Wagner Group activities in Syria

Last updated
Wagner mercenaries took part in the March 2016 Palmyra offensive. Liberation of Palmyra by RSII coalition (1).jpg
Wagner mercenaries took part in the March 2016 Palmyra offensive.

The Wagner Group is a private military company (PMC) with ties to the Russian state under Vladimir Putin [1] [2] that has conducted operations in Syria since late 2015. Their presence in the country has been reported as late as 2021.

Contents

Arrival and capture of Palmyra and al-Shaer

The presence of the PMCs in Syria was first reported in late October 2015, almost a month after the start of the Russian military intervention in the country's civil war, when between three and nine PMCs were killed in a rebel mortar attack on their position in Latakia province. [3] [4] [5] It was reported that the Wagner Group was employed by the Russian Defense Ministry, even though private military companies are illegal in Russia. [6] The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed the early reports by The Wall Street Journal about the Wagner Group's operations in Syria as an "information attack". However, sources within the Russian FSB and the Defense Ministry unofficially stated for RBTH that Wagner was supervised by the GRU. [7]

Furthermore, according to a few Wagner fighters, they were flown to Syria aboard Russian military transport planes. [8] Others were transported to Syria by the Syrian Cham Wings airline from the Rostov-on-Don Airport, with 51 round trips being made between January 2017 and March 2018. [9] Their equipment was delivered to Syria via the so-called Syrian Express , [10] a fleet of Russian military and civilian merchant ships that had been delivering supplies to Syria since 2012. [11] Later, a Defense Ministry source told RBK TV that the FSB was also directing the PMCs. [10] The usage of Wagner had reportedly cost Russia 170 million dollars by August 2016. [12]

By July 2017, according to The New York Times , the Kremlin established a policy in Syria where companies that seize oil and gas wells, as well as mines, from ISIL forces would get oil and mining rights for those same sites. Two Russian companies received contracts under this policy by this time, with one employing the Wagner Group to secure those sites from the militants. [13] Later, it was revealed that the company would receive 25 percent of the proceeds from oil and gas production at fields its PMCs captured and secured from ISIL. [14] Some reports stated that the contracts with Damascus were established after Wagner lost the trust and financing of the Russian Defense Ministry in early 2016. [15] As of early August 2017, the number of Wagner employees in Syria was reported to have reached 5,000, after the arrival of an additional 2,000 PMCs, including Chechens and Ingush. [16]

Wagner PMCs were involved in both Palmyra offensives in 2016 and 2017, as well as the Syrian Army's campaign in central Syria in the summer of 2017 and the Battle of Deir ez-Zor in late 2017. [17] [18] [19] [20] They were in the role of frontline advisors, fire and movement coordinators [21] and forward air controllers who provided guidance to close air support. [22] When they arrived in Syria the PMCs received T-72 tanks, BM-21 Grad MLRs and 122 mm D-30 howitzers. [23] During the first Palmyra offensive, according to one of the contractors, the PMCs were used as "cannon fodder" and most of the work was conducted by them, with the regular Syrian Army, who he described as "chickens", only finishing the job. [8] An expert on Russian security at the IIR, Mark Galeotti, said they served as "shock troops" alongside the Syrian Army. [24]

Following the successful conclusion of the offensive, during which 32 of the contractors were reportedly killed and about 80 wounded, the PMCs were withdrawn between April and May 2016, and they surrendered all of their heavy weapons and military equipment. When they returned for the second Palmyra offensive and to capture ISIL-held oil fields at the beginning of 2017, the PMCs reportedly faced a shortage of weapons and equipment as they were issued only older assault rifles, machine guns, T-62 tanks and M-30 howitzers. Several sniper rifles and grenade launchers were delivered a few weeks later, which did not solve the issue.

According to Fontanka, the equipment problems in combination with a reported reduction in the quality of its personnel led to Wagner suffering a significantly higher number of casualties in the second battle for Palmyra than the first one. Between 40 and 60 were reported killed and between 80 and 180 were wounded. [23] The Russian investigative blogger group [25] the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) attributed the higher losses mainly to ISIL's heavy use of suicide-bombers and the militant group's unwillingness to negotiate. [18] Still, the second offensive also ended in a victory for pro-government forces. [26] [27]

Besides fighting ISIL militants, according to RBK TV, the PMCs trained a Syrian Army unit called the ISIS Hunters, which was also fully funded and trained by Russian special forces. [28] The ISIS Hunters were one of the leading units [29] during the capture of the al-Shaer gas fields from ISIL in late April 2017, as part of the 2017 Eastern Homs offensive. [30] However, as of the beginning of July, the PMCs were still fighting to secure the al-Shaer gas fields and the areas of the phosphate mines. [31] Still, in mid-September, the al-Shaer gas fields started getting back into production. [32] Subsequently, the PMCs were in charge of guarding the refineries, with ISIL occasionally making attempts to retake the fields, each time being beaten back. During one attack, a PMC was tortured to death by ISIL. [33]

Killing of Muhammad Abdullah al-Ismail

In early July 2017, a video emerged that showed Wagner PMCs bludgeoning a man who was initially believed to be a captured ISIL militant in the Palmyra area. [31]

More than two years later, full footage was uploaded to a closed VKontakte group for members of Wagner with new information asserting that the killed person was a Syrian Army soldier who had deserted. [34] [35] The contractors also accused the man, named as Muhammad Abdullah al-Ismail (or Mohammed Taha Ismail Al-Abdullah a.k.a. Hamdi Bouta) from Deir ez-Zor, of being a jihadist for wanting to desert. Ismail had fled Syria earlier in the war for Lebanon, before returning in 2017, after which he was arrested and forcibly conscripted into the Syrian military. [36] After he was killed, his body was mutilated and burned. [37] In the video of the killing, a second severed head of an unidentified person could be seen lying on the ground. [38]

