| Battle of Zinjibar معركة زنجبار | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen, the Yemeni revolution and the Yemeni crisis | |||||||
| A building in Zinjibar with Ansar al-Sharia's seal | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
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| Strength | |||||||
| June 2011: 2,000 soldiers (25th Mechanized Brigade) [5] May 2012: 20,000 soldiers [6] | May 2011: 300 fighters [7] January 2012: 700–1,000 fighters [8] May 2012: 2,000 fighters [9] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1,000+ soldiers killed [10] | 600+ fighters killed [10] | ||||||
| 60,842 displaced | |||||||
| |||||||
The Battle of Zinjibar was a battle between forces loyal to Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and Islamist militant forces, possibly including elements of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for control of the town of Zinjibar and its surroundings as part of the wider insurgency in the self-declared Al-Qaeda Emirate in Yemen. Many of the Islamist forces operating in Abyan province refer to themselves as Ansar al-Sharia ("Partisans of Sharia").
Beginning in January 2011, the Yemeni revolution caused widespread unrest across Yemen as protestors demanded the resignation of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. [11] After numerous high-ranking army generals defected to the opposition in late March, threats of a conflict between the pro and anti-Saleh factions of the military brew. Saleh redeployed most army personnel and US-trained counterterrorism forces stationed in other locations, including in southern Yemen, to the capital of Sanaa and other urban areas in order to maintain control of the situation. [12] [13]
AQAP's traditional strongholds are positioned in southern Yemen, including Abyan Governorate, where it took refuge in the rugged, mountainous terrain. [14] [15] Prior to the revolution, AQAP had never attempted to control and administer terrority, instead remaining in their remote hideouts. [16] However, the government's preoccupation with the protests left several areas of the country, particularly the south, in a state of lawlessness and vulnerability, allowing for it to exploit the security gap. [12] [17] In late March, Islamist militants raided the town of Jaar, sparking brief clashes with soldiers before they fled their posts and retreated to the nearby Zinjibar, allowing for the city to be seized. [18] [19] By the end of the month, AQAP had declared an "Islamic Emirate of Abyan", [20] [12] and had made Jaar its capital and a staging ground for its activities. [19]
Ansar al-Sharia was first mentioned by an AQAP cleric in April 2011, identifying it as an alternate name for the group to attract locals. [21] The Royal United Services Institute identified Ansar al-Sharia's members as being "disgruntled tribal militia with former Afghan-Arab mujahideen and disaffected Yemeni youth." [22]
An estimated force of 300 militants led the initial capture of Zinjibar in May 2011. [23] Some reports describe those fighters as belonging to local tribes, [2] though others detailed hundreds of foreign fighters among them. [11] The leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Jalal Baleedi, was also present in the city during its capture and was identified as a former resident. [11] [21]
Many fighters from Jaar arrived to Zinjibar prior to tribal forces seizing the entrances to the city in July, when an estimated 700 militants were present. [7] [24] [15] Residents described hundreds of Islamists entering the town after its capture in order to join the militants in June. [25] Many fighters had come from other areas of Yemen including Marib, Shabwah, Saada and al-Jawf governorates. [7] [26] Small numbers of foreign fighters were also present in the town, [27] including Egyptians, Sudanese, Somalis, Pakistanis, Saudis, Iraqis and Syrians. [11] [8] By the end of 2011, estimates of Ansar al-Sharia fighters present in Zinjibar ranged from 700 to 1,000. [8]
The militants were extremely disciplined and had a clear military plan, moving in highly organized cells. [28] A resident noted that fighters were distributed throughout the city in groups of 15. [29] As government forces pushed deeper into Zinjibar and Ansar al-Sharia suffered more losses, by May 2012 the militants had adopted a guerilla strategy. [30] Ansar al-Sharia's ability to move in small cells and 'never hold out in one place' created difficulty for the Yemeni Army in confronting them. The group's fighters 'know the area very well … and take advantage of the dense trees to move surreptitiously' according to a military officer. [31]
