Generations of warfare

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A British Napoleonic Wars reenactor watching modern military helicopters fly over his camp, exemplifying the vast differences in each generation of warfare Time out of Mind - geograph.org.uk - 1409506.jpg
A British Napoleonic Wars reenactor watching modern military helicopters fly over his camp, exemplifying the vast differences in each generation of warfare

In military history, the term "generations of warfare" refers to the concept of five "generations" in warfare, with each generation having different tactics, strategies, and technologies. The generations of warfare are sometimes dubbed as "4GW" or "5GW". The term originated in 1989 to describe "the changing face of war" over time, initially only referring to the emergence of the fourth generation, but eventually seeing the addition of a fifth generation. [1] [2]

Contents

There are five generations of warfare:

First generation

A Prussian Leibgarde battalion using line and column formation tactics during the Seven Years' War Erstes pr. Bataillon Leibgarde in Schlacht bei Kollin.jpg
A Prussian Leibgarde battalion using line and column formation tactics during the Seven Years' War

In 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years' War, the Treaty of Westphalia gave a practical sovereignty to the German states, which until then were semi-independent components of the Holy Roman Empire. This more firmly established the sovereignty of the nation state, which meant, among other things, that governments would have exclusive rights to organize and maintain their own militaries. Before this time, many armies and nations were controlled by religious orders and many wars were fought in melee combat, or subversively through bribery and assassination. The first generation of modern warfare was intended to create a straightforward and orderly means of waging war. [3]

Alternatively, it has been argued that the Peace of Westphalia did not solidify the power of the nation state, but that the Thirty Years' War itself ushered in an era of large-scale combat that was simply too costly for smaller mercenary groups to carry out on their own. According to this theory, smaller groups chose to leave mass combatand the expenses associated with itin the domain of the nation-state. [4]

The increased accuracy and speed of the rifled musket and the breech-loader marks the end of first generation warfare; the concept of vast lines of soldiers meeting face to face became impractical due to the heavy casualties that could be sustained. Because these technologies were adopted gradually throughout the Americas and Europe, the exact end of the first generation of modern warfare depends on the region, but all world powers had moved on by the latter half of the 19th century. [3]

In order to create a more controlled environment for warfare, a military culture was developed that, in many ways, is still visible in the armed forces of today. Specially crafted uniforms set soldiers apart from the general populace.

An elaborate structure of rank was developed to better organize men into units. Rules for military drills were perfected, allowing line and column maneuvers to be executed with more precision, and to increase the rate of fire in battle.

Control of media and information released during the war and the production of counterfeit money in order to devaluate the enemy's economy were used for the first time during the Napoleonic Wars.

Examples

Second generation

German infantry and machine gun units advancing during World War I German machine gun detachment creeping into action, May 7, 1915 (30982753741).jpg
German infantry and machine gun units advancing during World War I

In the 19th century, the invention of the breech-loading rifled musket meant longer range, greater accuracy, and faster rate of fire. Marching ranks of men straight into a barrage of fire from such weapons would cause tremendous rates of casualties, so a new strategy was developed.

Second generation warfare still maintained lines of battle but focused more on the use of technology to allow smaller units of men to maneuver separately. These smaller units allowed for faster advances, less concentrated casualties, and the ability to use cover and concealment to advantage. [3] To some degree, these concepts have remained in use even as the next generations have arisen, so the end of the second generation is not as clearly defined as that of the first. The development of the blitzkrieg highlighted some of the flaws of static firing positions and slow-moving infantry, so this can be considered the beginning of the end for the second generation, at least as the dominant force in military strategy.

The contributions of the second generation were responses to technological development. The second generation saw the rise of trench warfare, artillery support, more advanced reconnaissance techniques, extensive use of camouflage uniforms, radio communications, and fireteam maneuvers.

Examples

Third generation

Tanks advancing alongside armored vehicles and mechanized forces during the Gulf War A Challenger 1 tank during the Gulf War.JPEG
Tanks advancing alongside armored vehicles and mechanized forces during the Gulf War

The use of blitzkrieg during the German invasion of France first demonstrated the power of speed and maneuverability over static artillery positions and trench defenses. Through the use of tanks, mechanized infantry, and close air support, the Germans were able to quickly break through linear defenses and capture the rear.

