Hezbollah in Latin America

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Hezbollah in Latin America
LeaderHussein Ahmad Karaki
Dates of operation1980s–present
Allegiance Hezbollah
Headquarters Ciudad del Este, Paraguay
Active regions South America and North America
Ideology Shia Islamism
Antisemitism
Part of Hezbollah
AlliesFlag of Venezuela.svg  Venezuela
Flag of Iran.svg  Iran
Flag of Bolivia.svg  Bolivia
Flag of Cuba.svg  Cuba (allegedly)
Flag of Nicaragua.svg  Nicaragua (allegedly)
'Ndrangheta
Camorra
Yin and Yang symbol.svg Primeiro Comando da Capital
OpponentsFlag of Argentina.svg  Argentina
Flag of Brazil.svg  Brazil
Flag of Paraguay.svg  Paraguay
Flag of the United States (23px).png  United States
Flag of Israel.svg  Israel [1]
Islamic State flag.svg Ansar al-Khilafah Brazil
Designated as a terrorist group byFlag of the United States (23px).png  United States [2]
Flag of Argentina.svg  Argentina [3]
Flag of Paraguay.svg  Paraguay [4]
Flag of Colombia.svg  Colombia [5]
Flag of Honduras.svg  Honduras [6]

Hezbollah in Latin America [a] is a splinter organization of the Shia Islamist Lebanon-based group Hezbollah which operates in throughout South America. [7]

Contents

History

The group was established in the 1980s in the tri-border region of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina which was considered a safe haven for the group's operations of smuggling, recruitment, and plotting of attacks. [8] They expanded into Venezuela with some degree of sponsorship from the Venezuelan state. [9] They also receive funding from the Iranian state to conduct operations against U.S. and Jewish interests in South America with many of the members of the group being Arab Muslims who either immigrated or were born in South America. [10] The establishment was also seen as a way for Iran to get more leverage against the U.S., with this formation being taken as the setting up of a South American proxy terrorist network of Iran. [11] [12] The group's headquarters are in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. [13] Through their establishment in the tri-border of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, members of Hezbollah in Latin America have expanded their operations in areas of Chile and Bolivia with some degree of sponsorship from Bolivia with them exporting narcotics from those areas and hosting paramilitary like operations in those areas as well. [14] In September, 2023, the United States Department of State designated Hezbollah in Latin America and other operatives associated with them as terrorists. [15] The leader of Hezbollah in Latin America is Hussein Ahmad Karaki, who also goes by the aliases of Abu Ali, Rami, and Sa'ad az-Aldin, who masterminds most if not all attacks by Hezbollah in Latin America including the attack against he Argentine Israelite Mutual Association building in 1994 and attacks against Jews in Brazil in 2023, where he also recruited Brazilian criminals to commit these attacks. [16] Venezuelan authorities helped him escape persecution by giving him legal documents in order to get around any arrest warrants he may had out or may have in the future. [17] He has also works with alongside mafias such as 'Ndrangheta and Camorra and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) from Brazil in order to expand drug smuggling operations and money laundering operations. [18] Besides the constant funding and revenue building, operations done by Hezbollah in Latin America are mostly minimal when it comes to terrorist attacks and other forms of paramilitary activity in order to keep a low profile. [19]

In 1994, Hezbollah in Latin America bombed the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association building. [20] [21] Though a Palestinian Jihadist group took responsibility as a front for Hezbollah. [22] A man by the name of Samuel Salman El Reda who also went by the other aliases of El Reda, Salman Raouf Salman, Sulayman Rammal, Salman Ramal, Salman Raouf Salman, and Hajj, was a Colombian-Lebanese man who helped plan and execute terrorist attacks in the 90s including the AIMA bombing on behalf of Hezbollah, he was also a member of the Islamic Jihad Organization and Hezbollah in Latin America. Charges were announced against him on December 30, 2023, by the United States Department of Justice, who released the statement through the Office of Public Affairs, including conspiring to provide and providing material support to a designated terrorist organization among other terror-related charges. [23]