An Ansar al-Sharia-affiliated media outlet claimed that the group seized 'heavy artillery pieces, modern anti-aircraft weapons, a number of tanks and armored transports in addition to large quantities of different kinds of ammunition' from deserting security forces during the capture of Zinjibar. [3] Militants were equipped with mortars, snipers, machine guns, Katyusha-type rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and Strela missile launchers among other weapons during the battle. [8] [5] [32] They utilized machine gun technicals and operated at least two T-62 tanks stolen from the military, though their effectiveness was negligible before they were destroyed by government airstrikes. [32] [33]
Three military brigades were involved in the bulk of the fighting in Zinjibar; [26] the 25th Mechanized Brigade, the 201st Mechanized Brigade and the 119th Infantry Brigade. [34] The strength of the 25th Mechanized Brigade by June 2011 was numbered at 2,000 soldiers. [5] During a visit to the brigade's base in February 2012, Jeremy Scahill of The Nation wrote that the soldiers "look thin and haggard, many with long beards and tattered uniforms or no uniforms at all." [3] In August 2011, the 31st Armoured Brigade sent soldiers to reinforce the front lines while the 39th Armoured Brigade began providing artillery support from its base in Dofas. [34] [7]
On 27 May, around 300 fighters from Ansar al-Sharia departed from Jaar and, after a travelling through a stretch of mountains, descended into Zinjibar unopposed. [35] [2] Attributed to an "intelligence breakdown", the surprise invasion was completed within a few hours and without any response by government forces stationed in the city. [36] [11] The first target of the militants, the local base of the Central Security Forces (CSF) on the eastern outskirts of the city, was quickly abandoned by its soldiers, allowing for the militants to raid it and loot the equipment. [35] Most of the CSF soldiers, excluding 50 who were captured, fled to the headquarters of the 25th Mechanized Brigade on the southeast edge of the city. After equipping themselves with the looted weapons, the militants proceeded to besiege the base, while other militants spread through the city and captured it uncontested, including the local government headquarters. [37] All government buildings were taken over, while surrendering soldiers were executed and occupants of the main prison were released. [38]
The commander of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, General Muhammad al-Somali, soon realized that nearly all local officials, including the governor, the security chief, and the head of an army brigade, had fled the city for Aden. [2] After receiving no response from a local Republican Guard outpost, Somali contacted influential renegade general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar for help. [37] The 119th Infantry Brigade, located west of Zinjibar, was pro-revolution and led by Ahmar ally General Faisal Rajab. [39] As Somali asserted to Ahmar that he remained neutral to the revolution, the 119th Infantry Brigade was not mobilized, allowing Ansar al-Sharia to consolidate control over Zinjibar. [37] Checkpoints were established by the militants at the three highways leading into the city. [40] [41] At noon, Ansar al-Sharia leader Jalal Baleedi, surrounded by his men, gave a speech for Friday prayers at a mosque in the city. They later looted the central bank and encouraged civilians to take part. [11]
On 29 May, the army began shelling Zinjibar with artillery, [14] and on 30 May the Yemeni Air Force began launching airstrikes on the city. [42] The period saw some of the most intense fighting during the entire battle, with the military bombing campaign indiscriminately targeting the city without warnings for civilians. [27] Residents estimated that around 200 homes were destroyed by the air raids. [2] Most of the city's residents had deserted the town by that time. [43]
Three brigades from neighbouring Aden and Lahij governorates were mobilized to recapture Zinjibar and break the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade. [44] Among them included the 119th Infantry Brigade. [39] On 4 June, two ambushes south of Zinjibar on reinforcements from Aden left nine soldiers dead. [45] On 6 June, army forces advanced towards the outskirts of Zinjibar overnight. [44] Ansar al-Sharia fighters attacked their positions, leading to an hours-long gun battle which left nine soldiers and six militants dead before the military retook the area. By the next day, the government claimed that at least 30 militants had been killed in Zinjibar in two days, including Hassan al-Aqili, an AQAP commander from Marib. [46] On 11 June, Ansar al-Sharia attempted a raid on the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, though it was repelled and led to the deaths of 18 militants and nine soldiers. [47] [48] Somali later stated in an interview that the attack "represented the greatest attempt by al-Qaeda to gain control of the brigade. Following this, they continued to lay ambushes, target our men with snipers, and carry out intermittent light attacks, but not on the previous scale." [49]
