Critical infrastructure

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Critical infrastructure, or critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the UK, describes infrastructure considered essential by governments for the functioning of a society and economy and deserving of special protection for national security. [1] Critical infrastructure has traditionally been viewed as under the scope of government due to its strategic importance, yet there is an observable trend towards its privatization, raising discussions about how the private sector can contribute to these essential services. [2] It is important to distinct between critical maritime infrastructure (CMI) and critical terrestrial infrastructure (CTI) because CMI reflects the maritime dimension of critical infrastructure while CRI reflects the land-based dimension [3] .

Contents

Items

Most commonly associated with the term are assets and facilities for:

Protection programmes

Canada

The Canadian Federal Government identifies the following 10 Critical Infrastructure Sectors as a way to classify essential assets. [4] [5]

  1. Energy & Utilities: Electricity providers; off-shore/on-shore oil & gas; coal supplies, natural gas providers; home fuel oil; gas station supplies; alternative energy suppliers (wind, solar, other)
  2. Information and Communication Technology: Broadcast Media; telecommunication providers (landlines, cell phones, internet, wifi); Postal services;
  3. Finance: Banking services, government finance/aid departments; taxation
  4. Health: Public health & wellness programs, hospital/clinic facilities; blood & blood products
  5. Food: Food supply chains; food inspectors; import/export programs; grocery stores; Agri & Aqua culture; farmers markets
  6. Water: Water supply & protection; wastewater management; fisheries & ocean protection programs
  7. Transportation: Roads, bridges, railways, aviation/airports; shipping & ports; transit
  8. Safety: Emergency responders; public safety programs
  9. Government: Military; Continuity of governance
  10. Manufacturing: Industry, economic development

European Union

European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) refers to the doctrine or specific programs created as a result of the European Commission's directive EU COM(2006) 786 which designates European critical infrastructure that, in case of fault, incident, or attack, could impact both the country where it is hosted and at least one other European Member State. Member states are obliged to adopt the 2006 directive into their national statutes.

It has proposed a list of European critical infrastructures based upon inputs by its member states. Each designated European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) will have to have an Operator Security Plan (OSP) covering the identification of important assets, a risk analysis based on major threat scenarios and the vulnerability of each asset, and the identification, selection and prioritisation of counter-measures and procedures.

Germany

The German critical-infrastructure protection programme KRITIS is coordinated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Some of its special agencies like the German Federal Office for Information Security or the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance BBK deliver the respective content, e.g., about IT systems. [6]

Singapore

In Singapore, critical infrastructures are mandated under the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act. [7] In 2017, the Infrastructure Protection Act was passed in Parliament, which provides for the protection of certain areas, places and other premises in Singapore against security risks. [8] It came into force in 2018. [9] [10]

United Kingdom

In the UK, the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) provides information, personnel and physical security advice to the businesses and organizations which make up the UK's national infrastructure, helping to reduce its vulnerability to terrorism and other threats.

It can call on resources from other government departments and agencies, including MI5, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and other government departments responsible for national infrastructure sectors.

United States

The U.S. has had a wide-reaching critical infrastructure protection program in place since 1996. Its Patriot Act of 2001 defined critical infrastructure as those "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters."

In 2014 the NIST Cybersecurity Framework was published, and quickly became a popular set of guidelines, despite the significant costs of full compliance. [11]

These have identified a number of critical infrastructures and responsible agencies:

  1. Agriculture and food – Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services
  2. Water – Environmental Protection Agency
  3. Public Health – Department of Health and Human Services
  4. Emergency Services – Department of Homeland Security
  5. Government – Department of Homeland Security
  6. Defense Industrial Base – Department of Defense
  7. Information and Telecommunications – Department of Commerce
  8. Energy – Department of Energy
  9. Transportation and Shipping – Department of Transportation
  10. Banking and Finance – Department of the Treasury
  11. Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials – Department of Homeland Security
  12. Post – Department of Homeland Security
  13. National monuments and icons - Department of the Interior
  14. Critical manufacturing - Department of Homeland Security (14th sector announced March 3, 2008; recorded April 30, 2008)

