Human rights in Kuwait are a topic of significant concern. Most notably, Kuwait's handling of the stateless Bedoon crisis has come under substantial criticism from international human rights organisations and the United Nations. [1] [2] [3] Kuwait has the largest number of stateless people in the entire region. [2] [3] Kuwait also faces significant criticism for the human rights violations against foreign nationals, women, and LGBT people. Although Kuwaiti law (including the Constitution of Kuwait) theoretically pledges to protect all human rights; the enforcement mechanisms designed to help protect human rights are very limited in Kuwait.
Kuwait is a party to several international human rights treaties, including [4]
The revocation of citizenship is a contentious human rights issue in Kuwait. [5] [6] According to Carnegie Endowment , Kuwait has weaponized citizenship revocation as a tool for political control. [7] The government has the authority to strip individuals of their Kuwaiti citizenship without providing any reason and Kuwait's courts are not allowed to handle appeals. [5] The lack of judicial oversight means that citizenship revocation occurs without a fair trial or an opportunity for appeal. [5]
The lack of transparency and recourse in the process of revoking citizenship, as well as its arbitrary application, is a violation of human rights. [6] The practice affects both citizens and, to some extent, long-term residents such as the stateless Bedoon community. A specific issue is that once an individual's citizenship is revoked, they may be referred to the "Central Agency for Illegal Residents," which handles stateless individuals, [8] further deepening the issue of statelessness in Kuwait. [6] [5]
Kuwait’s citizenship revocation policy contradicts international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "everyone has the right to a nationality" and "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality." [5] [6] Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have raised concerns over the potential for statelessness, lack of due process in citizenship revocations, and the discriminatory impact on certain groups, including Bedoon, women, Shia Muslims, and naturalized citizens.
The policy significantly impacts Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaiti men, as children of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis are not granted citizenship, further complicating their legal status in the country. [8] The policy has drawn criticism from human rights organizations, as it discriminates against Kuwaiti women by denying their children rights afforded to children of Kuwaiti fathers. [8]
Since March 2024, Kuwait has witnessed a significant increase in the revocation of citizenships. [6] [5] [9] Neveen Ma'arafi (Arabic : نيفين معرفي, lit. 'Neveen Ma'arafi') claimed that "There is a special law about the Kuwaiti Nationality that organizes the way to gain citizenship, what happened is that it appeared to the government that there are people who gained the citizenship through illegal ways, and there are those who gained the Kuwaiti citizenship then they were chosen to gain another citizenship whilst they were originally of Kuwaiti citizenship, the Kuwait citizenship system does not allow dual citizenship, therefore the citizen loses their Kuwaiti citizenship or they are made to choose between the two citizenship." - A human rights defender disputed her claims, stating that in many cases this is not true and citizenship revocation can be random. [9]
By the end of November 2024, social media platforms in the Gulf and Egypt have been abuzz with reactions to the Kuwaiti government's decision to revoke the Kuwaiti citizenship of singer Nawal Al-Kuwaitia, actor Dawood Hussein, and his children who acquired citizenship through paternal affiliation. [10] [11] [12] The decision also included Egyptian-Kuwaiti media personality and blogger Noha Nabil. [10] [11] [12] The Supreme Committee for Nationality Affairs in Kuwait decided during its Thursday meeting to revoke the Kuwaiti citizenship of 1,758 individuals, including Nawal Al-Kuwaitia and Dawood Hussein, with the cases to be presented to the Kuwaiti Cabinet for further action. [10] [11] [12]
Kuwait has the largest number of stateless people in the entire region. [13] Most stateless Bedoon of Kuwait belong to the northern tribes, especially the Al-Muntafiq tribal confederation. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] The linguist Bruce Ingham studied the northern tribes in Kuwait in the mid 20th century. [22] A minority of stateless Bedoon in Kuwait belong to the 'Ajam community. [23]
Under the terms of the Kuwait Nationality Law 15/1959, all the Bedoon in Kuwait are eligible for Kuwaiti nationality by naturalization. [24] In practice, it is widely believed that Sunnis of Persian descent or tribal Saudis can readily achieve Kuwaiti naturalization whilst Bedoon of Iraqi tribal ancestry cannot. [25] As a result, many Bedoon in Kuwait feel pressured to hide their background. [26]
From 1965 until 1985, the Bedoon were treated as Kuwaiti citizens and guaranteed citizenship: they had free access to education, health care and all the other privileges of citizenship. [2] The stateless Bedoon constituted 80-90% of the Kuwaiti Army in the 1970s and 1980s until the Gulf War. [27]
In 1985 at the height of the Iran–Iraq War, the Bedoon were reclassified as "illegal residents" and denied Kuwaiti citizenship and its accompanying privileges. [2] [27] [28] The Iran–Iraq War threatened Kuwait's internal stability and the authorities feared the sectarian background of the stateless Bedoon. [27] The Bedoon issue in Kuwait “overlaps with historic sensitivities about Iraqi influence inside Kuwait”, with many of those denied Kuwaiti nationality being believed to have originated from Iraq. [29]
In 1985, the then emir, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, escaped an assassination attempt. [30] [31] After the assassination attempt, the government changed the Bedoon's status from that of legal residents to illegal residents. [27] By 1986, the Bedoon were fully excluded from the same social and economic rights as Kuwaiti citizens.