In 2017, the United States arrested two members of Hezbollah in Latin America, Samer el Debek and Ali Kourani, who were both Lebanese United States citizens, Samer el Debek who was born in Dearborn, Michigan, was plotting on attack the Israeli embassy with Ali Kourani, Debek received paramilitary training outside the United States in Panama in a training base that was hosted and funded by Hezbollah in Latin America. [24]

In 2021, members of Hezbollah in Latin America were planning on assassinating an Israeli national in Colombia as revenge for the assassination of Qasem Soleimani which was apart of a larger operation of revenge attacks by Hezbollah. [25]

Terrorism after October 7th

After the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel and throughout the Israel–Hamas war, Hezbollah was accused of planning to carry out terrorist attacks against Jewish and Israeli civilians in South America. [26]

In November 2023 two men who had links to Hezbollah in Latin America and the main group of Hezbollah were arrested by Brazilian police. [27] One of the men was arrested in the São Paulo/Guarulhos International Airport after coming from Lebanon into Brazil. [28] The plan that the men had was to attack Jewish communities in Brazil, but the plan was foiled with assistance from the Mossad intelligence agency. [29] [30] In addition to these arrests, the Brazilian police executed 11 search warrants in relation to the recruitment of extremists in Brazil. [31] These search warrants included homes and storage facilities in São Paulo, the capital Brazil and all over the state of Minas Gerais. [32]

Revenue

Most of the group's international revenue comes from Iran, with some funds being laundered from Venezuela. Some of the revenue that is gained by Hezbollah in Latin America goes towards the main group in Lebanon to make up for loss of funds in Lebanon. [33] Money laundering was and is a huge part of their revenue making service towards the main Hezbollah branch in Lebanon and was the first thing that Hezbollah in Latin America did in order to gain more funds not only for themselves but for the main sector. [34] A lot of the funds they receive in South America come from the smuggling of illegal items through the tri-border of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay which is used to fund terroristic activities. Many of these items include drugs, stolen goods, weaponry, and pirated content which is funneled through money laundering. [35] [36] The group also funnels cocaine through Colombia and Venezuela. [37] Through their operations in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, they participate in illegal mining for valuable resources to either resell or smuggle to Lebanon and Iran. [38]

According to a 2006 report by the United States Department of the Treasury that designated 9 entities in Paraguay, Hezbollah in Latin America established and owned shops and shopping malls that funded operations for Hezbollah, among the entities designated were Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, who is involved in illegal activities ranging from drug trafficking to counterfeiting of US currency. [39] In 2010 a Lebanese cleric based in Brazil, Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, would be added to the list, and in the months leading up to the 2016 Summer Olympics several members would be detained in Brazilian territory. [40] [41]

Selling illegal goods make up around 60–70% of all of the group's revenue. [42] Another main way that Hezbollah in Latin America finances itself and the main Lebanese operation is through the establishment of false businesses, extortion, counterfeiting, and scamming with can produce, including the other array of illicit activities, around 20 million USD which is around one fifth of Hezbollah's annual budget of 100 million USD and 1/3 of what Iran contributes to Hezbollah in total. [43]

Hezbollah in Latin America has been compared to MS-13 and the Mexican cartels with the Maduro regime helping support Hezbollah in Latin America through the already prosperous Venezuelan–Lebanese in Venezuela being used as a starting point for them. Frequently, without the broader Lebanese community's knowledge of these covert operations, a network of logistical experts—including entrepreneurs, lawyers, and accountants—has developed within the diaspora in Venezuela. This network serves as a support system for Hezbollah, assisting in the raising, concealing, transferring, and laundering of illicit funds, some of which are used to finance its global terrorist activities. In Venezuela, Hezbollah's support network functions through compartmentalized, familial clan arrangements that integrate into the illicit economy controlled by the Maduro regime, as well as the regime's political structures and bureaucracy. Many of these clans are assimilated into the Venezuelan state and society through the extensive Lebanese and Syrian communities, which also extend into neighboring Colombia. [44]

