Battle of Zinjibar (2011–2012)

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Battle of Zinjibar
Part of the al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen and the Yemeni crisis
Battle of Zinjibar.svg
Map of the battle
Date27 May 2011 – 12 June 2012 (2011-05-27 – 2012-06-12)
(1 year, 2 weeks and 2 days)
Location
Zinjibar and surrounding areas, Abyan Governorate, Yemen
13°7′42″N45°22′49″E / 13.12833°N 45.38028°E / 13.12833; 45.38028
Result Yemeni government victory
Territorial
changes		 Zinjibar recaptured by Yemeni government forces
Belligerents
Islamic State flag.svg Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
Islamic State flag.svg Ansar al-Sharia
Strength
3,000–4,000+ soldiers [c] 700–1,000 fighters [d]
Casualties and losses
 600+ killed [10]
Hundreds of civilian casualties
90,000+ displaced
Yemen adm location map.svg
Red pog.svg
Zinjibar
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Location within Yemen

The Battle of Zinjibar was a battle between forces loyal to Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and Islamist militant forces, possibly including elements of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for control of the town of Zinjibar and its surroundings as part of the wider insurgency in the self-declared Al-Qaeda Emirate in Yemen. Many of the Islamist forces operating in Abyan province refer to themselves as Ansar al-Sharia ("Partisans of Sharia").

Contents

Background

As part of the wider Arab Spring movement, protesters in Yemen began demanding the ouster of longtime president Ali Abdullah Saleh in January 2011, sparking the Yemeni revolution. The mostly-peaceful demonstrations, which began in Taiz and eventually found its way to the capital of Sanaa, were inflamed after 18 March, when pro-Saleh gunmen killed at least 52 protestors at an anti-government encampment. Many of Saleh's allies began to switch sides in the aftermath of the massacre. The defection of influential military general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and several other generals effectively split the military between those supporting the protestors and those supporting Saleh. Tensions between the Saleh regime and the powerful Hashid tribal confederation, led by pro-revolution sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, culminated in May with open clashes in Sanaa. [12] [13] : 269–270 

Although other affiliate groups of al-Qaeda such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in Iraq had done so previously, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had never held or administered territory in Yemen prior to the revolution. [14] : 463  [6] The Yemeni government and public at large mostly believed AQAP to be an issue that the West was concerned with, in turn leading to AQAP prioritizing international attacks and maintaining a low profile within Yemen. [10] The group had conducted only brief takeovers of the southern towns of Lawdar and al-Hawtah in 2010. [6] Upon asking Osama bin Laden months before the Arab Spring, AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi was told that his group did not have enough popular support locally in order to establish an outward presence. But with the regime's preoccupation with its own survival in the context of the revolution and fractures and fighting within the military, AQAP's leadership believed there to be a renewed opportunity to establish a foothold in Yemen. [13] : 270–271  Their targets primary were the southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwah, which the group had historically used as hideouts due to the mountainous terrain and independent tribes. [15] [16]

On 27 March 2011, Islamic militants later identified as members of AQAP captured Jaar and its surrounding areas, as the soldiers guarding the small town in Abyan quickly fled their posts after having been unpaid for weeks. Senior AQAP cleric Adel al-Abab stated in an April interview that AQAP was controlling Jaar under the name Ansar al-Sharia, and would soon target the nearby provincial capital of Zinjibar. [13] : 271 

Combatants

Ansar al-Sharia

The militants controlling Zinjibar referred to themselves as Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law). [16] Despite the nominal difference, Ansar al-Sharia was widely believed to be affiliated with or a direct extension of AQAP. A month prior to the battle, Abab, a senior leader in AQAP, identified Ansar al-Sharia as "what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we work to tell people about our work and goals, and that we are on the path of Allah". [14] : 460  Ansar al-Sharia declared Jalal Baleedi (Abu Hamza) as the emir of Zinjibar, [17] but were formally led by Wuhayshi, the leader of AQAP. [18] Said Ali al-Shihri and Qasim al-Raymi, the deputy-leader and military commander of AQAP respectively, were the primary planners of the takeover of Zinjibar and other towns in the south. [12]

Around 700 to 1,000 mitalints were estimated to be in Zinjibar by the end of 2011. [8] Most were Yemenis from the local populace and other areas of the country, while there were also small numbers of foreign fighters from other Arab and non-Arab states. [16] [19] Some foreigners had joined after arriving from Aden International Airport pretending to be tourists. [20] : 9  The militants dressed in traditional fouta robes, and many were noted for their long hair and large beards. Every fighter was fitted with canvas military vests loaded with ammunition, grenades, and a copy of the Quran. [21] [13] : 278 

Ansar al-Sharia forces were well-equipped and possessed heavy weaponry, most of which was seized from security forces during the initial stages of the battle. These included heavy artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, tanks, and armored transports. [13] : 276  [14] : 461  At least two stolen T-62 tanks were operated by the militants, but their effectiveness was negligible before they were disabled by airstrikes. [22] Other weaponry utilized by the militants included mortars, snipers, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, Strela anti-air launchers, machine gun technicals, and Katyusha rocket artillery. [8] [7] [23] Fighters on the ground were described as being disciplined, highly organized, and having a clear strategy, operating in small cells. [24]

Yemeni government

The seven conventional brigades that fought in Zinjibar, most of which were armored or mechanized units, [6] belonged to the Southern Military Region command of the Yemeni Land Forces. [25] Three units were involved in most of the fighting; the 25th Mechanized Brigade, along with the 119th Infantry Brigade and 201st Mechanized Brigade. These brigades were estimated to comprise 1,000 soldiers each, [6] though the 25th Mechanized Brigade had also been numbered at around 2,000 soldiers. [7] Three other brigades were later deployed during August, them being the 31st Armored Brigade, 39th Armored Brigade and 115th Infantry Brigade. The 135th Infantry Brigade joined the fight in April 2012. [26]

