Chinese salami slicing theory

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China's outposts in the disputed South China Sea are often cited as examples of a "salami slicing" tactic. Spratly with flags.jpg
China's outposts in the disputed South China Sea are often cited as examples of a "salami slicing" tactic.

China's salami slicing refers to a theory that China uses small provocations, none of which would constitute a casus belli by itself, but cumulatively produce a much larger action or result in China's favor which would have been difficult or unlawful to perform all at once. In 1996, a United States Institute of Peace report on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea wrote, "[…] analysts point to Chinese "salami tactics," in which China is said to test the other claimants through aggressive actions, then back off when it meets significant resistance." [1] The term "salami slice strategy" has been used to describe policies that incrementally improve China's foreign policy position. [2] [3] Advocates of the term have cited examples such as the alleged String of Pearls strategy in the Indian Ocean, as manifestations of the strategy. [4] [5] The term has also been compared to cabbage tactics, which involve swarming a maritime target with large numbers of boats. [6] [7]

Contents

Strategy

Modus operandi

The theory is often described as covering many domains, including combining soft and hard power for coercive diplomacy, territorial claims on neighboring nations, economic coercion through so-called Debt-trap diplomacy, technological acquisition through lawful and unlawful means, and lobbying and influence operations in foreign nations and in international organisations like the World Health Organization, with a view to change their organizational culture to one that is advantageous to China. Salami Slicing has been compared to 5th and 6th Generation warfare. [8] [9]

According to Brahma Chellaney, China slices very thinly in a "disaggregating" manner by camouflaging offense as defense, which eventually leads cumulatively to large strategic gains and advantage for China. This throws its targets off balance by undercutting targets' deterrence, and presenting the targets a Hobson’s choice: either silently suffering China's salami slicing, or risking an expensive and dangerous war with China. This strategy also functions to place the blame and burden of starting the war on the targets. [10] According to Chellaney, "salami slicing" rather than overt aggression is China's favored strategy to gain strategic advantage through "steady progression of small actions, none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China’s favor. China’s strategy aims to seriously limit the options of the targeted countries by confounding their deterrence plans and making it difficult for them to devise proportionate or effective counteractions." [10]

Benefits accrued by China

Chellaney has claimed that China uses salami slicing tactics to control the Indian-claimed Kashmiri territory of Aksai Chin, during the 1950s and 1960s, and to acquire the Paracel Islands in 1974 with marine area of 15,000 square kilometres, Johnson Reef in 1988 from Philippines and Vietnam, Mischief Reef in 1995 from Philippines and Taiwan, and Scarborough Shoal in 2012 from Philippines. [10] [11]

Dimensions of Chinese salami slicing

Proponents of the salami slicing strategy allege that China has used techniques including exercise of soft and hard power, territorial claims, economic inducements, and foreign intelligence activities to advance Chinese national interests.

Power and control

China is alleged by Indian sources to use both soft and hard power including "coercive diplomacy, cartographic aggression, saber-rattling, gunboat diplomacy, population-control measures, loans, project funding leading to debt traps, educational programs and incentives". India claims that Chinese activities in Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, as well as supporting friendly states in North Korea and Pakistan constitute examples of the use of hard and soft power. [8]

Territorial claims

China's claimed nine-dash line in red, part of the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. South China Sea claims map.jpg
China's claimed nine-dash line in red, part of the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Indian authors accuse China of using piecemeal territorial claims to expand its territory, and cite examples such as the annexation of Tibet and the incorporation of Xinjiang into the PRC as examples of territorial expansionism. Chellaney has further claimed that the incorporation of Aksai Chin into China is an example of territorial expansionism. [12] [13] [10] China denies these claims, noting that Tibet and Xinjiang was a component of the Qing Dynasty, and the succeeding Republic of China, and further, that both territories were internationally recognized as provinces of China. [14]

South China Sea

Indian sources allege that China uses territorial claims in South China Sea to expand its Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) at the expense of other nations EEZ through its Nine-dash line claims, and that China's defense of these claims by installing and deploying military infrastructure constitute territorial expansionism. China deployed its paramilitary agencies, China Maritime Safety Administration, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command and State Oceanic Administration to advance its claims in the region. [10]

Debt diplomacy

Critics have claimed that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has pushed Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia and other nations have forced these countries, unable to pay their debts, to handover their infrastructure and resources to China. [15] According to Chellaney, this "clearly part of China's geostrategic vision". [16] China's overseas development policy has been called debt-trap diplomacy because once indebted economies fail to service their loans, they are said to be pressured to support China's geostrategic interests. [17] [18]

