Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council

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Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council
Part of the lead-up to the Iraq War
Colin Powell anthrax vial. 5 Feb 2003 at the UN.jpg
Colin Powell holding up a model vial of the supposed weaponized anthrax.
DateFebruary 5, 2003
Time10:30 a.m. (Eastern Time Zone)
Venue United Nations Security Council at the Headquarters of the United Nations
Location Manhattan, New York City
Type PowerPoint presentation
Theme Rationale for the Iraq War
Outcome Invasion of Iraq, U.S. reputation damage, Powell accused of having lied
Wikisource-logo.svg The full text of the presentation at Wikisource

On February 5, 2003, the Secretary of State of the United States Colin Powell gave a PowerPoint presentation [1] [2] to the United Nations Security Council. He explained the rationale for the Iraq War which would start on March 20, 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. The decision to invade Iraq had already been made prior to the presentation being given.

Contents

The content of the presentation was based on unreliable evidence. Powell was criticized for lying, while the U.S. saw its credibility heavily damaged.

Selection and preparation

On February 5, 2003, Powell appeared before the UN to prove the urgency to engage a war with Iraq. In 2016, Powell would say, "[A]t the time I gave the speech on Feb. 5, the president had already made this decision for military action." Powell was selected to deliver the speech based on his credibility, and he stated in 2016 that it had been written by the vice president's office: [3]

The speech supposedly had been prepared in the White House in the NSC [National Security Council]. But when we were given what had been prepared, it was totally inadequate, and we couldn't track anything in it. When I asked Condoleezza Rice, the national security advisor, where did this come from, it turns out the vice president's office had written it.

CIA analyst Nada Bakos has stated that the speech's language differed from what the CIA prepared for Powell and from the copies the CIA received in advance of the presentation. [4]

Content

My second purpose today is ... to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction ... Iraq's behavior demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort ... to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction ... every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.

— Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council [5]

Powell claimed that Iraq harbored a terrorist network headed by al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (in a small region controlled by Ansar al-Islam). He also claimed that Iraqis visited Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and provided training to al-Qaeda members, although thousands of Arabs from many countries did the same. US intelligence agencies have found no evidence of any substantive collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

Media

Slides

Reactions

Iraqi reaction

Ansar al Islam invited 20 journalists to a compound that should have been a 'poison factory'. [6]

Others

Although the presentation failed to change the fundamental position of the Security Council, including France, Russia, China, and Germany, Powell succeeded in hardening the overall tone of the United Nations towards Iraq. While Colin Powell's statement to the UN may have been accepted as proof by many in the US, this was not the case in Europe. [7]

Powell himself stated later: [8] "I, of course, regret the U.N. speech that I gave, which became the prominent presentation of our case. But we thought it was correct at the time. The President thought it was correct. Congress thought it was correct." "Of course I regret that a lot of it turned out be wrong," he said.

Powell's Chief of Staff Lawrence Wilkerson later said that he had inadvertently participated in a hoax on the American people in preparing Powell's erroneous testimony before the United Nations Security Council. [9]

In 2015, Michael Morell stated that he wanted to apologize to Powell for the evidence. [10]

Analysis

David Zarefsky noted that the speech mainly relied on the argument from ignorance. [11]

The Guardian dubbed the speech a decisive moment in undermining the credibility of the United States. [12]

The New York Times Magazine considered the speech one of the most indelible public moments of the Bush administration. [13]

FAIR analyzed the media coverage of the week before and the week after the presentation and urged the media to broaden their coverage. [14]

Further developments

In a 2005 interview, Powell stated that he did not lie because he did not know the information was false. [15]

"There were some people in the intelligence community who knew at that time that some of these sources were not good, and shouldn't be relied upon, and they didn't speak up. That devastated me."

Colin Powell, September 9, 2005

See also

Further reading

References

  1. ↑ McBrien, Tyler (February 8, 2023). "Why the Military (Still) Can't Quit PowerPoint". Slate. ISSN   1091-2339 . Retrieved April 18, 2023.
  2. ↑ "PowerPoint of view". The Guardian. February 7, 2003. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved April 18, 2023.
  3. ↑ "Colin Powell: U.N. Speech 'Was a Great Intelligence Failure'". pbs.org. Archived from the original on May 19, 2016. Retrieved May 19, 2016.
  4. ↑ "The Secret History of ISIS – Transcript". FRONTLINE. Retrieved September 18, 2021.
  5. ↑ Powell, Secretary Colin L. (February 5, 2003). "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council". New York City: US Department of State. Archived from the original on February 5, 2009. Retrieved October 21, 2021.
  6. ↑ Chivers, C. J. (February 9, 2003). "THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE EVIDENCE; Islamists in Iraq Offer a Tour of 'Poison Factory' Cited by Powell". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved April 18, 2023.
  7. ↑ What the international papers say Archived January 8, 2019, at the Wayback Machine , February 6, 2003, The Guardian
  8. ↑ The Daily Show, June 13, 2012
  9. ↑ Brancaccio, David (February 3, 2006). "Iraq Pre-War Intelligence". NOW . PBS. Archived from the original on March 12, 2014. Retrieved February 3, 2007.
  10. ↑ "Morell "wanted to apologize" to Powell about WMD evidence". CBS News . Retrieved April 22, 2023.
  11. ↑ Zarefsky, David (2007). "Making the Case for War: Colin Powell at the United Nations". Rhetoric and Public Affairs. 10 (2): 275–302. ISSN   1094-8392.
  12. ↑ "Colin Powell's UN speech: a decisive moment in undermining US credibility". the Guardian . October 18, 2021. Retrieved March 13, 2022.
  13. ↑ Draper, Robert (July 16, 2020). "Colin Powell Still Wants Answers". The New York Times . ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved April 21, 2022.
  14. ↑ "In Iraq Crisis, Networks Are Megaphones for Official Views". FAIR. March 18, 2003. Retrieved April 18, 2023.
  15. ↑ "Iraq War role was a stain on Powell's record — one he openly said he regretted". Washington Post. ISSN   0190-8286 . Retrieved March 13, 2022.
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