Ansarollah (ʾAnṣārollāhأَنْصَارٱللَّٰه "Supporters of God") otherwise known as the Houthis ( /ˈhuːθi/ ; Arabic : ٱلْحُوثِيُّونal-Ḥūthīyūn [al.ħuː.θiː.juːn] ), is an Islamic political and armed movement that emerged from Sa'dah in northern Yemen in the 1990s. The movement was called Houthis because its founder is from the Houthi tribe. [45] They are of the Zaidi school, though the movement reportedly also includes Sunnis. [46] [10] [47] Under the leadership of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the group emerged as an opposition to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whom they charged with massive financial corruption and criticized for being backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States [35] at the expense of the Yemeni people [48] and Yemen's sovereignty. [49] Resisting Saleh's order for his arrest, [50] Hussein was killed in Sa'dah in 2004 along with a number of his guards by the Yemeni army, sparking the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. [51] Since then, except for a short intervening period, the movement has been led by his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. [50]
Ansarollah attracts its Zaidi-Shia followers in Yemen by promoting regional political-religious issues in its media, including the overarching U.S.–Israeli conspiracy theory and Arab "collusion". [52] [53] In 2003, Ansarollah's slogan "God is great, death to the US, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam", became the group's trademark. [53] Ansarollah officials, however, have rejected the literal interpretation of the slogan. [54]
The movement's expressed goals include combating economic underdevelopment and political marginalization in Yemen while seeking greater autonomy for Zaidi-majority regions of the country. [55] They also claim to support a more democratic non-sectarian republic in Yemen. [56] Ansarollah have made fighting corruption the centerpiece of their political program. [35]
Ansarollah took part in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution by participating in street protests and by coordinating with other opposition groups. They joined the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative to broker peace following the unrest. However, Ansarollah would later reject the November 2011 GCC deal's provisions stipulating formation of six federal regions in Yemen, claiming that the deal did not fundamentally reform governance and that the proposed federalization "divided Yemen into poor and wealthy regions". Ansarollah also feared the deal was a blatant attempt to weaken them by dividing areas under their control between separate regions. [55] In late 2014, Ansarollah repaired their relationship with the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and with his help, they took control of the capital and much of the north. [57]
In 2014–2015, Ansarollah took over the government in Sanaa with the help of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and announced the fall of the current government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. [58] [59] Ansarollah have gained control of most of the northern part of Yemen's territory and since 2015 have been resisting the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen that claims to seek to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government [60] to power. Additionally, the Islamic State militant group has attacked all of the conflict's major parties including Ansarollah, Saleh forces, the Yemeni government, and the Saudi Arabian-led coalition forces. [61] [62] Ansarollah have launched repeated missile and drone attacks against Saudi cities, widely seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. [63]
According to Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sanaa University, Ansarollah began as a moderate theological movement that preached tolerance and held a broad-minded view of all the Yemeni peoples. [64] Their first organization, "the Believing Youth" (BY), was founded in 1992 in Saada Governorate [65] :1008 by either Mohammed al-Houthi, [66] :98 or his brother Hussein al-Houthi. [67]
The Believing Youth established school clubs and summer camps [66] :98 in order to "promote a Zaidi revival" in Saada. [67] By 1994–1995, 15–20,000 students had attended BY summer camps. The religious material included lectures by Mohammed Hussein Fadhlallah (a Lebanese shia scholar) and Hassan Nasrallah (Secretary General of Lebanon's Hezbollah Party)." [66] :99 [68]
The formation of Ansarollah has been described by Adam Baron of the European Council on Foreign Relations as a reaction to foreign intervention. Their views include shoring up Zaidi support against the perceived threat of Saudi-influenced ideologies in Yemen and a general condemnation of the former Yemeni government's alliance with the United States, which, along with complaints regarding the government's corruption and the marginalisation of much of Ansarollah's home areas in Saada, constituted the group's key grievances. [69]