A Russian independent media report identified one of the perpetrators as Stanislav Yevgenyevich Dychko, [39] a confirmed operative of the Wagner Group [34] [35] who previously worked for the Russian Interior Ministry. [39] A second one was identified as a former soldier named Ruslan from Bryansk, currently employed as a "patriotic educator" in local schools. [40] Arab media also established the place of the murder to be the al-Shaer oilfield near Homs. [41] Further investigation by Russian media in December 2019 identified the remaining perpetrators as Vladimir B., Dzhakhongyr M. ("Pamir"), Ruslan ("Chichi") and Vladislav Apostol, who was killed in Syria in February 2018. [42] The Novaya Gazeta newspaper sent the material from its investigation into the killing to the office of the Prosecutor General of Russia, as well as the Investigative Committee of Russia, however no criminal cases were opened as a result. [43]

In March 2021, human rights lawyers from three nongovernmental organizations representing the killed person's brother filed a lawsuit in Moscow against six Wagner Group PMCs accused of the killing. [44] [45] In December 2021, the Council of the European Union sanctioned Utkin for the killing, stating in a resolution that "According to a former member of the Wagner Group, Dmitry Utkin personally ordered the torturing to death of the deserter as well as the filming of the act." [46]

Push into Deir ez-Zor and clearing of Hama

In mid-September 2017, the PMCs helped Syrian troops [47] [48] to capture the town of Uqayribat from ISIL in the central Hama province. [49] [50] Several PMCs were killed during the fighting for the town and their bodies were seized by the militants. [19] One week later, the PMCs, along with regular Russian troops, supported Syrian government forces in repelling a HTS-led rebel offensive north of Hama. [51] At the end of that month, during an ISIL counter-offensive in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, two Wagner PMCs were captured by the militants. [52] [53] Initially, the Kremlin attempted to distance itself from the two, [54] while a brother of one of them accused the Russian government of rejecting them. [55]

Subsequently, the Syrian ISIS Hunters unit pledged to pay one million dollars for the release of each of the captive Russians. However, the ISIS Hunters also said they would execute 100 captive militants for each of the Russians if they were killed by the jihadists. [56] At the same time, a Russian parliamentary official stated that the two had almost certainly been executed, presumably for refusing to reject their Christian Orthodox religion, reject Russia, become Muslims and join the militant group. [57] [58] This claim was questioned by the CIT, who pointed out that there had been no reports of this effect from the militants' sources. [59]

In late October 2017, a video emerged on YouTube glorifying the PMCs actions in Syria. [60] Between the end of October and the start of November, Wagner took part in the Battle of Deir ez-Zor [20] where they cleared the remaining ISIL militants from the districts of Al-Rashidiyah and Al-Ardi, as well as the Al-Bazh and Abu-Adad neighborhoods, along with the Syrian Army. [61] Three or four companies of Wagner PMCs were involved in the fighting. [47] Syrian government forces took complete control of the city by 3 November. [62] [63] A besieged pocket of ISIL militants remained on an island in the city's outskirts, which soon came under attack. [64] As government forces advanced, the pro-opposition SOHR reported that Russia demanded the release of the two captive PMCs during negotiations with the trapped militants. [65]

On 17 November, the last ISIL fighters on the island had surrendered, leaving the Syrian Army in control of all territory surrounding Deir ez-Zor city. [66] [67] However, the two PMCs were still prisoners. At the end of November, it was reported that the Russian military was negotiating for the release of the two PMCs who were reportedly being held on the border of Syria and Iraq. [68] However, on 4 December, the ISIS Hunters reported they had killed the commander of the ISIL militants that had captured and executed the two PMCs. [69] The same day, a Wagner representative notified the parents of one of the two that both had died in captivity. [70]

At the end of November, Russia announced plans to withdraw some of its troops from Syria by the end of the year. It was reported that to avoid potential security losses, Russia would fill the void with private military companies, including Wagner. [71] On 11 December, Putin declared victory against "terrorists" during a visit to Russia's Khmeimim air base in Syria. [72]

Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies think tank, stated the usage of PMCs was one of the factors that contributed to Russia's victory in Syria. He pointed out that Russia managed to remove the need for deploying large numbers of ground forces by bringing in the Russian PMCs who, unlike American PMCs who were usually only in support roles, were used as highly capable assault troops and that they were often embedded with Syrian units to increase their fighting ability. He also pointed out that the Russian public proved completely indifferent to the losses suffered by the PMCs, believing that "these people are highly paid, and knew what they were getting into". [73]

In December 2017, the PMCs took part in the Syrian Army's offensive into Idlib province against mostly HTS rebel forces. [74] As part of the same campaign in the northwest of Syria, in early February 2018, the PMCs helped in the capture of several villages in the northeastern countryside of Hama from IS. [75] Between 3 and 7 February, pro-government forces seized at least 25 villages, [76] shrinking the IS pocket in that part of the country by a reported 80 percent. [77] The pocket was cleared on 9 February. [78]

Battle of Khasham

Syrian Democratic Forces in Baghuz south west of Khaasham, five days after the battle. SDF in Baghuz, 12 February 2019 (2).png
Syrian Democratic Forces in Baghuz south west of Khaasham, five days after the battle.

