Anti-American sentiment in mainland China

Last updated

Anti-American protests in Nanjing following the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 1999 Anti-American Protests in Nanjing, 1999 (flickr 2543499638).jpg
Anti-American protests in Nanjing following the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 1999

There is a history of anti-Americanism in China, beginning with the general disdain for foreigners in the early 19th century that culminated in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which the United States Marine Corps participated with other powers in suppressing. The 1905 Chinese boycott of American goods to protest discrimination against the Chinese living in America had a major negative impact on Chinese attitudes. After the Chinese Civil War, the United States and China fought an undeclared war during the Korean War, in which 148,000 Chinese soldiers died, that left bitter feelings on both sides. Relations warmed up after 1970, but large-scale anti-American sentiments significantly increased since US President Donald Trump launched a trade war against China in the late 2010s.

Contents

History

1905 boycott

In response to severe restrictions on Chinese immigration to the United States, the overseas Chinese living in the United States organized a boycott whereby people in China refuse to purchase American products. The project was organized by a reform organization based in the United States, Baohuang Hui. Unlike the Boxers, these reformers were modernizers. The Manchu government had supported the Boxers, but these reformers—of whom Sun Yat-sen was representative, opposed the government. The boycott was put into effect by merchants and students in the south and central China. It made only a small economic impact because China bought few American products apart from Standard Oil's kerosene. Washington was outraged and treated the boycott as a Boxer-like violent attack, and demanded the Peking government stop it or else. President Theodore Roosevelt asked Congress for special funding for a naval expedition. Washington refused to consider softening the exclusion laws because it responded to deep-seated anti-Chinese prejudices that were widespread, especially on the West Coast. It now began to denounce Chinese nationalism. [1] The impact on the Chinese people, in China and abroad, was far-reaching. Jane Larson argues the boycott, "marked the beginning of mass politics and modern nationalism in China. Never before had shared nationalistic aspirations mobilized Chinese across the world in political action, joining the cause of Chinese migrants with the fate of the Chinese nation." [2] [3] [4]

Cold War

During the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, the U.S. provided economic and military assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime against the Japanese invasion. In particular, the "China Hands" (American diplomats known for their knowledge of China) also attempted to establish diplomatic contacts with Mao Zedong's communists in their stronghold in Yan'an, with a goal of fostering unity between the Nationalists and Communists. [5] However, relations soured after the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the relocation of the Chiang regime to Taiwan, together with the start of the Cold War and rise of McCarthyism in U.S. politics. While the U.S. initially expected the Chiang regime to quickly fall, China and the U.S. fought a major undeclared war in Korea, 1950–53 and, as a result, President Harry S. Truman began advocating a policy of containment and sent the United States Seventh Fleet to deter a possible communist invasion of Taiwan. [6] The U.S. signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan which lasted until 1979 and, during this period, the communist government in Beijing was not diplomatically recognized by the U.S. By 1950, virtually all American diplomatic staff had left mainland China, and one of Mao's political goals was to identify and destroy factions inside China that might be favorable to capitalism. [7] [8]

Mao initially ridiculed the U.S. as "paper tiger" occupiers of Taiwan, "the enemy of the people of the world and has increasingly isolated itself" and "monopoly capitalist groups", [9] and it was argued that Mao never intended friendly relations with the U.S. [10] However, due to the Sino-Soviet split and increasing tension between China and the Soviet Union, US President Richard Nixon signaled a diplomatic re-rapprochement with communist China, and embarked on an official visit in 1972. [11] Diplomatic relations between the two countries were eventually restored in 1979. After Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping embarked on economic reforms, and hostility diminished sharply, while large-scale trade and investments, as well as cultural exchanges, became major factors. Following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the U.S. placed economic and military sanctions upon China, although official diplomatic relations continued. [12]

From 1990

Anti-American and Chinese nationalist sentiments surged following the Yinhe incident of 1993, where a Chinese ship was detained by the US Navy in international waters, allegedly containing chemical components headed for Iran, but was eventually cleared after months of inspection. [13] The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 has led the Chinese government to be concerned about a supposed China containment policy, and began viewing the United States as responsible for major issues that arise in the bilateral relationship between China and Taiwan, as the Chinese government believed that American support of Taiwan is an effort to weaken China. [14] During this time, there was also a sense of disillusionment with the U.S. among Chinese intellectuals, and popular books such as China Can Say No criticized U.S. foreign policy towards China and promoted grass-roots Chinese nationalism. Relations became severely strained by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, which was reported by U.S. media as an intelligence error, but cited in several foreign sources and believed by many Chinese to be deliberate. [15] [16] The bombing, alongside the perceived lack of apology from the U.S., led to mass protests in Beijing and other major Chinese cities. In 2001, diplomatic relations were further damaged by the Hainan Island incident, where a collision between a U.S. and Chinese aircraft resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot and detention of the 24 American crew.

