A year before the 2024, a similar undersea infrastructure disruption event, the Balticconnector incident, occurred when the Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear dragged its anchor across the seabed, damaging the pipeline and submarine cables between Sweden and Estonia.[5]
In general as of 2024, about 200 undersea cables have been cut or disrupted annually,[6] due most frequently to unintentional damage from fishing equipment or the anchors of ships.[7][8]
Disruption, November 18-28, 2024
On Monday, 18 November 2024,[9] the telecommunications company Telia Lithuania announced that the BCS East-West Interlink submarine cable between Lithuania and Sweden had been "cut" on Sunday morning at around 10 a.m. local time.[10] At around the same time, the submarine cable C-Lion1 for data communication between Finland and Germany was cut in the same region of the Baltic Sea. As a result, both of their telecom services were disrupted.[11][12] The C-Lion1 fault was discovered off the coast of the Swedish island of Öland.[13] The two faults were detected about 97–105 kilometres (60–65mi) apart from each other.[14] The BCS East-West cable is at a depth of 100–150 metres (330–490ft) and C-Lion at 20–40 metres (66–131ft) deep.[15]
An Arelion spokesperson described the damage to the BCS East-West Interlink cable as "...not a partial damage. It’s full damage”.[16] At the time of the incident, the cable provided about 1/3rd of the internet capacity of Lithuania.[14]
According to C-Lion1 operator Cinia Oy, the cable was severed by an outside force.[17] Cinia chief executive Ari-Jussi Knaapila stated that the company was in the process of conducting physical inspections at the site of the fault.[14][18][19]
BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1 were restored on 28 November 2024[20][21].
Reactions
On November 18, the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Finland issued a joint statement expressing "deep concern" over the C-Lion1 cable's disruption, and expressed suspicion over possible hybrid warfare conducted by Russia, causing the disruptions in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and elevated tension against NATO member states.[16][22]German Federal Defense MinisterBoris Pistorius called the incident an act of sabotage.[9] He further stated that "no one" believed that the cables were cut accidentally.[16] The Lithuanian Naval Force announced increased surveillance of its waters in response to the damage and would discuss further measures with Lithuania its allies.[9] The Lithuanian Armed Forces stated that NATO members corresponded with one another to determine the cause of the disruptions.[16]
European governments accused Russia of escalating hybrid attacks on Ukraine's Western allies, but not directly accusing Russia of destroying the seacables.[23]
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected suspicions and called it "absurd", accusing Russia without evidence.[23]
On 26 November 2024, Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement of "no knowledge" regarding the incident.[24]
Suspicious ships
Yi Peng 3 left the Russian Baltic harbour Ust-Luga on 15 November 2024. Information about the destination of the ship offered by media outlets varied, the most frequently mentioned being Port Said, Egypt, while the analysis provider MarineTraffic, said the destination was unknown upon departure.[25] On 17 November, between 1:30 a.m. (UTC) and 11:19 a.m. the ship passed the Swedish island of Gotland. Yi Peng 3 crossed BCS East-West. At around 10 a.m., the Lithuanian telecom provider Telia in Vilnius received a fault report: the connection between Šventoji, Lithuania, and Gotland, Sweden had been severed. The ship crossed several times over the position of damage of the two cables.[26][27] The Yi Peng 3 continued its journey south. After Gotland, the freighter switched off its automatic identification system (AIS) signal for 7.5 hours. At 22:41 UTC the ship switched AIS back on and was located south of the Swedish island of Öland.[26]
Three hours later, at 2 a.m. (UTC) on 18 November, the Finnish network provider Cinia reported a loss of data traffic via C-Lion1. It became clear that the cable between Gotland and Öland was damaged. In this area the Yi Peng 3 was traveling without an AIS signal.[26] The Danish public broadcaster DR sent a drone to survey the ship, showing images of how one of Yi Peng 3's anchors had become mangled – according to NZZ an indication that the freighter could have destroyed the cables.[25]
On 19 November, authorities in Northern Germany searched Turkish bulk carrier Fortune Express as it was passing through the Kiel Canal connecting the North and Baltic Seas. After a 2.5 hour search the vessel was allowed to continue its journey. Fortune Express had also passed over the location of the cables at the time of the incident and transmitted irregular AIS signals.[citation needed]
Since 20 November 2024, the Yi Peng 3 has been stationed at a sea position in the Kattegat off anchor and has been guarded by the Royal Danish Navy.[citation needed]
On 22 November, a ship from the Finnish Coast Guard, the Turva, a Swedish Coast Guard vessel and the Bamberg from the German Federal Police arrived at the damaged site of the C-Lion1 undersea data cable to examine it using ROVs from the Swedish military.[33]
Investigations
The Swedish Prosecution Authority opened an investigation into "sabotage" regarding the disruptions of both cables.[16] According to the Swedish Navy, it had an "almost 100% identification" of the ships that were in the area of the two cable breaks.[15] The navy is using a remote-controlled submarines to investigate the southern site of the two cables to support the Swedish prosecutor and police with their investigations.
