Internationalization of the renminbi | |||||||
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Traditional Chinese | 人民幣國際化 | ||||||
Simplified Chinese | 人民币国际化 | ||||||
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Since the late 2000s,the People's Republic of China (PRC) has sought to internationalize its official currency,the Renminbi (RMB). This initiative aims to reduce dependence on the United States dollar and enhance China's influence in the global financial system. Key strategies have included promoting the use of the yuan in international trade invoicing,cross-border lending,and bond issuance. Additionally,China has developed alternative payment systems such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the digital yuan,facilitating transactions outside traditional networks like SWIFT. The establishment of central bank swap lines and the expansion of offshore yuan markets further support this goal. [1]
Until the early 2000s,the Renminbi (RMB) was not convertible and its flow in and out of China was tightly restricted. The first step toward liberalisation came in 2004,when China began allowing limited border trade settlements in yuan. That same year,banks in Hong Kong were permitted to offer RMB deposit-taking,exchange,remittance,and card services for personal accounts,following approval by the State Council and arrangements with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). By 2009,RMB deposits in Hong Kong had risen from ¥12 billion in 2004 to ¥59 billion,and the territory emerged as the largest offshore centre for RMB activity. [2]
The internationalisation push accelerated after the 2007–2008 financial crisis. In July 2007,the China Development Bank issued the first offshore RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong,creating the “dim sum bond”market,which expanded rapidly as banks,corporations such as McDonald’s,and supranational institutions like the Asian Development Bank issued debt in offshore RMB (CNH). By 2013,the market had grown to ¥310 billion outstanding. [3] In parallel,Taiwan developed a Formosa bond market after signing a 2012 memorandum with Beijing,and similar RMB bond issuance spread to Singapore and other centres.
On 24 December 2008,China launched the Cross-Border Trade RMB Settlement Pilot Project,initially limited to Yunnan–ASEAN and Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macau trade. By 2010,the pilot expanded to 20 provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions,and by 2014 RMB settlements reached ¥5.9 trillion,or 22% of China’s trade volume. [4]
From 2009 onward,the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) signed a growing number of currency swap agreements with central banks,covering countries such as Argentina,Brazil,Turkey,South Korea,and the UK. [5] In August 2010,the PBoC allowed central banks and offshore clearing banks to invest surplus RMB in the onshore China Interbank Bond Market,and soon afterwards permitted outward direct investment (ODI) in RMB. That year,China and Russia began trading in their own currencies,abandoning the United States dollar in bilateral trade,followed by a similar arrangement with Japan in 2011. [6] In December 2011,the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) programme was introduced to allow offshore RMB funds to invest in mainland securities markets. [7]
China also experimented with financial reforms through the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone (SFTZ),launched in 2013,where RMB could circulate more freely between Free Trade Accounts and offshore accounts. In the same year,the UK became the first G7 country to establish an official RMB swap line. By late 2013,the RMB had overtaken the euro to become the second-most used currency in global trade finance,behind only the U.S. dollar. [8]
Between 2014 and 2017,a series of liberalisations deepened offshore RMB use. The Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched in 2014 to allow cross-border equity trading,followed in 2017 by Bond Connect to link mainland and Hong Kong bond markets. The China International Payments System (CIPS) was established in 2015 as an alternative to SWIFT,and the World Bank issued the first SDR bonds payable in RMB in 2016. In 2018,yuan-denominated oil futures were introduced on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange,marking a step toward pricing commodities in RMB.
Further reforms removed barriers for inbound investors:in September 2019 the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) abolished quotas under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) and RQFII programmes,and in 2020 the two schemes were merged with simplified application and expanded investment scope. By 2020,the RMB accounted for 4.3% of global foreign exchange turnover and was held in reserves by more than 70 central banks,though it remained used for less than 2% of global payments.
The road to the RMB Internationalization is far from complete.
On 14 August 2020, the People's Bank of China released the "Report on the Internationalization of RMB in 2020". The report said that RMB's function of reserve currency has gradually emerged. In the first quarter 2020, the share of RMB in global foreign exchange reserves rose to 2.02%, a record high. As of the end of 2019, the People's Bank of China has set up RMB clearing banks in 25 countries and regions outside of mainland China, which has made the use of RMB more secure and transaction costs have decreased. [9]
Since the late 2000s, China has encouraged the creation of offshore hubs for the RMB to expand its international use. Early initiatives included bilateral swap agreements and the designation of clearing banks in major financial centres. In Asia, Hong Kong and Macau became the first and largest offshore markets, with RMB deposits, trade settlement, and bond issuance expanding rapidly after 2010. Singapore followed with the designation of ICBC as a clearing bank in 2013, bilateral swap facilities, and the launch of direct CNY/SGD trading in 2014. Taiwan and South Korea also established clearing arrangements with Bank of China (Taipei) and Bank of Communications (Seoul), while Japan began direct RMB–yen trading in 2012. Russia developed RMB–rouble trading on the Moscow Exchange starting in 2010, with turnover growing steadily through the 2010s. In 2025 Turkey signed an agreement with China to create a clearing system after earlier currency-swap cooperation.
In Europe, London quickly became the leading European hub, accounting for over 60% of RMB activity outside China by 2013 and later ranking second globally in RMB settlements via SWIFT. Frankfurt was designated an official clearing centre in 2014, reflecting Germany’s role as China’s largest EU trading partner. Paris and Luxembourg also grew as centres for RMB deposits and bond issuance, with Luxembourg emerging as the leading RMB securities settlement venue in Europe. Switzerland signed a swap line with China in 2014, expanding European access to RMB. In the Americas, Canada became the first country to sign a reciprocal currency deal with China in 2014, enabling direct trading between the Canadian dollar and the yuan. In the Pacific, Australia signed a swap agreement with the PBoC in 2012, established clearing arrangements by 2014, and invested part of its foreign reserves in RMB-denominated bonds.