By 20 June, Ansar al-Sharia had dispersed its forces across three fronts in the area, one of which was besieging the 25th Mechanized Brigade in Zinjibar, while another battled the 119th Infantry Brigade in the nearby area of Dofas along the Aden-Abyan road. The 119th Infantry Brigade claimed that it had made significant progress in capturing parts of Dofas during heavy fighting. [50] However, days later it and the 201st Mechanized Brigade withdrew from Dofas and were pulled three kilometers away from the front lines into the outskirts of Aden to set up a security cordon. According to the military, the decision was a tactical move to remain in open territory and avoid heavy casualties as it had suffered during its advance in Dofas due to the militants setting up ambushes in the forests. [51] [52] A report published on 27 June described Ansar al-Sharia still retaining firm control of Zinjibar, and that military was mainly confined to launching daily artillery shelling and airstrikes on the city, which were indiscriminately hitting both Islamist positions and civilians. A local official said that 35 homes had been destroyed by the bombings in the previous two weeks alone. [53]
After failing to gain control of the base itself earlier in the month, Ansar al-Sharia instead tightened their siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade by taking control of the al-Wahda Stadium. [54] Witnesses describe around 300 militants armed with heavy weaponry attacking the base on 29 June, leading to an intense battle. The air force was mobilized to counterattack the militants, though one airstrike had hit a nearby civilian bus. By the end of the day, the stadium was in control of Ansar al-Sharia, with 25 soldiers and 11 dying during the clashes. [5] An army officer later reported an additional 50 troops being unaccounted for. [55] The loss of the stadium deprived the 25th Mechanized Brigade of a major outpost for storing supplies and refueling, [5] [56] and exposed the brigade on its southeastern flank. [54] The New York Times wrote that the defeat at the stadium was a clear display of the army's struggles in retaking Zinjibar. [5]
After capturing the stadium, the militants proceeded to surround the base of the 25th Mechanized Brigade, with gunmen situated above nearby buildings army movements. With the siege further intensified, the brigade was running out of fuel and water, and was in dire need of supplies and reinforcements in order to continue fighting. An army officer pleaded for more support in a 3 July interview with Reuters, stating that clashes were occurring daily around the vicinity of the base. [55] [56]
On 17 July, the Yemeni military launched an offensive in Zinjibar, with reinforcements including tanks, rocket launchers, and 500 soldiers, primarily from the 119th Infantry Brigade, being sent to the city along with 450 pro-government tribal fighters. Ansar al-Sharia had been losing support from the tribes of Abyan in the lead up to the offensive, [7] with tribal gunmen having cut supply lines to the city by 13 July. [24] Backed by heavy tank shelling and rocket attacks from naval ships off the coast, the reinforcements advanced from the west to lift the siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade. [7] Dozens of casualties were also reported in the east as militants fought army and tribal forces attempting to enter the city. [57] By 20 July, the 119th Infantry Brigade was fighting in the al-Khamila and Dio neighbourhoods of western Zinjibar, [7] as units from the 31st Armoured Brigade and 119th Infantry Brigade were entrenched in clashes after being attacked at the Zinjibar Bridge from al-Kawd. [58] On 22 July, tribal forces secured the road from Shabwah Governorate to Shuqrah in Abyan, a main highway leading to Zinjibar. [59] By 25 July, residents reported that Ansar al-Sharia fighters were present only in some pockets of Zinjibar and that government forces were starting to close in on the city. [60]
Fighting between the army and the militants intensified at the end of the month as Ramadan was set to begin. [61] A major setback in the offensive occurred as result of a friendly fire incident on 29 July, in which a Yemeni warplane launched at least three airstrikes on a communications building shortly after fighters from the Fadhl tribe had pushed Ansar al-Sharia out of it during their advance east towards the city. [7] [62] The strikes killed 40 people, including two colonels, a lieutenant colonel, a major and a sheik from the Nahee tribe. [63] Tribal commander Mohammed Gaadani said that the incident ruined tribal morale and trust in the government, resulting in tribal forces temporarily withdrawing from the battle to bury their dead as the militants resolidified control over Zinjibar. [63] [64] In an Asharq al-Awsat interview published on 30 July, Somali said that reinforcements and supplies for the 25th Mechanized Brigade were yet to have arrived, as the militants had repeatedly ambushed army convoys heading to eastwards to the brigade on the road from Aden. [49] [65] More than 100 militants were reported to have been killed in July alone. [61]