While the Chinese government officially condemned the September 11 attacks, the Chinese state-run media produced books, films and video games glorifying the terrorist attack as a "humbling blow against an arrogant nation. [17] The Washington Post recorded the mixed reactions among the general public after the attack had been reported: “While average Chinese routinely approach Americans to offer condolences for Tuesday's terrorist attacks, many others in their offices, schools and Internet chats have voiced satisfaction at what they describe as a well-deserved blow against U.S. arrogance.” [18] Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times considered the schadenfreude at 9/11 he saw on Chinese internet as a sign of rapidly increasing Chinese nationalism. [19] A 2001 Harris poll conducted 2 months afterwards also showed that Beijing respondents were much more likely to disapprove of the U.S. government's military actions against terrorism compared to Japanese, South Korean, and American respondents. [20] However, it was noted that the Chinese discourse primarily revolved around revenge against U.S. state policy instead of hatred for Americans, and a 2002 survey of Chinese netizens in light of 9/11 found that "international cooperation" was among the policies most would favour for fighting terrorism. [21] [22] A Chinese media report on the 2019 anniversary of 9/11 also suggested there to be more restrained rhetoric online in discussing the topic compared to the past.

Obama administration

Although the election of US President Barack Obama in 2008 created positive reactions in China [23] [24] [25] and a temporary increase in favorable views of the U.S., [26] it also signified a shift in American foreign policy towards the country, as then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a "Pivot to Asia", or rebalancing of U.S., strategic and economic interests in East Asia, specifically freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea. [27] This move was widely seen as attempts to counter Chinese interests in the region, and in response, the Chinese military began their own buildup in the region, such as the creation of its own Air Defense Identification Zone. [28] Recently, in 2009, Luo Ping, a director-general at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, criticized America's laissez-faire capitalism and said that he hated America when the United States Treasury would start to print money and depreciate the value of the U.S. dollar, thus cheapening the value of China's purchase of U.S. bonds. [29] Furthermore, China's leaders present their country as an alternative to the meddling power of the West. [30] In 2013, 53% of the Chinese surveyed had an unfavorable view of the U.S., [31] which slightly improved in 2016 where 44% of those surveyed had an unfavorable view compared to 50% expressing a favorable one. [32]

A poll of 500,000 Chinese netizens, conducted by Hong Kong's Phoenix Television in 2011 suggested that 60% of those surveyed agreed Osama bin Laden's death was a sad event because "he was an anti-US warrior". [33] [34] [35] However, another report by Public Radio International documented more mixed responses on Chinese social media, and noted that most users did not care about his death. [36]

Chinese hackers have also conducted cyberwarfare against American institutions. [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] Quartz suggested that certain Hollywood films such as Django Unchained were allowed to slip past China's film censorship, because they depicted a negative view of American society. It alleges that the film "depicts one of America's darker periods, when slavery was legal, which Chinese officials like to use to push back against criticism from the United States". [42]

After the China-U.S. strategic competition begins

There has been a significant increase in anti-US sentiment since the Trump administration launched a trade war against China, with Chinese media airing Korean War films. [43] [44] In May 2019, Global Times has said that "the trade war with the U.S. at the moment reminds Chinese of military struggles between China and the U.S. during the Korean War." [43]

According to SET News , a minority of Chinese online believe that the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan is a genetic bio-attack executed by United States. [45] Some scholars believe that the CCP is employing an evolving set of anti-American narratives to try to shore up its legitimacy in response to rising domestic challenges, including a slowing economy, growing questions about Xi Jinping’s personalization of power, and public dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of Covid-19. [46]

During the 2024 United States presidential election, Chinese netizens expressed anger in the face of Donald Trump's threat to impose tariffs of more than 60% on Chinese imported goods. Some think he would increase the odds of a war. The world will “never be at peace” with Mr Trump around, reckons another netizen. “This old madman is too vicious,” says a third. “He must be annihilated.” [47]