Sovereignty slicing

Some governments have accused the Belt and Road Initiative of being "neocolonial" due to what they allege is China's practice of debt trap diplomacy to fund the initiative's infrastructure projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. [19] China contends that the initiative has provided markets for commodities, improved prices of resources and thereby reduced inequalities in exchange, improved infrastructure, created employment, stimulated industrialization, and expanded technology transfer, thereby benefiting host countries. [20]

Allegations of technology theft

U.S. officials announced 23 criminal charges (Financial Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, Theft of Trade Secret Technology and Sanctions Violations, etc.) against Chinese technology company Huawei. U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, FBI Director Christopher Wray Announces 23 Criminal Charges Against China's Huawei & Wanzhou Meng.jpg
U.S. officials announced 23 criminal charges (Financial Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, Theft of Trade Secret Technology and Sanctions Violations, etc.) against Chinese technology company Huawei.

China is accused by critics of the theft of "cutting-edge technology from global leaders in diverse fields". China is said to have begun a widespread effort to acquire U.S. military technology and classified information and the trade secrets of U.S. companies. [21] [22] China is accused of stealing trade secrets and technology, often from companies in the United States, to help support its long-term military and commercial development. [23] China has been accused of using a number of methods to obtain U.S. technology, using lawful methods, as well as covert methods, such as espionage, leveraging a network of scientific, academic and business contacts. [24]

The German Federal Ministry of the Interior estimates that Chinese economic espionage could be costing Germany between 20 and 50 billion euros annually. Spies are reportedly targeting mid- and small-scale companies that do not have as strong security regimens as larger corporations. [25]

Lobbying and influence operations

China is accused of nominating persons to various organizations with the view of influencing the organizational culture and values to the advantage of China's national interests. Examples cited include the promotion of Chinese officials to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, which critics have claimed advances Chinese national interests. [26] The Confucius Institutes have also been claimed to advance Chinese state interests. [27] China is alleged to have attempted foreign electoral intervention in the domestic political elections of other nations, including in the United States, although these claims have not been supported by evidence., [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] China has been accused of interference in elections on Taiwan, [33] [34] [35] and has been accused of influencing Australian members of Parliament. [36] [37] [38]

Relations between China and Australia deteriorated after 2018 due to growing concerns of Chinese political influence in various sectors of Australian society including in the Government, universities and media as well as China's stance on the South China Sea dispute. [39] [40] Consequently, Australian Coalition Government announced plans to ban foreign donations to Australian political parties and activist groups. [41] Australia has empowered the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Attorney-General’s Department to target the China-linked entities and people under new legislation to combat alleged Chinese influence operations, [42] including the alleged deployment of the United Front Work Department [42] The United Work Front department is accused of lobbying policy makers outside of China to enact pro-China policies [43] targeting people or entities that are outside the Party proper, especially in the overseas Chinese community, who hold social, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups. [44] [45] Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to Chinese Communist Party interests and potential critics remain divided. [46] [47] [48]

In 2005, a pair of Chinese dissidents claimed that China may have up to 1,000 intelligence agents in Canada. [49] [50] The head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Richard Fadden in a television interview implied that various Canadian politicians at provincial and municipal levels had ties to Chinese intelligence, a statement which he withdrew few days later. [51]

Ideological operations

China officially promotes state atheism and persecutes people with spiritual or religious beliefs. [52] [53] [54] Antireligious campaigns began in 1949, after the Chinese Communist Revolution, and continue today in Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and other religious communities. [55] State campaigns against religion have escalated since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. [56] State repression and re-education in Xinjiang has been cited as examples of ideological "re-education", with critics comparing it to the re-education programs of the Maoist period. [57]

Usage of the phrase

Critique

Crispin Rovere, while agreeing that China's strategy is widely accepted as salami slicing approach, also counters that China's strategy is based on the ancient Chinese game of "Go" in which enemy territory is gradually surrounded until enemy is overpowered, whereas American strategy is based on the game of poker played with straight face in an ambiguous situation, and Russian strategy is based on the game of chess which is similar to salami slicing in terms of gaining strategic advantage through a series of smaller set of actions. [3]

