Possible third-party involvement in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war
Because of the geography, history, and sensitivities of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, accusations, allegations, and statements have been made of involvement by third-party and international actors during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, including in media reports. Azerbaijan has been accused of employing Syrian mercenaries during the war, including reports by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).[1][2] There have also been allegations of Kurdish militia from Syria and Iraq fighting on the Armenian side, and although some third-party sources had confirmed it,[3][4][5] some publications had considered these claims "dubious".[6][7][8] During the war, ethnic Armenian volunteers from the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America fought on Armenian side.[9][10][11][12] Both sides have denied employing mercenaries in the war,[13][14] but the OHCHR had stated that there were reports about Syrian fighters motivated primarily by private gain fighting on Azerbaijan's side recruited with Turkey's assistance and foreign nationals fighting on Armenian side with motivation being investigated, calling for withdrawal of any mercenaries and related actors from Nagorno-Karabakh.[15]
On 7 October 2020, Artsakh's Presidential Spokesman Vahram Poghosyan said that according to intelligence, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had reached an agreement with the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Islam) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to involve "new terrorist groups in the war against Artsakh".[16] On 17 October 2020, Armenia's National Security Service (NSS) stated that the Azerbaijani side is engaged in the transportation of a large amount of ammunition and mercenaries to its territory, citing the flights of Silk Way's Boeing 747 and Il-76 planes from Baku to air bases in different countries as evidence. According to the Armenian NSS, the Baku-Bagram flight was registered on 16 October, and the Bagram-Lashkar Gah-Baku flight on 17 October. The Armenian NSS reported that the same route was scheduled for 18 October and flights from Baku to Kandahar. It also notes that information on some of these flights is absent in the system of international timetables, and a number of airports do not have an international classification.[17] On 2 October 2020, Afghanistan's declared diplomatic support for Azerbaijan prompted Armenia to push for an end to Kabul's observer status in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led regional alliance.[18]
Armenian diaspora volunteers
Artsakh's president Arayik Harutyunyan awarding an Armenian volunteer for capturing a Syrian mercenary on 2 November 2020.
On 28 September 2020, the Azerbaijani MoD alleged that among the Armenian casualties were "mercenaries" of Armenian origin from Syria and a variety of Middle East countries.[21] On the same day, the Turkish Minister of Defence stated that Armenia must "send back the mercenaries and terrorists it brought from abroad".[22] Two days later, Azerbaijani authorities asked the international community to "adequately respond to the use of terrorist forces by Armenia".[23] On 30 September 2020, the SOHR also stated that Armenian-born Syrian fighters were being transported to Armenia to fight against Azerbaijan.[24] The next day, Azerbaijani authorities stated that Armenia had widely employed foreign "terrorist forces" and "mercenaries" against it, with there being evidence of people of Armenian origin from the Middle East, especially Syria and Lebanon, and subsequently Russia, Georgia, Greece, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries.[25] A Novaya Gazeta report, citing Lebanese Ministry of Internal Affairs intelligence, stated around 500 ethnic Armenian Lebanese had travelled to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh.[9] In early October, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that Armenians from Lebanon, who were members of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, a militant group listed as a terrorist organisation by the United States, had supported Armenia in the war.[4]Greek City Times have reported that about 500–800 Armenians from Greece, as well as some Greeks volunteered to the war on Armenia's side.[26] An Armenian defence ministry official had said many from the diaspora applied to volunteer without giving a precise number. Hundreds from as far afield as Argentina and the United States have rushed back to Armenia for combat training, a local instructor says. Karapet Aghajanyan, the combat instructor in Yerevan, who trains local and foreign volunteers, told Reuters around 10 Lebanese-Armenians had received training in his camp.[27]France 24 spoke to soldiers including Armenian diaspora from France fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh.[12]
On 24 April 2021, the Chief of Air Defense Forces of the Armenian Army Armen Vardanyan stated that Israel has not only supplied military equipment to Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War, but also operated them. According to the Major General, Israel provided direct assistance through their operators and personnel during hostilities.[28]