See also

Related Research Articles

The term One China may refer, in alphabetical order, to one of the following:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chinese nationalism</span>

Chinese nationalism is a form of nationalism in which asserts that the Chinese people are a nation and promotes the cultural and national unity of all Chinese people. According to Sun Yat-sen's philosophy in the Three Principles of the People, Chinese nationalism is evaluated as multi-ethnic nationalism, which should be distinguished from Han nationalism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">China–United States relations</span> Bilateral relations

The relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America has been mostly complex, and at times, strenuous since the establishment of the PRC and the retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan in 1949. They have significant economic ties and are significantly intertwined, yet they also have a global hegemonic great power rivalry.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-Americanism</span> Dislike of the United States

Anti-Americanism is a term that can describe several sentiments and positions including opposition to, fear of, distrust of, prejudice against or hatred toward the United States, its government, its foreign policy, or Americans in general.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sino-Soviet split</span> Conflict between communist blocs

The Sino-Soviet split was the gradual deterioration of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. This was primarily caused by doctrinal divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by their respective geopolitics during the Cold War of 1947–1991. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sino-Soviet debates about the interpretation of orthodox Marxism became specific disputes about the Soviet Union's policies of national de-Stalinization and international peaceful coexistence with the Western Bloc, which Chinese founding father Mao Zedong decried as revisionism. Against that ideological background, China took a belligerent stance towards the Western world, and publicly rejected the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence between the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc. In addition, Beijing resented the Soviet Union's growing ties with India due to factors such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Moscow feared that Mao was too nonchalant about the horrors of nuclear warfare.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Shanghai Communiqué</span> 1972 diplomatic relations agreement between the US and mainland China

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), was a diplomatic document issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China on February 27, 1972, on the last evening of President Richard Nixon's visit to China.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-Chinese sentiment</span> Hostility towards anything pertaining to China

Anti-Chinese sentiment, a form of racism against Asians, is a fear or dislike of China, Chinese people or Chinese culture, also referred to as Sinophobia. It is frequently directed at Chinese minorities which live outside China and it involves immigration, the development of national identities in neighbouring countries, political ideologies, disparity of wealth, the past tributary system of Imperial China, majority-minority relations, imperial legacies, and racism.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Formosa Resolution of 1955</span>

The Formosa Resolution of 1955 was a joint resolution passed by the U.S. Senate and signed by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower on January 29, 1955, to counteract the threat of an invasion of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The resolution gave the U.S. president the authority "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack [by the Communists]".

History of foreign relations of China covers diplomatic, military, political and economic relations in History of China from 1800 to the modern era. For the earlier period see Foreign relations of imperial China, and for the current foreign relations of China see Foreign relations of China.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China</span> American diplomatic overture to the Peoples Republic of China

The 1972 visit by United States President Richard Nixon to the People's Republic of China was an important strategic and diplomatic overture that marked the culmination of the Nixon administration's establishment of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China after years of American diplomatic policy that favored the ROC in Taiwan. The seven-day official visit to three Chinese cities was the first time a U.S. president had visited the PRC; Nixon's arrival in Beijing ended 25 years of no communication or diplomatic ties between the two countries and was the key step in normalizing relations between the U.S. and the PRC. Nixon visited the PRC to gain more leverage over relations with the Soviet Union, following the Sino-Soviet split. The normalization of ties culminated in 1979, when the U.S. established full diplomatic relations with the PRC.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China</span>

The United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China originated during the Cold War. At that time, the U.S. had a containment policy against communist states. The leaked Pentagon Papers indicated the efforts by the U.S. to contain China through military actions undertaken in the Vietnam War. The containment policy centered around an island chain strategy. President Richard Nixon's China rapprochement signaled a shift in focus to gain leverage in containing the Soviet Union. Formal diplomatic ties between the U.S. and China were established in 1979, and with normalized trade relations since 2000, the U.S. and China have been linked by closer economic ties and more cordial relations. In his first term as U.S. president, Barack Obama said, "We want China to succeed and prosper. It's good for the United States if China continues on the path of development that it's on".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Taiwan–United States relations</span> Bilateral relations

After the United States established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 and recognized Beijing as the only legal government of China, Taiwan–United States relations became unofficial and informal following terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which allows the United States to have relations with the Taiwanese people and their government, whose name is not specified. U.S.–Taiwan relations were further informally grounded in the "Six Assurances" in response to the third communiqué on the establishment of US–PRC relations. The Taiwan Travel Act, passed by the U.S. Congress on March 16, 2018, allows high-level U.S. officials to visit Taiwan and vice versa. Both sides have since signed a consular agreement formalizing their existent consular relations on September 13, 2019. The US government removed self-imposed restrictions on executive branch contacts with Taiwan on January 9, 2021.