By August, most fighting took place at night due to the sweltering heat during the day. [66] Zinjibar was being contested by the 119th Infantry Brigade from the west and the 25th Mechanized Brigade from the east, [67] the latter being limited to defensive clashes for most of the month as they were still under siege at their base. [68] Fighting took place early in the month between the 119th Infantry Brigade and militants in al-Khamila neighbourhood, with the 39th Armoured Brigade being deployed to provide artillery support there from Dofas. [7] The local tribes had rejoined the offensive, with an official confirming that tribal fighters had returned to their positions surrounding the city, some aiding the 25th Mechanized Brigade in the east. [69] [67] Clashes involving the 201st Mechanized Brigade intensified in Dofas in late August, [70] with militants launching at least five attacks on government forces there from 20 to 27 August, [71] including a 23 August attack on the 201st Mechanized Brigade base which killed seven soldiers and a 27 August ambush on army units attempting to reach the 25th Mechanized Brigade. [72] From 25 August until the end of the month, fighting in the area left a reported 40 militants and 23 soldiers dead according to FDD's Long War Journal . [73] AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi was rumoured to have been among those killed, though this was later disproved. [70] By the end of the month, the army had secured Dofas, al-Kawd and al-Matla on Zinjibar's outskirts, as well as the road linking it to Aden. [74]
From the start of September, advances by government forces towards the city were reported on multiple fronts. The 201st Mechanized Brigade and 119th Infantry Brigade pushed eastwards and recaptured the al-Wahda Stadium, linked up with the 25th Mechanized Brigade at their base, and secured the nearby Husn Shaddad neighbourhood. [75] The advance came amid a barrage of US drone strikes which freed the 25th Mechanized Brigade from militant pressure. [73] Other army units were approximately five kilometers south from Zinjibar after capturing al-Kawd. An AQAP-linked source confirmed that the military was beginning to enter southern Zinjibar. [75] Government forces had seized the main entrances to Zinjibar and were beginning to advance into the city. [76]
On 10 September, forces from the 119th Infantry Brigade, 201st Mechanized Brigade and 31st Armoured Brigade, as well as allied tribesmen, launched a coordinated push into Zinjibar. [77] [66] The militant siege on the 25th Mechanized Brigade was lifted, while more than 2,000 soldiers [78] moved in on and secured the eastern portion of the city, capturing areas including the local CSF base. [77] Facing a deluge of army reinforcements, AQAP military commander Qasim al-Raymi ordered most of the militants in Zinjibar to retreat into the mountains by Jaar, leading to the army fighting "only token resistance" during their advance. [66] Despite government statements celebrating the end of the battle and the liberation of the entire city, clashes were still taking place in many parts of the city. [77]
A standoff between government and militant forces ensued after the conclusion of the offensive in September. [32] Ansar al-Sharia remained in control of more than half of the city, including its center [8] and most of its government buildings. [79] It also controlled access points to the city in the north towards Jaar and in the east towards Shuqrah, attempting to cut off supply lines to the military in December. [32]
The army launched an offensive targeting the northern Bajdar neighbourhood of Zinjibar at the beginning of October. [80] [81] While the 201st Mechanized Brigade made several advances, [82] a Yemeni aircraft mistakenly bombed a school occupied by the 119th Infantry Brigade, which was followed by a militant attack. At least 30 soldiers in the school were confirmed to be dead by the Red Crescent, though the government denied any friendly fire. [83] By 5 October, the army had reportedly advanced to control the eastern and central parts of Zinjibar, while the militants occupied the remaining areas, including the northern areas bordering Jaar. [82]
More than 38 militants were reportedly killed in the first two weeks of November. [79] A security official said that fighting in Zinjibar was now more scattered and akin to a guerilla war, as the militants "do not have the manpower anymore to clash for continuous days as was the case two months ago." [84] Heavy fighting broke out in the city in mid-November, with the army launching artillery shelling at the local government headquarters and the offices of the internal security agency which killed multiple foreign fighters. [85] Outside of the city, Ansar al-Sharia launched an attack on al-Kawd, seizing the entire city and forcing the army to retreat to Dofas. [86] [87]