On 30 September 2020, Turkish sources alleged that approximately 300 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants were transported to Nagorno-Karabakh via Iran. However, according to Eurasianet and The Jerusalem Post, these claims were not substantiated by evidence.[6][7] On 6 October 2020, the Azerbaijani State Security Service (SSS) claimed, citing intercepts, which it released as an evidence, that Armenia had employed foreign mercenaries, including members of Kurdish militant groups whom Armenia had brought from Iraq and Syria, to fight Azerbaijan.[29] On the same day, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that there were Kurdish extremist groups, which, according to Al-Monitor, are fighting on the Armenian side, while there is no direct evidence of it.[3] In early October, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that there was evidence of Armenia being supported by the Martyr Nubar Ozanyan Brigade militants, part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and associated with the PKK.[4][5] However, the Martyr Nubar Ozanyan Brigade strongly denied claims of them travelling to Armenia.[30] The commander of the group mocked the Turkish accusation, saying "We know that this perception is completely false. Besides, everybody knows that the PKK members are not in Armenia. Because it's not Kurdistan."[30]
On 17 October 2020, the Armenian National Security Service stated that Azerbaijan was smuggling in a significant amount of ammunition, mercenaries and "terrorists" from Afghanistan and Pakistan.[31] Pakistan rejected this allegation as "irresponsible propaganda", and said the claims by the Armenian government had no substance.[32][33] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in an interview with the Indian media WION that there was "information that militants from Pakistan are involved in the war against Karabakh."[34] He told Russian reporters about Pakistan's active role in the conflict. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, stated that Pakistan had supported Baku diplomatically "but military assistance is out of the question." On 28 October 2020, based on informed sources, Kommersant reported that at least one batch of militants with weapons and ammunition were formed and sent from Pakistan's Peshawar to Karabakh.[35] Later there were new reports about provided support by Pakistan to Azerbaijan during the war.[36] In February 2021, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) called upon the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Janet Yellen to include Pakistan on the FATF blacklist for "funding mercenaries who fought in the Karabakh war".[37] In September 2021, the Azerbaijani MoD expressed his gratitude to Pakistan for its support during the war.[38]
On 9 November, the day when the ceasefire agreement was signed, the Azerbaijani forces in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic accidentally[39]shot down a RussianMil Mi-24 attack helicopter near Yeraskh, in Armenia.[40][41] According to Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall of The New York Times, this potentially gave Russia a reason to intervene in the war, and the Russian president Vladimir Putin delivered an ultimatum to the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev. According to Troianovski and Gall, in this ultimatum, Russia stated that if Azerbaijan did not cease its operations after seizing control of Shusha, it will intervene. The same night, an unknown missile hit an open area in Khyrdalan, near Baku, without causing any injuries, according to the Azerbaijani sources.[42] Also, yet again on the same day, a video emerged on the social media apparently showing the Armenian forces launching a Russian-made Iskander missile into Azerbaijan.[43] The former Head of the Military Control Service of the Armenian MoD Movses Hakobyan, after resigning from his post on 19 November 2020, stated that Armenia used an Iskander missile on Azerbaijan, though he did not say where the missile hit. Armenia's Prosecutor General's office said in a Facebook post that it would investigate Hakobyan's allegations. A Defense Ministry spokeswoman didn't respond to phone calls seeking comment. According to Can Kasapoğlu, the Director of Security and Defense Studies Program at the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, an Istanbul-based independent think-tank, Armenia could've used Iskander missiles only with the Russian consent.[44] Azerbaijan and Russia denied that Armenia fired an Iskander during the war,[45][46] however, according to the Middle East Eye, Armenia had fired at least one Russian-made Iskander ballistic missile at Azerbaijan's capital, Baku in November 2020 and they were shot down by a missile defence system operated by the Azerbaijani military.[47] In March 2021, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) stated that Armenia had used Iskander missiles during the battle, adding that they found the remains of two exploded Iskander missiles during the demining of the area in Shusha;[48] this was denied by Russia.[49]
Wagner Group