Anti-Western sentiment has been increasing in China since the early 1990s, particularly amongst Chinese young adults. Notable incidents which have resulted in a significant anti-Western backlash have included the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the 2008 demonstrations during the Olympic torch relay and alleged Western media bias, especially in relation to the March 2008 Tibet riots.

Anti-Korean sentiment in China refers to opposition, hostility, hatred, distrust, fear, and general dislike of Korean people or culture in China. This is sometimes referred to in China as the xianhan sentiment, which some have argued has been evoked by perceived Korean arrogance that has challenged the sense of superiority that the Chinese have traditionally associated with their 5,000-year-old civilization.

With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, American immigration policy towards Chinese emigrants and the highly controversial subject of foreign policy with regard to the PRC became invariably connected. The United States government was presented with the dilemma of what to do with two separate "Chinas". Both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China wanted be seen as the legitimate government and both parties believed that immigration would assist them in doing so.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea</span>

Korea has had a long history of both resistance against and subordination to Imperial China. Until the onset of Western imperialism in the 19th century, Korea had been part of the sinocentric East Asian regional order.

Netto-uyoku or net uyoku, often shortened to neto-uyo (ネトウヨ), is the term used to refer to Japanese netizens who espouse ultranationalist far-right views on social media. Netto-uyoku is evaluated as sharing similarities to Western right-wing populism or the alt-right.

East Asia–United States relations covers American relations with the region as a whole, as well as summaries of relations with China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and smaller places. It includes diplomatic, military, economic, social and cultural ties. The emphasis is on historical developments.

US-China strategic engagement refers to a wide range of specific practices and interaction including economic cooperation, public diplomacy, military and foreign aid between the United States and China. This phase of engagement can be traced back to the late 1960s following an intense period of hostility caused by indirect confrontation between the two countries, particularly during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. With the US' support for Taiwan during the Taiwan Strait crises and its military expansion in the Pacific region, the relationship grew more antagonistic for the Chinese government perceive these initiatives to be US' attempt to encircle China. The domestic upheaval as a result of the Cultural Revolution in China and its commitment to communism through political radicalism accelerated the conflict. The four presidencies preceding the Bush administration were said to embrace a national policy direction toward strategic ambiguity, or deliberate ambiguity particularly in dealing with China. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence delivered a speech at the Hudson Institute on China, signifying the end of strategic engagement and officially proclaiming a new stage in the bilateral relationship, strategic competition.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cold War in Asia</span>

The Cold War in Asia was a major dimension of the worldwide Cold War that shaped diplomacy and warfare from the mid-1940s to 1991. The main countries involved were the United States, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, South Korea, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Taiwan. In the late 1950s, divisions between China and the Soviet Union deepened, culminating in the Sino-Soviet split, and the two then vied for control of communist movements across the world, especially in Asia.