At about 10 pm, local time, on 7 February 2018, a battle began near the Syrian town of Khasham in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, between pro-Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led SDF, supported by the U.S. military. During the clashes, U.S. aircraft attacked Syrian troops, killing 45 to 100 government fighters. [79] [80]

A Russian newspaper, citing Russian military and contractor sources, reported pro-government forces were attempting to capture the ConocoPhillips (locally called Al Tabiyeh) gas field from the SDF. [81] [82] According to two U.S. defense officials, the U.S. military assessed that Russian PMCs also participated in the assault, with one saying some of the contractors had been killed in the air-strikes. [83] A Kurdish militia commander and an ex-Russian officer also claimed Russian contractors suffered casualties during the fighting. [83] [84]

On 19 February 2018, a publication by the Ukraine-based Inform Napalm alleged the battle was planned and cleared with the Russian military command by Sergey Kim, the chief of Wagner's operations department and a former Russian Marine officer. [85] [86] An official statement by the ISIS Hunters unit stated they had received intelligence that ISIL forces were moving towards Khasham and government forces decided to move from the Euphrates so as to cut off ISIL's line of attack. At this point, armed groups were spotted east of Khasham, in SDF-held territory, which then attacked the government's troops. The groups were quickly pushed back. The military claimed that, according to intercepted radio traffic, the groups were partly ISIL and partly Kurds, and retreated towards the Conoco factory. At this point, pro-government units were hit by air-strikes. [87]

According to Germany's Der Spiegel , the ferocious American response was primarily triggered by a unit of Syrian tribal militia and Shiite fighters moving from the town of Al Tabiyeh towards Khasham, concurrently with another group of pro-government forces that had crossed the Euphrates River near the Deir ez-Zor Airport advancing towards Khasham from the village of Marrat. Der Spiegel reported no Russians were in either formation; yet there was a small contingent of Russian PMCs stationed in Al Tabiyeh, who were not participating in the fighting. [88] Similarly, the SOHR activist organization reported that the Russian PMCs, who were accompanying government forces as they advanced towards the SDF-held oil and gas fields, were killed at Al Tabiyeh. Furthermore, the SOHR stated they were not killed in the air-strikes, but instead in a booby-trapped explosion at an arms depot. [89]

Several days after the battle, various Russian groups started confirming a number of Wagner PMCs had been killed in the air-strikes. [90] [91] Some posts on Russian social media made claims of over 200 Russian PMCs being killed, although the veracity of this information was questioned [92] and could not be confirmed. [93] A Russian paramilitary chief, critical of the killed contractors, also claimed 218 PMCs were killed and that the families were still waiting for their remains. [94] A Russian military doctor, a leader of a PMC-linked paramilitary Cossack organization, a source with ties to Wagner and the Ukrainian SBU claimed 80–100 PMCs were killed and 100–200 wounded. [95] [96] The SBU further named 64 of the PMCs. [97] A Russian journalist believed between 20 and 25 PMCs died in the strikes, [92] while similarly CIT estimated a total of between 20 and 30 had died. [98]

The Novaya Gazeta reported a Russian death toll of 13, while the ataman of the Baltic separate Cossack District, Maxim Buga, stated no more than 15–20 died and that the other estimates were exaggerations. [99] On 19 February, one of Wagner's leaders, Andrei Troshev, was quoted as saying 14 "volunteers" died in the battle. [100] [101] Three other Wagner commanders also stated the claim of 200 dead was an exaggeration and that 15 PMCs were killed at the most. [102] Russia officially confirmed five presumably Russian citizens had been killed in the air-strikes. [103] Der Spiegel and the SOHR reported mostly Syrians were killed in the strikes. [88] [104]

As of late March, the PMCs remained in the same area and were using local pro-government troops to scout coalition positions. [105] According to former Wagner members, the battle at Khasham had an impact that lead to changes to the organization, with the PMCs subsequently being given only guard duties at the local plants. [106]

Securing of Damascus

On 18 February 2018, the Syrian military launched an offensive against the rebel-held Eastern Ghouta, east of Damascus, [107] [108] and split the region into three separate pockets by 12 March. [109] [110]

As of 17 March, 82 percent of Eastern Ghouta was captured by the Syrian Army. [111] One of the towns captured by government troops during this time was Mesraba. [112] On 18 March, the rebels launched a counter-attack in an attempt to recapture Mesraba and quickly seized most of the town from government forces. Wagner PMCs then reportedly launched an operation and during the night between 18 and 19 March, fully recaptured Mesraba. [113]

Another mission they were charged with during the offensive was to secure the humanitarian corridor established by the Russian Reconciliation Center for Syria that allowed civilians to leave rebel-held areas for government territory. According to the center, 79,702 people had left rebel-held parts of Eastern Ghouta as of 19 March. [113] By 23 March, the SOHR put the number of those who left rebel areas or remained in two towns seized by government forces at 120,000, while the UN stated 50,000 had left the besieged areas. [114] The whole Eastern Ghouta region was captured by government forces on 14 April, [115] [116] effectively ending the near 7-year rebellion near Damascus. [117]

In March, an anonymous senior commander of the Wagner Group was quoted as saying that there were five Wagner companies operating in Syria, as well as The Carpathians (Russian : Карпаты, romanized: Karpaty) company attached to Wagner, composed mainly of Ukrainian citizens. [102] The Carpathians consisted of about 100 fighters. [118] In May, the SBU announced it identified Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Demyanenko of the Russian Armed Forces as the Carpathians' trainer. According to the announcement, the unit was formed to conduct reconnaissance and attacks in Ukraine. [119] Belarusians were also said to be among Wagner's contractors. [120]

Post-major combat

As of the end of November 2018, the PMCs were conducting very few combat missions. Instead, they were stationed at facilities and it was stated that during the past summer a company trained for three months at a base, 70 kilometers from Deir ez-Zor, for riot control. [121]

At the start of May 2019, it was reported Wagner snipers were being deployed along the Idlib frontline in northwest Syria in anticipation of a Syrian Army offensive. [122] The ground offensive was launched on 6 May, after a week-long aerial campaign against rebel territory, [123] with pro-government troops managing to capture two major towns within three days. Photos and videos appeared to show at least one Russian PMC accompanying Syrian troops into one of the towns. [124] Members of the Russian special forces were also present during the offensive. [125]

In early September, the PMC's were preparing for an offensive to assault the rebel-held city of Idlib. They have grouped into 50-man tank-equipped units supported by Russian air forces. While working with regular Syrian government forces, they were first to establish civilian evacuation corridors and then engage in the attack on the city. [126]