On 28 September, Russian media reported that Russian private military companies were ready to fight against Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.[50] On 1 October, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, citing a Wagner Group source, claimed they were already in Nagorno-Karabakh and participating in hostilities.[51] The Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer also stated that Wagner contractors were sent to support the Armenian forces as ATGM operators.[52] After the war, in December 2020, a photo of a Wagner mercenary, apparently taken in front a church in Shusha during the war, appeared on the internet. Also, the Russian media leaked a message, apparently describing how the Armenian government refused to pay the Russian mercenaries for their work, and how, because of that, some of the Wagner mercenaries intended to return to Russia or defect to the Azerbaijani side. The Russian media reported that, in November, there were about 500 Russian mercenaries fighting on the Armenian side,[53] and some 300 Russian mercenaries had taken part in the Battle of Shusha, with Victor Zlobov, a retired captain of the Russian Armed Forces, stating that Shusha was "defended mainly thanks to the Russian volunteers".[54][55]
The Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has been linked to the Wagner Group, denied any involvement of the Russian PMCs in the war.[51] According to the Armenian journalist Karine Ghazaryan, writing for Bellingcat, there was not "any firm evidence showing their arrival or involvement in the war". She stated that Reverse Side of the Medal (RSOTM), a media channel linked to Wagner Group, which, according to Ghazaryan, was the main source of the reports, was not the "breaking news source."[56]
Prior to the beginning of the conflict, Turkey's upped rhetoric against Armenia, as well as its recruitment of several hundred Syrian refugees had been reported the previous week by Syrian commentators, activists and others on social media, circulated among Syrian refugees, dissidents and others who monitor Syria.[57] Detailed reporting on the evidence of Syrian fighters in Azerbaijan exists, as well as apparent Turkish military involvement, causing international concern. Two days into the conflict, several Syrian National Army (SNA) members and the SOHR reported that a private Turkish security company was recruiting Syrians to fight in Artsakh;[58] Azerbaijan [59] and Turkey issued denials. France24, The Independent and The Guardian have reported evidence of Syrian mercenaries recruited in Syria by Turkey to fight alongside the Azerbaijani servicemen in Nagorno-Karabakh.[60][61][62][63] A report in The Times partially confirmed Turkish involvement in sending 200 Syrian fighters to support Azerbaijani forces;[64] a Turkish-based source reported that these were acting independently of the SNA.
Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar made threats to Armenia following the July 2020 Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes and stated, "Azerbaijan is not alone. Let everyone know that we are one nation."[65] Russian newspaper Kommersant claimed to have sources confirming that Akar arrived in Baku between 28 and 30 September and oversaw all operations during the war. Lieutenant General Şeref Öngay was in Azerbaijan during September to conduct joint Azerbaijani-Turkish tactical exercises.[66] Adnan Tanrıverdi, a former Turkish general, is the founder the SADAT Inc. International Defense Consultancy that has been responsible for recruiting, equipping, and transporting the Syrian mercenaries.[67][68] On 4 March 2021, Lieutenant General Osman Erbaş was killed in a military helicopter crash. Turan Information Agency stated that Erbaş was of the masterminds behind drones strategy used by Azerbaijan in the second war.[69]
Emmanuel Macron accused Turkey of dispatching Syrian jihadists to Nagorno-Karabakh via Gaziantep while Russia expressed concern over "illegal armed units" from Syria and Libya being present in the conflict zone.[70]Syrian PresidentBashar al-Assad reiterated Macron's concerns.[71] On 3 October 2020, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Syrian fighters, together with Turkish army specialists, were involved, along with circa 150 senior Turkish military officers, allegedly directing military operations.[72] The National Security Service of Armenia presented intercepts, allegedly between the Turkish and Azerbaijani military, and between the Azerbaijani military and mercenaries.[73] U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that Turkey's involvement in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has increased the risk in the region, inflaming the situation by arming the Azerbaijanis.[74]
On 2 October 2020, Russian investigative newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported 700–1,000 militants had apparently been sent to Azerbaijan and detailed their transport and recruitment itinerary, referring to the Hamza Division and the Samarkand and Nureddin Zinki Brigades.[75] The Georgian State Security Service stated news about the passage of Syrian fighters from Turkey through Georgia to Azerbaijan was disinformation.[76] On 3 October 2020, Elizabeth Tsurkov, an American expert on Syria, reported on videos of Arabic-speaking foreigners, who she identified as likely Syrian mercenaries in Horadiz, urging compatriots to join them.[1][77] Subsequently, Tsurkov detailed the recruitment, by the Hamza Division and Sultan Murad and Sultan Suleyman Shah Brigades, of at least a thousand mercenaries to Azerbaijan, including civilians with no fighting experience who had been informed they would be guarding oil facilities but were then sent to the front.