States Supreme Court explained the doctrine in its decision in Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp. This doctrine has been considered abrogated by the US Congress in 1952, when it passed the 1952 Patent Act.
In United States patent law, the machine-or-transformation test is a test of patent eligibility under which a claim to a process qualifies for consideration if (1) the process is implemented by a particular machine in a non-conventional and non-trivial manner or (2) the process transforms an article from one state to another.
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), is a United States Supreme Court decision in the area of patent law. This case was later cited in KSR v. Teleflex as an example of a case satisfying the requirement for non-obviousness of a combination of known elements. It also features one of the great stories of patent litigation lore, with Adams's attorney utilizing an innovative and unique method of non-oral advocacy at oral argument in front of the Supreme Court.
For a patent to be valid in Canada, the invention claimed therein needs to be new and inventive. In patent law, these requirements are known as novelty and non-obviousness. A patent cannot in theory be granted for an invention without meeting these basic requirements or at least, if a patent which does not meet these requirements is granted, it cannot later be maintained. These requirements are borne out of a combination of statute and case law.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), was a 2014 United States Supreme Court decision about patent eligibility of business method patents. The issue in the case was whether certain patent claims for a computer-implemented, electronic escrow service covered abstract ideas, which would make the claims ineligible for patent protection. The patents were held to be invalid, because the claims were drawn to an abstract idea, and implementing those claims on a computer was not enough to transform that abstract idea into patentable subject matter.
In US patent law, non-obviousness is one of the requirements that an invention must meet to qualify for patentability, codified as a part of Patent Act of 1952 as 35 U.S.C. §103. An invention is not obvious if a "person having ordinary skill in the art" (PHOSITA) would not know how to solve the problem at which the invention is directed by using exactly the same mechanism. Since the PHOSITA standard turned to be too ambiguous in practice, the U.S. Supreme Court provided later two more useful approaches which currently control the practical analysis of non-obviousness by patent examiners and courts: Graham et al. v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City et al., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) gives guidelines of what is "non-obvious", and KSR v. Teleflex (2006) gives guidelines of what is "obvious".
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