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) defines critical infrastructure sector in the US. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), [12] issued in February 2013 entitled Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience mandated an update to the NIPP. This revision of the plan established the following 16 critical infrastructure sectors:

  1. Chemical
  2. Commercial facilities
  3. Communications
  4. Critical manufacturing
  5. Dams
  6. Defense industrial base
  7. Emergency services
  8. Energy
  9. Financial services
  10. Food and agriculture
  11. Government facilities
  12. Healthcare and public health
  13. Information technology
  14. Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste
  15. Transportation systems
  16. Water and wastewater systems

National Monuments and Icons along with the postal and shipping sector were removed in 2013 update to the NIPP. The 2013 version of the NIPP has faced criticism for lacking viable risk measures. [13] [14] The plan assigns the following agencies sector-specific coordination responsibilities:

Department of Homeland Security
  • Chemical
  • Commercial facilities
  • Communications
  • Critical manufacturing
  • Dams
  • Emergency services
  • Government facilities (jointly with General Services Administration)
  • Information technology
  • Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste
  • Transportation systems (jointly with Department of Transportation)
Department of Defense
  • Defense industrial base
Department of Energy
  • Energy
Department of the Treasury
  • Financial services
Department of Agriculture
  • Food and agriculture
General Services Administration
  • Government facilities (jointly with Department of Homeland Security)
Department of Health and Human Services
  • Healthcare and Public Health
Department of Transportation
  • Transportation systems (jointly with Department of Homeland Security)
Environmental Protection Agency
  • Water and wastewater systems

State-level legislation

Several U.S. states have passed "critical infrastructure" bills, promoted by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), to criminalize protests against the fossil fuel industry. [15] In May 2017, Oklahoma passed legislation which created felony penalties for trespassing on land considered critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, or conspiring to do so; ALEC introduced a version of the bill as a model act and encouraged other states to adopt it. [16] In June 2020, West Virginia passed the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, which created felony penalties for protests against oil and gas facilities. [17]

Stress testing

Critical infrastructure (CI) such as highways, railways, electric power networks, dams, port facilities, major gas pipelines or oil refineries are exposed to multiple natural and human-induced hazards and stressors, including earthquakes, landslides, floods, tsunami, wildfires, climate change effects or explosions. These stressors and abrupt events can cause failures and losses, and hence, can interrupt essential services for the society and the economy. [18] Therefore, CI owners and operators need to identify and quantify the risks posed by the CIs due to different stressors, in order to define mitigation strategies [19] and improve the resilience of the CIs. [20] [21] Stress tests are advanced and standardised tools for hazard and risk assessment of CIs, that include both low-probability high-consequence (LP-HC) events and so-called extreme or rare events, as well as the systematic application of these new tools to classes of CI.

Stress testing is the process of assessing the ability of a CI to maintain a certain level of functionality under unfavourable conditions, while stress tests consider LP-HC events, which are not always accounted for in the design and risk assessment procedures, commonly adopted by public authorities or industrial stakeholders. A multilevel stress test methodology for CI has been developed in the framework of the European research project STREST, [22] consisting of four phases: [23]

Phase 1: Preassessment, during which the data available on the CI (risk context) and on the phenomena of interest (hazard context) are collected. The goal and objectives, the time frame, the stress test level and the total costs of the stress test are defined.

Phase 2: Assessment, during which the stress test at the component and the system scope is performed, including fragility [24] and risk [25] analysis of the CIs for the stressors defined in Phase 1. The stress test can result in three outcomes: Pass, Partly Pass and Fail, based on the comparison of the quantified risks to acceptable risk exposure levels and a penalty system.

Phase 3: Decision, during which the results of the stress test are analyzed according to the goal and objectives defined in Phase 1. Critical events (events that most likely cause the exceedance of a given level of loss) and risk mitigation strategies are identified.

Phase 4: Report, during which the stress test outcome and risk mitigation guidelines based on the findings established in Phase 3 are formulated and presented to the stakeholders.

