James Tobin was an American economist who served on the Council of Economic Advisers and consulted with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and taught at Harvard and Yale Universities. He contributed to the development of key ideas in the Keynesian economics of his generation and advocated government intervention in particular to stabilize output and avoid recessions. His academic work included pioneering contributions to the study of investment, monetary and fiscal policy and financial markets. He also proposed an econometric model for censored dependent variables, the well-known tobit model.
Donald Wilfrid Kao Andrews is a Canadian economist. He is the Tjalling Koopmans Professor of Economics at the Cowles Foundation, Yale University. Born in Vancouver, he received his B.A. in 1977 at the University of British Columbia, his M.A. in 1980 in statistics at the University of California, Berkeley, and his Ph.D. in economics in 1982 also from the University of California, Berkeley.
Christopher Albert Sims is an American econometrician and macroeconomist. He is currently the John J.F. Sherrerd '52 University Professor of Economics at Princeton University. Together with Thomas Sargent, he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2011. The award cited their "empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy".
Leonid Hurwicz was a Polish–American economist and mathematician, known for his work in game theory and mechanism design. He originated the concept of incentive compatibility, and showed how desired outcomes can be achieved by using incentive compatible mechanism design. Hurwicz shared the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his seminal work on mechanism design. Hurwicz was one of the oldest Nobel Laureates, having received the prize at the age of 90.
Eric Stark Maskin is an American economist and mathematician. He was jointly awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory". He is the Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics at Harvard University.
Pradeep Dubey is an Indian game theorist. He is a Professor of Economics at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, and a member of the Stony Brook Center for Game Theory. He also holds a visiting position at Cowles Foundation, Yale University. He did his schooling at the St. Columba's School, Delhi. He received his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Cornell University and B.Sc. from the University of Delhi. His research areas of interest are game theory and mathematical economics. He has published, among others, in Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, and Quarterly Journal of Economics. He is a Fellow of The Econometric Society, ACM Fellow and a member of the council of the Game Theory Society.
In economics and game theory, global games are games of incomplete information where players receive possibly-correlated signals of the underlying state of the world. Global games were originally defined by Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
Roger Bruce Myerson is an American economist and professor at the University of Chicago. He holds the title of the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts in the Harris School of Public Policy, the Griffin Department of Economics, and the college. Previously, he held the title The Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics. In 2007, he was the winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin for "having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory." He was elected a Member of the American Philosophical Society in 2019.
Artyom Shneyerov is a microeconomist working at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. He is also an associate editor of the International Journal of Industrial Organization. His current research is in the fields of game theory, industrial organization and applied econometrics. His contributions to these and other areas of economics include the following:
George-Marios Angeletos is a Greek economist who is a professor of Economics at Northwestern University. He was previously a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Hyun Song Shin is a South Korean economic theorist and financial economist who focuses on global games. He has been the Economic Adviser and Head of Research of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) since May 1, 2014.
Roger Guesnerie is an economist born in France in 1943. He is currently the Chaired Professor of Economic Theory and Social Organization of the Collège de France, Director of Studies at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, and the chairman of the board of directors of the Paris School of Economics.
John Geanakoplos is an American economist, and the current James Tobin Professor of Economics at Yale University.
Dirk Bergemann is the Douglass & Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Computer Science at Yale University. He received his Vordiplom in economics at Goethe University Frankfurt in 1989, and both his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania in 1992 and 1993, respectively.
Charles Frederick Roos was an American economist who made contributions to mathematical economics. He was one of the founders of the Econometric Society together with American economist Irving Fisher and Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch in 1930. He served as Secretary-Treasurer during the first year of the Society and was elected as President in 1948. He was director of research of the Cowles Commission from September 1934 to January 1937.
Felix Kübler is a German economist who currently works as Professor of Financial Economics at the University of Zurich. His research interests include computational economics, general equilibrium theory and portfolio choice. In 2012, he was awarded the Gossen Prize in recognition of his contributions to economic research.
Ilya R. Segal is an economist who is currently Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, particularly contract theory, mechanism design and auction design. His research interests include the design of competition policy, property rights, contracts, auctions, and other economic mechanisms. Segal has been elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and member of the Toulouse Network for Information Technology. His other awards include Compass Lexecon prize for “the most significant contribution to the understanding and implementation of competition policy,” a Guggenheim Fellowship, a fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, and a Hoover Fellowship.
Leeat Yariv is the Uwe E. Reinhardt Professor of Economics at Princeton University, a research fellow of CEPR, and a research associate of NBER. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University and has held positions at UCLA and Caltech prior to her move to Princeton in 2017, where she is the founder and director of the Princeton Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (PExL). Yariv's research focuses on political economy, market design, social and economic networks, and experimental economics.
Johannes Hörner is a French-German economist and currently Alfred Cowles Professor of Economics at Yale University. His research focuses on microeconomics and game theory.
In economic theory, the Wilson doctrine stipulates that game theory should not rely excessively on common knowledge assumptions. Most prominently, it is interpreted as a request for institutional designs to be "detail-free". That is, mechanism designers should offer solutions that do not depend on market details because they may be unknown to practitioners or are subject to intractable change. The name is due to Nobel laureate Robert Wilson, who argued:
Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is deficient to the extent it assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one agent's probability assessment about another’s preferences or information. I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.