[78] On 5 October 2020, Russian News Agency RIA Novosti stated that 322 Syrian mercenaries were in the conflict zone and that 93 had been killed, while 430 from Syria had already arrived.[79] On 6 October 2020, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that several thousand fighters from Middle East terrorist organisations had arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh to fight for Azerbaijan, specifically from Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda branch), Firkat Hamza, and the Sultan Murad Division, stating all were linked to the Islamic State (ISIL).[80][81] On 7 October 2020, Asia Times reported that mercenaries allegedly signed up to go to Azerbaijan for US$1,500 a month.[82]Kommersant states that during the first week of October up to 1,300 Syrian militants and 150 Libyan mercenaries deployed to Azerbaijan.[83]
On 16 October 2020, Kommersant provided details of Turkish military involvement. Turkish servicemen had apparently remained in Azerbaijan after joint military drills during the summer, to coordinate and direct the planning and conducting of the operations. Six hundred servicemen had stayed on, including a tactical battalion of 200 people, 50 instructors in Nakhchivan, 90 military advisers in Baku, 120 flight personnel at the airbase in Qabala; 20 drone operators at Dollyar Air Base, 50 instructors at the aviabase in Yevlakh, 50 instructors in the 4th Army Corps in Perekeshkul and 20 others at the naval base and Azerbaijan Higher Military Academy in Baku. According to the source, forces included 18 Turkish infantry fighting vehicles, one multiple launch rocket system, 10 vehicles and up to 34 aircraft, including 6 warplanes, 8 helicopters and up to 20 military intelligence drones.[83]
Canada suspended the export of its drone technology to Turkey over concerns that it is using the technology in the conflict.[84] On 11 January 2021, after being approached by the Embassy of Armenia, Hampshire-based UK aircraft component manufacturer Andair announced halting supply of Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar Makina – a subsidiary of Turkish Defence Company Baykar, as they were using components from Andair for armed drones.[85] The British manufacturer became the latest company to stop selling equipment to Turkey after its components were found in drones shot down during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[86]
At the start of the conflict, according to the SOHR, a total of 320 Syrian fighters were in Azerbaijan, primarily of Syrian-Turkmen descent from the Sultan Murad Division, and initially had not participated in the fighting. It stated that Arab-majority Syrian rebel groups had in fact refused to send their fighters to Azerbaijan.[87] However, the SOHR confirmed the deaths of 28 fighters several days after the start of the conflict.[88] On 3 December 2020, the SOHR stated that at least 541 pro-Turkey Syrian rebel fighters, who were among more than 2,580 combatants, had been killed in the war. An unidentified SNA leader, The Guardian and The Washington Post confirmed the deaths of dozens of Syrian fighters, most of them hired by Turkey.[89][90][91][92] Prime Minister Pashinyan in an interview given to French newspaper Le Figaro wrote that 30% of Azerbaijani forces killed in hostilities were foreign mercenaries.[93][94]
On 27 January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it strongly condemned Turkey's "destabilizing role" in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, accusing Ankara of sending foreign terrorist fighters from Syria and elsewhere to the conflict zone as confirmed by international actors, including the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries, and called for an end to Turkish military aid to Azerbaijan.[95][96] On 11 March 2021, the European Parliament adopted another resolution in which it has strongly condemned the use of Syrian mercenaries in conflicts in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, in violation of international law.[97]
Azerbaijani officials, including President Aliyev and his aid Hikmet Hajiyev, denied the transfer of Syrian mercenaries, with Hajiyev stating that "Rumours of militants from Syria allegedly being redeployed to Azerbaijan is another provocation by the Armenian side."[14][98] In December 2020, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Rosbalt questioned "the sources of information" regarding the participation of Syrian mercenaries in the war, pointing to the study by the Caspian and Black Sea Analysis Foundation (CCBS), a Bulgaria-based analytical center, which mentioned that the accusations were based on messages from social media users, and also suggested that the first publication on this matter was done on 21 September by Kevork Almasyan of whose statement was then used by adding random photos of Syrian fighters as evidence. CCBS further mentioned that even the photograph of a deceased soldier (Serdar Temelli), who had died during the Turkish Operation Tiger Claw in northern Iraq, was used to illustrate the mercenaries in Karabakh.[99][100]ANNA News correspondent Alexander Kharchenko, who reported from the Armenian positions during the war, in an interview he gave to Vladimir Solovyov on 14 November 2020, stated that he only saw and talked to Azerbaijani POWs, adding that he did not see any Syrian militants or Turkish special forces in the battlefield, and that the Armenians did not show him any documentation of third-party involvement on the Azerbaijani side.[101]
