 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
All 90 seats in the Supreme Council 46 seats needed for a majority | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
|---|
| Constitution |
Snap parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Kyrgyzstan by 30 November 2025 to elect 90 members of the Supreme Council, following the self-dissolution of parliament in September 2025. [1] The parliamentary elections were initially planned for November 2026 under the regular electoral calendar. [2]
The Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan (Jogorku Kenesh), the country's unicameral parliament, was elected in November 2021 following the annulment of the 2020 parliamentary election s and the resignation of President Sooronbay Jeenbekov. These elections were the first conducted under constitutional amendments adopted earlier in 2021, which strengthened presidential powers and reduced parliamentary authority. The legislature consisted of 90 deputies, elected through a mixed-member majoritarian representation. [3]
In 2024, the government implemented major administrative-territorial reforms, redefining the boundaries of rural municipalities (aiyl aimaks) and cities, reorganizing local councils, and clarifying the competencies of local authorities. Observers noted that these reforms created a misalignment between parliamentary representation and the newly structured administrative units.
Speculation about early parliamentary elections began in early 2025. In February, Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu dismissed rumors of early voting, confirming that both parliamentary and presidential elections would follow their constitutionally scheduled dates. [4] [5] In April 2025, parliament approved a constitutional amendment moving the next presidential election to January 2027, separating it from the parliamentary elections originally scheduled for November 2026. [6] [7] Officials, including Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Edil Baisalov, emphasized that no early elections were planned at that time. [8]
On 2 July 2025, President Sadyr Japarov made an unannounced working visit to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, ostensibly to discuss bilateral issues and migration concerns. That trip prompted speculation that Japarov may also have been seeking tacit support from Russia for early parliamentary elections, given forecasts that such elections could occur ahead of the 2026 schedule. [9] [10] Japarov publicly denied those claims, stating electoral timing is a purely internal matter. [11]
By mid-September 2025, a group of deputies initiated a proposal for early self-dissolution of the Supreme Council. The initiative reportedly began around 15 September 2025 and gathered the 32 signatures required to trigger parliamentary consideration, with Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu confirming receipt of the 32-deputy proposal and noted that its arguments were reasonable. The initiative group emphasized that holding the parliamentary elections alongside the presidential election in January 2027 would overburden the Central Election Commission and create logistical challenges. [12]
On 23 September 2025, the Committee on Constitutional Legislation, State Structure, Judicial and Legal Issues, and Rules of Procedure approved the proposal. By this time, debate over early dissolution had intensified. [13] Central Election Commission (CEC) chairman Tynchynbek Shainazarov stated that the CEC was technically prepared to administer early elections should parliament adopt a decision on self-dissolution, emphasizing that the proximity of the 2026–2027 electoral cycle could create overlap and legal disputes. [14]
The proposal generated debate among deputies. Alliance faction leader Janar Akayev supported early dissolution, citing electoral administration concerns and the need to align parliamentary representation with the restructured administrative units. [15] Other deputies, including Cholpon Sultanbekova, endorsed the measure to ensure the legislature reflected recent reforms. [15] Critics, such as Iskhak Masaliev, argued that the initiative could indicate presidential influence and risk the independence of parliament. [15]
On 24 September 2025, the 7th convocation of the Supreme Council unanimously voted to dissolve itself for the first time in Kyrgyzstan's history. Out of 90 registered deputies, 89 attended the session, and 84 voted in favor, with no opposition. [16] [17] Turgunbek uulu confirmed the deputies acted independently and that the parliament would retain its powers until the next convocation. According to law, the president must call early elections within five days, with the vote tentatively scheduled for 30 November 2025. [18]
Under 2025 amendments to Constitutional Law "On Elections of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic and Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh", Kyrgyzstan replaced its previous mixed electoral system with a new majoritarian representation framework. The Supreme Council will continue to consist of 90 deputies, but they will now be elected from 30 multi-member district s, each returning three representatives by plurality voting. This change abolished the earlier arrangement of electing deputies partly through open party-list proportional representation on a nationwide constituency and partly through single-member district s using first-past-the-post voting. [19] [20]
The reform was intended to simplify the voting process, harmonize parliamentary representation with ongoing administrative–territorial reforms, and reduce the disparity between deputies elected by party list s and those elected in electoral district s. Independent candidates may compete alongside party nominees, giving voters the option to choose either party-affiliated or non-party candidates within their district. [20]
In addition, the amendments introduced an online identification system for remote voting. This allows citizens to cast their ballot at polling stations outside their home district, while within their own district voters remain tied to their permanent registration address. The measure was aimed at easing participation for internal migrants and Kyrgyz citizens abroad. [21]
The table below presents the political party factions represented in the 7th convocation of the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan before its dissolution. [22]
| Name | Ideology | Position | Leader(s) | 2021 result | Seats at dissolution | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes (%) | Seats | |||||||
| AJK | Ata-Jurt Kyrgyzstan | Kyrgyz nationalism | Right-wing | Aybek Matkerimov | 19.07% | 15 / 90 | 20 / 90 | |
| Mekenchil | Mekenchil | Liberalism | Right-wing | Kamchybek Tashiev | DNP | 16 / 90 | ||
| Ishenim | Ishenim | Communitarianism | Centre-right | Azamat Doroyev | 15.03% | 12 / 90 | 12 / 90 | |
| Yntymak | Yntymak | Social conservatism | Centre-right | Chingis Makeshov | 12.13% | 9 / 90 | 9 / 90 | |
| Alliance | Alliance | Populism | Centre to centre-left | Mirlan Jeenchoroyev | 9.19% | 8 / 90 | 9 / 90 | |
| BK | United Kyrgyzstan | National conservatism | Centre-right to right-wing | Adakhan Madumarov | 7.77% | 5 / 90 | 5 / 90 | |
| YN | Light of Faith | Islamic democracy | Centre-right | Nurzhigit Kadyrbekov | 6.78% | 5 / 90 | 5 / 90 | |
| SD | Social Democrats | Social democracy | Centre-left | Temirlan Sultanbekov | 3.51% | 1 / 90 | 1 / 90 | |
| Presidential elections | |
|---|---|
| Parliamentary elections | |
| Local elections | |
| Referendums | |