On 7 December, Ansar al-Sharia attempted a nighttime raid on an army post east of Zinjibar but failed, leaving nine militants and a single soldiers dead. [88] Clashes intensified in late December, with at least 60 people, including 23 soldiers, being killed by 26 December since the previous week. Street fighting took place in the northern and eastern areas of Zinjibar, with army units reportedly advancing on some militant-controlled areas. [89] Amid the fighting, a US drone struck and killed Abdulrahman al-Wuhayshi, the brother of Nasir al-Wuhayshi. [90] In January 2012, further clashes took place in the north and east of the city. [91] Returning residents later in the month found that control of the city remained divided between the army and the militants, the two in some areas being separated by only meters. [92]
On 4 February, officials reported that the government had been in negotiations with Ansar al-Sharia via a tribal delegation for a potential militant withdrawal from Zinjibar. According to tribal negotiator Tariq al-Fadhli, the militants demanded that sharia law be implemented and that Yemeni soldiers "retreat to their barracks" before they withdrew from the city. [93] [94] The government claimed that a ceasefire had been agreed upon for the election on 21 February, but this was denied by Ansar al-Sharia in a statement shortly after a series clashes took place in the city. [95] In the three days preceding the election, militant attacks increased against local army barracks before they attempted to push into the eastern suburbs of Zinjibar, but were repulsed by the 201st Mechanized Brigade. [96]
Both Ansar al-Sharia and the Yemeni government were expecting the conflict to intensify after the inauguration of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on 25 February, replacing the ousted Ali Abdullah Saleh. During his inauguration speech, Hadi pointed out AQAP as a top priority for his administration, vowing to continue the battle against it. [97] [98] One of Hadi's first moves in as President was to name Gen. Salem Ali Qatan as the new commander of army forces in the south. [77] The Yemeni Army gave a seven-day ultimatum for the militants to surrender or flee on 28 February, [99] while Ansar al-Sharia gave the army a 10-day counter-ultimatum the following day. [100]
In response to increased US and Yemeni airstrikes under Hadi, Ansar al-Sharia forces launched an attack on military units stationed in Dofas on 4 March. [19] The 39th Armoured Brigade's artillery base was overran and looted, while the 115th and 119th Infantry Brigade's defended their encampments for hours until the militants withdrew. [101] [102] The battle killed 185 soldiers, the most in a single engagement since the military's conflict with Ansar al-Sharia began, dealing a heavy blow to army morale. [103] The military subsequently intensified its bombardment of Zinjibar in the next weeks, utilizing artillery shelling [104] [105] and naval strikes [106] [107] to inflict dozens of militant casualties.
On 19 April, the Yemeni Army reportedly advanced on the outskirts of Zinjibar after clashes killed 18 militants and wounded dozens of militants, forcing the rest to flee. [108] [109] Later in the day, the military launched an overnight surprise offensive, making a "major advance" while killing 25 militants and seizing a district on the outskirts of the city. [110] [111]
According to the military, on 23 April the Yemeni Air Force carried out strikes on Zinjibar before army forces backed by tribesmen moved in on the city. The 119th Infantry Brigade, approaching from the southwest, secured al-Kawd, the 25th Mechanized Brigade cleared the southeastern approaches to the city, the 201st Mechanized Brigade approached from the north and cleared the surrounding areas, and the 39th Armoured Brigade entered the city center from the east, securing several key government buildings, including the local post office, [112] by the morning of 24 April after a six-hour battle. [113] [114] [115] At the same time, clashes were being fought on the eastern and southern outskirts of Zinjibar. [112] While Ansar al-Sharia admitted that their forces had "encountered a massive offensive by Saana regime forces", it denied the government's report and said it had blocked the army's advances. [116]
On 12 May, the Yemeni government began an all-out offensive to recapture Zinjibar and other areas occupied by Ansar al-Sharia in Abyan Governorate. 20,000 members of the military participated in the operation, including the air force and navy. [6] The offensive involved government forces executing a crescent-shaped advance on Zinjibar. [117] On 13 May, government forces reached the Shaddad Fort, around three kilometers east of Zinjibar, and Zinjibar Bridge, just one kilometer south of it. [118] By mid-May the army had managed to push into the center of Zinjibar, with air force helicopters flying over the city for the first time since its seizure, indicating that the militants had lost their anti-air capability. [117] Army forces were moving slowly along the outskirts of Zinjibar in order to avoid being outflanked, though the offensive in general had slowed down in part due to poor intelligence, leading to uncertainty as to whether most militants in the city had been either killed, deserted or strategically withdrew in preparation for a counteroffensive. [119] [120]