During the months-long siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade's base, they were surviving mainly off rice and well water; [8] journalist Jeremy Scahill, who toured the frontlines of Zinjibar with brigade personnel, described them as "thin and haggard, many with long beards and tattered uniforms or no uniforms at all." [14] : 463  The brigade's inexperience in guerilla warfare and shortage in equipment such as night-vision goggles and snipers, and the government's inadequate deployment of special forces in the city, hampered its ability to effectively fight the militants during 2011. [8] Associated Press described military forces in Abyan at large as "ill-equipped, poorly trained with weak intelligence capabilities" and "riven with conflicted loyalties". [27]

The Central Security Forces (CFS) and elite Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), both components of the Ministry of Interior rather than the military, were officially deployed in Zinjibar to support the army in early April 2012, [28] though a journalist from Le Monde had wrote of a CTU force of 120 soldiers fighting on the frontlines since November 2011. [23] According to a CTU officer in Abyan, the unit was directly coordinating with conventional army forces on the ground and "participates in battles but in tactical ways." [28] The Republican Guard was also called in by June 2012. [29]

Battle

Ansar al-Sharia takeover (May 2011)

God bless our colleagues in the Public Security, Police, and Central Security who pulled out of the governorate and left behind all their military equipment and munitions as a gift for al-Qaeda elements... I do not want to go too far and accuse my colleagues of complicity with al-Qaeda against us and I do not cast doubt about them... but we can say that it is cowardice and fear that filled them after the governor, his deputies, and directors of departments left Zinjibar.

General Mohammed al-Somali describing the fall of Zinjibar [20] : 8 

On 27 May, around 300 fighters from Ansar al-Sharia departed from Jaar and, after a travelling through a stretch of mountains, descended into Zinjibar unopposed. [13] : 276  [3] Attributed to an "intelligence breakdown", the surprise invasion was completed within a few hours and without any response by government forces stationed in the city. [14] : 461  [12] The first target of the militants, the local base of the Central Security Forces (CSF) on the eastern outskirts of the city, was quickly abandoned by its soldiers, allowing for the militants to raid it and loot the equipment. Most of the CSF soldiers, excluding 50 who were captured, fled to the headquarters of the 25th Mechanized Brigade on the southeast edge of the city. After equipping themselves with the looted weapons, the militants proceeded to besiege the base, while other militants spread through the city and captured it uncontested, including the local government headquarters. [13] : 276–277 All government buildings were taken over, while surrendering soldiers were executed and occupants of the main prison were released. [30]

The commander of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, General Mohammed al-Somali, soon realized that nearly all local officials, including the governor, the security chief, and the head of an army brigade, had fled the city for Aden. [3] After receiving no response from a local Republican Guard outpost, Somali contacted influential renegade general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar for help. [13] : 277  The 119th Infantry Brigade, located west of Zinjibar, was pro-revolution and led by Ahmar ally General Faisal Rajab. [31] As Somali asserted to Ahmar that he remained neutral to the revolution, the 119th Infantry Brigade was not mobilized, allowing Ansar al-Sharia to consolidate control over Zinjibar. [13] : 277  Checkpoints were established by the militants at the three highways leading into the city. [13] : 278  [32] At noon, Ansar al-Sharia leader Jalal Baleedi, surrounded by his men, gave a speech for Friday prayers at a mosque in the city. They later looted the central bank and encouraged civilians to take part. [12]

The 25th Mechanized Brigade faced further pressure from Ansar al-Sharia by 30 May. [20] : 8  On 29 May, the army began shelling Zinjibar with artillery, [33] and on 30 May the Yemeni Air Force began launching airstrikes on the city. [34] The period saw some of the most intense fighting during the entire battle, with the military bombing campaign indiscriminately targeting the city without warnings for civilians. [19] Residents estimated that around 200 homes were destroyed by the air raids. [3] Most of the city's residents had deserted the town by that time. [35]

Intensified clashes and army encirclement (June–July 2011)

The military said that three additional brigades were mobilized on the evening of 6 June in preparation to assault Zinjibar and relieve the 25th Mechanized Brigade. Two days earlier, a pair of militant ambushes near the city had left nine soldiers dead. Army forces attempted to advance towards the city's entrance overnight but encountered stiff resistance from Ansar al-Sharia. [36] During the clashes, Ansar al-Sharia fighters attacked an army position outside of the city, leading to an hours-long gun battle which left nine soldiers and six militants dead before the post was resecured. By the next day, the government claimed that at least 30 militants had been killed in Zinjibar in two days. [37] Meanwhile, the United States inaugurated its targeted airstrike campaign on the city on 3 June, killing AQAP commanders Ali Abdullah Naji al-Harithi and Ammar al-Waeli. [20] : 10 

On 11 June, Ansar al-Sharia attempted an early morning attack on the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, though it was repelled and led to the deaths of 18 militants and nine soldiers. Elsewhere, the brigade destroyed a weapons and ammunition warehouse held by the militants. [38] [39] Somali stated in an interview that the attempted raid "represented the greatest attempt by al-Qaeda to gain control of the brigade. Following this, they continued to lay ambushes, target our men with snipers, and carry out intermittent light attacks, but not on the previous scale." [40] A group of militants planting a roadside bomb near Zinjibar were attacked by the army on 19 June, leading to 12 of them along with two soldiers dying. [41]

