The Siliguri Corridor, often dubbed the "Chicken's Neck", is a stretch of land around the city of Siliguri in West Bengal state of India. [1] [2] It is the sole terrestrial connection between India's mainland and its eight northeastern states, serving as a logistical lifeline for over 40 million people and crucial military movements. [3] [1] Bordered by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, it lies close to Tibet's Chumbi Valley to its northeast. [4] [5] [6] The city of Siliguri is the major city in the area and the central transfer point connecting Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sikkim, Darjeeling, Northeast India and mainland India. [4]
The partition of India led to the formation of the Siliguri Corridor through the creation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) after the partition of Bengal (into East Bengal and West Bengal) in 1947–1948. [7]
The Kingdom of Sikkim formerly lay on the northern side of the corridor, until its union with India in 1975 via a publicly held referendum. [8] [9] From Sikkim, India consolidated its control of the Chumbi Valley, along with Bhutan. [10] [11]
The dimensions of the corridor are a matter of interpretation. [12] Descriptions give it an area of 170 by 60 km (106 by 37 mi) with the narrowest section being 20–22 km (12–14 mi). [1] [2] Kamal Jit Singh places the length at 200 km (120 mi) with a width of 17 to 60 km (11 to 37 mi), giving it an area of approximately 12,200 km2 (4,700 sq mi). [12] Another description places its dimensions as approximately 200 km (120 mi) in length and 20 to 60 km (12 to 37 mi) wide, also giving it an area of approximately 12,200 km2 (4,700 sq mi). [13]
The corridor is located between Bangladesh to the southwest, Nepal on the northwest, and Bhutan to the north. [14] Between Sikkim and Bhutan lies the Chumbi Valley Tibetan territory. [15] The southern end of the Dolam plateau or Doklam tri boundary area slopes into the corridor. [16] At the narrowest stretch, the corridor is generally formed by the Mechi River in the east; Nepal's Bhadrapur lies on the banks of the river. [17] Further north the Mechi Bridge connects Mechinagar. [18] [19]
To mitigate the vulnerability India has undertaken several initiatives including enhancing security deployment as well as undertaking infrastructure development. To ensure seamless connectivity and military mobilization, India has prioritized developing high-capacity infrastructure in and around the corridor, notably under the Bharatmala Pariyojana. Projects include: [6]
India has embarked on a slew of projects. These include the construction of India-China Border Roads, where, as of 2024, multiple phases of border roads have been constructed, and Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs), such as the Nyoma Advanced Landing Ground, which is nearing completion as of 2024. [21] [22] [23] Other projects include Northeastern India connectivity and Look-East transnational connectivity projects including BIMSTEC and BBIN to create multiple alternatives to Silliguri corridor, including through Bangladesh and the sea.
All land transportation between the rest of India and its far northeastern states uses this corridor. The route has a major broad gauge railway line. Electrification of this double-track corridor is in progress with assistance from the Central Organization for Railway Electrification (CORE). Additionally, the old metre gauge line (recently converted to a 1.676 metres (5 ft 6.0 in) broad-gauge line) connects Siliguri Junction with Islampur in the North Dinajpur district of West Bengal, via Bagdogra (the only airport of national interest in the corridor) and the bordering towns of Adhikari, Galgalia, Thakurganj, Naxalbari and Taiabpur with Nepal. As of 2024, to reduce dependence on the Siliguri Corridor, India is planning to build railway lines through Jogbani in Bihar, which would enter Biratnagar in Nepal and then connect with New Mal Junction in West Bengal. [24] India is also developing railway lines through Bangladesh, which includes constructing new railway tracks and the gauge conversion of existing railway tracks, in order to reduce dependence on the Siliguri Corridor, as of 2024. [25]
As of 2024, there is no free-trade agreement between Bangladesh and India. [26] The Tetulia Corridor, an alternative to the Siliguri Corridor, is proposed under Article VIII of the India–Bangladesh Trade Agreement 1980, which states that "The two governments agree to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce between the two countries and for passage of goods between two places in one country through the territory of the other". [27] However, the opening of the Tetulia Corridor is still being discussed politically as of 2019. [27]