On 15 October 2019, Syrian government forces entered the city of Manbij and its surrounding countryside, as US military forces started a withdrawal from the area, [127] which was completed by the end of the day. [128] Subsequently, the Russian military started patrols between rebel and government-held areas in the Manbij district. [129] It was thought that Wagner PMCs were involved in the taking over of an abandoned US military base in the area, due to the confirmed presence of a Russian journalist who was known to regularly follow the contractors. [130]

In mid-January 2020, tense standoffs started with US troops blocking Russian military vehicles from using the M4 highway in northeastern Syria. Almost half a dozen incidents took place towards the end of the month. [131] [132] In early February, vehicles carrying Russian contractors were also blocked by US troops on the highways. According to the US, the incidents took place deep inside territory patrolled by their military and the Kurdish-led SDF. [133]

As of early February, PMCs were posted at the frontline in the Al-Ghab Plain of Hama province. [134] In April, the Wagner-linked Russian security contractor "Evro Polis" delivered 50 ventilators, 10,000 coronavirus test kits, and 2,000 items of protective clothing to Syria amid the coronavirus pandemic. [135] At the end of December 2020, ISIL attacks intensified in eastern Syria, after the PMCs reportedly withdrew from Deir ez-Zor province to Latakia. [136]

In late December 2021, Wagner PMCs took part in a large-scale military operation against ISIL cells in the Syrian desert. [137]

On 15 March 2023, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that 266 Russian PMCs were killed in Syria during the civil war. [138]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Slavonic Corps</span> Russian Hong Kong-registered military contractor

The Slavonic Corps was an 18 January 2012 established firm registered in Hong Kong as a private military contractor (PMC) that operated during the Syrian civil war for 113 days after which many of these fighters established the Wagner Group.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deir ez-Zor Governorate campaign</span> Military operation

The Deir ez-Zor Governorate campaign of the Syrian civil war consists of several battles and offensives fought across the governorate of Syria:

The Deir ez-Zor offensive was a military operation launched by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the Deir ez-Zor air base and the surrounding areas.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deir ez-Zor offensive (2016)</span> ISIL military operation

The Deir ez-Zor offensive (2016) was an ISIL military operation, during which it took over the northern suburbs of Deir ez-Zor on 16 January 2016, and killed from 135 to 300 people, while also kidnapping about 400 others.

The Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war started on 30 September 2015, with 4,000 Russian military personnel being stationed in Syria. The Russian forces also consisted of 25 strategic bombers, 20 tactical bombers, 12 attack bombers, 8 fighter aircraft, 16 attack helicopters and various other aircraft.

The September 2016 Deir ez-Zor air raid was a series of 37 U.S.-led Coalition airstrikes near the Deir ez-Zor Airport in eastern Syria on 17 September 2016, lasting from 3:55 p.m. to 4:56 p.m. Damascus time in which Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers were killed conducting operations against the Islamic State. Russia reported that at least 62 SAA soldiers were killed, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said at least 80 were killed and 120 wounded. The United States said that the intended target was Islamic State militants and that the attack on Syrian soldiers was due to a misidentification of ground forces while the Syrian and Russian governments claimed that it was an intentional attack against Syrian troops. The attack triggered "a diplomatic firestorm" with Russia calling an emergency United Nations Security Council meeting. Later, the Syrian government called off a ceasefire that had been the result of months of intense diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and Russian governments.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Siege of Deir ez-Zor (2014–2017)</span> Siege in the Syrian Civil War

The siege of Deir ez-Zor was a large-scale siege imposed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) against several districts in the city of Deir ez-Zor held by the Syrian Army, in an attempt to capture the city and secure full control of the Deir ez-Zor Governorate. The ISIL siege of the city lasted for almost 3 years and 2 months, after which the Syrian Army launched a successful offensive that fully recaptured the city nine weeks later.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Central Syria campaign</span> Military operation of the Syrian Army

The Central Syria campaign, known as "Operation Khuzam", or "Lavender", was a large-scale military operation of the Syrian Army (SAA) against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the Syrian Civil War. Its goal was to capture the strategic oil town of Al-Sukhnah, and besiege and capture 11,000 square kilometers of ISIL territory in central Syria, after which the Syrian Army would advance towards Deir ez-Zor, and lift the three-year ISIL siege of the government's enclave in the city. Afterwards, the Syrian Army advanced towards the Islamic State's then-capital of Mayadin.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Wagner Group</span> Russian private military company

The Wagner Group, officially known as PMC Wagner, is a Russian state-funded private military company (PMC) controlled until 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former close ally of Russia's president Vladimir Putin. The Wagner Group has used infrastructure of the Russian Armed Forces. Evidence suggests that Wagner has been used as a proxy by the Russian government, allowing it to have plausible deniability for military operations abroad, and hiding the true casualties of Russia's foreign interventions.

The following is a timeline of the Syrian Civil War from September to December 2017. Information about aggregated casualty counts is found at Casualties of the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deir ez-Zor campaign (2017–2019)</span> Part of the Syrian Civil War (2017–2019)

The Deir ez-Zor campaign, codenamed the al-Jazeera Storm campaign, was a military operation launched by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria's Deir ez-Zor Governorate in 2017 during the Syrian Civil War with the goal of capturing territory in eastern Syria, particularly east and north of the Euphrates river. The U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR) anti-ISIL coalition provided extensive air support while SDF personnel composed the majority of the ground forces; OIR special forces and artillery units were also involved in the campaign.

The 2017 Euphrates Crossing offensive was a military offensive launched by the Syrian Arab Army against members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, following the breaking of the three-year siege of the city of Deir ez-Zor. The Euphrates Crossing offensive, conducted by government troops, was done with the aim of denying US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the US itself leverage over the Syrian government.

