Lamparello v. Falwell | |
---|---|
Court | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit |
Full case name | Christopher Lamparello v. Jerry Falwell; Jerry Falwell Ministries |
Argued | 2005-05-26 2005 |
Decided | 2005-08-24 2005 |
Citation(s) | 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), Nos. 04-2122, 04-2011 |
Case history | |
Prior history | Claude M. Hilton ruled for plaintiff Falwell in 360 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. VA. 2004) |
Holding | |
The 4th Circuit holds that Lamparello's gripe site does not infringe on Falwell's trademarks. | |
Court membership | |
Judge(s) sitting | Diana Gribbon Motz, M. Blane Michael, Robert Bruce King |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Diana Gribbon Motz, joined by M. Blane Michael, Robert Bruce King |
Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir., 2005), was a legal case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concerning allegations of cybersquatting and trademark infringement. The dispute centered on the right to use the domain name fallwell.com, and provides discussion on cybersquatting as it applies to criticism of a trademark.
In 1999, Christopher Lamparello created a website to respond to and criticize the anti-homosexual statements by the American Christian evangelical preacher Jerry Falwell. Lamparello's website was located at fallwell.com (note the misspelling). Believing that there was confusing similarity between the domain name and Falwell's own name, domain name, and other trademarks, Falwell and his ministries attempted to legally block Lamparello from using the mark "fallwell" and transfer the ownership of the domain name to Falwell.
The initial decisions (ruled by the National Arbitration Forum in 2003 and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in 2004) decided in favor of Falwell, granting Falwell's claims of federal trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and cybersquatting.
On appeal in 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the earlier decisions, ruling that there was not a "likelihood of confusion" between Lamparello's and Falwell's official site; that there was no trademark infringement based on "initial interest confusion" for sites that were non-commercial and critical of the trademark holder; and since Lamparello's site was non-commercial, there was no "bad faith intent to profit" and it was not cybersquatting.
In 1999, Christopher Lamparello registered the domain name fallwell.com and used the affiliated website as a gripe site to express his negative opinions about the Fundamentalist Christian preacher Jerry Falwell's public statements against homosexuality.
Lamparello's site was plainly critical of Falwell and had very little viewership. [1] The website offered no goods or services for sale, though the website contained a link to a separate Amazon.com webpage selling a book supporting his views, but Lamparello did not stand to financially gain from the sales of the book. Lamparello's website also contained prominent statements declaring that it was not affiliated with Falwell and his ministry, and provided a hyperlink to redirect viewers to Falwell's official website. [1] Lamparello claimed that the domain name was chosen as a parody of Falwell's name, combining "fall" and "well". [2]
Falwell had a registered trademark in the name "Listen America with Jerry Falwell". At the time, Falwell did not have any registered trademarks in the names "Falwell" or "Fallwell", but was in the process of registering the name "Jerry Falwell". Falwell had an official website at the domain name falwell.com, where he also sold goods. [1]
Believing in a confusing similarity between the two domain names, Falwell sent Lamparello letters in 2001 and 2003 demanding that Lamparello cease and desist from using fallwell.com or any variation of Falwell's name as a domain name. Lamparello did not comply.
In October 2003, Falwell submitted a complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), requesting that the domain name be transferred from Lamparello to Falwell.
Under the UDRP, the complainant must show that the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to their trademark, that the registrant has no legitimate interest in the domain name, and that the domain name is being used in bad faith.
The NAF panel decided 2-1 on November 20, 2003 to transfer the domain name to Falwell's ministries, Liberty Alliance.
The dissenting panelist, David E. Sorkin, [3] argued that the domain name was not used in bad faith, and that this dispute was not one to be resolved under the UDRP or by the NAF. [1]
A contemporaneous case was one concerning Gary Cohn and the domain names jerryfalwell.com and jerryfallwell.com. Falwell sued Cohn for "reverse domain name hijacking", but the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, Switzerland did not accept the case since Falwell did not have a trademark on his own name. [4] After Falwell threatened to sue in Virginia, U.S. in 2003, Cohn surrendered both domain names. [5] [6]
Following the NAF decision, Lamparello filed an action against Falwell in federal district court, seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement. [7] Lamparello was supported by the Public Citizen Litigation Group. [2] The ACLU also provided an amicus brief, arguing that the domain name in question was protected by the First Amendment. [8]
Falwell filed a counterclaim, alleging trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000), false designation origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1126 and the common law of the state of Virginia, and cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
The District Court granted summary judgment for Falwell, blocking Lamparello from using the domain name and ordered the transfer of the website to Falwell. The court denied Falwell's request for statutory damages and attorney fees.