The threat of a Chinese advance is still considered by Indian planners. [28] A Chinese military advance of less than 130 km (81 mi) would cut off Bhutan, part of West Bengal and all of North-East India, an area containing almost 50 million people. This situation arose during the war between India and China in 1962. [15] The security threat to this corridor was heightened during the 2017 Doklam incident. [29] The probability of China cutting off seven states in northeast India has been questioned. [30] The Indian Army has said that the Siliguri Corridor is the Army's strongest defensive line. [31]
Military Bases and Deployment: India has several forces stationed on the borders, the Indian Army and Indo-Tibetan Border Police man the border with China; Sashastra Seema Bal is deployed along the border with Nepal and Bhutan and the Border Security Force for Bangladesh. [12] The strip is also patrolled by the Indian Army, the Assam Rifles, and state police forces including the West Bengal Police. [12] The security threat posed by the corridor decreased following the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. [28] Internal threats to the corridor are numerous. [28] Militant groups known to have used the corridor include the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). [13]
Anti-India hardliners in Bangladesh and Pakistan refer to Siliguri Corridor are India's Chicken's neck, while both nations have their own more vulnerable chicken's necks along the respective border with India. [35] [36]
Bangladeshi National Citizen Party's leader Hasnat Abdullah has rhetorically threatened to cut off India's northeastern states by cutting off India's chicken's neck, i.e. Siliguri Corridor, while downplaying India's contribution in 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. [37] [38] While India has two chicken's neck, Bangladesh also has the following two chicken's neck along its border with India. Both of these, comprising 34.2% or 50,715 km2 Bangladesh's total territory, are narrower and more vulnerable than India's Siliguri Corridor or Tripura Corridor, and contribute 30-45% to economy of Bangladesh and 80% of Bangladesh's total export-import is through Chittagong Port in this vulnerable area. [35] [36] In response to rhetoric from certain Bangladeshi political figures and hardliners highlighting India's "Chicken's Neck" vulnerability, Indian leaders have pointed out that Bangladesh itself possesses two narrow land corridors that are geographically isolated and potentially more vulnerable. [39] These counter-vulnerabilities, which could be exploited in the event of aggression, are described as North Bangladesh Corridor (Rangpur Division) and Chittagong Corridor (a slender strip, reportedly 28 kilometres at its narrowest, connecting the port city of Chittagong - the economic capital- with the political capital of Dhaka). [39] This diplomatic and strategic counter-narrative serves as a warning that any hostile action aimed at the Siliguri Corridor could result in severe repercussions for Bangladesh's own territorial integrity and economic connectivity. [40]
Akhnoor Bulge [48] (named "Akhnoor Dagger" by Pakistani Military, [49] [50] and as "Pakistan's Akhnoor Chicken's neck Corridor" by Indian Military) [50] [51] [52] a narrow strip of Pakistani territory that extends into the Indian administered-Jammu and Kashmir south of Akhnoor. This sensitive piece of land, which lies on the de facto Indo–Pakistani border on the west side of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, is part of Punjab Province's Sialkot District and measures roughly 170 km2 (66 sq mi). [50] [51] [52] However, this Akhnoor Bulge being a "dagger" or India's "Chicken's Neck" vulnerability, as perceived by Pakistan in 1965, has since been described by some analysts as a strategic myth, "the so-called 'Chicken's Neck' or Akhnoor Dagger area... proved to be a liability for Pakistan rather than an asset in the 1971 war when Indian forces successfully captured the area". [53] This is evidenced by India's swift 1971 capture of the area, which effectively negated the perceived threat to Akhnoor. [54] Any perceived vulnerability of India is further mitigated by improved infrastructure development by India, which now has many more high-capacity bridges and numerous alternate transport links connecting Jammu to Akhnoor and India to wider Jammu and Kashmir region, providing redundancy and resilience to the military supply lines. [55] In fact, the area has been argued to be a Pakistani vulnerability, as the land is a narrow doab between the Chenab and Tawi rivers surrounded by India from three sides, and is further doubly-isolated from the rest of Pakistan by the Chenab–Munawar Tawi doab to its southwest within Pakistan. [53]
Humphrey Hawksley, in his 2000 novel Dragon Fire, briefly authors a situation where China cuts off India's land route to its northeastern territories. [13] Assassin's Mace (2011) by Brigadier Bob Butalia also involves such a situation involving Doklam and Jaldhaka River. [12]
Future PAF operations, potentially coordinated with ground manoeuvres from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) or a thrust into the Akhnoor Bulge, could involve a larger, more sustained assault.
The Indian move into the Chicken's Neck... negated the 'dagger' threat to Akhnoor.