Herder-Farmer conflicts | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Farmers (mostly Christians) Adara, Berom, Jukun, Tiv and Tarok farmers Hausa farmers | Herders (mostly Muslims) Fulani herders |
Across Nigeria, there are a series of disputes over arable land between predominantly Muslim Fulani herders and predominantly Christian non-Fulani farmers. The conflicts have been especially prominent in the Middle Belt (North Central) since the return of democracy in 1999. More recently, they have deteriorated into attacks on farmers by Fulani herdsmen.
Attacks have also taken place in Northwestern Nigeria against farmers who are mainly Hausa, who are almost entirely Muslim. Many Fulani communities, who are usually farmers, have also been attacked and raided by Fulani bandits and other militias. [1] Despite the conflict fundamentally being a land-use conflict between farmers and herders across Nigeria's Middle Belt, it has taken on dangerous religious and ethnic dimensions mostly because most of the farmers are Christians of various ethnicities while most of the herders are Muslim Fulani who make up about 90% of the country's pastoralists. [2] Thousands of people have died since the attacks began. Sedentary farming in rural communities are often target of attacks because of their vulnerability. There are fears that the conflict will spread to other West African countries, but that has often been downplayed by governments in the region. Attacks on herders have also led them to retaliating by attacking other communities. [3] [4] [5]
Since 2022, Genocide Watch has classified the conflicts as a genocide of Christians perpetrated by ethnic Fulani jihadists. The organisation places Nigeria on the stages "Stage 9: Extermination" and "Stage 10: Denial" in the Ten Stages of Genocide model developed by American scholar Gregory Stanton. [6]
Herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria have deep roots and date back to pre-colonial times (before the 1900s). However, these conflicts have become far more severe in recent decades due to population pressures, climate change, and various other factors. During the British colonial era, herders and farmers would agree on a system called burti, in which specific migration routes were set up for herders, with mutual agreement from the farmers, herders, and local authorities. However, the burti system collapsed around the 1970s when farmers increasingly claimed ownership of lands along cattle migration paths, increasingly leading to conflicts. [7]
Before, herders frequently exchanged milk for cereal grains with farming communities. However, in recent decades, milk is no longer being widely bartered as packaged beverages became more popular in towns. [7]
Modern medicines have also made it possible for herders to move their livestock further south into the "tsetse fly zone" in the south, whereas before, herders could not keep their cattle on a large scale due to tropical diseases in humid climate zones. Starting from those implemented by the British colonial administration, tsetse control programs have reduced the threat of diseases such as trypanosomiasis. Today, herders also have easy access to drugs for trypanosomiasis and dermatophilosis in order to keep their livestock alive. In addition, over the past several decades, herders have cross-bred trypanosome-intolerant zebu cattle with trypanosome-tolerant humpless breeds, thereby increasing the cattle's tolerance of tropical diseases. All of these factors have enabled the widespread migration of Fulani herders into the southernmost areas of Nigeria, where they could easily sell their livestock for higher prices due to strong demand for beef and other meat products in Nigeria's populous southern towns and cities. However, in the south, they would encounter sedentary communities that have not historically had any experience with peacefully negotiating and co-existing with nomadic herders. Increasing ease of access to weapons and religious polarisation among both Christians and Muslims have added to the potential for violence. [7]
Since the Fourth Nigerian Republic's founding in 1999, farmer–herder violence has killed more than 19,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. [8] [9] It followed a trend in the increase of farmer–herder conflicts throughout much of the western Sahel, due to an expansion of agriculturist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification and soil degradation; [10] population growth; [3] breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crime in rural areas. [11] Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defence forces and ethnic and tribal militias, which have engaged in further violence. The majority of farmer–herder clashes have occurred between Muslim Fulani herdsmen and farmers, exacerbating hostilities. [12]
There are various pastoralist tribes in northern Nigeria that include not only Fulani people, but also Kanuri, Kanembu, Arab, and other groups. Blench (2010) lists the following pastoralist tribes in northern Nigeria. [7]
Tribe | Ethnic group | Location | Primary livestock |
---|---|---|---|
Baggara | Arab | south of Geidam | cattle |
Shuwa | Arab | eastern Borno/Cameroon | cattle |
Uled Suliman | Arab | Komadugu Yobe valley | camels |
Anagamba | Fulɓe | north-eastern Borno | cattle |
Bokolooji | Fulɓe | northern Borno | cattle |
Maare | Fulɓe | south-eastern Borno | cattle |
Sankara | Fulɓe | north-western Borno | cattle |
Uda'en | Fulɓe | north-eastern Nigeria | uda sheep |
Woɗaaɓe | Fulɓe | north-eastern Nigeria | cattle |
Badawai | Kanuri | central Borno | cattle |
Jetko | Kanuri | north of Geidam/Niger | camels |
Kanuri | Kanuri | Borno | cattle |
Koyam | Kanuri | south-central Borno | cattle |
Manga | Kanuri | north-west Borno | cattle/camels |
Mober | Kanuri | north-eastern Borno/Niger | cattle |
Kuburi | Kanembu | extreme north-east Borno/Niger | cattle |
Sugurti | Kanembu | Lake Chad shore | cattle |