Since 1986, the Kuwaiti government has refused to grant any form of documentation to the Bedoon, including birth certificates, death certificates, identity cards, marriage certificates, and driving licences. The Bedoon also face many restrictions in employment, travel and education. They are not permitted to educate their children in state schools and universities.
In 1995, Human Rights Watch reported that there were 300,000 stateless Bedoon, and this number was formally repeated by the British government. [32] [33]
According to several human rights organizations, the State of Kuwait is committing ethnic cleansing and genocide against the stateless Bedoon. [3] [18] The Kuwaiti Bedoon crisis resembles the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. [24] In 1995, it was reported in the British parliament that the Al Sabah ruling family had deported 150,000 stateless Bedoon to refugee camps in the Kuwaiti desert near the Iraqi border with minimal water, insufficient food and no basic shelter, and that they were threatened with death if they returned to their homes in Kuwait City. [33] [21] As a result, many of the stateless Bedoon fled to Iraq, where they remain stateless people even today. [34] [35] The Kuwaiti government also stands accused of attempting to falsify their nationalities in official state documents. [36] There have been reports of forced disappearances and mass graves of Bedoon. [3] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [21]
The 1995 Human Rights Watch report stated:
"The totality of the treatment of the Bedoons amounts to a policy of denationalization of native residents, relegating them to an apartheid-like existence in their own country. The Kuwaiti government policy of harassment and intimidation of the Bedoons and of denying them the right to lawful residence, employment, travel and movement, contravene basic principles of human rights. Denial of citizenship to the Bedoons clearly violates international law. Denying Bedoons the right to petition the courts to challenge governmental decisions regarding their claims to citizenship and lawful residence in the country violates the universal right to due process of law and equality before the law." [33]
British MP George Galloway stated:
"Of all the human rights atrocities committed by the ruling family in Kuwait, the worst and the greatest is that against the people known as the Bedoons. There are more than 300,000 Bedoons—one third of Kuwait's native population. Half of them—150,000—have been driven into refugee camps in the desert across the Iraqi border by the regime and left there to bake and to rot. The other 150,000 are treated not as second-class or even fifth-class citizens, but not as any sort of citizen. They are bereft of all rights. It is a scandal that almost no one in the world cares a thing about the plight of 300,000 people, 150,000 of them cast out of the land in which they have lived [when] many have lived in the Kuwaiti area for many centuries." [33]
By 2004, the Bedoon accounted for only 40% of the Kuwaiti Army, a major reduction from their presence in the 1970s and 1980s. [42] In 2013, the UK government estimated that there were 110,729 "documented" Bedoon in Kuwait, without giving a total estimate, but noting that all stateless individuals in Kuwait remain at risk of persecution and human rights breaches. [43] The Bedoon are generally categorized into three groups: stateless tribespeople, stateless police/military and the stateless children of Kuwaiti women who married Bedoon men. [27] According to the Kuwaiti government, there are only 93,000 "documented" Bedoon in Kuwait. [43] In 2018, the Kuwaiti government claimed that it would naturalize up to 4,000 stateless Bedoon per year but this is considered unlikely. [25] [44] In 2019, the Iranian embassy in Kuwait announced that it offers Iranian citizenship to stateless Bedoon of Iranian ancestry. [45] [46]
In recent years, the rate of suicide among Bedoon has risen sharply. [2]
The State of Kuwait formally has an official Nationality Law that grants non-nationals a legal pathway to obtaining citizenship. [47] However, as access to citizenship in Kuwait is autocratically controlled by the Al Sabah ruling family it is not subject to any external regulatory supervision. [48] [47] The naturalization provisions within the Nationality Law are arbitrarily implemented and lack transparency. [47] [48] The lack of transparency prevents non-nationals from receiving a fair opportunity to obtain citizenship. [1] [48] Consequently, the Al Sabah ruling family have been able to manipulate naturalization for politically motivated reasons. [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [1] [53] [54] [55] In the three decades after independence in 1961, the Al Sabah ruling family naturalized hundreds of thousands of foreign Bedouin immigrants