According to a researcher and Turkologist Viktor Nadein-Raevsky, the Azerbaijani army was commanded by Turkish generals, and during the war, drones were also commanded by Turkish generals.[102]
In his annual report on state institutions operating under the Presidency at parliament's Planning and Budget Committee on 26 November 2021, Turkey's vice-president Fuat Oktay stated that Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) played an active role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, helping to shape the balances in the field. This first-ever official confirmation came to support the earlier statement of Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin who on 6 November 2020 stated that Turkish intelligence agency was involved in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.[103]
Azerbaijani, Turkish and Israeli flags in Baku in October 2020
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (STIPI), Israel provided nearly two-thirds of all arms imports to Azerbaijan over 2020, which, according to STIPI, have had a significant influence on how the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was fought. The institute stated that Israel had provided the IAI Harop, as well as M095 DPICMcluster munitions that were declared illegal by the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008.[104]
Israel was reported by the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya to have continued shipping weapons, especially drones, during the war.[105] "Azerbaijan would not be able to continue its operation at this intensity without our support," an unnamed "senior source" reportedly in the Israeli Ministry of Defense said in an interview with Asia Times.[104] "Azerbaijan is an important country for us; we always try to be a good supplier even during times of tension, we have to make sure that we will honor the contracts we make with Azerbaijan," Efraim Inbar, president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security told Times of Israel.[106] Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported to have flagged significant airlift of arms and supplies from Israel to Azerbaijan during the conflict.[107]
In an interview with David Barsamian of Alternative Radio, American scientist and political activist Noam Chomsky said that "The immediate crisis came when Azerbaijan, surely with Turkish backing [and] Israeli arms pouring in [attacked Armenia]" and that this aid came from "Ben Gurion airport in Israel, [with] Ilyushin planes coming in and out, while no other planes are flying into Baku" and that they were "sending Israeli arms to Azerbaijan so they can kill people, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh".[108] In an open letter on 5 October, a group of Israeli scholars of Caucasian and associated studies from different institutions called upon the Israeli government to "immediately cease arms sales to Azerbaijan",[109][110] followed by the World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS) statement on 15 October calling on the Israeli government "to cease all exports of weapons to Azerbaijan while the conflict is ongoing, and instead to play a role as a peace-seeking mediator."[111]
Russia, Iran and Georgia
During the conflict, unverified video footage that reportedly showed Russian weaponry and military hardware being transported to Armenia through Iran were posted on social media. On 29 September 2020, the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied these reports. The next day, Azerbaijani government-affiliated media outlets shared footage reportedly showing the materiel being transported.[112] Azerbaijani MP Sabir Rustamkhanli stated that Iran was engaged in transporting weapons from various countries to Armenia.[113] Subsequently, in the Azerbaijani Parliament, Rustamkhanli suggested opening an Azerbaijani embassy in Israel.[114] The Chief of Staff of the President of Iran, in a phone call with the Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, denied the reports and stated that they were aimed at disrupting the two countries' relations. Iranian state-affiliated media stated that trucks depicted in the footage consisted of shipments of Kamaz trucks that the Armenian government had previously purchased from Russia.[115]
Azerbaijan's president initially stated that Georgia had not allowed the transportation of weapons through its territory and thanked Georgia, as a partner and friend.[116] However, in a subsequent interview, he stated that Armenia was misusing one of its Il-76 cargo planes for civil flights, to secretly transport fighters and Kornet anti-tank missiles from Russia through Georgian airspace into Armenia.[117] Georgia responded by stating that its airspace was closed to all military and military cargo flights but not for civil and humanitarian ones.[118]
A senior Armenian military official colonel-general Movses Hakobyan, who resigned his post after the war, said that Russia delivered military supplies to Armenia during the war.