By 20 June, Ansar al-Sharia had dispersed its forces across three fronts in the area, one of which was besieging the 25th Mechanized Brigade in Zinjibar, while another battled the 119th Infantry Brigade in the nearby area of Dofas along the Aden-Abyan road. The 119th Infantry Brigade claimed that it had made significant progress in capturing parts of Dofas during heavy fighting. [42] However, days later it and the 201st Mechanized Brigade withdrew from Dofas and were pulled three kilometers from the front lines into the outskirts of Aden to set up a security cordon. According to the military, the decision was a tactical move to remain in open territory and avoid heavy casualties as it had suffered during its advance in Dofas due to the militants setting up ambushes in the forests. [43] [44]

Reports on the battle by late June described Ansar al-Sharia still retaining firm control of Zinjibar, and the 25th Mechanized Brigade being confined to their base and fighting the militants on the city's outskirts. [45] The military was launching daily artillery shelling and airstrikes on the city, indiscriminately hitting both Islamist positions and civilians according to the residents. A local official said that 35 homes had been destroyed by the bombings in the previous two weeks alone. [46]

After failing to gain control of the base itself earlier in the month, Ansar al-Sharia instead tightened their siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade by taking control of the al-Wahda Stadium. [47] Witnesses describe around 300 militants armed with heavy weaponry attacking the base on 29 June, leading to an intense battle. The air force was mobilized to counterattack the militants, though one airstrike had hit a nearby civilian bus. By the end of the day, the stadium was in control of Ansar al-Sharia, with 25 soldiers and 11 dying during the clashes. [7] An army officer later reported an additional 50 troops being unaccounted for. [45] The loss of the stadium deprived the 25th Mechanized Brigade of a major outpost for storing supplies and refueling, [7] [48] and exposed the brigade on its southeastern flank. [47] The New York Times wrote that the defeat at the stadium was a clear display of the army's struggles in retaking Zinjibar. [7]

After capturing the stadium, the militants proceeded to surround the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, with gunmen situated above nearby buildings army movements. The brigade was running out of fuel and water, and was in dire need of supplies and reinforcements in order to continue fighting. An army officer pleaded for more support in a 3 July interview with Reuters, stating that clashes were occurring daily around the vicinity of the base. [45] [48] Tribal figure Tariq al-Fadhli attempted to mediate between the parties but neither side showed interest. [49]

Army-tribal offensive (17 July – 10 September 2011)

On 17 July, the Yemeni military launched an offensive in Zinjibar, with reinforcements primarily from the 119th Infantry Brigade being sent to the city along with 450 pro-government tribal fighters. Ansar al-Sharia had been losing support from the tribes of Abyan in the lead up to the offensive, [20] : 9  with tribal gunmen having cut supply lines to the city by 13 July. [50] Backed by heavy tank shelling and rocket attacks from naval units off the coast, the reinforcements advanced from the west to lift the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade, clashing with militants in the al-Khamila and Dio neighborhoods of Zinjibar. [20] : 9  Casualties were also reported in the east as militants fought army and tribal forces attempting to enter the city. [51] On 20 July, two senior AQAP commanders, Ayad al-Shabwani and Awad Mohammed Saleh al-Shabwani, were killed in combat, while units from the 31st Armoured Brigade and 119th Infantry Brigade fought against a militant attack at the bridge to Zinjibar in al-Kawd. [52] On 21 July, government forces closed off the entrances to Zinjibar; the next day, a tribal convoy intercepted a militant convoy heading to Zinjibar, killing one and capturing 10 others. By 25 July, residents reported that Ansar al-Sharia was present only in some pockets of the city and that government forces were starting to close in, as an attempted attack on the 25th Mechanized Brigade base left 10 militants dead. On 27 July, fighting in the city left 17 militants dead, including veteran Saudi militant and AQAP commander Ibrahim al-Najdi. [53] [20] : 9 

Fighting between the army and the militants intensified near the end of July as Ramadan was set to begin. [54] A major setback in the offensive occurred as result of a friendly fire incident on 29 July, in which a Yemeni aircraft launched at least three consecutive airstrikes on a communications building after tribal forces had occupied during their advance east towards the city. The strikes killed 40 people, including two colonels, a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a sheik from the Nahee tribe. The incident ruined tribal morale and trust in the government, resulting in tribal forces temporarily withdrawing from the battle to reevaluate their partnership with the army as the militants resolidified control over Zinjibar. [55] Intense fighting over 29 to 30 July left multiple tribal commanders and military officers dead, including Brigadier General Ahmad Awad Hassan al-Marmi, the army's chief of staff in Abyan. [20] : 10  Somali told Asharq al-Awsat in an interview that reinforcements and supplies for the 25th Mechanized Brigade were yet to have arrived, as the militants had repeatedly ambushed army convoys heading to eastwards to the brigade on the road from Aden. [40] [13] : 281  More than 100 militants were believed to have been killed in July alone. [54]

By August, most fighting took place at night due to the sweltering heat during the day. [13] : 282  Zinjibar was being contested by the 119th Infantry Brigade from the west and the 25th Mechanized Brigade from the east, [56] the latter being limited to defensive clashes for most of the month as they were still under siege at their base. [15] Fighting took place early in the month between the 119th Infantry Brigade and militants in al-Khamila, with the 39th Armoured Brigade being deployed to provide artillery support from Dofas, though the unit soon had to fend off attacks against their base. [20] : 10  Local officials reported that Predator drones had conducted air raids targeting multiple areas in Zinjibar, including al-Khamila and Amodiah neighbourhoods as well as the al-Wahda Stadium, on 1 August, killing 15 militants and destroying seized army equipment. [57] The local tribes had announced their rejoining of the offensive, with an official confirming that tribal fighters had returned to their positions surrounding the city, some aiding the 25th Mechanized Brigade in the east. [58] [56] Despite the resumption in support, the Jamestown Foundation had wrote by 12 August that "only slight progress can be reported... though some progress has been made on halting reinforcements from reaching [Ansar al-Sharia]." [20] : 11 