This stress-testing methodology has been demonstrated to six CIs in Europe at component and system level: [26] an oil refinery and petrochemical plant in Milazzo, Italy; a conceptual alpine earth-fill dam in Switzerland; the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline in Turkey; part of the Gasunie national gas storage and distribution network in the Netherlands; the port infrastructure of Thessaloniki, Greece; and an industrial district in the region of Tuscany, Italy. The outcome of the stress testing included the definition of critical components and events and risk mitigation strategies, which are formulated and reported to stakeholders.

Critical Maritime Infrastructure

Critical maritime infrastructure (CMI) refers to maritime-based systems within sectors whose disruption would have serious economic, security, environmental or societal consequences which includes shipping, energy, communications, fishing and biodiversity (nearly 99% of transoceanic digital communications are carried by undersea fiber-optic cables which makes the global submarine cable network critical for modern global infrastructure). [27] [28] CMI is defined through political and strategic assessments rather than technical criteria alone and varies across states and regions. Its transnational character with infrastructure spanning multiple maritime jurisdictions complicates governance and protection while recent incidents involving subsea cables and pipelines have underscored CMI’s vulnerability to hybrid threats and its growing geopolitical significance. [29]

Maritime infrastructure is governed by a combination of international law, sector-specific regimes and national legislation that operates within a fragmented legal environment defined by maritime zones rather than unified territorial sovereignty. [30] The core legal framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which divides ocean space into zones with different rights and obligations that shapes how maritime infrastructure is regulated and operated while balancing coastal state authority with freedoms of navigation and communication. [31] [32] Since the mid-twentieth century, states have expanded regulatory authority through functional territorialization without establishing full sovereignty. [33] In parallel, maritime security concerns have introduced additional governance layers addressing crime, environmental harm and infrastructure protection that has resulted in a hybrid regulatory order combining legal rules, security practices and technical management. [34]

International Governance of CMI

International governance of maritime infrastructure operates through a decentralized system shaped by historical power shifts and institutional plurality. [35] Rather than a unified global regime, governance has developed as an issue-specific system in which authority emerges through negotiations, norms and interaction among states, international organizations and transnational actors. [36] Since the implementation of UNCLOS, governance has been marked by institutional overlap and regime complexity which enables flexibility but also creates coordination challenges and jurisdictional ambiguity. [37] [38] [39] These arrangements reflect uneven power relations and are increasingly strained by technological change which leads to reliance on informal coordination and adaptive practices rather than comprehensive treaty reform. [40] [41]

Geographic Distribution of CMI in Regions

Maritime infrastructure is distributed across fluid ocean spaces shaped by currents, mobility and ecological processes which make fixed regional boundaries difficult to apply. Open-ocean areas demonstrate how infrastructure and management must adapt to shifting spatial conditions. [42] Ocean basins have historically structured maritime connectivity by producing uneven patterns of ports and shipping routes that reflect long-term commercial, biological and cultural exchange rather than national borders. [43] More recently, infrastructure has clustered within global ocean regions formed through political, economic and security practices. [44] Institutional regionalization (including the UNEP Regional Seas Programme) further influences infrastructure development, while geographic scholarship emphasizes the three-dimensional nature of maritime regions spanning surface waters, the water column and the seabed. [45] [46]

Red Sea Disruptions and Cascading Effects on CMI

Since November 2023, attacks on commercial shipping by the Iran-aligned Houthi movement in Yemen have disrupted maritime traffic in the Red Sea that functions as a key corridor by linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. [47] [48] The targeting of commercial vessels has increased security risks and instability along one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. These disruptions have led to widespread rerouting of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope which extends voyage times and raises transportation costs with measurable impacts on global supply chains, commodity prices and shipping markets. [49] [50] The rerouting has also redistributed environmental pressures by reducing ship-related air pollution in the Red Sea while increasing emissions along alternative routes off southern Africa. [51] The security situation in the Red Sea has further intensified regional and global geopolitical tensions influenced by the intersection of rival interests among Middle Eastern states and broader great-power competition which has reinforced international concerns over the protection of critical maritime infrastructure in the region. [52]