Although Hussein al-Houthi, who was killed in 2004, had no official relation with Believing Youth, according to Zaid, he contributed to the radicalization of some Zaidis after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. BY-affiliated youth adopted anti-American and anti-Jewish slogans which they chanted in the Saleh Mosque in Sanaa after Friday prayers. According to Zaid, Believing Youth's insistence on chanting the slogans attracted the authorities' attention, further increasing government worries over the extent of their influence. "The security authorities thought that if today they chanted `Death to America', tomorrow they could be chanting 'Death to the president [of Yemen]". 800 Believing Youth supporters were arrested in Sanaa in 2004. President Ali Abdullah Saleh then invited Hussein al-Houthi to a meeting in Sanaa, but Hussein declined. On 18 June 2004 Saleh sent government forces to arrest Hussein. [50] Hussein responded by launching an insurgency against the central government, but was killed on 10 September 2004. [48] The insurgency continued intermittently until a ceasefire agreement was reached in 2010. [64] During this prolonged conflict, the Yemeni army, and air force was used to suppress Ansarollah in northern Yemen. The Saudis joined these anti-Ansarollah campaigns, but Ansarollah won against both Saleh and the Saudi army. According to the Brookings Institution, this particularly humiliated the Saudis, who spent tens of billions of dollars on their military. [35]
Later, Ansarollah participated in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, as well as the ensuing National Dialogue Conference (NDC). [70] However, they rejected the provisions of the November 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council deal on the ground that "it divide[d] Yemen into poor and wealthy regions" and also in response to assassination of their representative at NDC. [71] [72]
As the revolution went on, Ansarollah gained control of greater territory. By 9 November 2011, Ansarollah were said to be in control of two Yemeni governorates (Saada and Al Jawf) and close to taking over a third governorate (Hajjah), [73] which would enable them to launch a direct assault on the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. [74] In May 2012, it was reported that Ansarollah controlled a majority of Saada, Al Jawf, and Hajjah governorates; they had also gained access to the Red Sea and started erecting barricades north of Sanaa in preparation for more conflict. [75]
By 21 September 2014, Ansarollah were said to control parts of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, including government buildings and a radio station. [76] While Ansarollah control expanded to the rest of Sanaa, as well as other towns such as Rada', this control was strongly challenged by Al-Qaeda. It was believed by the Gulf States that Ansarollah had accepted aid from Iran while Saudi Arabia was aiding their Yemeni rivals. [77]
On 20 January 2015, Ansarollah seized the presidential palace in the capital. President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was in the presidential palace during the takeover, but was not harmed. [78] The movement officially took control of the Yemeni government on 6 February, dissolving parliament and declaring its Revolutionary Committee to be the acting authority in Yemen. [58] On 20 March 2015, The al-Badr and al-Hashoosh mosques came under suicide attack during midday prayers, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant quickly claimed responsibility. The blasts killed 142 worshippers and wounded more than 351, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Yemen's history. [79]
In a televised speech on 22 March, Ansarollah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi accused the US and Israel of supporting the terrorist attacks. He blamed regional Arab states for financing terrorist groups operating inside Yemen. [80] On 27 March 2015, in response to perceived Ansarollah threats to Sunni factions in the region, Saudi Arabia along with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan led a gulf coalition airstrike in Yemen. [81] The military coalition included the United States which helped in planning of airstrikes, as well as logistical and intelligence support. [82]
According to a 2015 September report by Esquire magazine, Ansarollah, once the outliers, are now one of the most stable and organised social and political movements in Yemen. The power vacuum created by Yemen's uncertain transitional period has drawn more supporters to Ansarollah. Many of the formerly powerful parties, now disorganized with an unclear vision, have fallen out of favour with the public, making Ansarollah all the more attractive. [6]
Ansarollah spokesperson Mohamed Abdel Salam stated that his group had spotted messages between UAE and Saleh three months before his death. He told Al-Jazeera that there was communication between Saleh, UAE and a number of other countries such as Russia and Jordan through encrypted messages. [83] The alliance between Saleh and Ansarollah broke down in late 2017, [84] with armed clashes occurring in Sanaa from 28 November. [85] Saleh declared the split in a televised statement on 2 December, calling on his supporters to take back the country [86] and expressed openness to a dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition. [84] On 4 December 2017, Saleh's house in Sanaa was assaulted by fighters of Ansarollah, according to residents. [87] Saleh was killed by Ansarollah on 4 December. [88] [89]