Heavy clashes involving the 201st Mechanized Brigade took place in Dofas in late August, [59] with militants launching at least five attacks on government forces there from 20 to 27 August, [60] including a 23 August attack on the 201st Mechanized Brigade base which killed seven soldiers and a 27 August ambush on army units attempting to reach the 25th Mechanized Brigade. [61] From 25 August until the end of the month, fighting in the area left a reported 40 militants and 23 soldiers dead according to FDD's Long War Journal . [62] AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi was rumoured to have been among those killed, though this was later disproved. [59] By the end of the month, the army had secured Dofas, al-Kawd and al-Matla on Zinjibar's outskirts, as well as the road linking it to Aden. [63]

Zinjibar, September 2011, 2.png
Zinjibar, September 2011.png
A destroyed residential area in Zinjibar, September 2011

From the start of September, advances by government forces towards the city were reported on multiple fronts. The 201st Mechanized Brigade and 119th Infantry Brigade pushed eastwards and recaptured the al-Wahda Stadium, linked up with the 25th Mechanized Brigade at their base, and secured the nearby Husn Shaddad neighbourhood. [64] The advance came amid a barrage of US airstrikes from 31 August to 1 September which left nearly 30 militants dead and freed the 25th Mechanized Brigade's base from militant pressure. [62] Other army units were approximately five kilometers south from Zinjibar after capturing al-Kawd. An AQAP-linked source confirmed that the military was beginning to enter southern Zinjibar. [64] Government forces had seized the main entrances to the city and were beginning to advance. [65]

On 10 September, forces from the 119th Infantry Brigade, 201st Mechanized Brigade and 31st Armoured Brigade, as well as allied tribesmen, launched a coordinated push into Zinjibar. [66] [13] : 282  The militant siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade was lifted, while more than 2,000 soldiers [67] moved in on and secured the eastern portion of the city, capturing areas including the local CSF base. [66] Facing a deluge of army reinforcements, AQAP military commander Qasim al-Raymi ordered most of the militants in Zinjibar to retreat into the mountains by Jaar, leading to the army fighting "only token resistance" during their advance. [13] : 282  Despite government statements celebrating the end of the battle and the liberation of the Zinjibar, fighting would continue to take place. [66] Major clashes later broke out on 14 September leaving 12 militants and two civilians dead. Peace negotiations had stalled as Ansar al-Sharia rejected an offer for their total withdrawal in exchange for security forces refraining from pursuing them. [68]

Continued fighting (October 2011 – February 2012)

The central market of Zinjibar, October 2011 Zinjibar market, Oct 2011.png
The central market of Zinjibar, October 2011

The army launched an offensive targeting the northern Bajdar neighbourhood of Zinjibar at the beginning of October. [69] [70] While the 201st Mechanized Brigade made several advances, [71] a Yemeni aircraft mistakenly bombed a school occupied by the 119th Infantry Brigade, which was followed by a militant attack. At least 30 soldiers in the school were confirmed to be dead by the Red Crescent, though the government denied any friendly fire. [4] By 5 October, the army had reportedly advanced to control the eastern and central parts of Zinjibar, while the militants occupied the remaining areas, including the northern areas bordering Jaar. [71] An airstrike the same day struck an AQAP hideout in al-Arqoub, east of Zinjibar, killing five militants. [72] Later in the month, reports emerged of the militants forcing the 39th Armoured Brigade to withdraw to the outskirts of the city after an attack on their local outpost, regaining control of some areas in Zinjibar. [73]

More than 38 militants were reportedly killed in the first two weeks of November. [74] A security official said that fighting in Zinjibar was now more scattered and akin to a guerilla war, as the militants "do not have the manpower anymore to clash for continuous days as was the case two months ago." [75] Heavy fighting broke out in the city in mid-November, with the army launching artillery shelling at the local government headquarters and the offices of the internal security agency which killed multiple foreign fighters. [76] Ansar al-Sharia was reportedly regrouping during November due to persistent raids on houses in the city. [77] Outside of the city, Ansar al-Sharia launched an attack on al-Kawd, seizing the entire city and forcing the army to retreat to Dofas. [78] [79]

A street corner in Zinjibar, December 2011 Zinjibar, Dec 2011.png
A street corner in Zinjibar, December 2011

Residents noticed significant militant reinforcements arriving in the city during December. On 7 December, the militants attempted a nighttime raid on an army post east of Zinjibar but failed, leaving nine fighters and a single soldiers dead. [80] Fierce clashes broke out across the city on 17 December in an Ansar al-Sharia offensive, leaving seven militants three soldiers dead and four army vehicles destroyed during the day. [77] By 26 December, at least 60 people, including 23 soldiers, had been killed. Clashes took place in the northern and eastern areas of Zinjibar, with army units reportedly advancing on some militant-controlled areas. [81] Amidst the fighting, a US drone strike killed Abdulrahman al-Wuhayshi, a relative of Nasir al-Wuhayshi. [82] Stories published by visiting Western journalists at the end of the year described most of the city, including its center and the northern and eastern entrance points, as still being mostly under Ansar al-Sharia control, and the battle being akin to a stalemate. [8] [23]

Clashes took place throughout January 2012 in the northern and eastern outskirts of Zinjibar. [83] [84] [85] Returning residents found that control remained divided between the army in the east and the militants in the west, the two in some areas being separated by only meters. [86] [87] By February, with military options seemingly exhausted, the government reauthorized tribal mediation in hopes of a negotiated militant withdrawal similar to than in Radda a month before. A ceasefire was reportedly agreed upon by both parties on 4 February for the upcoming presidential elections, but this was denied by Ansar al-Sharia as clashes broke out the same day. [88] The three days preceding the election saw an increase in attacks on local army positions. Ansar al-Sharia then attempted to push into the eastern suburbs of Zinjibar on 20 February, but were fought back by the 201st Mechanized Brigade. [89]