The Economic Importance of CMI for the Blue Economy

Maritime infrastructure supports the blue economy which frames the ocean as a key driver of economic growth through activities such as shipping, fisheries, offshore energy, aquaculture and seabed resource extraction. Ports, shipping networks, offshore platforms, and subsea cables enable global trade, energy supply and access to marine resources which makes maritime infrastructure central to national economies and global economic integration. [53] [54] While proponents emphasize opportunities for growth, employment and innovation, critical scholarship highlights environmental risks and social tensions which includes resource enclosure and the unequal distribution of benefits associated with large-scale infrastructure development. [55] [56]

Environmental Protection and CMI in Marine Protected Areas

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a key tool for marine environmental protection and increasingly shape the governance of maritime infrastructure. By restricting or regulating activities of infrastructure such as shipping, offshore energy development, fisheries and seabed installations, MPAs influence where and how infrastructure can be developed. The global expansion of large MPAs reflects growing international conservation commitments even though their design and implementation vary significantly. [57] Research highlights tensions between conservation goals and economic or infrastructural interests because MPAs are often established in areas of low economic use that have limiting conflict with infrastructure development with potentially low reducing ecological effectiveness. [58] At the same time, Marine spatial planning (MSP) has emerged as a key mechanism for managing interactions between conservation and infrastructure while also reflecting power imbalances and strategic considerations that includes security and geopolitical interests. [59] [60]

Security Threats to CMI and Blue Crime

Maritime infrastructure faces security threats from geopolitical competition, grey-zone activities and transnational organized crime, and these risks increasingly affect ports, shipping routes, offshore energy installations and subsea cables which are vulnerable to sabotage and coercive practices below the threshold of armed conflict. [61] Blue crime (includes piracy, smuggling, trafficking, illegal fishing, and pollution) further undermines maritime infrastructure by exploiting jurisdictional complexity and limited enforcement at sea, and international responses led by the United Nations and regional organizations rely mainly on coordination and capacity-building but remain fragmented across regions and issue areas. [61] [62]

CMI and the Influence of Non-State Actors

Civil society, scientific institutions and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a significant role in maritime infrastructure governance by producing expertise, shaping policy agendas and monitoring activities at sea. Scientific networks contribute data and assessments that inform international negotiations and regulatory frameworks in particular areas such as marine biodiversity, environmental protection and infrastructure planning beyond national jurisdiction. [63] [64] NGOs and activist groups influence governance through advocacy, surveillance and digital monitoring tools that increase transparency around shipping, fishing and infrastructure use while also raising concerns about power, visibility and control. [65] [66] Their involvement operates alongside state authority and can both challenge and reinforce existing governance arrangements in complex maritime spaces . [67] [68]

See also

References

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  2. ↑ De Bruijne, Mark; Van Eeten, Michel (2007). "Systems that Should Have Failed: Critical Infrastructure Protection in an Institutionally Fragmented Environment". Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. 15 (1): 18–29. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2007.00501.x. ISSN   0966-0879.
  3. ↑ Bueger, Christian; Liebetrau, Tobias (September 1, 2023). "Critical maritime infrastructure protection: What's the trouble?". Marine Policy. 155 105772. Bibcode:2023MarPo.15505772B. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2023.105772. ISSN   0308-597X.
  4. ↑ "National Cross Sector Forum 2021-2023 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure". May 26, 2021.
  5. ↑ "National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure". December 21, 2018.
  6. ↑ "Nationale Strategie zum Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen (KRITIS-Strategie)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on September 15, 2017. Retrieved September 17, 2010.
  7. ↑ "Protected Areas and Protected Places Act - Singapore Statutes Online". sso.agc.gov.sg. Government of Singapore. December 31, 2013. Retrieved October 15, 2022.
  8. ↑ "Infrastructure Protection Act 2017 - Singapore Statutes Online". sso.agc.gov.sg. October 2, 2017. Retrieved October 15, 2022.
  9. ↑ "Infrastructure Protection Act". police.gov.sg. Singapore Police Force. March 14, 2019. Retrieved October 15, 2022.
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  11. ↑ "NIST Cybersecurity Framework Adoption Hampered By Costs, Survey Finds". Dark Reading. March 30, 2016. Retrieved August 2, 2016.
  12. ↑ "Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience". whitehouse.gov. February 12, 2013. Retrieved March 12, 2019.
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