predominantly from Saudi Arabia. [51] [56] [48] [53] [49] [54] [50] [1] [55] [57] By 1980, as many as 200,000 immigrants were naturalized in Kuwait. [56] Throughout the 1980s, the Al Sabah's politically motivated naturalization policy continued. [56] [48] The naturalizations were not regulated nor sanctioned by Kuwaiti law. [48] [49] [51] [57] The exact number of naturalizations is unknown but it is estimated that up to 400,000 immigrants were unlawfully naturalized in Kuwait. [57] [51] The foreign Bedouin immigrants were mainly naturalized to alter the demographic makeup of the citizen population in a way that made the power of the Al Sabah ruling family more secure. [52] [48] [49] [51] As a result of the politically motivated naturalizations, the number of naturalized citizens exceeds the number of Bedoon in Kuwait. [1] The Al Sabah ruling family actively encouraged foreign Bedouin immigrants to migrate to Kuwait. [56] The Al Sabah ruling family favored naturalizing Bedouin immigrants because they were considered loyal to the ruling family, unlike the politically active Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian expats in Kuwait. [56] The naturalized citizens were predominantly Sunni Saudi immigrants from southern tribes. [55] [51] [49] Accordingly, none of the stateless Bedoon in Kuwait belong to the Ajman tribe. [49]
The Kuwaiti judicial system's lack of authority to rule on citizenship further complicates the Bedoon crisis, leaving Bedoon no access to the judiciary to present evidence and plead their case for citizenship. [1] Although non-nationals constitute 70% of Kuwait's total population the Al Sabah ruling family persistently denies citizenship to most non-nationals, including those who fully satisfy the requirements for naturalization as stipulated in the state's official Nationality Law. There is no official national census disclosing sectarian affiliation in Kuwait. However, it is estimated that 60-80% of Kuwait's Bedoon are Shia Muslims [58] [59] [60] [16] [61] and, as a result, it is widely believed that the Bedoon issue in Kuwait is sectarian in nature. [58] [60] [59] [62] [16] [63] [61] The Kuwaiti authorities permit the forgery of hundreds of thousands of politically motivated naturalizations [1] [57] whilst simultaneously denying citizenship to the Bedoon. [1] [57] The politically motivated naturalizations were noted by the United Nations, political activists, scholars, researchers and even members of the Al Sabah family. [1] [48] [49] [51] [52] [50] [64] [53] [56] [54] [57] It is widely considered a form of deliberate demographic engineering. [7] It has been likened to Bahrain's politically motivated naturalization policy. [48] [52] [55] Within the GCC countries, politically-motivated naturalization policies are referred to as "political naturalization" (التجنيس السياسي). [48]
A large number of stateless Bedoon from Kuwait regularly immigrate to Europe as asylum seekers. The United Kingdom is the most popular destination for Bedoom asylum seekers. According to the Home Office, Kuwait is the eighth largest source of asylum seekers crossing the English Channel on small boats. [65] [66] [67]
In recent years, several Shia citizens have reported cases of torture, forced disappearance, unfair trial, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial punishment, and other human rights abuses. [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims and United Nations criticized the Kuwaiti authorities' treatment of the so-called "Abdali Cell". [71] [72] [73] [74] In November 2021, Kuwait arbitrarily detained eight elderly Shia Kuwaiti men without any charges. [68] [75] [69] [70]
Human rights organizations frequently criticize Kuwait for the human rights abuses toward foreign nationals. Foreign nationals account for 70% of Kuwait's total population. The kafala system leaves foreign nationals prone to exploitation. Administrative deportation is very common in Kuwait for minor offenses, including minor traffic violations. Kuwait is one of the world's worst offenders in human trafficking. Hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals are subjected to numerous human rights abuses including inhumane conditions of involuntary servitude by employers in Kuwait. They are subjected to physical and sexual abuse, non-payment of wages, poor work conditions, threats, confinement to the home, and withholding of passports to restrict their freedom of movement. [76] [77]
Repeated abusers include M A Al-Kharafi & Sons and its subsidiary Kharafi National that have been cited by human rights organizations and the United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Kuwait. [78] [79] [80] Many human rights organizations have accused Kuwait of apartheid policies toward foreign nationals. Kuwait is considered one of the most xenophobic countries in the world.