Ansarollah avoid assuming a singular tribal identity. Instead, the group strategically draws support from tribes of the northern Bakil federation, rival to the Hashid federation which had been a traditional ally of the central government. Ansarollah's lack of centralised command structure allows them to generate immense support, as Yemenis from diverse backgrounds have joined their cause. [90]
Membership of the group had between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters as of 2005 [91] and between 2,000 and 10,000 fighters as of 2009. [92] In 2010, the Yemen Post claimed that they had over 100,000 fighters. [93] According to Ansarollah expert Ahmed Al-Bahri, by 2010, Ansarollah had a total of 100,000–120,000 followers, including both armed fighters and unarmed loyalists. [94]
As of 2015, the group is reported to have managed to pick up swaths of new supporters outside their traditional demographics. [69] [95] On 5 February 2016, Iran's PressTV reported that Men of Hamdan, one of Yemen's most powerful tribes, rallied to the north of the capital, Sanaa, vowing to provide support in the form of potential mobilisation for the country's fighters resisting the Yemeni government. In a gathering held in the capital, hundreds of tribesmen from the southern parts pledged union against what they described as a U.S.-Israeli initiative targeting the country, which was being implemented by Saudi Arabia. [96]
Ansarollah follows a mixed ideology with religious, Yemeni nationalist, and big tent populist tenets, imitating Hezbollah. Outsiders have argued that their political views are often vague, contradictory, and many of their slogans do not accurately reflect their aims. Ansarollah have portrayed themselves as national resistance, defending all Yemenis from outside aggression and influences, as champions against corruption, chaos, and extremism, and as representative for the interests of marginalized tribal groups and the Zaidi sect. [10] [11] The group has also exploited the popular discontent over corruption and reduction of government subsidies. [16] According to a February 2015 Newsweek report, Ansarollah are fighting "for things that all Yemenis crave: government accountability, the end to corruption, regular utilities, fair fuel prices, job opportunities for ordinary Yemenis and the end of Western influence". [98] In forging alliances, Ansarollah have been opportunistic, at times allying with countries it later declared its enemy such as the United States. [11]
In general, Ansarollah has centered its belief system on the Zaydi branch of Islam, [10] [lower-alpha 1] a sect of Islam almost exclusively present in Yemen. [99] Zaydis make up about 25 percent of the population, Sunnis make up 75 percent. Zaydi-led governments ruled Yemen for 1,000 years up until 1962. [50] Since its foundation, Ansarollah has often acted as advocate for the Zaydi population of Yemen. [16]
Although they have framed their struggle in religious terms and put great importance in their Zaydi roots, Ansarollah are not an exclusively Zaydi group. In fact, they have outright rejected their portrayal by others as faction which is purportedly only interested in Zaydi-related issues. They have not advocated for the restoration of the old Zaydi imamate, [10] and have allied with and are supported by Sunni Muslims. [10] [46] Ansarollah have asserted that their actions are to fight against the expansion of Salafism in Yemen, [100] and for the defence of their community from discrimination, whereas their opponents have argued that they desire to institute Zaidi religious law, [105] destabilising the government and stirring anti-American sentiment. [106] [107] Hassan al-Homran, a former spokesperson for Ansar Allah, has said that "Ansar Allah supports the establishment of a civil state in Yemen. We want to build a striving modern democracy. Our goals are to fulfil our people's democratic aspirations in keeping with the Arab Spring movement." [108] In an interview with Yemen Times , Hussein al-Bukhari, an Ansarollah senior member, said that Ansarollah's preferable political system is a republic with elections where women can also hold political positions, and that they do not seek to form a cleric-led government after the model of Islamic Republic of Iran, for "we cannot apply this system in Yemen because the followers of the Shafi (Sunni) doctrine are bigger in number than the Zaydis". [56]
As a result of their strong support among the northern tribes, Ansarollah have also been described as tribalist faction in opposition to republicanism. Regardless, they have managed to rally many people outside of their traditional bases to their cause, and became a major nationalist force. [11] When armed conflict for the first time erupted back in 2004 between the Yemeni government and Ansarollah, the President Ali Abdullah Saleh accused Ansarollah and other Islamic opposition parties of trying to overthrow the government and the republican system. However, Ansarollah leaders, for their part, rejected the accusation by saying that they had never rejected the president or the republican system, but were only defending themselves against government attacks on their community. [109] Ansarollah have an ambivalent stance on the possible transformation of Yemen into a federation, or the separation into two fully independent countries to solve the country's crisis. Though not opposed to these plans per se, they have declined any plans which would in their eyes marginalize the northern tribes politically. [10]