Lamparello appealed the District Court's order and Falwell cross-appealed the denial of statutory damages and attorney fees.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that Lamparello could continue maintaining the gripe website at fallwell.com. The court reasoned as follows:
After even a quick glance at the content of the website at www.fallwell.com, no one seeking Reverend Falwell’s guidance would be misled by the domain name — www.fallwell.com — into believing Reverend Falwell authorized the content of that website. No one would believe that Reverend Falwell sponsored a site criticizing himself, his positions, and his interpretations of the Bible. [9]
On April 17, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from Falwell regarding the 4th Circuit opinion, giving no reasons for declining. [10] [11]
As of August 2018, the website is no longer functioning. The last archival snapshot of the site was taken in February 2012, implying that it went down later that year. [12]
In contrast to the Court of Appeals' 2001 opinion in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, [13] where the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment against the defendant, this case supported the defendant, ruling against one gripe site and for the other. In PETA, the parody website's content was not conveyed simultaneously with the message that the site was peta.org. In short, the Fourth Circuit backtracked on its decision in PETA, justifying the different opinions as a distinction between parody and consumer confusion. [14] Additionally, in both PETA and Lamparello, the website in question had links to items for sale. The distinction between the two cases may have been that in PETA, the defendant registered numerous other websites for cybersquatting purposes. [15] The utilization of the bad-faith factors of the ACPA has been criticized by some scholars for leading to counterintuitive results when applied to cases that are not clear-cut cybersquatting. [15]
Perhaps the Court of Appeals has created a lesson here for counsel representing parties who might assert cyber squatting claims. Before filing suit, initiate bad faith settlement negotiations, for the purpose of obtaining a statement from the cyber squatter that he might be willing to settle. Then, file suit under the ACPA, asserting that your opponent's willingness to engage in your bad faith settlement negotiations demonstrates a bad faith intent to profit on his part. [16]
This opinion is important when considering typosquatting and gripe sites as it upheld Fifth and Sixth Circuit decisions that "the use of a mark in a domain name for a gripe site criticizing the markholder does not constitute cybersquatting." [9] This opinion contained direct analysis of application of the Initial Interest Confusion doctrine, but leaves questions regarding the IIC unanswered. [17]
Reverse domain name hijacking, occurs where a rightful trademark owner attempts to secure a domain name by making cybersquatting claims against a domain name’s "cybersquatter" owner. This often intimidates domain name owners into transferring ownership of their domain names to trademark owners to avoid legal action, particularly when the domain names belong to smaller organizations or individuals. Reverse domain name hijacking is most commonly enacted by larger corporations and famous individuals, in defense of their rightful trademark or to prevent libel or slander.
Trademark dilution is a trademark law concept giving the owner of a famous trademark standing to forbid others from using that mark in a way that would lessen its uniqueness. In most cases, trademark dilution involves an unauthorized use of another's trademark on products that do not compete with, and have little connection with, those of the trademark owner. For example, a famous trademark used by one company to refer to hair care products might be diluted if another company began using a similar mark to refer to breakfast cereals or spark plugs.
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d),(passed as part of Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law 106–113 ) is a U.S. law enacted in 1999 that established a cause of action for registering, trafficking in, or using a domain name confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, a trademark or personal name. The law was designed to thwart "cybersquatters" who register Internet domain names containing trademarks with no intention of creating a legitimate web site, but instead plan to sell the domain name to the trademark owner or a third party. Critics of the ACPA complain about the non-global scope of the Act and its potential to restrict free speech, while others dispute these complaints. Before the ACPA was enacted, trademark owners relied heavily on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) to sue domain name registrants. The FTDA was enacted in 1995 in part with the intent to curb domain name abuses. The legislative history of the FTDA specifically mentions that trademark dilution in domain names was a matter of Congressional concern motivating the Act. Senator Leahy stated that "it is my hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others".