Lithuania's Prosecutor General's Office launched a pre-trial investigation into terrorism.[34]
On November 20, Keskusrikospoliisi (KRP), Finland's national bureau of investigation opened a criminal investigation into the rupture of the C-Lion1 cable on suspicion of "aggravated criminal mischief and aggravated interference with communications."[35] On 26 November, the three nations signed an agreement to proceed with a joint investigation, coordinated through the Eurojust.[24]
Following the allegations of sabotage by Yi Peng 3, Sweden asked China to cooperate with the Swedish authorities on the case, according to Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson. China agreed on 29 November 2024 to cooperate in the investigation. China was ready to "work with relevant countries to find out the truth," said a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, China and Sweden in close contact on the matter, she added.[36]
The Baltic Sea is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean that is enclosed by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the North and Central European Plain.
The Baltic Cable is a monopolar HVDC power line running beneath the Baltic Sea that interconnects the electric power grids of Germany and Sweden. Its maximum transmission power is 600 megawatts (MW).
Nord Stream is a pair of offshore natural gas pipelines in Europe that run under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. It consists of the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline running from Vyborg in northwestern Russia, near Finland, and the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline running from Ust-Luga in northwestern Russia near Estonia. Both pipelines run to Lubmin in the northeastern German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Each pipeline contains two pipes, denoted A and B; each of the four pipes is approximately 1,200 kilometres (750 mi) long and with approximate diameters of 1,220 millimetres (48 in). The combined capacity of the four pipes is 110 billion cubic metres per annum of natural gas.
NordBalt is a submarine power cable between Klaipėda in Lithuania and Nybro in Sweden. The purpose of the cable is to facilitate the trading of power between the Baltic and Nordic electricity markets, and to increase the supply and energy security in both markets.
Balticconnector is a bi-directional natural gas pipeline between Ingå, Finland and Paldiski, Estonia operated by Gasgrid Finland and Elering. It connects the Estonian and Finnish gas grids, and provides Finland with access to the Inčukalns underground gas storage facility in Latvia.
The 2008 submarine cable disruption refers to three separate incidents of major damage to submarine optical communication cables around the world. The first incident caused damage involving up to five high-speed Internet submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East from January 23 to February 4, 2008, causing internet disruptions and slowdowns for users in the Middle East and India. The incident called into doubt the safety of the undersea portion of the Internet cable system.
Šventoji is a resort town on the coast of the Baltic Sea in Lithuania. Administratively it is part of Palanga City Municipality. The total population of Šventoji as of 2012 was 2631. The town is located about 12 km north of Palanga center and close to the border with Latvia. Further north of the town is Būtingė and its oil terminal. Šventoji River flows into the Baltic sea at the town. The town also has a famous lighthouse, which is located 780 meters from the sea. Its height is 39 meters. The town is a popular summer resort for families, during summer it has many cafes, restaurants and various attractions for the visitors.
Finnish–Chinese relations are the foreign relations between Finland and China.
BALTOPS is an annual military exercise, held and sponsored by the Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe, since 1971, in the Baltic Sea and the regions surrounding it.
China–Denmark relations are foreign relations between China and Denmark. Denmark recognized the People's Republic of China on January 9, 1950, and the two countries established diplomatic relations on May 11, 1950. On February 15, 1956, the two countries upgraded diplomatic relations from ministerial to ambassadorial level and exchanged ambassadors. China has an embassy in Copenhagen. Denmark has an embassy in Beijing and 4 general consulates in Chongqing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Shanghai.
The Bad Bramstedt-class is a class of three offshore patrol vessels operated by the Federal Police of Germany. The vessels were ordered in year 2000 to replace the eight boats of the Neustadt class.
C-Lion1 is a submarine communications cable between Finland and Germany. The cable is owned and operated by the Finnish telecommunications and IT services company Cinia Oy. It is the first direct communications cable between Finland and Central Europe; previous connections have been through Sweden and Denmark.
Submarine internet cables, also referred to as submarine communications cables or submarine fiber optic cables, connect different locations and data centres to reliably exchange digital information at a high speed.
Newnew Polar Bear is a Hong Kong-registered feeder container ship.
EE-S1 is a submarine communications cable between Sweden and Estonia. The cable is 240 km in length and it has three landing points – Kärdla (Estonia), Tallinn (Estonia) and Stavsnäs (Sweden). It became operational in June 1995. EE-S1 is owned by the Swedish pension fund AP-fonderna through its ownership in Arelion. Arelion was previously called Telia Carrier and was part of Telia Group.
Events in the year 2024 in Finland.
The BCS East-West Interlink is a submarine data communication cable that runs through the Baltic Sea, owned by Arelion. It connects Sventoji in Lithuania to Katthammarsvik on the east coast of the Swedish island of Gotland. The 218 kilometres (135 mi) long cable was in operation from November 1997 to November 18, 2024.
In 1959, the Soviet vessel MV Novorossiysk was boarded by naval personnel from the United States warship USS Roy O. Hale during the Transatlantic cables incident. The action was in response to a complaint filed by AT&T and Western Union over breakages in their undersea telecommunications cables. It was the first and, until 2024, only enforcement action taken under the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables of 1884.
Yi Peng 3 originally named Leda and later Avra is a 2001 HD Hyundai Samho-built Chinese bulk carrier.
↑ Saffo, Paul (4 April 2013). "Disrupting Undersea Cables: Cyberspace's Hidden Vulnerability". atlanticcouncil.org. Atlantic Council. Retrieved 23 November 2024. As already mentioned, the global undersea cable system experiences several hundred disruptions per year, and the consortia operating the various cable networks maintain specialized cable repair resources at the ready to respond within twenty-four hours of a failure.
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