The emphasis on maneuvering and speed to bypass enemy engagement remains a common strategy throughout the world, and collapsing an enemy's defenses by striking at deeper targets is—in a somewhat different way—a major strategy in fourth generation warfare. [3]

The contributions of the third generation were based on the concept of overcoming technological disadvantage through the use of clever strategy. As linear fighting came to an end, new ways of moving faster began to appear.

The emphasis on mobility moved from heavy armor to greater speed, the development of the helicopter allowed insertions in hostile territory, and advanced missile technology allowed forces to bypass enemy defenses and strike at targets from great distances. The speed inherent in these methods necessitated a greater degree of independence allowed to the units on the front lines.

Greater trust needed to be placed in junior officers commanding sub-units by higher-ranking officers—a belief that they could adequately achieve their objectives without micromanagement from higher ranking commanders in command headquarters.

Smaller units were allowed greater decision flexibility to deal with changing situations on the ground, rather than have decisions made for them by commanders who were distant from the front. This began to break down the regimented culture of order that was so important in previous theoretical eras of military command and control.

Examples

Fourth generation

Guerillas in the Philippines in 1999 Maguindanao guerillas, 1999.jpg
Guerillas in the Philippines in 1999

The term "fourth-generation warfare" was first used in 1989 by a team of American analysts, including William S. Lind, to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. In terms of generational modern warfare, the fourth generation signifies the nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times. [5]

The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent non-state actor. Classical examples, such as the slave uprising under Spartacus or the mercenary uprising that occurred in Carthage after the First Punic War, predate the modern concept of warfare and are examples of this type of conflict.

Fourth generation warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements:

Fourth-generation warfare theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "nothing more than repackaging of the traditional clash between the non-state insurgent and the soldiers of a nation-state." [6]

Examples

Fifth generation

An office belonging to Russian web brigades captured by Ukrainian forces during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine Pro-Russian bot farm in Ukraine (2022).jpg
An office belonging to Russian web brigades captured by Ukrainian forces during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Fifth-generation warfare is warfare that is conducted primarily through non-kinetic military action, such as social engineering, misinformation, cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems. Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception". [7]

There is no widely agreed upon definition of fifth-generation warfare, [8] and it has been rejected by some scholars, including William S. Lind, who was one of the original theorists of fourth-generation warfare. [9]

The term 'fifth-generation warfare' was first used in 2003 by Robert Steele. The following year, Lind criticised the concept, arguing that the fourth generation had yet to fully materialize. [10]

In 2008, the term was used by Terry Terriff, [11] who presented the 2003 ricin letters as a potential example, but stated that he was not entirely sure if it was a fifth-generation attack, claiming "we may not recognize it as it resolves around us. Or we might look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth generation." [11] Terriff argued that while fifth-generation warfare allows "super-empowered individuals" to make political statements through terrorism, they lack the political power to actually have their demands met. [12]

L.C. Rees described the nature of fifth generation warfare as difficult to define in itself, alluding to the third law of science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke – "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." [13]

Alex P. Schmid said that fifth-generation warfare is typified by its "omnipresent battlefield", and the fact that people engaged in it do not necessarily use military force, instead employing a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic force. [14] In the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare by colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People's Liberation Army, they noted that in the years since the 1991 Gulf War, conventional military violence had decreased, which correlated to an increase in "“political, economic, and technological violence”, which they argued could be more devastating than a conventional war. [15] On the contrary, Thomas P. M. Barnett, believes that the effectiveness of fifth-generational warfare is exaggerated, as terrorism conducted by individuals, such as Timothy McVeigh or Ted Kaczynski, lacks the support of more organized movements. This was seconded by George Michael, who noted that in the United States, gang violence was responsible for far more deaths than lone wolf terrorist attacks. [16]

