Historic Compromise

Prominent DC member Aldo Moro (pictured left) and leader of the PCI Enrico Berlinguer, the main architects of the Historic Compromise.

The Historic Compromise (Italian : Compromesso storico), also known as the Third Phase (Italian : Terza Fase) or the Democratic Alternative (Italian : Alternativa Democratica), was a historical political accommodation between Christian Democracy (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the 1970s.

History

In 1973, Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), launched a three-article proposal in the communist magazine Rinascita calling for a "democratic alliance" with Christian Democracy (DC), embraced by Aldo Moro. One factor that inspired this proposal was the recent overthrow of the Allende Government in Chile. For Berlinguer, the events in Chile proved that the Marxist left could not aspire to govern in democratic countries without establishing alliances with more moderate forces. ^{[1] [2] [3]}

Another major reason for the change in PCI policy was the advent of the 1973 oil crisis that challenged the Western welfare states and would ultimately provide the pretext for neoliberalism. Not only could the crisis endanger welfare spending, but the PCI feared it could even threaten the fragile liberal democracy as a whole, in the same way that the 1929 crisis had given way to Nazism and ultimately to the Second World War. Stephen Gundle has remarked that the party had legitimate reasons to fear a resurgence of fascist authoritarianism due to the terrorist strategy of tension employed during the Years of Lead, along with the increasing electoral strength of both the centre-right and far-right. ^[4] Hence the PCI aimed to participate in government to at least consolidate the gains of the previous decades and structurally entrench the Italian road to socialism. ^[5] This could even "be seen as orthodoxy" because it was in line with the post-war coalition governments that followed Togliatti's so-called Salerno Turn in 1944. ^[6]

The cooperation between the PCI and DC grew into an ambivalent political alliance in 1976, with Prime Minister Moro including Berlinguer in an emergency meeting with Italy's political party leaders on March 17, 1976, to discuss averting the collapse of the economy. ^[7] This replaced a governing alliance between Christian Democracy and the other center-left parties known as the Organic Centre-left. Berlinguer's PCI attempted to distance itself from the USSR, with the launching of "Eurocommunism" along with the Communist Party of Spain and the French Communist Party.

The compromise was unpopular among the other centre-left groups like the Italian Republican Party (PRI) and Italian Socialist Party (PSI), led respectively by Ugo La Malfa and Bettino Craxi. The rightist Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti also had doubts about the accommodation. ^[8] Some communist sympathizers or PCI members were estranged by the PCI's "refusal to consider the possibility of the exclusion of the DC from power", which seemed to indicate the PCI had moved beyond mere tactics and had entirely committed itself to collaboration with the DC. ^{[9] [10]} Even inside the PCI leadership, there was uncertainty about what the compromise would entail due to its overall vagueness and lack of a clear programme. Former party secretary Luigi Longo criticized it while discussing the 1975 election, stating that the proposed alliance was "enigmatic and ambiguous, and this ambiguity probably contributed to our electoral success, but the proposal remains impracticable and will lead us into passivity." ^{[11] [12]} However, Lucio Magri also notes that Berlinguer "enjoyed unlimited trust" in the ranks of his party, and was not rebuked when he moved to the right on such sensitive topics as Italian NATO membership. ^[13]

Finally, in the aftermath of the 1976 election, the PCI started to provide external support to a Christian Democratic one-party government led by Andreotti. This minority government - the DC had achieved a score of 38,8% - derived its legitimacy simply from the promise of the PCI and PSI to refrain from declaring no confidence in it. ^{[14] [15]} Despite official PCI support, several radical communists in the PCI boycotted the DC government.^{[ clarification needed ]} There was an increase in far-left terrorism, mainly committed by the Red Brigades (Italian : Brigate Rosse, BR). In response to this, the PCI started supporting repressive police measures. Criminologist Phil Edwards notes that this further damaged its anti-establishment credentials: "Rather than a principled loyalty to the constitution on which the Italian state had been founded, the party now appeared to stand for unconditional loyalty to the state as it was." ^[16] The BR kidnapped Aldo Moro, the then Party President of DC, on 16 March 1978. After several consultations in the Italian Parliament, the government refused the terrorists' conditions, and Moro was killed on 9 May 1978. Nevertheless, the Compromise continued but it was in decline.

At the DC's Fourteenth Congress in 1980, the DC's moderate wing (the "Democratic Initiative", "Dorothean" and "New Force" factions) won with an anti-communist programme, obtaining 57.7% of the vote, while the DC's conservative wing and Giulio Andreotti's faction "Spring", obtained 42.3% with a pro-Compromise program. The new DC Secretary became Flaminio Piccoli, a Dorothean, and the Compromise was discontinued. It was replaced with Christian Democracy's political alliance with the other center-left parties known as the Pentapartito.

The PCI also started distancing itself from the Historic Compromise on its Fifteenth Congress in 1979. On November 28, 1980, in Salerno, Berlinguer officially announced the policy's demise. ^[17]

See also

• Grand coalition (Germany)
• Strategy of tension
• Years of Lead (Italy)

Notes

1. Berlinguer, Enrico (28 September 1973). "Imperialismo e coesistenza alla luce dei fatti cileni - Necessaria una riflessione attenta sul quadro mondiale". Rinascita (38). Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 November 2024.
2. Berlinguer, Enrico (5 October 1973). "Via democratica e violenza reazionaria - Riflessione sull'Italia dopo i fatti del Cile". Rinascita (39). Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 November 2024.
3. Berlinguer, Enrico (12 October 1973). "Alleanze sociali e schieramenti politici - Riflessioni sull'Italia dopo i fatti del Cile". Rinascita (40). Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 November 2024.
4. Gundle, Stephen (1 June 1987). "The PCI and the Historic Compromise" (PDF). New Left Review (I/163): 27–35. Retrieved 1 November 2024.
5. Magri, Lucio (2018). The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 251-252 and 261-262. ISBN   9781786635549.
6. Edwards, Phil (2009). 'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 50. ISBN   9780719078736.
7. "Italian Communists Consulted by premier First Time Since '47", The New York Times, March 18, 1976, p.4
8. Fallaci, Oriana (1974). Intervista con la storia. Rizzoli.
9. Edwards, Phil (2009). 'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 52-53. ISBN   9780719078736.
10. Hellman, Stephen (1988). Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise and Fall of the Historic Compromise in Turin, 1975-1980. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 31-32. ISBN   9780195053357.
11. Magri, Lucio (2018). The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 270. ISBN   9781786635549.
12. Luigi Longo at the Encyclopædia Britannica
13. Magri, Lucio (2018). The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 273. ISBN   9781786635549.
14. Magri, Lucio (2018). The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 271-272. ISBN   9781786635549.
15. Edwards, Phil (2009). 'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 53. ISBN   9780719078736.
16. Edwards, Phil (2009). 'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 55. ISBN   9780719078736.
17. Balampanidis, Ioannis (2019). Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left. London and New York: Routledge. p. 63. ISBN   9780815373322.