By the mid-2020s, this network of offshore hubs stretching across Asia, Europe, North America, and Australia had created multiple channels for RMB clearing, bond issuance, and foreign exchange trading. [10]
Appointed Date | Country | Clearing Bank | Clearing hour (GMT) |
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24 December 2003 | ![]() | BoC, Hong Kong [11] | 00:30-21:00 [12] |
September 2004 | ![]() | BoC, Macau branch [13] | |
11 December 2012 | ![]() | BoC, Taipei branch [14] | |
8 February 2013 | ![]() | ICBC, Singapore branch [15] | |
18 June 2014 | ![]() | CCB, London branch [16] | |
19 June 2014 | ![]() | BoC, Frankfurt branch [17] | |
4 July 2014 | ![]() | BoCom, Seoul branch [18] | |
15 September 2014 | ![]() | BoC, Paris Branch [19] | |
16 September 2014 | ![]() | ICBC, Luxembourg [20] | |
3 November 2014 | ![]() | ICBC, Doha | |
8 November 2014 | ![]() | ICBC, Toronto [21] | |
17 November 2014 | ![]() | BoC, Sydney [22] | |
6 January 2015 | ![]() | ICBC, Bangkok [23] | |
6 January 2015 | ![]() | BoC, Malaysia [24] | |
25 May 2015 | ![]() | CCB, Santiago | |
28 June 2015 | ![]() | BoC, Budapest [25] | |
9 July 2015 | ![]() | BoC, Johannesburg [26] | |
17 September 2015 | ![]() | ICBC, Buenos Aires [27] | |
30 September 2015 | ![]() | BoC, Lusaka [28] | |
30 November 2015 | ![]() | CCB, Zurich [29] | |
21 September 2016 | ![]() | BoC, NYC [30] | |
September 2016 | ![]() | ICBC, Moscow | |
December 2016 | ![]() | ABC, Dubai |
Earliest agreement [31] [32] | Economic partner | Max. value in foreign currency (including extensions) | Max. value in RMB (including extensions) |
---|---|---|---|
12 December 2008 | ![]() | KRW 64 trillion | ¥360 billion [33] [34] |
25 November 2020 | ![]() | HKD 590 billion | ¥500 billion [31] [35] |
8 February 2009 | ![]() | MYR 90 billion | ¥180 billion [36] |
11 March 2009 | ![]() | BYR 16 trillion | ¥7 billion [37] [38] |
23 March 2009 | ![]() | IDR 878 trillion | ¥400 billion [39] [40] |
29 March 2009 | ![]() | ARS 38 billion | ¥70 billion [41] |
9 June 2010 | ![]() | ISK 66 billion | ¥3.5 billion [42] |
23 July 2010 | ![]() | SGD 60 billion | ¥300 billion [43] |
18 April 2011 | ![]() | NZD 5 billion | ¥25 billion [44] |
19 April 2011 | ![]() | UZS 167 billion | ¥0.7 billion |
6 May 2011 | ![]() | MNT 2 trillion | ¥15 billion [45] [46] |
13 June 2011 | ![]() | KZT 150 billion | ¥7 billion [47] |
23 June 2011 | ![]() | RUB 815 billion | ¥150 billion [48] [49] |
22 December 2011 | ![]() | THB 320 billion | ¥70 billion [50] [51] |
23 December 2011 | ![]() | PKR 140 billion | ¥10 billion [52] |
17 January 2012 | ![]() | AED 20 billion | ¥35 billion [53] |
21 February 2012 | ![]() | TRY 189 billion | ¥35 billion |
22 March 2012 | ![]() | AUD 30 billion | ¥200 billion [54] |
26 June 2012 | ![]() | UAH 19 billion | ¥15 billion [55] |
26 March 2013 [56] | ![]() | BRL 60 billion | ¥190 billion [5] |
22 June 2013 | ![]() | GBP 21 billion | ¥200 billion [57] |
9 September 2013 | ![]() | HUF 375 billion | ¥10 billion [58] |
12 September 2013 | ![]() | ALL 35.8 billion | ¥2 billion [59] |
9 October 2013 | ![]() | EUR 45 billion | ¥350 billion [60] |
21 July 2014 | ![]() | CHF 21 billion | ¥150 billion [61] |
16 September 2014 | ![]() | LKR 225 billion | ¥10 billion [62] |
3 November 2014 | ![]() | QAR 20.8 billion | ¥35 billion [63] |
8 November 2014 | ![]() | CAD 30 billion | ¥200 billion [64] |
23 December 2014 | ![]() | NPR | ¥ billion [65] |
18 March 2015 | ![]() | SRD 520 million | ¥ 1 billion |
10 April 2015 | ![]() | ZAR 54 billion | ¥ 30 billion [66] |
25 May 2015 | ![]() | CLP 2.2 trillion | ¥ 22 billion [67] |
5 September 2015 | ![]() | TJS 3.2 billion | ¥ 3.2 billion [68] |
5 December 2019 | ![]() | MOP 35 billion | ¥ 30 billion [68] |
20 November 2023 | ![]() | SAR 26 billion | ¥ 50 billion [68] |
Total (excluding Nepal) | ¥3,489 billion |
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