Gold Codes

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The Gold Code is the launch code for nuclear weapons provided to the President of the United States in their role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. [1] In conjunction with the nuclear football, the Gold Codes allow the president to authorize a nuclear attack. [2] Gold Codes, as well as a separate nuclear football, are also assigned to the vice president in case the president is incapacitated or otherwise unable to discharge the duties of office pursuant to the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [3] [4] Gold Codes are arranged in a column and printed on a plastic card nicknamed "the biscuit". [5]

Contents

The card's size is similar to that of a credit card, and the president is supposed to carry it on their person. Before it can be read, an opaque plastic covering must be snapped in two and removed. [6]

Gold Codes are generated daily and provided by the National Security Agency (NSA) to the White House, The Pentagon, United States Strategic Command and TACAMO. For an extra level of security, the list of codes on the card includes codes that have no meaning, and therefore the president must memorize where on the list the correct code is located. The concept behind the codes is that they permit the president to present positive identification of being the commander-in-chief and thereby authenticate a launch order to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). [7] [8]

Protocol

If the president decides to launch nuclear weapons, he or she would be taken aside by the carrier of the nuclear football and the briefcase would be opened. [3] The president would select from among sets of specific orders for attacks on specific targets. The attack options are preset war plans developed under OPLAN 8010, and include major attack options, selected attack options, and limited attack options. The chosen attack option and the Gold Codes would be transmitted to the NMCC via a special secure channel. Before the order can be followed by the military, the president must be identified using a special code issued on a plastic card, nicknamed "the biscuit". [9] The authentication is conducted between the president and the NMCC's deputy director of operations, using a challenge code of two phonetic letters. The president will read from the biscuit the daily phonetic letters and the deputy director will confirm or deny if they are correct, confirming that the person is the president and the attack orders can be given. [10] As commander-in-chief, the president is the only person with the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. [11] [12] [13] [14] Nuclear-defense policy expert Franklin Miller argues that the president has almost singular authority to initiate a nuclear attack; while the secretary of defense is required to verify the order, he or she cannot veto it. [15] Daniel Ellsberg argues that in practice, this authority has been delegated by the president to a number of military officers. [16]

See also

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References

  1. "The Nuclear Football". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
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  3. 1 2 "Military aides still carry the president's nuclear 'football'". USA Today . Associated Press. May 5, 2005. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  4. The Football. Archived July 14, 2014, at the Wayback Machine Brookings Institution
  5. Donvan, John (October 20, 2010). "President Bill Clinton Lost Nuclear Codes While in Office, New Book Claims". ABC News . Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  6. Ambinder, Marc (July 10, 2013). "2 White House movie tropes that don't make sense". The Week . Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  7. "US nuclear codes: key terms explained". The Daily Telegraph . October 21, 2010. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  8. Ambinder, Marc (October 22, 2010). "Why Clinton's Losing the Nuclear Biscuit Was Really, Really Bad". The Atlantic . Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  9. Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, International Commission on Nuclear Non proliferation and Disarmament Archived September 4, 2011, at the Wayback Machine , p. 10.
  10. Lewis, Jeffrey G.; Tertrais, Bruno (February 18, 2019). "The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States" (PDF). nonproliferation.org. Middlebury Institute for International Studies. Retrieved October 13, 2023.
  11. Zacher, Jules (April 19, 2013). "Presidential Authority and Nuclear Weapons: Taking Back Our Rights". University of Pennsylvania Law School.
  12. Lewis, Jeffrey G.; Tertrais, Bruno (February 18, 2019). "The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States" (PDF). nonproliferation.org. Middlebury Institute for International Studies. Retrieved October 13, 2023.
  13. "Whose Finger Is On the Button?" (PDF). www.ucsusa.org. Union of Concerned Scientists. September 22, 2017. Retrieved October 13, 2023. In the United States, the president has the sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, for any reason and at any time.
  14. Blair, Bruce G. (January 3, 2020). "Loose cannons: The president and US nuclear posture". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 76 (1): 14=-26. doi:10.1080/00963402.2019.1701279 . Retrieved October 13, 2023.
  15. Broad, William J.; Sanger, David E. (August 5, 2016). "Debate Over Trump's Fitness Raises Issue of Checks on Nuclear Power". The New York Times . Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  16. Ellsberg, Daniel (2017). The doomsday machine: confessions of a nuclear war planner. London Oxford New York New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury. ISBN   978-1-60819-670-8.

Further reading