The 2017 Mayadin offensive was a military offensive launched by the Syrian Arab Army against members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, following the breaking of the three-year siege of the city of Deir ez-Zor. The Mayadin offensive, conducted by Syrian Army troops, was conducted with the aim of capturing ISIL's new de facto capital of Mayadin, and securing the villages and towns around it.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deir ez-Zor offensive (September–November 2017)</span> Military operation launched by the Syrian Armed Forces

The Deir ez-Zor offensive was a military operation launched by the Syrian Armed Forces to completely expel the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from the city of Deir ez-Zor, a provincial capital, located on the banks of the Euphrates river. From 2014 until 2017, the city had been divided into Syrian government and ISIL-controlled halves. The rest of the Governorate (province) was under ISIL control for most of this time, putting the government-controlled half of the city under siege.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2017 Abu Kamal offensive</span> Military offensive

The 2017 Abu Kamal offensive, codenamed Operation Fajr-3, was a military offensive launched by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate. The aim of the offensive was to capture ISIL's last urban stronghold in Syria, the border town of Abu Kamal. This offensive was a part of the larger Eastern Syria campaign.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Eastern Syria campaign</span> Military operation

The Eastern Syria campaign of September–December 2017 was a large-scale military operation of the Syrian Army (SAA) and its allies against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the Syrian Civil War. Its goal was to clear the city of Deir ez-Zor of any remaining ISIL forces, capture ISIL's de facto capital of Mayadin, as well as seize the border town of Abu Kamal, which became one of ISIL's final urban strongholds by the latter stages of the campaign.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Khasham</span> 2018 battle of the Syrian Civil War

The Battle of Khasham, also known as the Battle of Conoco Fields, was a military engagement of the Syrian civil war fought on 7 February 2018 near the towns of Khasham and Al Tabiyeh in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, Syria. The Operation Inherent Resolve coalition delivered air and artillery strikes on Syrian Armed Forces and pro-government militias after they reportedly engaged a U.S. military and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) position in the region.

The Deir ez-Zor offensive (2018) was launched by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant against government-held areas throughout the Deir ez-Zor Governorate of Eastern Syria. During the offensive, on 8 June, ISIL managed to penetrate the city of Abu Kamal, capturing several parts of it.

On 29 April 2018, clashes took place between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir ez-Zor Governorate.

The Syrian Desert campaign is a campaign waged by Syrian government forces and their allies, including Iran and Russia, against the remaining forces of the Islamic State (IS) in the Syrian Desert region.