Teda (Tubu) | Teda (Tubu) | northern Borno/Niger | camels |
Tuareg | Tuareg | north of Sokoto/Niger | camels |
Yedina (Buduma) | Yedina (Buduma) | Lake Chad shore | cattle |
Fulani herdsmen are represented by advocacy groups such as Miyetti Allah. [13]
Farmers belong to diverse ethnic groups, primarily Hausa people and the diverse ethnic groups of the Middle Belt. In more recent years, this has also expanded to include southern Nigerian ethnic groups such as the Yoruba, Igbo, and others. [7] Farmers belonging to various minority ethnic groups in the Middle Belt are represented by partisan advocacy groups such as CONAECDA. [14] [15] [16]
The farmer/herder conflicts have been taking place in regions which have been unstable since the 2000s. Urban conflicts in Jos and Kaduna have been particularly violent and, despite violent clashes with the authorities, their causes have never been addressed politically. Conflicts might not have been addressed adequately because traditional authorities have not been fulfilling their role in colonial-era settlements. [17]
Over time the periodic clashes between herders and farmers in Northern and North-Central Nigeria have precipitated a general climate of insecurity. This widespread insecurity both allows for and is perpetuated by acts of broader criminality, in which gangs of bandits target locations in the area for raids, mass kidnappings, and looting. [18]
Conflicts between farmers and herders can be understood as a problem of access to land. The beginning of the 21st century witnessed an expansion of the agriculturist population and its cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands in the Middle Belt. In an already politically unstable region, it has never been possible to ascertain a legal title to land for every farmer. As a result, transhumance routes of herders were no longer available, especially in a context of global warming. [19]
Deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification and soil degradation [10] [20] [21] have led Fulani herdsmen from Northern Nigeria to change their transhumance routes. Access to pastureland and watering points in the Middle Belt became essential for herdsmen travelling from the North of the country. It is often assumed that climate change is the driver of the conflict but a recent study suggests that climate change does not automatically cause the conflict. [22] In actuality, regions vulnerable to climate change (Northern Regions) experience less farmer-herder conflict and less intense farmer-herder fighting. [22] It is argued that ethnic conflict between farming and herding groups is the primary mechanism behind the farmer-herder conflict nexus. [22]
The Nigerian government has been unwilling to address the causes of the crisis. [23] Fighting Boko Haram in the North-East and facing rising levels of violence in different regions of the country, the government has nonetheless tried to implement a few measures.
Due to the widely perceived inefficacy of the Nigerian government, armed vigilante groups have sprung up in many farmer communities. This situation would often lead to vicious cycles of bloody feuds among farmers and herders. Local politicians and religious leaders have also exacerbated conflicts by recruiting members and frequently exaggerating claims. [7]
Since 2012, there have been projects to create transhumance corridors through the Middle Belt. Mostly supported by Northern lawmakers and opposed by their Southern counterparts, these endeavours have been rarely successful. [24]
In 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari tried to create Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) settlements. His proposal was met with fierce criticism. [25] On 17 May 2021, the 17 Southern governors in Nigeria issued the Asaba Declaration, aimed at solving the crisis. [26]
Although ranching, where cattle are kept in enclosed parcels of land, has frequently been proposed as a solution to the crisis, this has proven to be highly unfeasible in Nigeria due to poor infrastructure (with unstable supplies of electricity, water, and fuel) and difficulties with acquisition and legal ownership of land. [27] [28] Land grabbing and cattle rustling are also potential difficulties that ranchers would have to deal with. Ranchers would also be unable to compete with nomadic herders with zero land-related costs. [29]
Nigerian and foreign newspapers are often unable to provide exact numbers of casualties. Despite the high number of attacks, Nigerian and foreign journalists rarely have access to first-hand testimonies and tend to report inaccurate figures. [30]
The Fula, Fulani, or Fulɓe people are an ethnic group in Sahara, Sahel and West Africa, widely dispersed across the region. Inhabiting many countries, they live mainly in West Africa and northern parts of Central Africa, South Sudan, Darfur, and regions near the Red Sea coast in Sudan. The approximate number of Fula people is unknown, due to clashing definitions regarding Fula ethnicity. Various estimates put the figure between 25 and 40 million people worldwide.
Middle Belt or Central Nigeria is a term used in human geography to designate a belt region stretching across central Nigeria longitudinally and forming a transition zone between Northern and Southern Nigeria. It is composed of the southern half of the defunct Northern Region of Nigeria, now comprising mostly the North Central and parts of the North East and North West geopolitical zones, and is characterised by its lack of a clear majority ethnic group. It is also the location of Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory.
The 2010 Jos riots were clashes between Muslim and Christian ethnic groups in central Nigeria in and near the city of Jos. The first spate of violence of 2010 started on 17 January in Jos and spread to surrounding communities. Houses, churches, mosques and vehicles were set ablaze, during at least four days of fighting. At least 326 people, and possibly more than a thousand, were killed.