In 2018, there was a diplomatic crisis between Kuwait and the Philippines due to the mistreatment of Filipino workers in Kuwait. There are roughly 241,000 Filipinos in Kuwait. Most are migrant workers, [81] and approximately 60% of Filipinos in Kuwait are employed as domestic workers. In July 2018, Kuwaiti fashionista Sondos Alqattan released a controversial video criticising domestic workers from the Philippines. Many of her clients were quick to denounce her. [82]
In 2020, there was a diplomatic crisis between Kuwait and Egypt due to the mistreatment of Egyptian workers in Kuwait. [83] In November 2021, Egyptian foreign worker Samih Maurice Bowles filed official complaints against Kuwait in front of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment for torture, forced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and other human rights abuses. [84]
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait; the Iraqi military forces committed many human rights violations against Kuwaiti citizens, stateless Bedoon, and foreign nationals in Kuwait. Some were taken back to Iraq and released later. [85]
Human rights organizations persistently criticize the unequal status of women in Kuwait. The United Nations Working Group warned against the persistent barriers, both in law and in practice, on the path of women's quest for full equality. [86] UN human rights experts Alda Facio and Kamala Chandrakirana said despite significant achievements, "discrimination against women persists in law and in practice, particularly in the context of the family and nationality laws, based on the presumption of women's dependence on men, which is contrary to the principle of equality." [86] Muslim women in Kuwait are discriminated against under the family law. Children born to a Kuwaiti mother and non-Kuwaiti father do not get Kuwaiti citizenship, unless a decree is passed by the Minister of Interior. [87]
Kuwait's position in international rankings has varied over the years. In 2014, Kuwait was ranked 113 of 142 globally in the Global Gender Gap Report, [88] [89] the country improved its ranking due to significant increases in the overall income indicator. In 2015, Kuwait was ranked 117 of 145 globally in the Global Gender Index. [90] In 2020, Kuwait was ranked 122 of 153 globally in the Global Gender Gap Report. Regarding the GGGR subindex, Kuwait ranked 142 of 152 on political empowerment 143 of 153 on health and survival, 120 of 153 on economic opportunity, and 57 of 153 on educational attainment. [91] In 2021, Kuwait was ranked 143 of 156 globally in the Global Gender Gap Report. [92] Regarding the GGGR subindex, Kuwait ranked 153 of 156 on political empowerment, 94 of 156 on health and survival, 137 of 156 on economic opportunity, and 59 of 156 on educational attainment. [92] In 2013, 53% of Kuwaiti women participated in the labor force. [93] Kuwaiti women outnumber men in the workforce. [94]
Camel racing is a popular sport in Kuwait. In the past, children employed as jockeys were severely mistreated. [95]
LGBT people living in Kuwait face discriminatory laws and public attitudes. The penal code contains some general provisions against debauchery and immorality that can be used to punish LGBT people.
Foreign nationals infected with AIDS/HIV are deported. [98]
All forms of news and entertainment media is subject to high levels of government censorship.
Content that criticizes the ruling family (especially the Emir) is strictly prohibited.
According to a 2009 report from the Reporters without Borders, Kuwait is engaged in pervasive Internet filtering and selective filtering in security areas. The primary target of Internet filtering is pornography. The Kuwait Ministry of Communication regulates ISPs, making them block pornography websites. [99]
Voice over Internet Protocol is legal in Kuwait. [100]
This is a demography of the population of Kuwait.
Nationality is the legal status of belonging to a particular nation, defined as a group of people organized in one country, under one legal jurisdiction, or as a group of people who are united on the basis of culture.