References

    1. Faulkner, Christopher (June 2022). Cruickshank, Paul; Hummel, Kristina (eds.). "Undermining Democracy and Exploiting Clients: The Wagner Group's Nefarious Activities in Africa" (PDF). CTC Sentinel . 15 (6). West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center: 28–37. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 July 2022. Retrieved 16 August 2022.
    2. "What is the Wagner Group, Russia's mercenary organisation?". The Economist. ISSN   0013-0613 . Retrieved 16 March 2022. "From a legal perspective, Wagner doesn't exist," says Sorcha MacLeod
    3. Karouny, Mariam (20 October 2015). "Three Russians killed in Syria: pro-government source". Reuters . Retrieved 21 October 2015.
    4. Grove, Thomas (18 December 2015). "Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say". The Wall Street Journal . Retrieved 23 December 2015.
    5. Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. (21 June 2016). "How Many Russian Soldiers Have Died in Syria?". The Daily Beast . Retrieved 18 September 2017.
    6. "More Russian Fighters from Private 'Wagner Group' Die in Syria". The Moscow Times . 22 March 2017. Retrieved 4 August 2017.
    7. "Russia's Wagner group fighters sighted in Syria". RBC. No. 9. 31 August 2016. Retrieved 18 September 2017 via Russia Beyond.
    8. 1 2 "Revealed: Russia's 'Secret Syria Mercenaries'". Sky News. 10 August 2016. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
    9. "How a secret Russian airlift helps Syria's Assad". Reuters.com. 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on 6 April 2018.
    10. 1 2 Rozhdestvensky, Ilya; Bayev, Anton; Rusyayeva, Polina (September 2016). Призраки войны: как в Сирии появилась российская частная армия. RBC (in Russian). No. 9. Retrieved 25 August 2016.
    11. Parker 2017, p. 6.
    12. "Moscow denies IS captives are Russian soldiers". iReporterOnline. 5 October 2017. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    13. Kramer, Andrew E. (5 July 2017). "Russia Deploys a Potent Weapon in Syria: The Profit Motive" . The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331. Archived from the original on 5 July 2017. Retrieved 4 August 2017.
    14. "Thousands of Russian private contractors fighting in Syria". AP News. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    15. "'Wagner Group': the mercenaries serving Putin in Syria". France 24. 22 March 2018.
    16. Nemtsova, Anna (2 January 2018). "A Russian Blackwater? Putin's Secret Soldiers in Ukraine and Syria". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    17. Korotkov, Denis (29 March 2016). Они сражались за Пальмиру (in Russian). Fontanka.ru. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
    18. 1 2 Leviev, Ruslan (22 March 2017). "They fought for Palmyra… again: Russian mercenaries killed in battle with ISIS". Conflict Intelligence Team. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
    19. 1 2 "After inflicting heavy losses on the regime forces, ISIS restore its stronghold in Hama and the regime desperate to retake Uqayribat". Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 11 September 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
    20. 1 2 "The media reported the death of another soldier PMC Wagner in Syria". en.news-4-u.ru. Archived from the original on 1 March 2021. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    21. Owen Matthews. PUTIN’S SECRET ARMIES WAGED WAR IN SYRIA—WHERE WILL THEY FIGHT NEXT?, Newsweek , 17 January 2018.
    22. "Секретные армии Кремля". charter97.org. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    23. 1 2 "What losses PMC Wagner suffered in Syria". Fontanka.ru. 22 August 2017. Archived from the original on 8 October 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017 via RusLetter.
    24. "How 'Wagner' came to Syria" The Economist , 2 November 2017.
    25. "The Conflict Intelligence Team Versus The Kremlin". Khodorkovsky.com. 4 April 2016. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    26. "Syrian army announces recapture of Palmyra from Islamic State". Reuters . 2 March 2017. Archived from the original on March 2, 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    27. Dearden, Lizzie (2 March 2017). "Isis driven out of ancient Syrian city of Palmyra for second time". The Independent . Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    28. Rozin, Igor (7 March 2017). "Mysterious Russian private military group pops up again in media reports". Russia Beyond . Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    29. Fadel, Leith (24 April 2017). "ISIS Hunters on the verge of liberating the strategic Al-Sha'er Gas Fields". al-Masdar News . Archived from the original on 2 May 2019. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    30. Fadel, Leith (26 April 2017). "ISIL falls apart in northern Palmyra as Syrian Army troops liberate strategic gas fields". al-Masdar News . Archived from the original on 2 May 2019. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    31. 1 2 McLoughlin, Paul (1 July 2017). "Syrian man filmed being bludgeoned with hammer blows by 'Russian mercenaries'". The New Arab . Retrieved 18 September 2017.
    32. "Al-Sha'er gas field in Homs restarts production". Syrian Arab News Agency. 14 September 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    33. "Наемник ЧВК Вагнера: Половину людей "накрыло" прямо в машинах". charter97.org.
    34. 1 2 "Головорезы (21+)". Новая газета – Novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). Retrieved 22 November 2019.
    35. 1 2 Moscow, Marc Bennetts. "Investigators say man filmed beheading Syrian is Russian Wagner Group mercenary". The Times.
    36. Ensor, Josie (18 November 2019). "Russian mercenaries 'beat and beheaded Syrian man' in leaked video" . The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 11 January 2022.
    37. "Russian Mercenaries Linked to Gruesome Syrian Torture and Beheading Video". 21 November 2019.
    38. "Man who filmed beheading of Syrian identified as Russian mercenary". The Guardian . 21 November 2019.
    39. 1 2 "Russian Press Names Wagner Mercenary as Likely Perpetrator in Gruesome Syria Beheading". The Moscow Times. 22 April 2020.
    40. "One of the suspected Russian mercenaries who helped torture and execute a man in Syria is now reportedly teaching kids about patriotism in Bryansk". meduza.io. Retrieved 25 November 2019.
    41. "Journalists say Russian mercenaries in Syria tortured, beheaded, and burned a deserter from Assad's army. For fun". Meduza. Retrieved 22 November 2019.
    42. "Опознаны все 5 российских головорезов из состава ЧВК "Вагнер", жестоко казнившие пленного сирийца в 2017 году". Информационный навигатор (in Russian). 13 December 2019. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
    43. "Головорезы 2.0". Новая газета – Novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). 21 April 2020. Retrieved 23 April 2020.
    44. Rondeaux, Candace (15 March 2021). "Russian Paramilitaries Accused of Torture and Beheading in Landmark Legal Case Against Wagner Group". The Daily Beast via thedailybeast.com.
    45. "Syria: NGOs file torture case against Russian Wagner fighters | DW | 15.03.2021". Deutsche Welle.
