Xi Jinping's cult of personality

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Portrait of Xi in Beijing, September 2015 Kang Zhan Sheng Li 70Zhou Nian Yue Bing Yan Lian .jpg
Portrait of Xi in Beijing, September 2015
"Grateful to the General Secretary, Endeavoring towards a New Era", a Big-character poster slogan in Chun'an 201812 Grateful to General Secretary, Endeavoring to a New Era Slogan in Chun'an.jpg
"Grateful to the General Secretary, Endeavoring towards a New Era", a Big-character poster slogan in Chun'an

A cult of personality has been developing around Xi Jinping since he became General Secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and the country's paramount leader in 2012. [1] [2] [3] [4]

Contents

Background

After Deng Xiaoping started the Chinese economic reforms and introduced the concept of collective leadership in the late 1970s, there was no longer a cult of personality around Chinese leaders. Deng and others wanted to prevent another leader from rising above the party as Mao Zedong had done. [5] When Xi came to power in 2012, he started centralizing power and paved the way for a cult of personality. [6]

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has denied that there was any cult of personality. Xie Chuntao, director of the government-funded Central Party School's academic department, claimed the “respect and love” ordinary Chinese felt for Xi was “natural” and “heartfelt” and bore no similarities to a cult of personality. He added that memories of the excesses of Mao's cult were strong enough that the CCP would not allow another leader to form a cult around himself. [5] [7]

Characteristics

Since Xi assumed power in 2012, books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines have honoured his rule. [8] In 2017, the local government of Jiangxi province told Christians to replace their pictures of Jesus with Xi Jinping. [9] [10] [11]

Writing in the Sydney Morning Herald , Philip Wen notes that “perhaps the most stunning characteristic shared with Mao has been a growing personality cult around Xi fanned by the central propaganda department, which has produced some jarring results: newspaper front-pages dominated by Xi's every move, saccharine music videos professing love and loyalty to the leader.” [12] In May 2016, just prior to the 50th anniversary celebration of Mao's Cultural Revolution, a “Mao-themed revival show” at the Great Hall of the People featuring revolutionary “red songs” was designed to generate nostalgia for the Mao era, with “giant images of Mao and Xi projected on stage.” [12]

In March 2017, Xi claimed that he carried bags of 110 kilograms of wheat over 3 miles of mountain road without changing shoulder, [13] a feat deemed extraordinary [14] and broadcast by China Central Television during what was described as an image-crafting campaign. [14]

When he was re-elected in 2017, Xi dominated the front page of the People's Daily [lower-alpha 1] compared to previous editions, which emphasized a “collective leadership” model. [15]

The political ideology bearing his name, Xi Jinping Thought, was enshrined into the CCP's constitution in the 19th National Congress in October 2017 [16] and into the state constitution in 2018. [17] China Central Television (CCTV) also showed members of the National People's Congress "crying in happiness" because of Xi Jinping's re-election as president in 2018. [18]

Since October 2017, many universities across China have placed Xi Jinping Thought at the core of their curricula, the first time since Mao Zedong that a Chinese leader has been accorded similar academic stature. [19] Fudan University revised their charter to remove "academic independence and freedom of thought" and include a "pledge to follow the Communist party's leadership", leading to protests among the students. [20] [21] It also said that Fudan University had to “equip its teachers and employees” with Xi Jinping Thought, leading to concerns about the diminishing academic freedom of Fudan. [22] [23]

Former inmates in the Xinjiang internment camps claimed that they were forced to give thanks to the leader by chanting "Long live Xi Jinping." [24]

In October 2018, Hunan TV started airing a game show about Xi Jinping and his ideology. [25] In January 2019, Alibaba released a mobile app for studying Xi Jinping Thought named Xuexi Qiangguo . (The name of the app is a pun on Xi Jinping's name. Xuéxí can mean "learning" or "learn from Xi.") [26] [27] As of October 2019, it had more than 100 million active users, [28] and is now claimed to be the most downloaded item on Apple's domestic App Store, surpassing social media apps such as WeChat and TikTok (also known as Douyin in Mandarin). [29] [30]

Apps such as Toutiao, Tencent, and Sina have been forced to use what has been described as "a super algorithm", where the story at the top "has to be about Xi". [31] [32]

A portrait of Xi Jinping, taken from Qingfeng Steamed Dumpling Shop, Tangshan branch. Xi Jinping Portrait (2).jpg
A portrait of Xi Jinping, taken from Qingfeng Steamed Dumpling Shop, Tangshan branch.