Re-escalation (March–May 2012)

The political crisis in Yemen was alleviated with the appointment of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi as president on 25 February, replacing the ousted Saleh. During his inauguration speech, Hadi said that defeating AQAP would be a top priority for his government. [90] As he set out on reorganizing the divided military, one of his first decisions was to dismiss General Mahdi Maqula from his position as Southern Military Region commander. [25] After the military announced plans to intensify the fight in Zinjibar, Ansar al-Sharia declared a campaign of attacks against the government, and gave the military a 10-day ultimatum to withdraw. [91]

An army technical looted by militants during the Dofas attack Looted Yemeni army technical.png
An army technical looted by militants during the Dofas attack

On 4 March, Ansar al-Sharia launched a major surprise attack on military positions near Zinjibar. The 39th Armoured Brigade artillery base at the al-Alam checkpoint at Dofas was raided and occupied in an early morning assault, while the 115th and 119th Infantry Brigade's held out for hours at their outposts in al-Kawd until reinforcements from Aden had arrived. [91] At least 185 soldiers were killed in the assault and droves of army equipment was looted, while the estimated total casualty figure of 400 effectively neutralized an entire brigade's worth of troops. [92] Accusations emerged of Maqula, a Saleh loyalist, secretly supplying equipment to Ansar al-Sharia as he resisted orders to step down until he finally did so on the day of the attack. [25] Upon being asked on how the attack proved to be so lethal, Colonel Ali Saleh Kardah of the 115th Infantry Brigade said "It's simple: The soldiers in Abyan have been on the front lines for months, zero morale, zero interest... We don't have a professional army." [93]

Maqula's replacement, Major General Salem Ali Qatan, headed a renewed bombing campaign against the militants from 9 March onwards in response to the attack which "reflect improved communication and intelligence under the new commander" according to officials. [25] On 18 March 2012, the Yemeni Navy reportedly conducted strikes on northeastern Zinjibar, killing 16 militants. [94] Four days later, an alleged joint US-Yemeni naval bombardment on the city left 29 militants dead. [95]

Efforts to combat Ansar al-Sharia escalated across Abyan as pro-government forces fended off a militant assault on the city of Lawdar in early April. On 20 April, an official statement reported that the army had advanced on and secured a district on the outskirts of Zinjibar while killing 25 militants. Ansar al-Sharia acknowledged a "massive offensive by Sanaa regime forces", but maintained that they still controlled most areas. [96] Yemeni forces advanced deeper towards the center of Zinjibar after a six-hour battle which ended on 24 April. [97] Multiple government buildings were secured, including the local post office, while heavy fighting continued to take place in the southern and eastern outskirts of the city. [98] Ansar al-Sharia denied the army's progress. [99] On 8 May, another attack in Dofas and al-Kawd, targeting the 2nd Infantry Battalion and the Artillery Battalion of the 115th Infantry Brigade, left dozens of soldiers dead and captured, a day after a US drone strike killed AQAP leader Fahd al-Quso. [2]

Final offensive (12 May – 12 June 2012)

On 12 May, the Yemeni government began an all-out offensive, codenamed Operation Golden Swords, [100] to recapture Zinjibar and other areas occupied by Ansar al-Sharia in Abyan Governorate. Nearly 20,000 military personnel were involved in the operation, including the air force and navy. [101] The offensive involved government forces executing a crescent-shaped advance on Zinjibar. [27] On 13 May, government forces reached the Shaddad Fort, around three kilometers east of Zinjibar, and Zinjibar Bridge, just one kilometer south of it. [102] By mid-May the army had reached the center of Zinjibar but "did not outright control it", with air force helicopters flying over the city for the first time since its seizure, indicating that the militants had lost their anti-air capabilities. [27] A commanding officer said that "The army is deployed at the entrances of the city. It advances during the day and tactically retreats at night out of fear of terrorist attacks." [103] Army forces were "moving slowly along the outskirts of... Zinjibar, trying to avoid being out-flanked", [104] though the offensive in general had stalled in part due to poor intelligence on the status of the militants. [105]

Resolve to defeat Ansar al-Sharia was increased following a suicide bombing in Sanaa on 21 May which killed nearly 100 soldiers. Government forces advanced into and secured several parts of the central and northern neighborhoods of Zinjibar, including a stadium and government buildings on 23 May. [106] Further advances were made on 26 May, with the 25th Mechanized Brigade capturing the northeastern neighbourhoods of Maraqid and Mashqasa, while killing 20 militants and seizing their equipment. [107] By end of the month, the 25th Mechanized Brigade, 39th Armoured Brigade and local Popular Committees had managed to recapture all militant-held positions in the east of Zinjibar. 62 militants, including Somali foreign fighters, were believed to have been killed in the fighting, while dozens were wounded and many more fled. The 135th Infantry Brigade had also made significant advances towards Jaar. [108]

The biggest challenge we face is that al-Qaeda fighters are constantly on the move in small numbers, they never hold out in one place... It's an army fighting militias, they know the area very well... and take advantage of the dense trees to move surreptitiously.