Azerbaijan stated that Armenia employed Serbian weapons, alleged to have been transported via Georgia.[119] In response, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, stated that Serbia considered both Armenia and Azerbaijan to be friends and "brotherly nations", insisting that Serbian weapons were not used in Nagorno-Karabakh.[120] Armenian sources, however, claimed that Serbia exported armaments to both countries.[121]
The First Nagorno-Karabakh War was an ethnic and territorial conflict that took place from February 1988 to May 1994, in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan, between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan with support from Turkey. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics, entangled themselves in protracted, undeclared mountain warfare in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians until 2023, and seven surrounding districts, inhabited mostly by Azerbaijanis until their expulsion during the 1990s. The Nagorno-Karabakh region was entirely claimed by and partially controlled by the breakaway Republic of Artsakh, but was recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan gradually re-established control over Nagorno-Karabakh region and the seven surrounding districts.
There are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The two neighboring states had formal governmental relations between 1918 and 1921, during their brief independence from the collapsed Russian Empire, as the First Republic of Armenia and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan; these relations existed from the period after the Russian Revolution until they were occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union, becoming the constituent republics of Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan. Due to the five wars waged by the countries in the past century—one from 1918 to 1921, another from 1988 to 1994, and the most recent in 2016, 2020 and 2023—the two have had strained relations. In the wake of hostilities, social memory of Soviet-era cohabitation is widely repressed through censorship and stigmatization.
The Armenian-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh were areas of Azerbaijan, situated around the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), which were occupied by the ethnic Armenian military forces of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh with military support from Armenia, from the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994) to 2020, when the territories were returned to Azerbaijani control by military force or handed over in accordance to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. The surrounding regions were seized by Armenians under the justification of a "security belt" which was to be traded for recognition of autonomous status from Azerbaijan.
The 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, also known as the Four-Day War, April War, or April clashes, began along the former Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact on 1 April 2016 with the Artsakh Defence Army, backed by the Armenian Armed Forces, on one side and the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on the other.
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was an armed conflict in 2020 that took place in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding occupied territories. It was a major escalation of an unresolved conflict over the region, involving Azerbaijan, Armenia and the self-declared Armenian breakaway state of Artsakh. The war lasted for 44 days and resulted in Azerbaijani victory, with the defeat igniting anti-government protests in Armenia. Post-war skirmishes continued in the region, including substantial clashes in 2022.
This is an account of engagements which occurred during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, primarily based on announcements from the belligerents. The war has been characterized by the use of armoured warfare; drone warfare, especially the use of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and Israeli loitering munition Harop drones; heavy artillery; rocket attacks; and trench warfare. It has also featured the deployment of cluster munitions, which are banned by the majority of the international community but not by Armenia or Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan states that Armenia has deployed cluster munitions against civilians, and international third parties have confirmed evidence of Azerbaijan's use of cluster munitions against civilian areas of Nagorno-Karabakh. A series of ballistic missile attacks have inflicted mass civilian casualties in Ganja, Azerbaijan, while civilian residences and infrastructure in Stepanakert, and elsewhere have been targeted, inflicting casualties and causing extensive damage.