On 15 June 2020, Xi's birthday, Study Times  [ zh ], the media run by the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, labelled Xi Jinping Thought as "21st Century Marxism". [33]

In October 2017, the CCP Politburo named Xi Jinping lingxiu ( 领袖 ), a reverent term for "leader" and a title previously only given to Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and his immediate successor, Hua Guofeng. [34] [35] [36] He is also sometimes called the "Great Helmsman" (大舵手), [18] and in July 2018, Li Zhanshu, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, referred to Xi as the "eternal core" of the party. [37] On 25 December 2019, the politburo officially named Xi as "People's Leader" (人民领袖; rénmín lǐngxiù), a title only Mao held previously. [38]

In 2022, the 20th National Congress of the CCP added the "Two Establishes and Two Safeguards" into the Party's constitution, which established Xi as the "core" of the Central Committee and the CCP, and cemented his policies as guiding rules for the future of China. [39]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ The paper is an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

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References

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  5. 1 2 "China 'won't allow' a Mao-style cult of personality around Xi". South China Morning Post. 6 November 2017. Archived from the original on 18 August 2019. Retrieved 18 August 2019.
  6. ↑ Jiayang Fan; Taisu Zhang; Ying Zhu. "Behind the Personality Cult of Xi Jinping". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 26 July 2019. Retrieved 18 August 2019.
  7. ↑ "No cult of personality around Xi, says top China party academic". Reuters. 6 November 2017. Archived from the original on 18 August 2019. Retrieved 18 August 2019.
  8. ↑ Phillips, Tom (19 September 2015). "Xi Jinping: Does China truly love 'Big Daddy Xi' – or fear him?". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077. Archived from the original on 27 April 2019. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
  9. ↑ "Replace pictures of Jesus with Xi to escape poverty, Chinese villagers urged". South China Morning Post . 14 November 2017. Archived from the original on 17 July 2019. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
  10. ↑ Denyer, Simon (14 November 2017). "Jesus won't save you - President Xi Jinping will, Chinese Christians told". The Washington Post . Archived from the original on 31 May 2019. Retrieved 7 September 2019.
  11. ↑ Haas, Benjamin (28 September 2018). "'We are scared, but we have Jesus': China and its war on Christianity". The Guardian . ISSN   0261-3077. Archived from the original on 23 August 2019. Retrieved 7 September 2019.
  12. 1 2 Wen, Philip (13 May 2016). "China's Great Leap Backwards: Xi Jinping and the cult of Mao". The Sydney Morning Herald . Retrieved 4 May 2024.
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  14. 1 2 "Drawing the News: Xi's 100 Kilos of Grain [Updated]". China Digital Times (CDT). 21 March 2017. Archived from the original on 4 August 2022. Retrieved 6 August 2022.
  15. ↑ Hernández, Javier C.; Carlsen, Audrey (9 November 2017). "Why Xi Jinping's (Airbrushed) Face Is Plastered All Over China". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on 1 June 2020. Retrieved 3 June 2020.
  16. ↑ "Xi Jinping's political thought to be added to party charter". South China Morning Post. 18 September 2017. Archived from the original on 23 July 2019. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
  17. ↑ "China to enshrine Xi's thought into state constitution amid..." Reuters. 19 January 2018. Archived from the original on 26 July 2019. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
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  20. ↑ "Students protest at Shanghai's Fudan University". Asia Times . 19 December 2019. Retrieved 19 December 2019. A video circulating this week showed students at Shanghai's Fudan University singing the school song – which extols "academic independence and freedom of thought" – in an apparent protest.{...}Besides removing "freedom of thought", the ministry adds to the charter "arming the minds of teachers and students with Xi Jinping's new era of socialist ideology with Chinese characteristics". It also obliges faculty and students to adhere to "core socialist values" and build a "harmonious" campus environment – a code phrase for the elimination of anti-government sentiment.
  21. ↑ 復旦大學章程刪除思想自由 學生唱校歌抗議要求學術獨立[影]. Central News Agency (in Chinese (Taiwan)). 18 December 2019. Archived from the original on 18 December 2019. Retrieved 19 December 2019.
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  24. ↑ Goldfarb, Kara (18 May 2018). "China Has Been Forcing Muslims To Drink Alcohol And Eat Pork In "Reeducation Camps"". All That's Interesting. Archived from the original on 2 April 2019. Retrieved 1 August 2019.
  25. ↑ bureau, Beijing (4 October 2018). "China has made a game show about its president". Archived from the original on 26 July 2019. Retrieved 26 July 2019.{{cite news}}: |last= has generic name (help)
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  27. ↑ Field, Anna. "Chinese app on Xi's ideology allows data access to users' phones, report says". Washington Post. Archived from the original on 28 November 2020. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  28. ↑ "Chinese app on Xi's ideology allows data access to 100 million users' phones, report says". Washington Post. Archived from the original on 28 November 2020. Retrieved 13 October 2019.
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  32. ↑ Kuo, Mercy A. (7 December 2017). "China's Media Market Competition". thediplomat.com. Archived from the original on 4 December 2017. Retrieved 2 June 2020. The state also imposes what I call "a super algorithm" on these platforms – the story at the very top of every news website and news app has to be about Xi Jinping.
  33. ↑ 習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想是21世紀馬克思主義--理論-人民網. theory.people.com.cn. Archived from the original on 15 June 2020. Retrieved 30 June 2020.
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