Not only do they have operative areas in Latin America, but they do operations involving illicit activities in areas of Mexico since the early 2000s, with the smuggling of illegal immigrants and Lebanese foreigners in Mexico to the United States to provide monetary support to Hezbollah in Latin America and the main Hezbollah operation in Lebanon, one case being when the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested a Lebanese national by the name of Mahmoud Youssef Kourani in Dearborn, Michigan, in May of 2003 on the grounds of housing an illegal immigrant in which further investigation found he himself immigrated from Mexico to the United States in 2001 after he arrived in Mexico via an illegally obtained travel visa that he got after bribing a Mexican official in the Mexican embassy in Beirut where he funneled 40,000 USD to Hezbollah operatives. [45] Hezbollah in Latin America has worked with Mexican drug cartels using Lebanese nationals to negotiate alliance contracts with Mexican crime bosses, gangs, and cartels in order to gang access to drug routes on the Mexico–United States border to smuggle drugs from the tri-border region of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina to the Isthmus of Panama or just across the Pan-American Highway into Mexico then into the United States using the same falsified documents that Mexican cartels use with 60% of their drug ties having to deal with the Mexican cartels according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, these routes include the World Trade International Bridge between Nuevo Laredo and its sister city, Laredo, Texas, as well as Interstate 35 and Highways 59, 359 and 83, which act as branches into the United States in from the Texas via the Texas–Mexico border that is used by Mexican syndicates, running from southern Texas to cities across the U.S. and as far north as the Canada–United States border. [46] Some weaponry that Hezbollah in Latin America uses can be traced back to Russian suppliers though Russia denies any involvement in the funding of Hezbollah in Latin America, saying that the weapons could have been placed in their hands by accident. [47]

Support

Hezbollah in Latin America has received support from Iran via the main sector of Hezbollah or straight directly to Hezbollah in Latin America, and has been seen as an Iranian proxy in Latin America. Other countries including Cuba, who helped with basing and supporting Hezbollah militants in their jurisdiction, [48] Nicaragua, who allegedly help set up and facilitate a Hezbollah training camp alongside the Nicaraguan Army in their territory, [49] and Bolivia have been accused of helping support Hezbollah in Latin America and establish itself for illegal activities in the western hemisphere since the end of the first gulf war and the tighter ties Iran and these countries have had since then. [50]

With their presence in South America and a prominent Iranian proxy in South America, they attempt to establish connections with governments in South America that are considered oppositional to the United States governments. [51] Using governmental and local anti-American sentiment they exploit resources in South America in order to fund themselves and Iran with Bolivia giving resources to Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America with the goal of better diplomatic relations between both countries. [52] One of the major known supporters of Hezbollah in Latin America, besides Iran, is Venezuela which was tightened after the assassination of the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani from a United States airstrike, Venezuela under the rule of Nicolás Maduro is considered a "valued ally" of not only Hezbollah in Latin America but Iran as well since they are complicit in allowing Hezbollah in Latin America launder money and establish financial circuits in Venezuelan jurisdiction and allowing the shipment of illegal narcotics from Venezuela and Bolivia into areas of the United States and Europe. [53]

Sanctions

Hezbollah in Latin America is sanctioned and designated as a terrorist organization by multiple countries and agencies. [54]

The United States have issued many sanctions against the group, but they have been more limited in South America compared to its Lebanese sector. [55] These sanctions also targeted a member of Hezbollah in Latin America by the name of Amer Mohamed Akil Rada who is considered the main operative behind the AMIA bombing. [56] This action was considered a way by the United States government to continue to combat Hezbollah operations as United States Department of State Spokesman Matthew Miller stated that the sanctions underscored the United States' commitment to not let the facilitators and financers of Hezbollah to continue to operate. [57]

The of Argentina's Ministry of Security under a joint investigation with both Brazil and Paraguay stated that the leader of Hezbollah in Latin America is Hussein Ahmad Karaki. [58] They also stated that Karaki took direct orders from the then-leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, before Nasrallah's assassination by the Israel Defense Forces, where Karaki also resides in Lebanon, his birthplace. [59] He masterminded the AMIA bombing where he was present in Buenos Aires on the day of the attack and bought the van using a fake Colombian passport that identified him as "Alberto León Nain", later that day he left via a flight, hours before the explosion. Karaki left from Aeroparque Jorge Newbery to the city of Foz do Iguaçu. Karaki speaks Spanish and Portuguese. [60]

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Notes

  1. Spanish: Hezbolá en América Latina, Portuguese: Hezbollah na América Latina, Arabic: حزب الله في أمريكا اللاتينية