Colonel Ali Radman Qahtan [109]

Army forces "concentrically squeezed Zinjibar" from 3 June onwards. [6] The Republican Guard was ordered to take a central role in the final stretch of recapturing the city. [29] An army officer stated that government forces controlled most of the city's outskirts but not its center, as were attempting to secure the remaining northwestern entrances to "cut it off from Jaar and Shaqra." [110] As Yemeni forces made inroads into central Zinjibar on 3 June, Ansar al-Sharia attempted to attack army positions at the Central Bank and other government institutions. Clashes in the central streets lasted for two hours and resulted in the army successfully repelling the militants, killing six while losing two soldiers. [29] [111] As more territory was secured, Ansar al-Sharia began to employ a guerilla strategy, [109] increasingly utilizing suicide bombers to impede the offensive. On 4 June, two bombers had attempted to attack army positions east of the city, but were stopped and only managed to kill four tribal fighters. [112] Later in the day, Yemeni forces killed at least 23 militants entering from northern Zinjibar and from the southeast in al-Kawd. [113] [112]

Ansar al-Sharia's control of the region began to break down after seizure of the strategically located 7 October ammunition factory in Jaar on 11 June. After bombarding the town through the night, Yemeni forces moved in, and had secured Jaar by dawn on 12 June. [100] By then, Ansar al-Sharia had completely withdrew from the city. Later in the morning, the army and Popular Committees moved in on and captured the rest of Zinjibar in a large-scale offensive movement. [114] Final clashes for control over the city left 10 militants dead, [115] but were relatively less intense as most militants had gone to reinforce Jaar earlier in the day. [100] Abyan's governor said that 200 to 300 militants had fled Zinjibar and Jaar to the remaining areas under their control, notably Shuqrah in Abyan and Azzan in Shabwah. Ansar al-Sharia confirmed that it had withdrew, stating that they had done so in order to avoid further destruction in the area, and vowed revenge against the government. [115] Senior government officials toured the city the next day in a confirmation of the victory. [114]

Foreign involvement

United States

The takeover of Zinjibar and other areas of Abyan alarmed the United States and the Barack Obama administration. [21] American officials had been monitoring the situation in Zinjibar since the early stages of the battle. For years the US had viewed AQAP as the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda globally since its attempts to attack the US mainland. Through the collapse of security in Abyan, the government feared that AQAP could consolidate control in the area through Ansar al-Sharia and use it as a base of operations for further attacks on the US. [16]

Viewing it as one of the few ways to limit the group's rapid expansion, the US military resumed covert airstrikes against AQAP, which had started in 2009 but were suspended the year after. [116] The US launched at least six unilateral airstrikes on Zinjibar in 2011. [117] These operations, conducted by the military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) starting in September, utilized cruise missiles, fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, [20] : 10  [72] and were independent of the Yemeni military. [14] : 464 

CENTCOM chief James Mattis advocated for greater US involvement in the battle early on, but was denied by federal officials. Mattis Centcom 2009.jpg
CENTCOM chief James Mattis advocated for greater US involvement in the battle early on, but was denied by federal officials.

Several top officials, including President Barack Obama and homeland security advisor John Brennan, were intent on specifically targeting AQAP operatives involved in attacks on the US, viewing airstrikes on Ansar al-Sharia, a local insurgent group, as tantamount to involving the US in Yemen's own war against al-Qaeda. [13] : 279–280  A proposal from US Central Command head James Mattis to launch an air raid on militants near the al-Wahda Stadium was rejected due to many intended targets being Ansar al-Sharia figures involved only in the local conflict. [14] : 464  Despite this, The Washington Institute noted instances during the battle which veered into "intervention on the regime's behalf." [15]

As the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade progressed, the US began to airdrop supplies to its base as the rest of the Yemeni army was unable to reach them. [14] : 464   Deputy information minister Abdo al-Janadi confirmed the receival of airdrops during a press conference on 22 July 2011. [52] Somali corroborated this, and stated there was an "active partnership" between the US and Yemeni forces in Zinjibar. According to him, the US would share real-time intelligence on militant positions in Zinjibar with army units, who would then target the locations with artillery shelling and airstrikes. [14] : 464  The final push to lift the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade in September was influenced by American pressure on the Yemeni government. [13] : 282  President Saleh thanked the US for its support upon the conclusion of the offensive. [66] That month, a US official told FDD's Long War Journal that "We continue to provide counterterrorism aid, intelligence, and logistical support to Yemeni forces." [62]

Upon reports of naval strikes hitting Zinjibar in March 2012, analyst Bill Roggio noted that the Yemeni Navy was incapable of such attacks on land targets as it only possessed anti-ship missiles, suggesting that it had been the work of the US Navy if true. He also noted that the airstrikes had targeted low-level Ansar al-Sharia fighters as opposed to AQAP leaders, claiming that "the US appears to be directly intervening in Yemen's civil war with AQAP." [94] An official from the Fifth Fleet denied any American naval involvement in the conflict. [95]

With Saleh's removal from office and the US government seeking to demonstrate its support for President Hadi, [118] Operation Golden Swords received overt support from the US, described by Yemeni military personnel as "the most direct American involvement yet". Around 60 US soldiers were assigned to al-Anad Air Base to operate a long-term joint command center with Yemeni forces, which would coordinate the offensive and monitor drone strikes. The offensive itself was being overseen by an unidentified US military general. [27] Witnesses in Abyan reported both US drones and navy vessels on the coast launching strikes on militant positions during the offensive. [103]

Saudi Arabia

Along with the US, Saudi Arabia gave similar concern to the rise of Ansar al-Sharia, owing to AQAP's previous interest in attacking the Kingdom as well as Zinjibar's strategic position on the Gulf of Aden. The Saudi Air Force collaborated with their American counterparts in airdropping supplies to the 25th Mechanized Brigade. [6] Saudis forces began launching airstrikes against the militants in August 2011 to assist in breaking the siege, and levied diplomatic pressure upon Yemen alongside the US until the siege was broken in September, [13] : 281–282  when the Yemeni government acknowledged the "logistic support" provided to them by the Saudi government. [66] Saudi Arabia also aided Operation Golden Swords with money for the Yemeni government which was used to buy the allegiance of numerous tribes in Abyan to fight Ansar al-Sharia alongside the army. [118]

