Since 2008, China has maintained a standing People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) task force in the Gulf of Aden as an anti-piracy measure in response to piracy off the coast of Somalia. [1] The task force was initially authorized to escort only Chinese ships and ships carrying humanitarian supplies to Somalia; [2] this was later expanded to accept commercial ships from other countries. [3] Escorting Chinese ships in the Red Sea may have begun in January 2024 in response to the Red Sea crisis. [4]
The task force is China's first sustained "far seas" military presence. [5] It provides the PLAN with "invaluable" operational experience, [6] the benefits of which are spread by rotating units from all fleets into the task force. [7]
In the 2000s, China developed greater interest and capability to protect its global interests.
Chinese discussions through 2012 identified the strategic importance of securing maritime trade routes. [8] Shipping contributed to China's financial and energy security. [9] 90% of China's international trade in goods was moved by ship. [8] The country became a net importer of oil in 1993, [9] and of natural gas in 2007. [8] By 2012, 80% of imported oil arrived by sea. [9] Reliable routes affected oil prices, which affected the stability of the United States dollar, and which in turn affected the value of Chinese investments in the United States and US capacity to buy Chinese products. [10]
By 2009, views expressed by Chinese analysts included identifying piracy as a threat to national interests [11] and that the state had a responsibility to protect Chinese shipping. [8]
Global piracy increased every year from 2005 to 2010. [12] China's response to piracy was uncoordinated and informal. The Ministry of Transport (MoT) responded to pirated ships through intermediaries, but this was "not very effective". Anti-pirate tactics for civilian ships recommended by MoT were also inadequate. By 2008, there was domestic support for comprehensive protective measures. [13] By October, Chinese shipping companies, [2] MoT, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) supported deploying naval escorts. [14] That year from January to November, 83 of 1,265 Chinese ships were attacked with several being pirated. [13]
Intervention would require exercising force inside the exclusive economic zone of another country beyond China's periphery. This novel scenario for Chinese foreign policy and law, combined with internal debate over the legality of intervention in terms of domestic and international law, delayed action. [15] Three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in 2008 authorizing intervention in Somali waters may have provided China with part of the legal foundation to intervene. [16] Another part was securing an invitation from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) to avoid appearances of subverting sovereignty. [17]
International and domestic pressure led the PLAN, the MoT, and the MoFA to develop a policy framework for the mission with "unusual alacrity" in late-2008. [18]
The PLA began feasibility studies in May 2008; a task force may have been seen as an opportunity to test the navy's newest equipment. The PLAN publicly announced its support in November, and the Central Military Commission (CMC) approved the navy's plan shortly afterward. [18]
China "worked frantically" to secure an agreement from the Somali TFG. [18] In a late-November interview with the Global Times, Mohammed Ahmed Awil, the TFG's ambassador to China, reported that the TFG had sent an invitation for Chinese warships and was awaiting a response. [19] In mid-December, Awil [20] and Ali Jangali, the Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs [21] reiterated the TFG's support for a Chinese naval task force.
On 20 December 2008, China announced it would deploy a naval task force. This followed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, [18] which extended the area of operations of UN authorized anti-piracy operations to include the Somali coast. [22]