References

  1. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (1955) pp 212–252
  2. Jane Leung Larson, "The 1905 anti-American boycott as a transnational Chinese movement." Chinese America: History and Perspectives (2007): 191-98, Quoting page 191, Excerpt
  3. Guanhua Wang, In Search of Justice: The 1905-1906 Chinese Anti-American Boycott (Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2002).
  4. Sin-Kiong Wong, "Die for the boycott and nation: Martyrdom and the 1905 anti-American movement in China." Modern Asian Studies 35.3 (2001): 565-588.
  5. John Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations (Berkeley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, U of California Press, 1971), 191 – 192.
  6. "Harry S Truman, "Statement on Formosa," January 5, 1950". University of Southern California . Retrieved 7 May 2017.
  7. Qiu Xu, Guang (2000). "U.S. Air Aid and the CCP's Anti-American Campaign, 1945–1949". Air Power History. 47 (1): 24–39.
  8. Michael M. Sheng, "Chinese Communist Policy Toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,' 1948–1950," Modern Asian Studies 28 (1994); Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (Columbia University Press, 1994)
  9. Mao Tse Tung. "Quotations from Mao Tse Tung – Chapter 6". Marxists.org. Retrieved 11 May 2012.
  10. Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton University Press, 1997) ch 1
  11. Nixon, Richard. "Announcement of the President's Trip to China". US-China documents collection. USC US-China Institute. Retrieved 24 July 2011.
  12. The West Condemns the Crackdown, New York Times, 5 June 1989.
  13. "No chemical arms aboard China ship", New York Times, 6 September 1993.
  14. Ma, Ying (February–March 2002). "China's America Problem". Policy Review: 111.
  15. "U.S. Media Overlook Expose on Chinese Embassy Bombing". FAIR. 22 October 1999. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  16. "New York Times on Chinese Embassy Bombing". FAIR. 9 February 2000. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  17. McElroy, Damien (4 November 2001). "Beijing produces videos glorifying terrorist attacks on 'arrogant' US". The Telegraph.
  18. "Chinese Cyber Nationalism (page 217)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 December 2019. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  19. Kristof, Nicholas D. (18 January 2002). "The Chip On China's Shoulder". The New York Times.
  20. "How The Japanese, South Koreans And Chinese View The Post-9/11 World And U.S. Military Action" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 December 2019. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  21. Shen, Simon; Breslin, Shaun (18 March 2010). Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations. Lexington Books. ISBN   978-0-7391-3249-4.
  22. Katzenstein, Peter J.; Keohane, Robert O. (2007). Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN   978-0-8014-6165-1.
  23. "Chinese entrepreneurs get Obama-mania". The Telegraph. November 2008. Retrieved 30 October 2020.
  24. "POLITICS-US: Online Poll Shows Obama a Hit in China". Inter Press Service . October 2008. Retrieved 31 October 2020.
  25. "China visit sparks Obama mania". BBC. 15 November 2009. Retrieved 31 October 2020.
  26. "Global Indicators Database (China)". Pew Research Center. Retrieved 31 October 2020.
  27. Clinton, Hillary (November 2011). "America's Pacific Century". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 7 June 2013.
  28. Bodeen, Christopher (16 April 2013). "China criticizes increase in US forces in Asia". Stars and Stripes. Associated Press. Retrieved 16 April 2013.[ permanent dead link ]
  29. Sender, Henny (11 February 2009). "China to stick with US bonds". Financial Times. Retrieved 11 May 2012.
  30. Kurlantzick, Joshua (23 June 2007). "China's charm offensive". Los Angeles Times.
  31. "Opinion of the United States". Pew Research Center.
  32. "A Look at America's International Image". Pew Research Center. 28 June 2016. Retrieved 31 October 2020.
  33. SAAG (15 May 2011). "Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan and China – Analysis". Eurasia Review. Retrieved 25 July 2019.
  34. "Chinese view of bin laden's death - China.org.cn". www.china.org.cn. Retrieved 25 July 2019.
  35. "China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 21". Freedom House . Retrieved 27 November 2023.
  36. "Most Chinese unmoved by bin Laden's death". Public Radio International. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  37. Menn, Joseph (11 February 2011). "Chinese hackers hit energy groups". Financial Times. Retrieved 11 May 2012.
  38. Swartz, Jon (11 March 2007). "Chinese hackers seek U.S. access". USA Today.
  39. (registration required)Shane, Scott; Lehren, Andrew W. (28 November 2010). "Cables Shine Light into Secret Diplomatic Channels". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 29 November 2010. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
  40. Colvin, Ross (28 November 2010). "Saudi King Urged U.S. To Attack Iran: WikiLeaks". Reuters. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
  41. Goodin, Dan. "Chinese hackers 'slurped 50 MB of US gov email'". The Register.
  42. "Why China is letting 'Django Unchained' slip through its censorship regime". Quartz. 13 March 2013. Archived from the original on 14 May 2013.
  43. 1 2 Kuech, Andrew Kuech. "The Dangerous Reprise of Chinese Korean War Propaganda". The Diplomat . Retrieved 25 July 2019.
  44. Hernández, Javier C. (14 May 2019). "China's Propaganda Machine Takes Aim at U.S. Over Trade War". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 25 July 2019.
  45. "中國家長指稱「武漢肺炎是美國投放病毒」 網友傻爆眼 The" (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Retrieved 22 January 2020.
  46. Christopher, Carothers. "Understanding the Chinese Government's Growing Use of Anti-American Propaganda". Wilson Center. Retrieved 21 February 2024.
  47. "How scared is China of Donald Trump's return?". The Economist. ISSN   0013-0613 . Retrieved 21 February 2024.