Related Research Articles

<i>Blitzkrieg</i> Military strategy

Blitzkrieg or Bewegungskrieg is a word used to describe a combined arms surprise attack using a rapid, overwhelming force concentration that may consist of armored and motorized or mechanized infantry formations; together with artillery, air assault, and close air support; with intent to break through the opponent's lines of defense, dislocate the defenders, unbalance the enemies by making it difficult to respond to the continuously changing front, and defeat them in a decisive Vernichtungsschlacht: a battle of annihilation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Guerrilla warfare</span> Form of irregular warfare

Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional warfare in which small groups of irregular military, such as rebels, partisans, paramilitary personnel or armed civilians including recruited children, use ambushes, sabotage, terrorism, raids, petty warfare or hit-and-run tactics in a rebellion, in a violent conflict, in a war or in a civil war to fight against regular military, police or rival insurgent forces.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tank</span> Tracked heavy armoured fighting vehicle

A tank is an armoured fighting vehicle intended as a primary offensive weapon in front-line ground combat. Tank designs are a balance of heavy firepower, strong armour, and battlefield mobility provided by tracks and a powerful engine; their main armament is often mounted within a turret. They are a mainstay of modern 20th and 21st century ground forces and a key part of combined arms combat.

Military tactics encompasses the art of organizing and employing fighting forces on or near the battlefield. They involve the application of four battlefield functions which are closely related – kinetic or firepower, mobility, protection or security, and shock action. Tactics are a separate function from command and control and logistics. In contemporary military science, tactics are the lowest of three levels of warfighting, the higher levels being the strategic and operational levels. Throughout history, there has been a shifting balance between the four tactical functions, generally based on the application of military technology, which has led to one or more of the tactical functions being dominant for a period of time, usually accompanied by the dominance of an associated fighting arm deployed on the battlefield, such as infantry, artillery, cavalry or tanks.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Combined arms</span> Approach to warfare

Combined arms is an approach to warfare that seeks to integrate different combat arms of a military to achieve mutually complementary effects—for example, using infantry and armour in an urban environment in which each supports the other.

Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. A military doctrine outlines what military means should be used, how forces should be structured, where forces should be deployed, and the modes of cooperation between types of forces. "Joint doctrine" refers to the doctrines shared and aligned by multinational forces or joint service operations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">John Boyd (military strategist)</span> American fighter pilot and strategist (1927–1997)

John Richard Boyd was a United States Air Force fighter pilot and Pentagon consultant during the second half of the 20th century. His theories have been highly influential in military, business, and litigation strategies and planning.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Invasion</span> Type of military offensive where armed forces of one geopolitical entity forcibly enter another

An invasion is a military offensive of combatants of one geopolitical entity, usually in large numbers, entering territory controlled by another similar entity. Generally, invasions have objectives of conquering, liberating or reestablishing control or authority over a territory; forcing the partition of a country; altering the established government or gaining concessions from said government; or a combination thereof. An invasion can be the cause of a war, be a part of a larger strategy to end a war, or it can constitute an entire war in itself. Due to the large scale of the operations associated with invasions, they are usually strategic in planning and execution. Not every military offense with the goal to capture territory or remove a government is an invasion.

AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces. AirLand Battle replaced 1976's "Active Defense" doctrine, and was itself replaced by "Full Spectrum Operations" in 2001.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Maneuver warfare</span> Military strategy focused on movement

Maneuver warfare, or manoeuvre warfare, is a military strategy which emphasizes movement, initiative and surprise to achieve a position of advantage. Maneuver seeks to inflict losses indirectly by envelopment, encirclement and disruption, while minimizing the need to engage in frontal combat. In contrast to attrition warfare where strength tends to be applied against strength, maneuver warfare attempts to apply strength against weakness in order to accomplish the mission.