In international law, a stateless person is someone who is "not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law". Some stateless people are also refugees. However, not all refugees are stateless, and many people who are stateless have never crossed an international border. At the end of 2022, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated 4.4 million people worldwide as either stateless or of undetermined nationality, 90,800 (+2%) more than at the end of 2021.
In law, an alien is generally any person who is not a citizen or a national of a specific country, although definitions and terminology differ across legal systems.
Denaturalization is the loss of citizenship against the will of the person concerned. Denaturalization is often applied to ethnic minorities and political dissidents. Denaturalization can be a penalty for actions considered criminal by the state, often only for errors in the naturalization process such as fraud. Since the 9/11 attacks, the denaturalization of people accused of terrorism has increased. Because of the right to nationality, recognized by multiple international treaties including Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, denaturalization is often considered a human rights violation.
Kuwait, officially the State of Kuwait, is a country in West Asia. It is situated in the northern edge of the Arabian Peninsula at the tip of the Persian Gulf, bordering Iraq to the north and Saudi Arabia to the south. With a coastline of approximately 500 km (311 mi), Kuwait also shares a maritime border with Iran, across the Persian Gulf. Most of the country's population reside in the urban agglomeration of Kuwait City, the capital and largest city. As of 2024, Kuwait has a population of 4.82 million, of which 1.53 million are Kuwaiti citizens while the remaining 3.29 million are foreign nationals from over 100 countries. Kuwait has the third largest foreign-born population in the world.
Non-citizens or aliens in Latvian law are individuals who are not citizens of Latvia or any other country, but who, in accordance with the Latvian law "Regarding the status of citizens of the former USSR who possess neither Latvian nor another citizenship," have the right to a non-citizen passport issued by the Latvian government as well as other specific rights. Approximately two thirds of them are ethnic Russians, followed by Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Lithuanians.
The Constitution of Kuwait was created by the Constitutional Assembly in 1961–1962 and signed into law on 11 November 1962 by the Emir, the Commander of the Military of Kuwait Sheikh Abdullah III Al-Salim Al-Sabah.
Important political issues in the Kuwait include rights for immigrant workers, stateless people, and education reform. Kuwait has the largest number of stateless people in the entire region. The Bedoon issue in Kuwait is largely sectarian.
Uruguayan nationality law is based on the principle of Jus soli and a limited form of Jus sanguinis. The Uruguayan Constitution does not use the word "national" in defining those inhabitants (habitantes) of Uruguay. Those inhabitants are described as "natural citizens" and "legal citizens" in Article 73 of the Constitution. According to Article 74, natural citizens are born in the territory of Uruguay and the children of natural citizens, wherever those children are born. In Article 75, the steps to become a legal citizen are set forth. In terms of the text of the Constitution, the term national is only introduced in the Constitution in Article 81. Article 81 states that, "Nationality is not lost by being naturalized in another country, to recover the exercise of the rights of citizenship, it is enough to come to the Republic (avecinarse) and register in the Civic Registry." Further, a second clause in Article 81 provides, "Legal citizenship is lost by any other form of subsequent naturalization."
The women of Kuwait have experienced many progressive changes since the early 20th century. Since then, women have had increased access to education, gained political and economic rights, and financial power. They can serve in the police, military, and as judges in courts. However, women in Kuwait struggle against a patriarchal culture which discriminates against them in several fields. Kuwait's Bedoon (stateless) women are at risk of significant human rights abuses and persecution. Kuwait has the largest number of Bedoon in the entire region.
Lebanese nationality law governs the acquisition, transmission and loss of Lebanese citizenship. Lebanese citizenship is the status of being a citizen of Lebanon and it can be obtained by birth or naturalization. Lebanese nationality is transmitted paternally. Therefore, a Lebanese man who holds Lebanese citizenship can automatically confer citizenship to his children and foreign wife. Under the current law, descendants of Lebanese emigrants can only receive citizenship from their father and women cannot pass on citizenship to their children or foreign spouses.