    46. Regulation (EU) No 2021/2195 of 13 December 2021 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses
    47. 1 2 "Признание бойца ЧВК Вагнера: "Шойгу приказал отобрать у нас оружие"". ura.news. 22 October 2018.
    48. "Former Russian mercenary lifts lid on secretive Wagner Group". rfi.fr. Radio France Internationale. 21 May 2022.
    49. "معركة الوجود الأخير يخوضها تنظيم "الدولة الإسلامية" وأكثر من 400 قتيل من قوات النظام والتنظيم خلال أقل من أسبوعين من القتال الطاحن". 15 September 2017.
    50. "Russia touts essential role in Syria's advance against IS". France 24. 18 September 2017.
    51. Tomson, Chris (21 September 2017). "VIDEO: Russian Army intervenes in northern Hama, drives back Al-Qaeda militants". al-Masdar News . Archived from the original on 12 June 2019. Retrieved 24 September 2017.
    52. Fahmy, Omar (3 October 2017). "Islamic State releases video it says shows two Russians captured in Syria". Reuters . Archived from the original on October 3, 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    53. Roth, Andrew (5 October 2017). "The Russian captives who may link Syria, Ukraine and the Kremlin's fight against the opposition". The Washington Post . Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    54. "Kremlin distances itself from captured 'Russian soldiers' in Isis propaganda video". The Independent . 4 October 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    55. "Media: FSB tells family of Russian prisoner captured by ISIS in Syria not to cause stir". 5 October 2017. Retrieved 5 October 2017.
    56. O'Connor, Tom (5 October 2017). "Syria's 'ISIS Hunters' Offer $1 Million for Russian Hostages". Newsweek . Retrieved 7 October 2017.
    57. 2 Russians Who Refused to Reject Jesus on Camera 'Almost Certainly' Killed by ISIS The Christian Post, 6 October 2017.
    58. Депутат Госдумы заявил о возможной казни в Сирии двух якобы плененных россиян Interfax, 5 October 2017.
    59. "28 сентября пришло 12 гробов" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 October 2017.
    60. "Video Glorifying Russian Mercenaries in Syria Trends on YouTube". 25 October 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    61. Dmitriy. "В боях в Сирии погиб уроженец Оренбурга Сергей Карпунин". geo-politica.info. Archived from the original on 19 September 2020. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    62. "Syria declares victory over Islamic State in Deir al-Zor". Reuters. 3 November 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
    63. "Isis dealt twin blows with loss of Deir ez-Zor and key Iraq border post". The Guardian. Agence France-Presse. 3 November 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
    64. "Syrian Army resumes offensive to expel ISIS from large Deir Ezzor island". almasdarnews.com. 11 November 2017. Archived from the original on 21 November 2018. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    65. "Fears for the lives of about 150 citizens in besieged Hawija Katea of being shelled by the regime forces which started to advance towards it through water bridges". 11 November 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    66. "ISIS mass surrenders large Deir Ezzor island, 250+ terrorists captured". AMN News. 17 November 2017. Archived from the original on 19 May 2019. Retrieved 17 November 2017.
    67. "After an undisclosed agreement, the regime forces imposes their control over Hwyjet Katea' and tens of ISIS members surrender, the fate of about 150 civilians in it is unknown". 17 November 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    68. "Russia negotiating the release of two nationals captured by IS". 1 December 2017. Archived from the original on 1 March 2021. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    69. "+18: Russian-Trained Syrian Unit Eliminates Scores Of ISIS In Black Operation". 4 December 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    70. "В ЧВК "Вагнера" сообщили родителям плененного "ИГ" россиянина о его смерти". tsn.ua. 16 December 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    71. eakin (29 November 2017). "Private military companies: Moscow's other army in Syria" . Retrieved 12 December 2017.
    72. Vladimir Isachenkov. "Russia's Putin stops at Russian military base in Syria". The Washington Post. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 11 December 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    73. Pukhov, Ruslan (10 December 2017). "Moscow-based think tank director: Russia's unexpected military victory in Syria". defensenews.com. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    74. "Еще один доброволец из Томской области погиб в Сирии". vtomske.ru. 15 January 2018. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
    75. "Бойцы ЧВК Вагнера помогли освободить населенные пункты на северо-востоке Хамы". Правда.Ру. 5 February 2018.
    76. "The clashes continue in the besieged circle within 3 provinces between the regime forces and their allies against ISIS • The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights". 7 February 2018.
    77. Aboufadel, Leith (7 February 2018). "Syrian Army liberates 80 percent of ISIL's pocket in northeast Hama – map". Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 8 February 2018.
    78. "Islamic State fighters move to Syria's Idlib, clash with factions, sources say". Reuters. 9 February 2018.
    79. "Syria says rare US strike an effort 'to support terrorism'". ABC News .
    80. "U.S. dismisses fears of wider war after deadly Syria clashes". Reuters.com. Reuters. 8 February 2018. Archived from the original on November 27, 2018.
    81. "Diplomats specify who was killed by an American strike (Дипломаты уточняют, кто погиб от американского удара)". Kommersant . 14 February 2018.
    82. Bergengruen, Vera; Daragahi, Borzou; al-Awad, Munzer (13 February 2018). "Here's What We Know About The US Airstrikes That Killed Russian Fighters In Syria". BuzzFeed. Retrieved 14 February 2018.
    83. 1 2 Barbara Starr; Ryan Browne (7 February 2018). "US-led coalition strikes kill pro-regime forces in Syria". CNN.
    84. Times, The Moscow (9 February 2018). "U.S. Airstrikes Kill 100 Russian and Syrian Fighters, Reports Say". The Moscow Times.
    85. Провальную операцию РФ в Хишаме планировал начальник оперативного отделения ЧВК «Вагнера» Сергей Ким Inform Napalm, 19 February 2018.
    86. Wagner's failed attack on US forces in Syria ‘led by former Russian Marine officer’ Kyiv Post , 19 February 2018.
    87. Aboufadel, Leith (11 February 2018). "Pro-gov't ISIS Hunters release official statement after US airstrikes in Deir Ezzor". Archived from the original on 12 February 2018. Retrieved 3 August 2018.
    88. 1 2 Christoph Reuter. American Fury: The Truth About the Russian Deaths in Syria: Hundreds of Russian soldiers are alleged to have died in U.S. airstrikes at the beginning of February. Reporting by DER SPIEGEL shows that events were likely very different. Der Spiegel , 2 March 2018.
    89. Fifteen Russian security staff killed in Syria explosion: The incident at a weapons depot follows the reported deaths of scores of Russian mercenaries in a US-led coalition attack last week The Guardian, 15 February 2018.