Casualties

The official number of total casualties during the battle are unknown. Analyst Michael Knights wrote "a conservative estimate would be around 500–700 government troops and Popular Committee fighters killed, plus an unknown number of civilians and Ansar al-Sharia fighters." [9] Time magazine claimed that "unofficial estimates" within the military put the figure at as many as 1,000 soldiers. Speaking to Time, Major General Nasser al-Taheri, who replaced Qatan as commander of the Southern Military Region, said that at least 600 Ansar al-Sharia militants out of a total of 3,000 were killed, several of them high-ranking commanders. [10]

The official Saba News Agency reported on 11 September 2011, a day after the conclusion of the July–September offensive, that more than 280 [119] pro-government forces were killed and 600 were wounded since the fighting began in May. [11] Of those killed, around 230 were army soldiers from the Southern Military Region, of whom 90 were from the 25th Mechanized Brigade, while the other 50 were tribal fighters supporting the army. [119] Over 300 Ansar al-Sharia militants were believed to have been killed, [120] with then-vice president Hadi telling European diplomats that 30 were leaders in the group. [119] By the end of December, official figures put the total number of soldiers killed at around 270, and the number of militants at more than 400 according to local officials. [121]

Humanitarian impact

Militant governance

A building in Zinjibar with an Ansar al-Sharia seal written on it. Zinjibar, January 2012.png
A building in Zinjibar with an Ansar al-Sharia seal written on it.

Upon solidifying control of Zinjibar, Ansar al-Sharia sought to govern the city as an Islamic emirate similar to that of the Taliban. [14] : 463  Government institutions, such as the local authority and education department, were converted into an Islamist system. [87] Legal courts adhering to Sharia were set up to address crime and civil disputes. [17] The militants demanded strict adherence to Islam, and supporters of Saleh and the government were branded as infidels and American spies. [12] [8] Ansar al-Sharia was also concerned with gaining popular support among the people of Zinjibar. [14] : 463  The individuals the militants put in charge of managing the city were local southerners rather than northern Yemenis or foreign fighters. Numerous displaced residents noted the politeness of the militants, more so than government authorities beforehand, and their eagerness to help the locals. [24] Limited public services were provided by the militants, including road and electricity maintenance, [14] : 463  food and water distribution, [46] [13] : 279  and garbage collection. Local merchants and shop owners were forced into lowering food prices. [46] Militants conducted security patrols throughout the city and its surroundings, [14] : 463  while others were tasked with guarding abandoned residencies to stop looters. Loudspeaker announcements would warn civilians of incoming artillery shelling. [24] Residents wishing to leave would be permitted to do so and given a lump sum of money for support. [46]

Refugee crisis

A returning civilian sitting next to a destroyed building in Zinjibar, January 2012. Zinjibar destruction, January 2012.png
A returning civilian sitting next to a destroyed building in Zinjibar, January 2012.

The intense fighting in Zinjibar led to nearly all of its some 20,000 residents deserting it within weeks. [13] : 278  The few who stayed in the city were often men guarding their property from looters. [16] [12] More than 90,000 people in total were believed to have been displaced by the conflict. [21] Some had "camped under trees in rural areas outside the city", [19] while many others wound up in the nearby governorates of Aden and Lahij, occupying schools as makeshift refugee camps. [87] [122] The government estimated that more than 65% of the people displaced by the conflict were living in schools in Aden. [121]

Around 20 to 30 people slept in each classroom, and lived off food donated by local charities. [122] Shortages had been reported in electricity, food, water, and sleeping amenities in many schools. [87] [123] Displaced residents reported receiving minimal assistance from the government, which was instead supplemented by help from the local opposition movement and humanitarian agencies. [19] [21] Most had taken only what they could carry on themselves, in some cases with nothing at all. [8] [122]

In mid-January 2012, around 2,500 displaced residents returned to Zinjibar in a vehicular convoy agreed upon by both Ansar al-Sharia and the Yemeni government. [87] [86] The residents were welcomed by the militants in a festival and were allowed to visit the main city, which was held by Ansar al-Sharia, and other nearby areas before returning to Aden. [124]

Destruction

The battle resulted in catastrophic and unprecedented destruction to Zinjibar. [125] A local journalist in al-Kawd said that the fighting in Zinjibar was the most intense ever felt in the region, surpassing the wars of 1978, 1986 and 1994. [16] Western journalists touring Zinjibar after its liberation were shocked at the level of destruction; Adam Baron for Foreign Policy described it as "nearly apocalyptic", [18] while Time war photographer Yuri Kozyrev compared it to Grozny after the First Chechen War. [10] The water, sanitation and telecommunications, and electricity networks had all been disabled due to structural damage. The governor of Abyan, Jamal al-Aqel, said: "We found everything demolished. We started from scratch or even below that. The scope of the damage and destruction was much greater than we expected. Everything was flattened: the people, the buildings, the crops, the livestock and the land." [125]

Hundreds of families returning to the city found their homes to be completely leveled or significantly damaged, resulting in many occupying government facilities such as Martyrs' Square. [126] Structures which were destroyed or suffered damage included the administrative complex, which had been finished in 2010, residential apartments along the main road, along with banks, roads, and other buildings across the city. The Bajdar and al-Saher neighborhoods suffered enormous damage. [125] One residential area in Bajdar was so devastated that returning civilians had nicknamed it "Fallujah", in reference to the Iraqi city. [127] [128] In total, over 2,800 residential buildings and public facilities were officially estimated to have been affected by the conflict; [126] the United Nations recorded 285 major structures being completely destroyed or seriously damaged. [6] The projected cost for rebuilding the city was at $233 million. [126]