In late-November 2024, Wolfgang E. Nolting, the commander of the German Navy, met Liang Guanglie, China's Minister of National Defense, in Beijing and discussed military aspects of China–Germany relations. Nolting hoped improved cooperation would extend to anti-piracy efforts. [23]
China's escort mission is organizationally independent from other coalition forces. In 2008, China may have perceived international piracy law as being too immature to provide a framework. Furthermore, the existing coalition forces—the United States' Combined Maritime Forces, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, and the European Union's Operation Atalanta [24] —were not UN-led, and close integration may have allowed partners to gather intelligence on Chinese capabilities. [25] Integration may also have required installation of foreign software or hardware which may not have been possible or desirable for security reasons. [26]
China participates in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) which provides a high-level discussion forum for coordinating counter-piracy forces. SHADE does not exercise control over participating forces. [27]
The mission is jointly managed by the PLAN, the MoT, and the MoFA. [18] The MoT participates in coordinating Chinese anti-piracy efforts with other countries and media relations. [28]
The naval forces are controlled by PLAN headquarters instead of the Joint Staff Department, which nominally has control over operations beyond China's periphery. [29] A task force is deployed by a PLAN fleet [7] and typically include two warships, a supply ship, and approximately 800 personnel. The formations deploy for four to six months. [28] It takes about two weeks to sail from China to Somalia. [30]
Rules of engagement are restrictive to avoid capturing pirates and the need to prosecute them. [16] Suspected pirates are advised to disengage through visual, verbal, and live-fire warnings before escalating the engagement; [16] [31] [32] the main tactic is to deter, drive away, or disarm attacks. [17] China's justice system lacks mechanisms to prosecute piracy, and it is also reluctant to try criminals captured in foreign countries in domestic courts. [33] China is also sensitive to the lack of an internationally agreed upon process for dealing with captured pirates. [34]
Nearby ports used for replenishment include Aden, Djibouti City, and Salalah. [35] Djibouti was used as a forward repair base in August 2009; [36] China's first overseas military base opened in Djibouti in August 2017. [37]
The initial mission was the protection of UN World Food Programme aid to Somilia and Chinese shipping. [2] This was expanded to foreign ships; foreign requests are handled through the MoT. [18] In 2024, escorts may have started for Chinese ships in the Red Sea. [4]
The first task force deployed from Sanya [38] on 26 December 2008. [39]
In March 2011, the frigate Xuzhou from the seventh task force escorted a civilian ship transporting Chinese evacuated from the Libyan civil war. This was the PLAN's first noncombatant evacuation operation overseas. [40]
By the end of 2012, the task forces had escorted over 5,000 ships. [41]
Escort Task Group | Ships | Crew [a] | Departure | Start | End | Return | Ref |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1st Escort Task Group (Task Group 169) |
| 869 | 26-12-2008 | 26-1-2009 | 15-4-2009 | 28-4-2009 | [42] [43] |
2nd Escort Task Group (Task Group 167) |
| 866 | 2-4-2009 | 15-4-2009 | 1-8-2009 | 21-8-2009 | [44] |
3rd Escort Task Group (Task Group 529) |
| 806 | 16-7-2009 | 1-8-2009 | 29-11-2009 | 20-12-2009 | [45] |
4th Escort Task Group (Task Group 525) |
| 788 | 30-10-2009 | 27-11-2009 | 18-3-2010 | 23-4-2010 | [46] |
5th Escort Task Group (Task Group 168) |
| 825 | 4-3-2010 [b] | 18-3-2010 [c] | 20-7-2010 | 12-9-2010 | [47] |
6th Escort Task Group (Task Group 998) |
| 981 | 30-6-2010 | 14-7-2010 | 20-11-2010 | 7-1-2011 | [48] |
7th Escort Task Group (Task Group 530) |
| 788 | 2-11-2010 | 23-11-2010 | 11-11-2011 | 9-5-2011 | [49] |
8th Escort Task Group (Task Group 526) |
| 796 | 21-2-2011 | 18-3-2011 | 21-7-2011 | 28-8-2011 | [50] |
9th Escort Task Group (Task Group 169) |
| 878 | 2-7-2011 | 23-7-2011 | 15-11-2011 | 24-12-2011 | [51] |