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is conflict characterized by a blurring of the distinction between war and politics, and of the distinction between combatants and civilians.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Armoured warfare</span> Use of armored fighting vehicles in war

Armoured warfare or armored warfare, is the use of armoured fighting vehicles in modern warfare. It is a major component of modern methods of war. The premise of armoured warfare rests on the ability of troops to penetrate conventional defensive lines through use of manoeuvre by armoured units.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Modern warfare</span> Contemporary warfare as contrasted with previous methods

Modern warfare is warfare that diverges notably from previous military concepts, methods, and technology, emphasizing how combatants must modernize to preserve their battle worthiness. As such, it is an evolving subject, seen differently in different times and places. In its narrowest sense, it is merely a synonym for contemporary warfare.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Industrial warfare</span> Mass produced weapons on a grand scale

Industrial warfare is a period in the history of warfare ranging roughly from the early 19th century and the start of the Industrial Revolution to the beginning of the Atomic Age, which saw the rise of nation-states, capable of creating and equipping large armies, navies, and air forces, through the process of industrialization.

Battlespace or battle-space is a term used to signify a military strategy which integrates multiple armed forces for the military theatre of operations, including air, information, land, sea, cyber and outer space to achieve military goals. It includes the environment, timeframe and other factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes enemy and friendly armed forces, infrastructure, weather, terrain, and the electromagnetic spectrum within the operational areas and areas of interest.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">German Army (1935–1945)</span> 1935–1945 land warfare branch of the German military

The German Army was the land forces component of the Wehrmacht, the regular armed forces of Nazi Germany, from 1935 until it effectively ceased to exist in 1945 and then was formally dissolved in August 1946. During World War II, a total of about 13.6 million soldiers served in the German Army. Army personnel were made up of volunteers and conscripts.

Hybrid warfare is a theory of military strategy, first proposed by Frank Hoffman, which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare, regime change, and foreign electoral intervention. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. The concept of hybrid warfare has been criticized by a number of academics and practitioners due to its alleged vagueness, its disputed constitutive elements, and its alleged historical distortions.

Patterns of Conflict was a presentation by Colonel John Boyd outlining his theories on modern combat and how the key to success was to upset the enemy's "observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop", or OODA loop. Patterns developed the idea of a "counter-blitz", a blitzkrieg in reverse, with numerous attacks followed by withdrawals to the rear. The aim was to confuse the enemy by presenting no apparent strategy, reveal the enemy's intentions through the strength of the response, and present a misleading picture of the defender's own actions in order to disrupt the attacker's future plan of action.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fifth-generation warfare</span> Warfare conducted without the use of lethal force

Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) is warfare that is conducted primarily through non-kinetic military action, such as social engineering, misinformation, cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems. Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception". There is no widely agreed upon definition of fifth-generation warfare, and it has been rejected by some scholars, including William S. Lind, who was one of the original theorists of fourth-generation warfare.

References

  1. Defense Technical Information Center (2007-06-01). DTIC ADA521639: Military Review. Volume 87, Number 3, May-June 2007.
  2. 1 2 Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 20.
  3. 1 2 3 4 Lind, William S. (January 15, 2004), "Understanding Fourth Generation War", antiwar.com , retrieved February 7, 2010
  4. Echevarria, Antulio J. II (November 2005). Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (PDF). United States Army War College. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-04-22. Retrieved 2014-04-26.{{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  5. Lind, William S.; Nightengale, Keith; Schmitt, John F.; Sutton, Joseph W.; Wilson, Gary I. (October 1989), "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", Marine Corps Gazette, pp. 22–26
  6. On Fourth Generation Warfare, The Mackenzie Institute
  7. Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 20.
  8. Michael, George (2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance. Vanderbilt University Press. p. 156.
  9. Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 125.
  10. Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 209.
  11. 1 2 Terriff, Terry (2008). Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. Routledge. p. 42. ISBN   9780415413572.
  12. Terriff, Terry (2008). Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. Routledge. p. 50. ISBN   9780415413572.
  13. Abbott, Daniel (2010). The Handbook of Fifth-Generation Warfare. Nimble Books. p. 15.
  14. Schmid, Alex (2011). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. Routledge. p. 167.
  15. Michael, George (2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance. Vanderbilt University Press. p. 157.
  16. Michael, George (2012). Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance. Vanderbilt University Press. p. 166.