Ali Akbar Velayati, International Affairs Advisor to Supreme Iranian Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, stated in October 2014 that "We are hopeful that Ansar-Allah has the same role in Yemen as Hezbollah has in eradicating the terrorists in Lebanon". [110]
The group's slogan reads as following: " God Is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam ". [111] This motto is partially modelled on the motto of revolutionary Iran, which reads "Death to U.S., and death to Israel". [112]
Some Ansarollah supporters stress that their ire for the U.S. and Israel is directed toward the governments of America and Israel. Ali al-Bukhayti, the spokesperson and official media face of Ansarollah, rejected the literal interpretation of the slogan by stating in one of his interviews that "We do not really want death to anyone. The slogan is simply against the interference of those governments [i. e., U.S. and Israel]". [54] In the Arabic Ansarollah-affiliated TV and radio stations they use religious connotations associated with jihad against Israel and the US. [53] They also call Saudi Arabia a U.S. puppet state. [113]
Ansarollah have been accused of expelling or restricting members of the rural Yemeni Jewish community, which has about 50 members. [114] Reports of abuse include Ansarollah supporters bullying or attacking the country's Jews. [115] [9] Ansarollah officials, however, have denied any involvement in the harassment, asserting that under Ansarollah control, Jews in Yemen would be able to live and operate freely as any other Yemeni citizen. "Our problems are with Zionism and the occupation of Palestine, but Jews here have nothing to fear", said Fadl Abu Taleb, a spokesman for Ansarollah. But despite insistence by Ansarollah leaders that the movement is not sectarian, a Yemeni Jewish rabbi has reportedly said that many Jews remain terrified by the movement's slogan. [9] As a result, Yemeni Jews reportedly retain a negative sentiment towards Ansarollah, who they allege have committed persecutions against them. [8] According to Israeli Druze politician Ayoob Kara, Ansarollah militants had given an ultimatum telling Jews to "convert to Islam or leave Yemen". [116]
In March 2016, a UAE based newspaper reported that one of the Yemeni Jews, who emigrated to Israel in 2016, was fighting with Ansarollah. In the same month a Kuwaiti newspaper, al-Watan, reported that a Yemeni Jew named Haroun al-Bouhi was killed in Najran while fighting with Ansarollah against Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti newspaper added that the Yemeni Jews had a good relationship with Ali Abdullah Salah who was at that time allied with Ansarollah and were fighting in different fronts with them. [117] [118]
Ansarollah have been accused of detaining, torturing, arresting, and holding incommunicado Bahá'í Faith members on charges of espionage and apostasy, which are punishable by death. [119] [120] Ansarollah leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi has targeted Bahais in public speeches, and accused the followers of Bahá'í Faith of being "satanic" [121] and agents for the western countries, citing a 2013 fatwa issued by Iran's supreme leader. [119]
During their campaigns against Hadi government, Ansarollah used civil disobedience. Following the Yemeni government's decision in 13 July 2014 to increase fuel prices, [125] Ansarollah leaders succeeded in organizing massive rallies in the capital Sanaa to protest the decision and to demand resignation of the incumbent government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi for "state-corruption". [126] These protests developed into the 2014–2015 phase of the insurgency. Similarly, following 2015 Saudi-led airstrikes against Ansarollah which claimed civilians lives, Yemenis responded to the Abdul-Malik al-Houthi's call and took to streets of the capital, Sanaa, in tens of thousands to voice their anger at the Saudi invasion. [127] [128]
Ansarollah have also held a number of mass gatherings since the revolution. On 24 January 2013, thousands gathered in Dahiyan, Sa'dah and Heziez, just outside Sanaa, to celebrate Mawlid al-Nabi, the birth of Mohammed. A similar event took place on 13 January 2014 at the main sports' stadium in Sanaa. On this occasion, men and women were completely segregated: men filled the open-air stadium and football field in the centre, guided by appointed Ansarollah safety officials wearing bright vests and matching hats; women poured into the adjacent indoor stadium, led inside by security women distinguishable only by their purple sashes and matching hats. The indoor stadium held at least five thousand women—ten times as many attendees as the 2013 gathering. [6]
Ansarollah are said to have "a huge and well-oiled propaganda machine". They have established "a formidable media arm" with the Lebanese Hezbollah's technical support. The format and content of the group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi's televised speeches are said to have been modeled after those of Hezbollah's Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. Following the peaceful youth uprising in 2011, the group launched its official TV channel, Almasirah. "The most impressive part" of Ansarollah propaganda, though, is their media print which includes 25 print and electronic publications. [53]