In 2019, only in the limited context of Sino-Indian border dispute according to retired Indian Lieutenant General H. S. Panag, the phrase 'salami slicing' that is used "by military scholars as well as Army Chief General Bipin Rawat in relation to the Line of Actual Control — is a misnomer". General Panag argues that whatever territory China needed to annex, was done prior to 1962 and after 1962, while there has been territorial claims by China, this is done more to "embarrass" rather than a form of "permanent salami slicing". [66]

Linda Jakobson has argued that rather than salami slicing based territorial expansion and decision making, "China's decision-making can be explained by bureaucratic competition between China's various maritime agencies." [67] [68] Bonnie S. Glaser argues against this view point, saying "bureaucratic competition among numerous maritime actors [...] is probably not the biggest source of instability. Rather, China's determination to advance its sovereignty claims and expand its control over the South China Sea is the primary challenge." [69]

See also

Related Research Articles

Salami slicing is a series of many small actions, often performed by clandestine means, that as an accumulated whole produces a much larger action or result that would be difficult or unlawful to perform all at once. The term is typically used pejoratively. An example of salami slicing, also known as penny shaving, is the fraudulent practice of stealing money repeatedly in extremely small quantities, usually by taking advantage of rounding to the nearest cent in financial transactions. It would be done by always rounding down, and putting the fractions of a cent into another account. The idea is to make the change small enough that any single transaction will go undetected. Coin-shaving apps are a legal example of this same logic. These apps automatically set aside small amounts of value from every financial transaction for subsequent investment or charity.

Exclusive economic zone Adjacent sea zone in which a state has special rights

An exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, is an area of the sea in which a sovereign state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind. It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles (nmi) from the coast of the state in question. It is also referred to as a maritime continental margin and, in colloquial usage, may include the continental shelf. The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit. The difference between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a "sovereign right" which refers to the coastal state's rights below the surface of the sea. The surface waters, as can be seen in the map, are international waters.

China–India relations Bilateral diplomatic relations

China–India relations, also called Sino-Indian relations or Indo–Chinese relations, refers to the bilateral relationship between China and India. China and India had historically peaceful relations for thousands of years of recorded history. But the tone of the relationship has varied in modern time, especially after the rule of Communist Party in China; the two nations have sought economic cooperation with each other, while frequent border disputes and economic nationalism in both countries are a major point of contention. The modern relationship began in 1950 when India was among the first countries to end formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and recognise the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of Mainland China. China and India are two of the major regional powers in Asia, and are the two most populous countries and among the fastest growing major economies in the world. Growth in diplomatic and economic influence has increased the significance of their bilateral relationship.

Chinese expansionism Aspect of Chinese history

Over the last four thousand years, Chinese Imperialism has been a central feature of the history of East Asia. Since the recovery of Chinese strength in the late 20th century, the issues involved have been of concern to China's neighbors.

Salami tactics, also known as the salami-slice strategy or salami attacks, is a divide and conquer process of threats and alliances used to overcome opposition. With it, an aggressor can influence and eventually dominate a landscape, typically political, piece by piece. In this fashion, the opposition is eliminated "slice by slice" until it realizes, usually too late, that it is virtually gone in its entirety. In some cases it includes the creation of several factions within the opposing political party and then dismantling that party from the inside, without causing the 'sliced' sides to protest. Salami tactics are most likely to succeed when the perpetrators keep their true long-term motives hidden and maintain a posture of cooperativeness and helpfulness while engaged in the intended gradual subversion.

Freedom of navigation (FON) is a principle of customary international law that ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall not suffer interference from other states, apart from the exceptions provided for in international law. In the realm of international law, it has been defined as “freedom of movement for vessels, freedom to enter ports and to make use of plant and docks, to load and unload goods and to transport goods and passengers". This right is now also codified as Article 87(1)a of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Not all UN member states have ratified the convention; notably, the United States has not signed nor ratified the convention. However, the § United States enforces the practice; see below.

The String of Pearls is a geopolitical hypothesis proposed by United States political researchers in 2004. The term refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centres in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia.

Bipin Rawat Current Chief of Defence Staff of India

General Bipin Rawat, is a four star general of the Indian Army. He is the first and current Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of India. On 30 December 2019, he was appointed as the first CDS of India and assumed office from 1 January 2020. Prior to taking over as the CDS, he served as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as well as 26th Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army.