On 23 May, government forces advanced into and secured several parts of the central and northern neighborhoods of Zinjibar, including the local stadium and government buildings. [121] Further advances were made on 26 May, with the 25th Mechanized Brigade capturing the Maraqid and Mashqasa areas. [122] By end of the month, the 25th Mechanized Brigade, 39th Armoured Brigade and local Popular Committee's had managed to recapture all militant-held positions in the east of Zinjibar. [123]
Militant defenses in the area began to collapse on 11 June after the seizure of the 7 October factory, which was used as a base by the militants and was located on a hilltop overlooking Jaar, five kilometers from the center of the town. [124] [125] On 12 June, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committee fighters moved into Zinjibar as Ansar al-Sharia completely withdrew from the city. The push into Zinjibar came hours after the military seized Jaar after the militants left the city during dawn. Gen. Qatan confirmed the capture of Zinjibar via a phone call from the local government headquarters. [126] Abyan governor Jamal al-Aqel said that about 300 militants fled from Zinjibar towards Shuqrah, which was still under Ansar al-Sharia control. Retreating militants distributed flyers to local residents stating that they were withdrawing in order to avoid more bloodshed and destruction in the area. [127]
The United States accelerated its drone campaign by June 2011 as American officials saw it as one of the few ways to prevent the militants from consolidating control in southern Yemen. The campaign was being conducted by the Department of Defense's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA had ramped up its intelligence-gathering on militant locations with the support of Saudi Arabian intelligence officers, who had a vast network of on-the-ground informants in Yemen. [128] [129] On 14 June, The Wall Street Journal reported that the CIA was preparing to launch drone strikes independent of the US military. [129]
Six drone strikes were launched in Zinjibar during 2011. [130] The first strike came on 3 June, when a US drone strike killed two high-ranking AQAP leaders, Ali Abdullah Naji al-Harithi and Ammar al-Waeli, along with four civilians according to witnesses. [131] [7] [128] US and Saudi aircraft provided initial air support for ground advances by the 25th Mechanized Brigade. [19] Both brigade commander Gen. Somali and Deputy Information Minister Abdo al-Janadi confirmed that during the siege on the brigade, US aircraft had airdropped essential supplies for the unit at least once. [49] [132] [133]
The May–June 2012 offensive received direct and extensive support from the US, which positioned nearly 60 soldiers at the al-Anad Air Base to coordinate the offensive and oversee drone strikes. [117] The Times reported that US Army Special Forces and Army Ranger personnel were deployed to coordinate air and ground attacks for Yemeni forces. [134] Saudi Arabia also aided the offensive by funneling money to the Yemeni government which was used to buy the allegiance of numerous tribes in the area, who began to fight Ansar al-Sharia alongside the army. [135]
According to Time magazine, although the Yemeni military was reluctant to disclose its casualties publicly, unofficial internal estimates report that at as many as 1,000 soldiers had died in the battle to reclaim the city altogether. Gen. Nasser al-Taheri, commander of the Southern Military Region after the assassination of Gen. Qatan, estimated that at least 600 militants were killed in the battle, including many in the core leadership of Ansar al-Sharia and AQAP. [10]
As reported by the state-ran Saba News Agency on 11 September 2011, a day after the conclusion of the July–September offensive, Defence Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed said that 230 soldiers from the Southern Military Region had been killed in the battle since May, while 50 pro-government tribal fighters were also killed. Then-vice president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi reportedly told European diplomats that 90 soldiers from the besieged 25th Mechanized Brigade and 30 AQAP leaders had been killed in Zinjibar since the battle began. [136]
According to an Agence France-Presse tally composed of multiple sources, 485 people were killed in the 2012 Abyan offensive since its instigation on 12 May until the liberation of Zinjibar on 12 June. The total included 368 militant fighters, 72 army soldiers, 26 Popular Committee fighters and 19 civilians. The total includes fighting not only in Zinjibar, but all of Abyan. [137]