Analysis

Alleged complacency or support for militants

Within the context of the then-ongoing revolution, the seizure of Zinjibar provoked suspicion and allegations that Saleh and his regime had willfully or intentionally let the city fall. [24] The CSF and the Republican Guard, both of which were supposed to protect Zinjibar but withdrew without a fight, were loyal to Saleh throughout the revolution, being commanded by his nephew Yahya Saleh and son Ahmed Saleh respectively. [19] [14] : 462  The US-trained and funded counterterrorism units were instead deployed in Sanaa to help quell the revolution. [14] : 463  Accusations were also levied against Saleh loyalists within the military for not combating and even aiding the militants in the fight for Zinjibar. Pro-Saleh Southern Military Region commander Mahdi Maqula was criticized internally for allegedly obstructing efforts to resupply the army. The Yemeni Air Force, ran by Saleh's half-brother Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, [25] committed several friendly fire incidents during the battle, such as the one against allied tribal forces in July 2011 [55] and another against the pro-revolution 119th Infantry Brigade in October, [4] which further inflamed the accusations. [21]

There are many conspiracy theories about how we lost Zinjibar... Many thought that there was a deal between Saleh and the jihadis. The truth is much simpler: the army leadership is rotten and corrupt. Why would a soldier fight if the army is split in Sanaa?

A lieutenant in the 25th Mechanized Brigade [129]

Foreign minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi publicly denied any such conspiracy relating to the battle. Numerous opposition figures levied accusations against the regime regardless. This included Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and other allied generals, who released a joint statement accusing Saleh of "surrendering Abyan [Governorate] to an armed terrorist group" shortly after the fall of Zinjibar. [20] : 7  Yemen expert Gregory D. Johnsen said that gauging the regime's complacency with the militants could not be done without independent observers in Zinjibar, and that "the conspiracy theories ignore the real possibility of a wider militant takeover." [21] A lieutenant in the 25th Mechanized Brigade denied any plot outright, saying that security forces let Zinjibar fall simply due to a lack of will to fight. [129]

Many opposition figures and political analysts alike suspected that Saleh had let Zinjibar fall as a ploy to convince Yemenis as well as international observers, particularly the United States and neighboring Arab nations, that having himself in power was needed to prevent chaos and the complete usurpation of Yemen by AQAP. [16] [115] [14] : 462  Saleh was known to have historically exaggerated the al-Qaeda threat in Yemen and even collude with jihadists in order to amass more financial aid from the US and Saudi Arabia to solidify his rule. [24] [14] : 462  Even if the regime didn't directly facilitate the takeover, it did utilize its existence to pressure the US between its position on the revolution and fighting AQAP. [15]

Saleh's alleged plot had ultimately failed. [115] Rather than full-scale intervention and political support for his regime, the US instead provided support for on-the-ground forces engaging in the fighting, and escalated its independent drone strike program. The US had determined that it had no reason keep engaging with the regime in its declining state, [14] : 465  and instead doubled down on support for the Hadi administration upon its inauguration. [115]

Strategic value

Zinjibar is located east of the Bab al-Mandab, a major oil shipping strait. It is also located around 35 kilometers east of the strategic port city of Aden, the second largest city of Yemen. [20] : 11  Ansar al-Sharia's occupation of Zinjibar allowed them to cut off the only road connecting Abyan and Shabwah to Aden. [26] : 4  Analysts and security officials believed that if Ansar al-Sharia was allowed to fully consolidate control over Zinjibar and eliminate nearby military forces, it would have used the city as a base of operations to further expand towards and eventually try to seize Aden. [8] [47] [20] : 11  Critical Threats analyst Katherine Zimmerman wrote on the scenario in July 2011:

The fall of Aden raises the possibility of the fall of the south, which will have resounding effects on the future of the Yemeni state. Al-Qaeda would gain relative freedom of movement from the Arabian Sea to the Saudi border, significantly increasing the risk of an attack on an international or Saudi oil target, and could erect a form of an Islamist government in its territories. The Yemeni state would not only lose its southern port city of Aden, but would also lose revenues from southern oil. Should the Yemeni military or some other actor fail to halt al-Qaeda's advance, there is the very real prospect that al-Qaeda could establish an Islamic emirate in south Yemen. [47]

Insurgent activity in Aden saw a notable increase in June and July 2011. This included several assassinations against military officials and suicide attacks targeting military reinforcements heading to Zinjibar. [20] : 11  The uptick in militant activity eventually drew the attention of the central government, which responded by establishing a security cordon around Aden and sending in additional reinforcements to Zinjibar, which managed to push the frontlines to within Abyan by August. Zimmerman claimed that the deployment of these forces did not serve the goal of defeating the militants in Zinjibar, but was instead done to secure the safety of Aden from the militants. She described army gains during the July–September offensive as "tenuous at best", noting that progress had stalled later on and only picked up beginning in April 2012. [26] : 4, 7–8 

Aftermath

2015–2016 fall and recapture

Al-Qaeda's fighters stormed Jaar and Zinjibar in early December 2015 and recaptured the towns, [130] later declaring them "Emirates", providing civilian services, and establishing a Sharia court. In summer 2016 Yemeni government forces backed by Arab coalition aircraft and gunboats moved to retake the towns, and despite encountering "repeated suicide attacks" drove AQAP out of Zinjibar on 14 August 2016. [131]

Notes

  1. ↑ Until March 2012
  2. ↑ After March 2012
  3. ↑ Estimate of 1,000 soldiers for the primary three brigades involved. [6] The New York Times estimated one of them as having 2,000 soldiers. [7]
  4. ↑ As of December 2011 [8]
  5. ↑ As of September 2011 [11]

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