Shia Islam constitutes a significant minority in Kuwait. In 2001, the US Department of State reported that there were 300,000 Shia Kuwaiti citizens and 820,000 Kuwaiti citizens in total thus Shias formed 36.5% of the Kuwaiti citizen population. In 2002, the US Department of State reported that Shia Kuwaitis formed 30-40% of Kuwait's citizen population, noting there were 525,000 Sunni citizens and 855,000 Kuwaiti citizens in total. In 2004, there were 300,000-350,000 Shia Kuwaiti citizens and 913,000 Kuwaiti citizens in total. The Strategic Studies Institute reported that they constitute 40% of the population in 2008.
The Kuwaiti protests refers to the series of 2011–2012 demonstrations for government reforms in the state of Kuwait. In November 2011, the government of Kuwait resigned in response to the protests, making Kuwait one of several countries affected by the Arab Spring to experience major governmental changes due to unrest. The protests began with stateless people (Bedoon).
The Bedoon or Bidoon, fully Bidoon jinsiya, are stateless people in several Middle Eastern countries, but particularly in Kuwait, where there is a large population of stateless people who lack access to many of the country's basic services. It is widely believed that the Bedoon issue in Kuwait is sectarian in nature.
The Kuwaiti nationality law is the legal pathway for non-nationals to become citizens of the State of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti nationality law is based on a wide range of decrees; first passed in 1920 and then in 1959. An Amiri decree was passed later in 1960. Since the 1960s, the implementation of the nationality law has been very arbitrary and lacks transparency. The lack of transparency prevents non-nationals from receiving a fair opportunity to obtain citizenship. A number of amendments were made in 1980, 1982, 1994, 1998, and 2000.
Emirati nationality law governs citizenship eligibility in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The law is primarily jus sanguinis. Foreigners who meet certain criteria may be naturalized and granted citizenship. Gulf Cooperation Council citizens are allowed to live in the UAE without restriction and have the right of freedom of movement.
Jordanian nationality law details the conditions by which a person is a national of Jordan. The primary law governing nationality regulations is the Jordanian Nationality Law, which came into force on 16 February 1954.
Dominican Republic nationality law is regulated by the 2015 Constitution, Law 1683 of 1948, the 2014 Naturalization Law #169-14, and relevant treaties to which the Dominican Republic is a signatory. These laws determine who is, or is eligible to be, a citizen of the Dominican Republic. The legal means to acquire nationality and formal membership in a nation differ from the relationship of rights and obligations between a national and the nation, known as citizenship. Nationality in the Dominican Republic is typically obtained either on the principle of jus soli, i.e. by birth in the Dominican Republic; or under the rules of jus sanguinis, i.e. by birth abroad to a parent with Dominican nationality. It can also be granted to a permanent resident who has lived in the country for a given period of time through naturalization or for a foreigner who has provided exceptional service to the nation.
Demographic engineering is deliberate effort to shift the ethnic balance of an area, especially when undertaken to create ethnically homogeneous populations. Demographic engineering ranges from falsification of census results, redrawing borders, differential natalism to change birth rates of certain population groups, targeting disfavored groups with voluntary or coerced emigration, and population transfer and resettlement with members of the favored group. At an extreme, demographic engineering is undertaken through genocide. It is a common feature of conflicts around the world.
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: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)Political naturalizations of tribesmen
Extra-Legal Naturalisations and Population Statistics
To counter the strong influence of Arab nationalism in the decades after independence in 1961, Kuwait naturalized more than 200,000 Bedouin tribesmen to serve as a reliable pro-government bloc in parliament.
How then do we explain the naturalizations that have occurred in the Gulf states in the past, such as the granting of citizenship to thousands of bedu (bedouin) by Kuwait in the 1960s and 1970s? Typically these naturalizations were imposed by the ruling families and were designed to alter the demographic makeup of the citizen society in a way that made the power of the ruling families more secure
"The Kuwaiti Bedoon`s continued exclusion from nationality can only be understood in the light of the power struggle in a system which was largely based on sectarianism and tribalism within newly emerging emirates striving to assert their legitimacy and authority. The majority of the Bedoon are in fact an extended branch of tribes across the borders between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia and are largely of the Muslim Shi'ite faith".
The Sunni ruling elite discriminate against the bidoon, many of whom are Shia.
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)Kuwait has higher female labor market participation than other GCC countries; further improvements in labor force participation can support future growth prospects. Kuwait's labor force participation rate for Kuwaiti women (53 percent) is slightly above the world average (51 percent) and much higher than the MENA average (21 percent).