The bombardment of Stepanakert began on September 27, 2020, the first day of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and lasted throughout the duration of the war. Stepanakert is the capital and largest city of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and was home to 60,000 Armenians on the eve of the war. Throughout the 6-week bombardment, international third parties consistently confirmed evidence of the indiscriminate use of cluster bombs and missiles by Azerbaijan against civilian areas lacking any military installations in Stepanakert; this was denied by Azerbaijan. The prolonged bombardment forced many residents to flee, and the rest to take cover in crowded bomb shelters, leading to a severe outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the city, infecting a majority of the remaining residents. Throughout the course of the bombardment, 13 residents were killed, 51 were injured, and 4,258 buildings in the city were damaged.
The casualties of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, fought between Armenia, the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh internationally recognized as the territory of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan, officially number in the low thousands. According to official figures released by the belligerents, Armenia and Artsakh lost 3,825 troops, with 187 servicemen missing in action, while Azerbaijan lost 2,906 troops, with 6 missing in action. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported the deaths of 541 Syrian fighters or mercenaries fighting for Azerbaijan. However, it is believed that the sides downplayed the number of their own casualties and exaggerated the numbers of enemy casualties and injuries.
The Battle of Hadrut began in early October 2020 in Hadrut and its surrounding villages and heights, now seat of Khojavend District, Azerbaijan, and earlier controlled by the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and was part of Hadrut Province.
The 2020 shelling of Ghazanchetsots Cathedral took place prior to the Battle of Shusha on 8 October, when the Holy Savior Cathedral of the city of Shusha, known as Ghazanchetsots Cathedral, was struck twice by missiles, resulting in the collapse of a part of the roof. Armenia accused the Azerbaijani Armed Forces over the shelling.
The Aras Valley campaign was a military operation launched by Azerbaijan against the breakaway Republic of Artsakh along the Aras River in the Azerbaijan–Iran border during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
The Lachin offensive was a military operation launched by Azerbaijan against the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh and their Armenian allies along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, with the suspected goal of taking control of the Lachin corridor. The offensive began in mid-October, when the Azerbaijani forces advanced into Qubadlı and Laçın Districts after capturing Zəngilan. On 25 October, the Azerbaijani forces seized control of the city of Qubadlı.
The Battle of Shusha was the final and decisive battle of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, fought between the armed forces of Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, militarily supported by Armenia, over the control of the city of Shusha. The battle is considered one of the bloodiest battles of the war.
This is the military history of the 2020s.
The Memorial Day in Azerbaijan is a public holiday in Azerbaijan for honoring and mourning the military personnel who have died while serving in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, officially labelled as The Patriotic War. Established by the decree of the President of Azerbaijan, dated 2 December 2020, the holiday is held on 27 September, the day when the war began.
The following is list of the official reactions to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
In the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, peacekeeping operations were initiated by Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region to monitor the ceasefire between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. Separate from the Russian operation, Turkey also has personnel working in a joint Russian–Turkish monitoring centre.
The bombardment of Martuni was the bombardment of the cities, towns, and villages in the Martuni Province of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, which is de jure a part of Azerbaijan. It was carried out by Azerbaijani Armed Forces during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The city Martuni, along with the de facto capital Stepanakert, were badly damaged as a result of shelling. The shelling resulted in the deaths of five civilians. 1,203 buildings were damaged in the province as a result of the bombardment, according to Artsakh Urban Development Ministry. Victoria Gevorgyan, a resident of the Martuni Province of Nagorno-Karabakh, became the first child killed on the first day of the war.
1 2 Semenov, Kirill (14 October 2020). "Will Russia recruit Syrian Kurds to fight in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict?". Al-Monitor. Retrieved 22 October 2020. In this context, it was beneficial for the Russian side to stress the presence of "Kurdish extremist groups", which, according to the intelligence service, came to participate in the conflict on the side of Armenia. While there is no direct evidence of this yet, the potential deployment of Kurdistan Workers Party units or affiliated organizations in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict would be extremely sensitive for Turkey. If confirmed, instead of Ankara having eliminated the "Kurdish threat" at the southern borders of the country, a "terrorist hotbed" could be being created at Turkey's northern borders. This could be one price of Turkey's support for Azerbaijan.
1 2 el-Hayek, Wadih (2 October 2020). "В бой вступают наемники". novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 4 October 2020. Retrieved 13 October 2020.