Ansarollah also utilize radios as an effective means of spreading influence, storming radio stations and confiscating equipment of radio stations that do not adhere to what they're allowed to broadcast by Ansarollah. [129] An Ansarollah fundraising campaign through a radio station affiliated with Ansarollah raised 73.5 million Yemeni rials ($132,000) from Lebanese supporters of Hezbollah. [130]
Another western-based media, "Uprising Today", is regarded as pro-Ansarollah. [131]
In 2009, US Embassy sources have reported that Ansarollah used increasingly more sophisticated tactics and strategies in their conflict with the government as they gained more experience, and that they fought with religious fervor. [132] [133]
Late in 2015, Ansarollah announced the local production of short-range ballistic missile Qaher-1 on Al-Masirah TV. On 19 May 2017 Saudi Arabia intercepted an Ansarollah ballistic missile targeting a deserted area south of the Saudi capital and most populous city Riyadh. Ansarollah militias have captured dozens of tanks and masses of heavy weaponry from the Yemeni Armed Forces. [134] [135] [136]
In June 2019, the Saudi-led coalition stated that Ansarollah had launched 226 ballistic missiles during the insurgency so far. [137]
The 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack targeted the Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia on 14 September 2019. Ansarollah claimed responsibility, though the United States has asserted that Iran was behind the attack. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that "Yemeni people are exercising their legitimate right of defence ... the attacks were a reciprocal response to aggression against Yemen for years." [138]
In course of the Yemeni Civil War, Ansarollah developed tactics to combat their opponents' navies. At first, their anti-ship operations were unsophisticated and limited to rocket-propelled grenades being shot at vessels close to the shore. [139] After seizing power in Sanaa, Ansarollah took control of numerous coastal missile batteries and patrol boats belonging to the Yemeni military. From 2015, these were gradually converted, adapted and modernized to be effectively used in combat. Ansarollah increasingly began to employ specialised anti-ship missile and naval mines, some of them taken from old Yemeni arsenals, others newly contructed or imported from outside supporters such as Iran. [139] [140] Patrol boats were fitted with anti-tank guided missiles, about 30 coast-watcher stations were set up, disguised "spy dhows" were constructed, and the maritime radar of docked ships used to create targeting solutions for attacks. [140] One of the most notable features of Ansarollah's naval arsenal became its remote-controlled drone boats which carry explosives and ram enemy warships. [139] [141] [142] Among these, the self-guiding Shark-33 explosive drone boats originated as patrol boats of the old Yemeni coast guard. [141] In addition, Ansarollah have begun to train combat divers on the Zuqar and Bawardi islands. [140]
Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh had accused Ansarollah of having ties to external backers, in particular the Iranian government. [143] Saleh stated in a New York Times' interview that "The real reason they received unofficial support from Iran was because they repeat same slogan that is raised by Iran death to America, death to Israel". He also said "The Iranian media repeats statements of support for these Houthi elements. They are all trying to take revenge against the USA on Yemeni territories". [52] [144] Tehran has denied allegations of Ansarollah receiving arms support from Iran. [145] Ansarollah in turn accused the Saleh government of being backed by Saudi Arabia and of using Al-Qaeda to repress them. [146] [147] [148] Under the next President Hadi, Gulf Arab states accused Iran of backing Ansarollah financially and militarily, though Iran denied this, and they were themselves backers of President Hadi. [149] Ansarollah denied reception of financial or arm support from Iran. [16] [150] Joost Hiltermann of Foreign Policy wrote that whatever little material support Ansarollah may have received from Iran, the intelligence and military support by US and UK for the Saudi Arabian-led coalition exceed that by many factors. [151]
In April 2015, the United States National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan remarked that "It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over Ansarollah in Yemen". [152] Joost Hiltermann wrote that Iran does not control Ansarollah's decision-making as evidenced by their flat rejection of Iran's demand not to take over Sanaa in 2015. [151] Thomas Juneau, writing in the journal, International Affairs , states that even though Iran's support for Ansarollah has increased since 2014, it remains far too limited to have a significant impact in the balance of power in Yemen. [144]
A December 2009 cable between Sanaa and various intelligence agencies disseminated by WikiLeaks states that US State Dept. analysts believed Ansarollah obtained weapons from the Yemeni black market and corrupt members of the Yemenis Republican Guard. [132] On the edition of 8 April 2015 of PBS Newshour , Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the US knew Iran was providing military support to Ansarollah in Yemen, adding that Washington "is not going to stand by while the region is destabilised". [153]