Religious violence in Nigeria refers to Christian-Muslim strife in modern Nigeria, which can be traced back to 1953. Today, religious violence in Nigeria is dominated by the Boko Haram insurgency, which aims to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. Since the turn of the 21st century, 62,000 Nigerian Christians have been killed by the terrorist group Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen and other groups. The killings have been referred to as a silent genocide.
Fulani herdsmen or Fulani pastoralists are nomadic or semi-nomadic Fulani people whose primary occupation is raising livestock. The Fulani herdsmen are largely located in the Sahel and semi-arid parts of West Africa, but due to relatively recent changes in climate patterns, many herdsmen have moved further south into the savannah and tropical forest belt of West Africa. The herdsmen are found in countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon. In Senegal, they inhabit northeastern Ferlo and the southeastern part of the country. In some of these countries the Fula constitute a minority group. They inhabit Northern Nigeria and some parts of the country.
Communal conflicts in Nigeria can be divided into two broad categories:
Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria is a loose partisan advocacy group centered on promoting the welfare of Fulani pastoralists in Nigeria. The organization was founded in the early 1970s with headquarters in Kaduna. It became legally operational in 1979 and gained wider acceptance as an advocacy group in 1987.
On February 10–11, 2019, 141 people were killed in the Kajuru LGA of the Nigerian state of Kaduna according to the state governor, hours before the Nigerian general election. The dead included 11 Adara people and 130 Fulani. However the Fulani group Miyetti Allah was reported to have published a list of 131 Fulani who had died and it also stated that the bodies of 66 Fulani were recovered while the bodies of 65 other Fulani remained missing. An attack by suspected Fulani gunmen on Ungwar Bardi killed 11 Adara people. An Adara militia in turn attacked Fulani settlements. Miyetti Allah later clarified 66 were buried in graves and 65 remained missing.
Ethnic conflicts involving the Fulani people occur in West Africa, primarily in Nigeria, but also in Mali, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, due to conflicts over land and culture. The death count for each attack is small, although the cumulative death count is in the thousands.
On March 23, 2019, several attacks by gunmen killed a reported 160 Fulani herders in central Mali. The violence came in the aftermath of the Malian government cracking down on Islamic terror cells in the country. Two villages, Ogossagou and Welingara, were particularly affected.
Adara people, are an ethnic group in the Middle Belt who speak the Adara language, a north Plateau language of Nigeria. Dio Awemi Maisamari is the National president of Adara Development Association (ADA) with his assistant Luke Waziri assistant secretary of the association.
The Fulani refers to an ethnic group, the Fulani, whose neighboring farmers are against them in various ethnicities. Nigeria is considered a “melting pot” of different cultural and ethnic groups. Ethnic identification in the country is a complicated amalgamation of primordial and constructivist approaches.
Nomadic conflict, also called farmer–herder conflict, is a type of environmental conflict where farming and herding communities overlap and has been used to refer to fighting among herding communities or fighting between herding and farming communities. This is sometimes referred to as conflict involving “pastoralists” or “nomadic” people and “agriculturalists” or “settled” people. The conflicts usually arise from destruction of crops by livestock and is exacerbated during times when water and lands to graze are scarce.
Anti-Fulani sentiment is the hostility that exists towards Fulani people in Nigeria, Mali and other West African nations and the discrimination that they are subjected to as a result of it. The Fulani are a semi-nomadic ethnic group that is dispersed across several West African countries. Fulani people represent 6% of Nigeria's population.
The 2021 Nasarawa massacre was an attack by Fulani herdsmen gunmen on Tiv civilians that occurred on December 20, 2021, in the state of Nasarawa, Nigeria. The herdsmen killed approximately 52 people according to eyewitnesses in 12 different villages, although the death toll was initially put at least 20 by the Tiv Development Association.
CONAECDA is an organization that serves as a coalition of indigenous ethnic communities in central and northern Nigeria. CONAECDA works in diverse areas such as language development, community development, and indigenous land rights. It represents a few hundred indigenous groups that are spread across 15 Nigerian states.
The majority of herders in African countries are livestock owners. Livestock farming is a part of Nigeria's agriculture system. In 2017, Nigeria had approximately over 80 million poultry farming, 76 million goats, 43.4 million sheep, 18.4 million cattle, 7.5 million pigs, and 1.4 million of its equivalent. Livestock farming is about 5% of Nigeria's gross domestic product and 17% of its agricultural gross domestic product.
A series of armed attacks occurred between 23 and 25 December 2023 in Plateau State in central Nigeria. They affected at least 17 rural communities in the Nigerian local government areas of Bokkos and Barkin Ladi, resulting in at least 200 deaths and injuries to more than 500 people as well as significant property damage. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attacks, they are believed to have been committed by Fulani militias.
The immediate origins of killings in Southern Kaduna especially in the 2010s and early 2020s can be traced to the events that brought in Goodluck Jonathan into power in 2010 as the President of Nigeria, and escalated after the presidential election in 2011, which he won.