10th Escort Task Group (Task Group 171) |
| 875 | 2-11-2011 | 19-11-2011 | 17-3-2012 | 5-5-2012 | [52] |
11th Escort Task Group (Task Group 113) |
| 779 | 27-2-2012 | 17-3-2012 | 18-7-2012 | 12-9-2012 | [53] |
12th Escort Task Group (Task Group 548) | 788 | 3-7-2012 | 18-7-2012 | 23-11-2012 | 19-1-2013 | [54] | |
13th Escort Task Group (Task Group 570) |
| 787 | 9-11-2012 | 23-11-2012 | 13-3-2013 | 23-5-2013 | [55] |
14th Escort Task Group (Task Group 112) |
| 736 | 16-2-2013 | 13-3-2013 | 22-8-2013 [d] | 28-9-2013 | [56] |
15th Escort Task Group (Task Group 999) |
| 853 | 8-8-2013 | 22-8-2013 | 20-12-2013 | 22-1-2014 | [57] |
16th Escort Task Group (Task Group 546) |
| 660 | 11-11-2013 | 20-12-2013 | 18-4-2014 | 18-7-2014 | [58] |
17th Escort Task Group (Task Group 150) |
| 810 | 25-3-2014 | 18-4-2014 | 23-8-2014 | 22-10-2014 | [59] |
18th Escort Task Group (Task Group 989) |
| 1200 | 2-8-2014 | 23-8-2014 | 24-12-2014 | 19-3-2015 | [60] |
19th Escort Task Group (Task Group 547) |
| 780 | 2-12-2014 | 24-12-2014 | 24-4-2015 | 10-7-2015 | [61] |
20th Escort Task Group (Task Group 152) |
| ~800 | 3-4-2015 | 24-4-2015 | 22-8-2015 | 5-2-2016 | [62] |
21st Escort Task Group (Task Group 573) |
| ~700 | 4-8-2015 | 22-8-2015 | 3-1-2016 | 8-3-2016 | [63] |
22nd Escort Task Group (Task Group 576) |
| ~700 | 6-12-2015 | 3-1-2016 | 29-4-2016 | 30-6-2016 | [64] |
23rd Escort Task Group (Task Group 531) |
| ~700 | 7-4-2014 | 29-4-2016 | 4-9-2016 | 1-11-2016 | [65] |
24th Escort Task Group (Task Group 112) |
| ~700 | 10-8-2014 | 2-9-2016 | 5-1-2017 | 8-3-2017 | [66] |
25th Escort Task Group (Task Group 568) |
| ~700 | 17-12-2016 | 2-1-2017 | 21-4-2017 | 12-7-2017 | [67] |
26th Escort Task Group (Task Group 577) |
| ~700 | 1-4-2017 | 21-4-2017 | 23-8-2017 | 1-12-2017 | [68] |
27th Escort Task Group (Task Group 171) |
| ~700 | 1-8-2017 | 23-8-2017 | 26-12-2017 | 18-3-2018 | [69] |
28th Escort Task Group (Task Group 546) |
| ~700 | 3-12-2017 | 26-12-2017 | 1-5-2018 | 9-8-2018 | [70] |
29th Escort Task Group (Task Group 515) |
| ~700 | 4-4-2018 | 28-4-2018 | 3-9-2018 | 4-10-2018 | [71] |
30th Escort Task Group (Task Group 539) |
| ~700 | 6-8-2018 | 1-9-2018 | 24-12-2018 | 27-1-2019 | [72] |
31st Escort Task Group (Task Group 998) |
| ~700 | 9-12-2018 | 24-12-2018 | 28-4-2019 | 30-5-2019 | [73] [74] |
32nd Escort Task Group (Task Group 153) |
| ~700 | 4-4-2019 | 28-4-2019 | 14-9-2019 | 1-11-2019 | [73] [75] |
33rd Escort Task Group (Task Group 117) |
| ~600 | 29-8-2019 | 14-9-2019 | 20-11-2019 | 1-1-2020 | [75] |
34th Escort Task Group (Task Group 118) |
| ~700 | 10-6-2020 | 14-7-2019 | 14-3-2020 | 10-4-2020 | |
35th Escort Task Group (Task Group 122) |
| ~600 | 28-4-2020 | 14-5-2020 | 1-8-2020 | 14-10-2020 | |
36th Escort Task Group (Task Group 202) |
| ~700 | 4-9-2020 | 14-10-2020 | Ongoing | Ongoing |
This section needs additional citations for verification .(July 2025) |
Fleet (lot) | Ships (number of times) | Formation commander | Departure Escort period Return | Description, including total number of escort batches and vessels |
---|---|---|---|---|
South Sea Fleet (Batch 37) |
| Wei Bing Wang Zhanwu (& 700+ personnel) | 2021/01/16 (Hainan) 2021/01/31 – 2021/06/07 2021/06/29 (Sanya) | Lasted 165 days, covering a distance of over 90,000 nautical miles, continuously at sea without docking for rest. Verified and drove away 15 batches of 24 suspicious small boats, provided special escort for 16 batches of 28 Chinese merchant ships, monitored the safety of 11 passing merchant ships, ensuring the safe navigation of escorted ships, completing 40 batches of 64 Chinese and foreign ship escort tasks. |
East Sea Fleet Destroyer 6th Squadron (Batch 38) |
| Shi Weilin Zhang Xianxing | 2021/05/15 (Zhejiang) 2021/06/07 – 2021/10/17 2021/11/15 (Zhoushan) | Lasted 185 days, covering a distance of over 90,000 nautical miles, continuously at sea without docking for rest. Completed 31 batches of escort tasks for 45 Chinese and foreign ships, providing safety monitoring for 9 passing ships, ensuring the safety of escorted ships. |
North Sea Fleet Destroyer 1st Squadron (Batch 39) |