Phillip Smyth of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy told Business Insider that Iran views Shia groups in the Middle East as "integral elements to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)". Smyth claimed that there is a strong bond between Iran and Ansarollah working to overthrow the government in Yemen. According to Smyth, in many cases Ansarollah leaders go to Iran for ideological and religious education, and Iranian and Hezbollah leaders have been spotted on the ground advising Ansarollah troops, and these Iranian advisers are likely responsible for training Ansarollah to use the type of sophisticated guided missiles fired at the US Navy. [154] For Iran, supporting the revolt in Yemen is "a good way to bleed the Saudis", Iran's regional and ideological rival. Essentially, Iran is backing Ansarollah to fight against a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf States fighting to maintain government control of Yemen. [155] The discord has led some publishers to fear that further confrontations may lead to an all-out Sunni-Shia war. [156]
In 2013, photographs released by the Yemeni government show the United States Navy and Yemen's security forces seized a class of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles not publicly known to have been out of state control. [157]
In April 2016, the U.S. Navy intercepted a large Iranian arms shipment, seizing thousands of weapons, AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The Pentagon stated that the shipment was likely headed to Yemen. [158]
In August 2018, the United Nations had found out the North Korean government had armed Ansarollah via Syria after a meeting between an Ansarollah member and a North Korean government official. [159] [19] [20]
Ansarollah have repeatedly used a drone that is nearly identical to Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company's Ababil-T drone in strikes against Saudi Arabia. [160]
In 2013, an Iranian vessel was seized and discovered to be carrying Katyusha rockets, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, RPG-7s, Iranian-made night vision goggles and artillery systems that track land and navy targets 40 km away. That was en route to Ansarollah. [161]
In March 2017, Qassem Soleimani the head of Iran's Quds force met with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps to look for ways to what was described as "empowering" Ansarollah. Soleimani was quoted as saying, "At this meeting, they agreed to increase the amount of help, through training, arms and financial support." Despite the Iranian government, and Ansarollah both officially denying Iranian support for the group. Brigadier General Ahmad Asiri, the spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition told Reuters that evidence of Iranian support was manifested in Ansarollah use of Kornet anti-tank guided missiles which had never been in use with the Yemeni military or with Ansarollah and that the arrival of Kornet missiles had only come at a later time. [162] In the same month the IRGC had altered the routes used in transporting equipment to Ansarollah by spreading out shipments to smaller vessels in Kuwaiti territorial waters in order to avoid naval patrols in the Gulf of Oman due to sanctions imposed, shipments reportedly included parts of missiles, launchers, and drugs. [163]
In May 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on Iran's IRGC, which was also listed as a designated terrorist organization by the US over its role in providing support for Ansarollah, including help with manufacturing ballistic missiles used in attacks targeting cities and oil fields in Saudi Arabia. [164]
In August 2018, despite previous Iranian denial of military support for Ansarollah, IRGC commander Nasser Shabani was quoted by the Fars News Agency which has been described as the semi-official news agency of the Iranian government as saying, "We told Yemenis to strike two Saudi oil tankers, and they did it," on 7 August 2018. In response to Shabani's account, the IRGC released a statement saying that the quote was a "Western lie" and that Shabani was a retired commander, despite no actual reports of his retirement after 37 years in the IRGC, and media linked to the Iranian government confirming he was still enlisted with the IRGC. [165] Furthermore, while Ansarollah and the Iranian government have previously denied any military affiliation, [166] Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei openly announced his "spiritual" support of the movement in a personal meeting with Ansarollah spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam in Tehran, in the midst of ongoing conflicts in Aden in 2019. [167] [168]
Ansarollah have been accused of violations of international humanitarian law such as using child soldiers, [169] [170] [171] shelling civilian areas, [172] forced evacuations and executions. [132] According to Human Right Watch, Ansarollah intensified their recruitment of children in 2015. The UNICEF mentioned that children with Ansarollah and other armed groups in Yemen comprise up to a third of all fighters in Yemen. [173] Human Rights Watch has further accused Ansarollah forces of using landmines in Yemen's third-largest city of Taizz which has caused many civilian casualties and prevent the return of families displaced by the fighting. [174] HRW has also accused the Houthis of interfering with the work of Yemen's human rights advocates and organizations. [175]