    90. "Russians dead in 'battle' in Syria's east". Yahoo! News. Archived from the original on 2020-11-09. Retrieved 2023-02-02.
    91. Aboufadel, Leith (13 February 2018). "US attack on pro-gov't forces in Deir Ezzor killed more than 10 Russians (photos)". Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 13 February 2018.
    92. 1 2 "More than 200 Russians may have been killed in Coalition strikes in Syria". 10 February 2018.
    93. "Reports of Russian Deaths Underscore Dangers of Syria's War". U.S. News & World report. 13 February 2018.
    94. "The business of war: Russian mercenaries in Syria". France 24. 23 February 2018. Retrieved 23 February 2018.
    95. "Russian toll in Syria battle was 300 killed and wounded: sources". Reuters. 16 February 2018.
    96. "ЧВК "Вагнера" в Сирии и на Донбассее: 40 уничтоженных авиацией США наемников 7 февраля 2018". Цензор.НЕТ. 29 July 2018.
    97. SBU publishes list of 206 non-TOE employees of the Directorate of General Staff of Russian Army, members of Wagner PMC, plus personal data on eight more killed mercs
      SBU releases personal details of 11 Russian Wagner PMC mercenaries who fought in Donbas separatists’ ranks. PHOTOS
      Hrytsak: “The lie stained with blood, greed and fear for the committed crimes – this is the true face of Russian special services. The situation with the passports of killed mercenaries is a glaring confirmation.” Archived 26 June 2020 at the Wayback Machine
    98. Tim Lister; Mary Ilyushina; Sebastian Shukla (18 February 2018). "The oil field carnage that Moscow doesn't want to talk about". CNN.
    99. "Названо точное число россиян, погибших в Сирии из-за удара США". vz.ru.
    100. В Сирии погибло 14 человек – руководитель ЧВК "Вагнер" Трошев Андрей Pravda.ru, 17 February 2018.
    101. "PMC Wagner chief: 14 were killed in Syria". PravdaReport. 19 February 2018. Archived from the original on 19 February 2018. Retrieved 28 May 2020.
    102. 1 2 "Проект 'Мясорубка'. Рассказывают три командира 'ЧВК Вагнера'" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 March 2018. (in Russian)
    103. "Russia says U.S. airstrike killed 5 of its citizens". CBS News. 15 February 2018.
    104. "About 220 casualties and wounded of the Russian security companies, the regime forces and their allies in Coalition's bombing and the explosion of a warehouse of the Russian protection forces east of Euphrates". Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 14 February 2018.
    105. Ryan Browne; Barbara Starr (20 March 2018). "Pro-Syrian regime forces building up near US troops in Syria". CNN.
    106. "Вагнера в охрану. Бывший командир рассказал о новом облике ЧВК". Радио Свобода. 16 March 2019.
    107. "Syrian government air strikes kill 71 and wound 325 in 24 hours, monitor says". Independent. 19 February 2018. Retrieved 20 February 2018.
    108. "Syria forces ready for assault on rebel enclave". France 24. 18 February 2018. Retrieved 20 February 2018.
    109. Jomana Karadsheh, Tamara Qiblawi and Lauren Said-Moorhouse (12 March 2018). "Syrian regime forces cut Eastern Ghouta into three parts". CNN. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
    110. Syria war: Thousands flee Eastern Ghouta as army advances, BBC News, 15 March 2018
    111. "Fears for the lives of civilians after the regime forces advanced in the southwestern pocket of the Eastern Ghouta under heavy fire cover". SOHR. 17 March 2018.
    112. "Syrian troops cut major roads in suburbs of Damascus". ABC News. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
    113. 1 2 "ЧВК "Вагнер" не дала боевикам уничтожить мирное население Восточной Гуты / ИА REX". iarex.ru.
    114. Barrington, Lisa (23 March 2018). "Syrian army celebrates as rebels quit most of their Ghouta stronghold". Reuters.com. Reuters.
    115. "The Latest: Syrian army says it has retaken eastern Ghouta". Ynetnews. 15 April 2018.
    116. Aboufadel, Leith (14 April 2018). "East Ghouta officially under the Syrian Army's control after last militant convoy leaves Douma". Archived from the original on 23 November 2018. Retrieved 19 May 2018.
    117. "Western airstrikes unlikely to impact Assad's war machine". ABC News. Associated Press.
    118. "Ukrainians fight and die among Russian Wagner mercenaries | KyivPost – Ukraine's Global Voice". Kyiv Post. 27 February 2018.
    119. "Ukraine's SBU identifies chief instructor of Ukrainian unit at Russia's PMC Wagner". unian.info.
    120. "СБУ: Мы идентифицировали личности 11 белорусов из ЧВК Вагнера, воевавших в Сирии". TUT.BY. 26 July 2018. Archived from the original on 13 May 2021. Retrieved 30 July 2018.
    121. Илья Барабанов; Андрей Сошников; Анастасия Напалкова; Павел Аксенов (23 November 2018). "От Африки до Украины. Где воюет "ЧВК Вагнера" и кто построил им церковь" (in Russian). BBC News Russian.
    122. "In pictures: Russian snipers deployed near Idlib front as offensive approaches". Al-Masdar News. 1 May 2019. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Retrieved 1 May 2019.
    123. "Syrian government troops launch an offensive against rebels in the country's northwest". Los Angeles Times. 6 May 2019.
    124. Cornish, Chloe; Khattab, Asser (9 May 2019). "Syrian pro-regime forces renew advance on rebel-held Idlib". Financial Times.
    125. "Russian special forces take part in northwestern Hama offensive (photos)". 10 May 2019. Archived from the original on 27 April 2020. Retrieved 10 May 2019.
    126. Putin's ‘Chef’ Preps Soldiers for Final Assault on Syrian Rebels, Bloomberg, 6 September 2019
    127. "قوات النظام تبدأ دخول مدينة منبج شمال شرق حلب بالتزامن مع استمرار انسحاب قوات التحالف من المدينة". 15 October 2019.
    128. "U.S. coalition: 'We are out' of Syria's Manbij". Reuters. 15 October 2019.
    129. McKernan, Bethan (15 October 2019). "Russian troops patrol between Turkish and Syrian forces on border". The Guardian.
    130. Bostock, Bill. "Video shows the inside of an abandoned US camp in Syria taken over by Russian mercenaries". Business Insider.
    131. "Fresh Russian-U.S. 'Skirmish' Reported in Syria". The Moscow Times. 27 January 2020.
    132. "U.S. troops block Russian vehicles from reaching Simalka border crossing with northern Iraq". 4 February 2020.
    133. Donati, Jessica (6 February 2020). "U.S. Troops in Standoffs With Russian Military Contractors in Syria". The Wall Street Journal.
    134. "Russian military at front-lines in northwestern Syria: photos". Al-Masdar News. 8 February 2020. Archived from the original on 14 June 2021. Retrieved 8 February 2020.
    135. Mackinnon, Amy (27 November 2023). "Russia's Shadowy Mercenaries Offer Humanitarian Aid to Clean Image".
    136. "Политолог: в Сирии ужесточились бои после вывода ЧВК "Вагнера"". ura.news. 11 January 2021.
    137. "Supported by Regime forces | Wagner and Fatemiyoun launch military campaign against ISIS in Syrian desert • The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights". 22 December 2021.
    138. "Syrian Revolution 12 years on | Nearly 614,000 persons killed since the onset of the revolution in March 2011". SOHR. 15 March 2023. Archived from the original on 15 March 2023. Retrieved 15 March 2023.

    Sources