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that by 6 June, up to 95% of Zinjibar and its surrounding villages' population, nearly 10,000 people, had been displaced by the fighting. [138] [139] By mid-2011, 60,842 residents of Zinjibar and its surrounding areas were recorded as internally displaced persons according to the Abyan government. [140] The United States Agency for International Development recorded 40,000 people as displaced from the city due to the fighting. [3]
Yemeni NGO Seyaj reported there being only 500 remaining residents in the city by June. [141] Some families had taken refuge in the open in the surrounding rural areas of Zinjibar, living underneath trees. [142] [27] Most residents and families sought refuge in Aden, occupying schools and abandoned houses as makeshift refugee camps. Yemen's Ministry of Health pledged to deliver 10,000 tons of medical aid to displaced residents of Zinjibar, on top of another 10,000 for refugees in Aden specifically. Regardless, displaced refugees voiced frustration and criticism against the government for its perceived indifference to their situation and scarce support given to them. [27] [143] [3]
In mid-January 2012, around 2,500 displaced residents returned to Zinjibar in a vehicular convoy agreed upon by both Ansar al-Sharia and the Yemeni government. [92] [144] The residents were welcomed by the militants in a festival and were allowed to visit the main city, which was held by Ansar al-Sharia, and other nearby areas before returning to Aden. [145]
War photographer Yuri Kozyrev compared the destruction in Zinjibar to that of Grozny during the First Chechen War. [10] Writing for Foreign Policy , journalist Adam Baron described the state of the city as "apocalyptic" during his tour, with nearly every building destroyed. [146] Local authorities estimated that around 80% of homes in the city were in some way damaged during the battle. [147] A United Nations team assessed a "total destruction of infrastructure" in the city a month after its recapture. [148] Most government headquarters, offices, and institutions also sustained damage, [149] including the newly-built main government complex for Abyan. The water and power supply network of the city was disabled. [150] The power network in particular suffered damages leaving lasting effects by 2020. [151]
Almasdar Online wrote in January 2012 that the souk, the Aden bus station, and areas of the al-Asla and Sawahil neighborhoods were the most damaged. [152] The al-Sarh neighborhood also witnessed some of the fiercest fighting during the battle and near-total destruction in its aftermath. [153]
Within the context of the then-ongoing revolution, the seizure of Zinjibar provoked suspicion that the government had willfully or intentionally let the city fall. The army's quick abandonment of the city to the militants led to accusations that Saleh had ordered security forces to withdraw and let the militants capture it. [14] A number of commentators claimed that the militants were working for the Saleh regime; [154] [23] some Saleh supporters had even joined the militants believing them to be backed by the government. [11] Analyst Ali Dahmis claimed that Saleh had allowed Zinjibar to fall in order to shift attention from his loss of control over Sanaa, [155] where open street fighting was taking place at the time of its seizure. [15] Political analyst Abdul Ghani al-Iryani questioned the absence of counterterrorism units normally stationed in the area who could have easily defended the city, believing that "if AQAP was strong enough to take control of an entire governorate, they would have done so much sooner." [156] Gen. Somali, who led the only army brigade which remained to defend the city, stated in an interview:
God bless our colleagues in the Public Security, Police, and Central Security who pulled out of the governorate and left behind all their military equipment and munitions as a gift for al-Qaeda elements… I do not want to go too far and accuse my colleagues of complicity with al-Qaeda against us and I do not cast doubt about them… but we can say that it is cowardice and fear that filled them after the governor, his deputies, and directors of departments left Zinjibar. [7]