Nine-dash line Map delineating Chinese territorial claims to South China Sea waters

The nine-dash line—at various times also referred to as the ten-dash line and the eleven-dash line—refers to the ill-defined demarcation line used by the People's Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), for their claims of the major part of the South China Sea. The contested area in the South China Sea includes the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and various other areas including Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. The claim encompasses the area of Chinese land reclamation known as the "Great Wall of Sand". Despite having made the vague claim public in 1947, neither the PRC nor the ROC has filed a formal and specifically defined claim to the area.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea Disputes over maritime and island sovereignty

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims by several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Strategic dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the United States

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a strategic dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India that is maintained by talks between member countries. The dialogue was initiated in 2007 by the then Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, with the support of the then Vice President of USA Dick Cheney, the then Prime Minister of Australia John Howard and the then Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh. The dialogue was paralleled by joint military exercises of an unprecedented scale, titled Exercise Malabar. The diplomatic and military arrangement was widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power, and the Chinese government responded to the Quadrilateral dialogue by issuing formal diplomatic protests to its members.

First island chain

The first island chain refers to the first chain of major archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast. It is principally composed of the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan (Formosa), the northern Philippines, and Borneo, hence extending all the way from the Kamchatka Peninsula in the northeast to the Malay Peninsula in the southwest. Some definitions of the first island chain anchor the northern end on the Russian Far East coast north of Sakhalin Island, with Sakhalin Island being the first link in the chain. However, others consider the Aleutians as the farthest north-eastern first link in the chain. The first island chain forms one of three island chain doctrines within the Island Chain Strategy in US foreign policy.

Air Defense Identification Zone (East China Sea)

The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is an Air Defense Identification Zone covering most of the East China Sea where the People's Republic of China announced that it was introducing new air traffic restrictions in November 2013. The area consists of the airspace from about, and including, the Japanese controlled Senkaku Islands north to South Korean-claimed Socotra Rock. About half of the area overlaps with a Japanese ADIZ, while also overlapping to a small extent with the South Korean and Taiwanese ADIZ. When introduced the Chinese initiative drew criticism as the ADIZ overlapped with the ADIZ of other countries, imposed requirements on both civilian and military aircraft regardless of destination, and included contested maritime areas

Belt and Road Initiative Chinese-funded global development strategy and framework

The Belt and Road Initiative, known in Chinese and formerly in English as One Belt One Road or OBOR for short, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in nearly 70 countries and international organizations. It is considered a centerpiece of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary and Chinese leader Xi Jinping's foreign policy, who originally announced the strategy as the "Silk Road Economic Belt" during an official visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013.

Debt-trap diplomacy is a theory that describes a powerful lending country or institution seeking to saddle a borrowing nation with enormous debt so as to increase its leverage over it. Debt-trap diplomacy was associated with Indian academic Brahma Chellaney, who promoted the term in early 2017. It has been used contentiously in relation to Chinese state-backed lending policies to other countries.

The People's Republic of China is a Communist state that came to power in 1949 after a civil war. It became a great power in the 1960s and today has the world's largest population, second largest GDP and the largest economy in the world by PPP. China is now considered an emerging global superpower. The main institutions of foreign policy are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and the United Front Work Department.

Brahma Chellaney Indian geostrategist and writer

Brahma Chellaney is a New Delhi-based geostrategist and author who won the Asia Society's 2012 Bernard Schwartz Book Award. He is a columnist for Project Syndicate. He "commands respect", as one magazine put it, for his independent scholarship and for speaking truth to power. He received the $20,000 Bernard Schwartz Award from the New York-based Asia Society for his work, Water: Asia's New Battleground, published by Georgetown University Press.

The Five Fingers of Tibet is a Chinese foreign policy attributed to Mao Zedong that considers Tibet to be China's right hand palm, with five fingers on its periphery: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Arunachal Pradesh, and that it is China's responsibility to "liberate" these regions. It was never discussed in official Chinese public statements, but external concerns have been raised over its possible continued existence or revival. An article in a provincial mouthpiece magazine of the Chinese Communist Party verified the existence of this policy in the aftermath of the 2017 China–India border standoff.

The People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia is the government funded maritime militia of China. For reportedly operating in the South China Sea without clear identification, they are sometimes referred to as the "little blue men", a term coined by Andrew S. Erickson of the Naval War College in reference to Russia's "little green men" during the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Cabbage tactics is a militarily swarming and overwhelming tactic of seizing control of islands. It is a tactic to overwhelm and seize control of an island by surrounding and wrapping the island in successive layers of Chinese naval ships, China Coast Guard ships and fishing boats and cut-off the island from outside support.

References

Notelist

    Citations

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