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, was a ruling at the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The ruling was an important early precedent on the nominative use of trademarked terms for self-identification on the World Wide Web.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, was an Internet domain trademark infringement decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The ruling became an early precedent on the nature of domain names as both trademarked intellectual property and free speech.
Jacobsen v. Katzer was a lawsuit between Robert Jacobsen (plaintiff) and Matthew Katzer (defendant), filed March 13, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The case addressed claims on copyright, patent invalidity, cybersquatting, and Digital Millennium Copyright Act issues arising from Jacobsen under an open source license developing control software for model trains.
A trademark is a type of intellectual property consisting of a recognizable sign, design, or expression that identifies a product or service from a particular source and distinguishes it from others. A trademark owner can be an individual, business organization, or any legal entity. A trademark may be located on a package, a label, a voucher, or on the product itself. Trademarks used to identify services are sometimes called service marks.
Typosquatting, also called URL hijacking, a sting site, a cousin domain, or a fake URL, is a form of cybersquatting, and possibly brandjacking which relies on mistakes such as typos made by Internet users when inputting a website address into a web browser. A user accidentally entering an incorrect website address may be led to any URL, including an alternative website owned by a cybersquatter.
Cybersquatting is the practice of registering, trafficking in, or using an Internet domain name, with a bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else.
Initial interest confusion is a legal doctrine under trademark law that permits a finding of infringement when there is temporary confusion that is dispelled before the purchase is made. Generally, trademark infringement is based on the likelihood of confusion for a consumer in the marketplace. This likelihood is typically determined using a multi-factor test that includes factors like the strength of the mark and evidence of any actual confusion. However, trademark infringement that relies on Initial interest confusion does not require a likelihood of confusion at the time of sale; the mark must only capture the consumer's initial attention.
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, was a court ruling at the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The ruling was an important early precedent on the trademark value of a domain name on the World Wide Web, and established the theory that hosting a site under a domain name that reflected the registered trademark of a different party constituted trademark infringement.
The case Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036, heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, established that trademark infringement could occur through the use of trademarked terms in the HTML metatags of web pages when initial interest confusion was likely to result.
Trademark infringement is a violation of the exclusive rights attached to a trademark without the authorization of the trademark owner or any licensees. Infringement may occur when one party, the "infringer", uses a trademark which is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark owned by another party, especially in relation to products or services which are identical or similar to the products or services which the registration covers. An owner of a trademark may commence civil legal proceedings against a party which infringes its registered trademark. In the United States, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 criminalized the intentional trade in counterfeit goods and services.
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 was a court case decided on March 8, 2011, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the use of a competitor's trademark as an Internet search advertising keyword did not constitute trademark infringement. In the case, Network Automation advertised their own competing product in search queries that contained Advanced Systems Concepts' "ActiveBatch" trademark. In determining whether trademark infringement occurred, the court evaluated factors relevant to the likelihood of customer confusion outlined in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats and concluded that confusion was unlikely.
Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer, No. 04-55962 is a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reversed and remanded the rulings of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, holding that defendant, Michael Kremer, could not be held liable for trademark infringement or dilution for his use of the Bosley Medical Group's name in creating a website that was critical of the company's business practices.
Microsoft Corp. v. Shah was an Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) case heard before the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Microsoft sued the defendants, Amish Shah and others, for, among other charges, contributory cybersquatting for encouraging others, through videos and software, to infringe on Microsoft's trademarks. The case was settled out of court in July 2011 after judge Ricardo S. Martinez denied Shah's motion for dismissal. Legal observers suggested that, if upheld, the case would prove notable for the court's expansion of the ACPA liability to include contributory cybersquatting.
Rosetta Stone v. Google, 676 F.3d 144 was a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that challenged the legality of Google's AdWords program. The Court overturned a grant of summary judgment for Google that had held Google AdWords was not a violation of trademark law.
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 was a United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case concerning trademark infringement under the Lanham Act due to the unauthorized use of a domain name and website. The appellate court held that Taubman's trademark infringement claim did not have a likelihood of success and that the use of the company's mark in the domain name was an exhibition of Free Speech.
Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F.Supp.2d 484 (2001), was a trademark law case of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, over the use of a registered trademark owned by an American company in the web address of a foreign company. The court ruled that a foreign firm's use of an American trademark in a web address could be a violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, but such a violation requires a show of bad faith.