| Liu Bo | 2021/09/26 (Shandong) 2021/10/17 – 2022/02/04 2022/03/09 (Qingdao) | Lasted 165 days, covering a distance of over 90,000 nautical miles, efficiently completing 28 batches of escort tasks for 48 Chinese and foreign ships. Since the beginning of the mission, the fleet has strictly implemented epidemic prevention and control measures, organized escort operations meticulously, and adopted various methods such as extended escort and relay escort to ensure the safe navigation of escorted ships, effectively safeguarding the safety of international maritime trade routes and regional peace and stability. |
South Sea Fleet (Batch 40) |
| Zou Fuquan Yang Yaohua | 2022/01/15 (Guangdong) 2022/02/04 – 2022/06/08 2022/07/05 (Zhanjiang) | Lasted 172 days, covering a distance of nearly 90,000 nautical miles, efficiently completing 30 batches of escort tasks for 50 Chinese and foreign ships. Provided medical assistance to one ship during the mission. Throughout the mission, the fleet strictly implemented epidemic prevention and control measures, organized escort operations meticulously, and adopted various methods such as relay escort, extended escort, and regional escort to ensure the safe navigation of escorted ships. |
East Sea Fleet (Batch 41) |
| Wang Mingyong Liu Hao | 2022/05/18 (Zhejiang) 2022/06/08 – 2022/10/15 2022/11/15 (Zhoushan) | Lasted 182 days, covering a distance of nearly 90,000 nautical miles, efficiently completing 30 batches of escort tasks for 38 Chinese and foreign ships, continuously at sea without docking for rest. Throughout the mission, the fleet strictly implemented epidemic prevention and control measures, organized escort operations meticulously, and adopted various forms such as relay escort, extended escort, and regional escort to ensure the safe navigation of escorted ships. |
North Sea Fleet (Batch 42) |
| Sun Honglin Huang Zhongxin | 2022/09/21 (Shandong) 2022/10/15 – 2023/02/05 2023/03/30 (Qingdao) | Lasted 191 days, covering a distance of over 100,000 nautical miles, smoothly completing 20 batches of escort tasks for 29 Chinese and foreign ships, providing safety monitoring for 11 passing merchant ships. After completing the escort mission on February 29, the escort fleet arrived at Richard's Bay, South Africa, to participate in the joint maritime exercise of China, Russia, and South Africa. The exercise focused on "Joint Action to Maintain Shipping and Maritime Economic Activity" and included two phases: port and sea. The maritime exercise included fleet maneuvers, mine clearance, anti-piracy, rescue of distressed vessels, and more than 10 other subjects. |
South Sea Fleet (Batch 43) |
| Zhao Lang Yang Yanhua | 2023/01/10 (Guangdong) 2023/02/05 – 2023/06/02 2023/08/29 (Zhanjiang) | Lasted 232 days, with a total mileage of nearly 120,000 nautical miles. During the mission, the fleet successfully completed 16 batches of escort tasks for 21 ships and provided safety monitoring for 16 passing merchant ships. From April 26 to May 2, two warships, excluding Sanya, went to Sudan to carry out the evacuation task and smoothly transported more than 1,000 Chinese and foreign nationals. After completing the evacuation mission, Nanning-class destroyer went to Pakistan, the UAE, and Iran to participate in the "Peace-23" multinational naval joint exercise, the 16th Abu Dhabi Defense Exhibition, and the 7th Naval Defense Exhibition. Also, it participated in the "Security Link-2023" maritime joint exercise. Friendly visits: Abidjan Port (Côte d'Ivoire), Tema Port (Ghana), Lagos Port (Nigeria), Libreville Port (Gabon), Pointe-Noire Port (Republic of the Congo), technical stop in Cape Town (South Africa), Port Klang (Malaysia) |
East Sea Fleet (Batch 44) |
| Sun Bo Li Jiamei (& 700+ personnel) | 2023/04/28 (Zhejiang) 2023/06/02 – 2023/10/02 Return: ? (Zhoushan) | On November 27, the escort fleet arrived in Yangon to conduct a 4-day friendly visit. There were also reports that it conducted naval security exercises with Myanmar. [76] [77] Friendly visits: Muscat [78] (Oman), Shuwaikh Port [79] (Kuwait), Doha (Qatar),Abu Dhabi (UAE), Yangon (Myanmar) |
North Sea Fleet (Batch 45) |
| 2023/09/12 (Shandong) 2023/10/02 – ? Return: ? (Qingdao) |