An HRW researcher, quoted in 2009 US embassy report, has downplayed the allegations by the former government of Yemen accusing Ansarollah of using civilians as human shields, by saying that they did not have enough evidence to conclude that Ansarollah have been intentionally using civilians as human shields. [132] [133]
According to the Human Rights Watch, Ansarollah also use hostage taking as a tactic to generate profit. Human Rights Watch documented 16 cases in which Ansarollah authorities held people unlawfully, in large part to extort money from relatives or to exchange them for people held by opposing forces. [176]
The United Nations World Food Programme has accused Ansarollah of diverting food aid and illegally removing food lorries from distribution areas, with rations sold on the open market or given to those not entitled to it. [177] The WFP has also warned that aid could be suspended to areas of Yemen under the control of Ansarollah due to "obstructive and uncooperative" Ansarollah leaders that have hampered the independent selection of beneficiaries. [178] WFP spokesman Herve Verhoosel stated "The continued blocking by some within Ansarollah leadership of the biometric registration ... is undermining an essential process that would allow us to independently verify that food is reaching ... people on the brink of famine". The WFP has warned that "unless progress is made on previous agreements we will have to implement a phased suspension of aid". The Norwegian Refugee Council has stated that they share the WPF frustrations and reiterate to Ansarollah to allow humanitarian agencies to distribute food. [179] [180]
According to the 2009 US Embassy cable leaked by WikiLeaks, Ansarollah have reportedly established courts and prisons in areas they control. AP's reporter, Ahmad al-Haj argued that Ansarollah were winning hearts and minds by providing security in areas long neglected by the Yemeni government while limiting the arbitrary and abusive power of influential sheikhs. According to the Civic Democratic Foundation, Ansarollah help resolve conflicts between tribes and reduce the number of revenge killings in areas they control. The US ambassador believed that the reports that explain Ansarollah role as arbitrating local disputes were likely. [132] [133]
The Ansarollah dominated Supreme Political Council administers the bulk of North Yemen. [181] As of 28 April 2020, they control all of North Yemen except for Marib Governorate. [182] [183] Ansarollah's direct administration includes the following territories:
The Armed Forces of Yemen includes the Yemen Army, Navy, 1st Armored Division, and the Yemeni Air Force (2008). A major reorganization of the armed forces continues. The unified air forces and air defenses are now under one command. The navy is concentrated in Aden. The Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen joined to form the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990.
Ali Abdullah Saleh was a Yemeni politician who served as the first President of Yemen, from Yemeni unification on 22 May 1990 to his resignation on 25 February 2012, following the Yemeni Revolution. Previously, he had served as President of the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, from July 1978 to 22 May 1990, after the assassination of President Ahmad al-Ghashmi.
The Houthi insurgency in Yemen, also known as the Houthi rebellion, Sa'dah War, or Sa'dah conflict, was a military rebellion pitting Zaidi Shia Houthis against the Yemeni military that began in Northern Yemen and has since escalated into a full-scale civil war. The conflict was sparked in 2004 by the government's attempt to arrest Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a Zaidi religious leader of the Houthis and a former parliamentarian on whose head the government had placed a $55,000 bounty. Initially, most of the fighting took place in Sa'dah Governorate in northwestern Yemen, but some of the fighting spread to neighbouring governorates Hajjah, 'Amran, al-Jawf and the Saudi province of Jizan. Since 2014 the nature of the insurgency has changed with the Houthi takeover in Yemen and then into the ongoing Yemeni civil war (2015–present) with a major Saudi-led intervention in Yemen beginning in 2015.
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi is a Yemeni politician and former Field Marshal of the Yemeni Armed Forces. He was Vice President from 1994 to 2012; and the President of Yemen since 27 February 2012. Although Hadi enjoys international recognition, following the 22 January 2015 armed takeover by Houthis, his position as President of Yemen has been rejected by Houthis. Because of ongoing military operations inside Yemen, Hadi currently spends much of his time in exile in Saudi Arabia.
The Cabinet of Yemen refers to the governing body of the internationally recognized Yemen government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi who replaced former President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh on February 25, 2012 as the new President of Yemen. He then selected new cabinet members of the Yemeni Government.
Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar, sometimes spelled "Muhsin", is the Vice President of Yemen. He is a general in the Yemeni Army and was the commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division. He played a leading role in the creation of the General People's Congress.
Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi is a Yemeni politician who serves as the leader of the Zaidi revolution movement Ansar Allah (Houthis). His brothers Yahia and Abdul-Karim are also leaders of the group, as were his late brothers Hussein, Ibrahim, and Abdulkhalik. Abdul-Malik Houthi is the leading figure in a revolution starting in the Sa'dah province in northern Yemen, which has been continuing from 2004 to the present day. The uprising was called the Houthi Rebellion due to his leadership.
The Houthi takeover in Yemen, also known as the September 21 Revolution, or 2014–15 coup d'état, was a gradual armed takeover of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh by the Houthis and their supporters that pushed the Yemeni government from power. It had origins in Houthi-led protests that began the previous month, and escalated when the Houthis stormed the Yemeni capital Sana'a on 21 September 2014, causing the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa, and later the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and his ministers on 22 January 2015 after Houthi forces seized the presidential palace, residence, and key military installations, and the formation of a ruling council by Houthi militants on 6 February 2015.
The following lists events that happened in 2015 in Yemen.
The Yemeni Crisis began with the 2011–12 revolution against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had led Yemen for more than three decades. After Saleh left office in early 2012 as part of a mediated agreement between the Yemeni government and opposition groups, the government led by Saleh's former vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, struggled to unite the fractious political landscape of the country and fend off threats both from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Houthi militants that had been waging a protracted insurgency in the north for years.
The Battle of Sana'a in 2014 marked the advance of the Houthis into Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, and heralded the beginning of the armed takeover of the government that unfolded over the following months. Fighting began on 9 September 2014, when pro-Houthi protesters under the command of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi marched on the cabinet office and were fired upon by security forces, leaving seven dead. The clashes escalated on 18 September, when 40 were killed in an armed confrontation between the Houthis led by military commander Mohammed Ali al-Houthi and supporters of the Sunni hardliner Islah Party when the Houthis tried to seize Yemen TV, and 19 September, with more than 60 killed in clashes between Houthi fighters and the military and police in northern Sana'a. By 21 September, the Houthis captured the government headquarters, marking the fall of Sana'a.
The aftermath of the Houthi takeover in Yemen refers to developments following the Houthis' takeover of the Yemeni capital of Sana'a and dissolution of the government, which eventually led to a civil war and the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen.
The Yemeni Civil War is an ongoing conflict that began in 2015 between two factions: the Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi-led Yemeni government and the Houthi armed movement, along with their supporters and allies. Both claim to constitute the official government of Yemen.
The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, also called the Arab coalition, is an intervention launched by Saudi Arabia in 2015, leading a coalition of nine countries from West Asia and Africa, in response to calls from the internationally recognized pro-Saudi president of Yemen Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi for military support after he was ousted by the Houthi movement due to economic and political grievances, and fled to Saudi Arabia.
A Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border conflict between Saudi Arabian troops and Yemeni Houthi insurgents has been taking place, in the southern regions of Asir, Jizan, and Najran, since the onset of the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen in 2015.
The following is a timeline of the Second Yemeni Civil War, which began in March 2015.
The Battle of Sanaa (2017) was fought between forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis in the Yemeni capital of Sana'a. Both sides were allied during the 2014–15 Houthi takeover of the government but the alliance ended when Saleh decided to break ranks with the Houthis and call for dialogue with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who are leading a military intervention in Yemen. Fighting then broke out between the Houthis and forces loyal to Saleh as the Saudi-led coalition began bombing Houthi areas, ultimately resulting in Saleh's death and a Houthi victory.
The Ma'rib campaign is a campaign for control of the Ma'rib Governorate of Yemen, between the Houthis and Yemen Army units loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh on one side, and militiamen and Yemen Army units loyal to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on the other side.
North Korea's military support for Houthi rebels in Yemen is the latest manifestation of its support for anti-American forces.
The summary also accuses North Korea of violating a UN arms embargo and supplying small arms, light weapons and other military equipment to Libya, Sudan, and Houthi rebels in Yemen, through foreign intermediaries.
The report said that experts were investigating efforts by the North Korean Ministry of Military Equipment and Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to supply conventional arms and ballistic missiles to Yemen’s Houthi group.
Just how neutral is Oman in Yemen war?"
Yemen War and Qatar Crisis Challenge Oman’s Neutrality
Oman is a mediator in Yemen. Can it play the same role in Qatar?