↑ "SSS announces facts, approving fighting of PKK terrorists on the Armenian side against Azerbaijan". apa.az. 5 October 2020. Retrieved 5 October 2020. The Republic of Armenia uses foreign mercenaries, including members of the Kurdish terrorist groups whom Armenia has brought from Iraq and Syria, in its aggression against Azerbaijan, Public Relations Department of the State Security Service (SSS) told APA. State Security Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan has intercepted conversations of the terrorists related to the PKK who are participating in combat activities against Azerbaijan. According to the intercepted conversations, the terrorists discuss the precarious situation on Armenia's side and numerous losses. They also talk about how the Azerbaijani side effectively uses drones and regret that they have come to the war zone being deceived by the Armenians. Here we present the above-mentioned materials.
↑ FRANTZMAN, SETH J. (26 September 2020). "Is Turkey planning to recruit Syrians to fight Armenia? – The Jerusalem Post". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 18 October 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2020. Turkey has upped its rhetoric against Armenia in recent days, threatening the country and claiming Armenia is "playing with fire" and alleging Armenia has recruited "terrorists". [...] Several hundred Syrian refugees have been recruited by Turkey to fight against Armenia in the disputed Karabagh region, according to claims by Syrian commentators, activists and other reports. The claims were posted on social media this week and circulated among Syrian refugees, dissidents and others who monitor Syria.
↑ "Famous general killed in helicopter crash in Turkey". Turan Information Agency. 4 March 2021. Retrieved 2 April 2021. As a result of a plane crash with a military helicopter, which occurred on Thursday, March 4, in eastern Turkey, Turkish General Osman Erbash, who was at the origin of the creation of the Bayraktar combat drones, was killed...In addition, General Erbash in Turkey is called one of the authors of the strategy used by Azerbaijan to succeed in the Second Karabakh War.
↑ "150 Turkish high ranking military officers in Azerbaijani command centers – PM Pashinyan". armenpress.am. Armenpress. 3 October 2020. Archived from the original on 9 October 2020. Retrieved 10 October 2020. Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan announced that the analysis of the developments of the previous day show that 150–200 soldiers of the enemy attack 1 military position of the Defense Army of Artsakh.
↑ Phillips, Owen (11 January 2021). "Cessation of supply to Baykar Makina"(PDF) (Press release). Hampshire, UK: Andair. Archived(PDF) from the original on 14 January 2021. Retrieved 14 January 2021. After investigation, Andair immediately halted supply and cancelled all orders from Baykar Makina
↑ Carley, Patricia (29 September 2020). "Turkey recruiting Syrians to guard troops and facilities in Azerbaijan". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 2 October 2020. Retrieved 10 October 2020. "These situations are dangerous and this is not our battle, the Shia have been our number one enemy supporting the Syrian regime for 10 years", he said, adding that they will not just be used as guards and 30 Syrians have already been killed in fighting on the front.
1 2 Ben-Eprahim, Shaiel (14 October 2020). "Israel to maintain Azeri edge in Karabakh war". Asia Times. Retrieved 9 January 2021. Azerbaijan would not be able to continue its operation at this intensity without our support," a senior source in the Israeli Ministry of Defense said
↑ Barsamian, David (10 October 2020). "Noam Chomsky Discusses Azeri Aggression on Artsakh". Chomsky.info. Retrieved 10 January 2021. the immediate crisis came when Azerbaijan, surely with Turkish backing, Israeli arms pouring in. Ben Gurion airport in Israel, Ilyushin planes coming in and out, while no other planes are flying [into Baku], sending Israeli arms to Azerbaijan so they can kill people, Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh
↑ Amitai, Reuven; Auron, Yair; Charny, Israel; Deitch, Moran, eds. (5 October 2020). An open letter regarding the war in Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh). Armenian Studies at The Hebrew University. Jerusalem, Israel: Armenian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. We call upon the Israeli government to cease immediately the sales of arms to Azerbaijan.
↑ "انتقال کامیونهای روسی از خاک ایران!". iribnews.ir (in Persian). Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. 29 September 2020. Archived from the original on 30 September 2020. Retrieved 30 September 2020.
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