Opposition figures and analysts suspected that Saleh had let the city fall in an attempt to convince the US and neighbouring countries that he was needed in power in order to deal with the threat and prevent a complete AQAP takeover, thus saving his faltering regime. [126] [157] [8] Saleh's government was known to have previously utilized and exaggerate the threat of al-Qaeda, and in some cases collude the group, in order to receive increased aid and attention from the US government. [14] Saleh himself warned the US and Europe in a televised speech prior to the takeover of Zinjibar that 'al-Qaeda is coming and it will take control,' and that the 'future will be worse than the present' if he were to resign. [158] Iryani said in February 2012 that Saleh "ordered his police force to evacuate the city and turn it over to the militants because he wanted to send a signal to the world that, without me, Yemen will fall into the hands of the terrorists." [3] Former defense minister Abdullah Ali Alewa claimed that the move was in order to "frighten people that if he goes, Yemen will become Somalia." [14] A group of pro-opposition army generals, led by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, released a statement in which they stated that Saleh "delivered Zinjibar to groups that he has formed and armed, to continue to utilize the spectre of al-Qaeda to frighten regional and international parties." [159] Southern Movement figure Ali Nasir Muhammad viewed the Ansar al-Sharia seizure as facilitated by the government in order to tarnish the reputation of the secular separatists. [7]
Opposing allegiances between different army brigades participating in the battle led to internal conflicts. [160] The besieged 25th Mechanized Brigade was considered to be a close ally of the pro-opposition Gen. Ahmar, [7] along with the 119th Infantry Brigade. [77] Meanwhile, two other units participating in the battle, the 31st Armoured Brigade and the 201st Mechanized Brigade, were still loyal to Saleh. [77] Gen. Mahdi Maqula, a close ally of Saleh who was the commander of the 31st Armoured Brigade and the entire Southern Military Region, was accused by military officers of hindering the delivery of supplies to army forces fighting in the south. After taking helm of the government, one of Hadi's first decisions as president was to replace Maqula with Gen. Salem Ali Qatan in both of his roles. [161]
Zinjibar lies east of the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait, through which about three million barrels of oil pass daily. [162] The city also lies upon the only road connecting the city of Aden to the rest of Abyan Governorate. [19] Aden itself is located approximately 50 kilometers west of Zinjibar. [163] If Ansar al-Sharia were to win the battle for Zinjibar, Aden would have likely been its next target, with the former acting as a staging ground. [8] Multiple AQAP leaders claimed that Aden would be the groups next target after Zinjibar. [11] [19] Analyst Katherine Zimmerman of Critical Threats wrote on matter:
Should Ansar al Sharia defeat the Yemeni military in Zinjibar, Abyan would become a staging ground for an offensive to take the strategic city of Aden. The fall of Aden raises the possibility of the fall of the south, which will have resounding effects on the future of the Yemeni state. Al Qaeda would gain relative freedom of movement from the Arabian Sea to the Saudi border, significantly increasing the risk of an attack on an international or Saudi oil target, and could erect a form of an Islamist government in its territories. The Yemeni state would not only lose its southern port city of Aden, but would also lose revenues from southern oil. Should the Yemeni military or some other actor fail to halt al Qaeda’s advance, there is the very real prospect that al Qaeda could establish an Islamic emirate in south Yemen. [54]
By June 2011, "noticeable movements" of Ansar al-Sharia militants were recorded in several areas of Aden Governorate, including Khor Maksar and al-Mansoura districts. Two officers from the 31st Armoured Brigade were assassinated by car bombings during the month, while Gen. Madhi Maqula survived an assassination attempt at his house. [164] The attacks grew increasingly bolder over time; [28] a suicide car bombing killed four soldiers and civilian in al-Mansoura district on 24 June, [165] while a similar attack on 24 July killed 9 soldiers in a convoy heading to reinforce the army at Zinjibar. [166]
The intensification of attacks in Aden drew the attention of the government. [34] On 3 July 2011, the Ministry of Defense admitted that a number of militants had infiltrated Aden, and announced that it would deploy a security belt around the city. [56] The deployment of the 31st Armoured Brigade to participate in the battle in August was seen as a reaction to the threat to Aden, though the operation was more so done to prevent further Ansar al-Sharia advances towards Aden rather than recapturing its territory in Abyan. The July–September offensive succeeded in establishing a front line that prevented the spread southward of the insurgency. [34]
Al-Qaeda's fighters stormed Jaar and Zinjibar in early December 2015 and recaptured the towns, [167] later declaring them "Emirates", providing civilian services, and establishing a Sharia court. In summer 2016 Yemeni government forces backed by Arab coalition aircraft and gunboats moved to retake the towns, and despite encountering "repeated suicide attacks" drove AQAP out of Zinjibar on 14 August 2016. [168]