President Adly Mansour announced on 7 November 2013 that Egypt was restarting its nuclear power program in El Dabaa; a deal was reached with the residents in which it was agreed that a residential area will also be built. [1] The Egyptian minister of electricity, Ahmed Emam, has called the project "necessary" because of a small amount of renewable energy sources and not enough fuel. [2]
The Egyptian nuclear power program was started in 1954 as the first research reactor ETRR-1 was acquired from the Soviet Union in 1958 and was opened by Gamal Abdel Nasser at Inchass, Nile Delta. [3] The disposal of its spent fuel was controlled by the Soviets.
In 1964, a 150 MWe nuclear power station was proposed, followed by a 600 MWe proposal in 1974. Also, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) was established in 1976, and in 1983 the El Dabaa site on the Mediterranean coast was selected. [4] The nuclear program was then rejected just after Egypt's defeat by Israel in the Six-day War in 1967 and the weakening of the Egyptian economy. [5]
In 1968 Egypt signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but postponed ratifying it citing evidence that Israel had undertaken a nuclear weapons program. Consequently, Egypt lost many of its nuclear experts and scientists who had to travel abroad to seek work opportunities. Some of them joined the Iraqi nuclear program and others emigrated to Canada. Egypt's nuclear plans were frozen after the Chernobyl accident. [3]
In 1992, Egypt acquired a 22MW multi-purpose research reactor ETRR-2 from Argentina. [6]
In 2006, Egypt announced it would revive its civilian nuclear power programme, and within 10 years build a 1,000 megawatt nuclear power station at El Dabaa. It was estimated to cost US$1.5bn, and it would be constructed with the participation of foreign investors. [7] In March 2008, Egypt signed with Russia an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. [8] [9]
As of 2012 [update] , after years of stop-start efforts, Egypt's nuclear energy ambitions were once again in flux. El Dabaa had been targeted by protesters who were claiming that their land was wrongly taken by the government to make way for the nuclear plant. As of 2012 [update] , as a result of those protests, the site was shut down. The Morsi government did not make any statements about its plans for the plant since construction was suspended. [10]
Egypt withdrew from talks regarding the implementation and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Geneva on 29 April 2013, but remains a ratifier of the NPT. [11]
In November 2015 and March 2017 Egypt signed preliminary agreements with Russian nuclear company Rosatom for a first VVER-1200 unit at El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant to start in 2024. [12] Discussions continue for final approval. [13] [14] [15]
In August 2022, state-run Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) signed a $2.2 billion deal with Russian state-run ASE (a subsidiary of Rosatom) to help build El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant. [16] [17]
In late 2004 and early 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) started to investigate undisclosed experiments, [18] which was published in open sources by former and current staff of the AEA, that indicated nuclear material, activities and facilities connected to uranium extraction, conversion, irradiation and reprocessing that unreported to the agency and a team of Agency inspectors visited the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas from 9 to 13 October 2004. [19] [20]
On 14 February 2005, IAEA's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei circulated a report to the board of Governors finding "a number of failures by Egypt to report to the agency in accordance with its obligations." [21]
Egypt justified its reporting failures as the government and the IAEA had "differing interpretations" of Egypt's safeguards obligations and emphasizing that the country's "nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes." [22] Accordingly, Egypt had taken corrective actions and maintained full cooperation during the 2004/2005 investigation, which ended that the IAEA found no discrepancies between what have been declared during the investigation and IAEA's findings and no evidences of extraction of plutonium or enrichment of uranium and the investigation had been closed. [23] [20]
In May 2009, according to a restricted IAEA report (IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2008) obtained by Reuters, the U.N. nuclear watchdog was investigating the discovery of traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a nuclear research facility. The detection was made by the environmental swipe samples taken in 2007 and 2008 at the Nuclear Research Center, which was tested positive for both low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium without confirming whether the (HEU) particles were weapon-grade material. [23] [24] [25]
Egypt accounted for the discovery of (HEU) material that it "could have been brought into the country through contaminated radioisotope transport containers," and the IAEA's inspectors had not verified the source of the particles, and there were no evidence that Egypt's explanation was not correct. [23] [24] [25] Also, the report concludes that earlier issues of undeclared nuclear activities and material reported to the Board of Governors in February 2005, are no longer outstanding and all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.[ citation needed ]
During December, 2004 and January, 2005 inspections the IAEA found that Egypt failed to declare in the initial report in 1982, a 67 kg of imported uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), 3 kg of imported and domestically produced uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, and small amounts of domestically produced uranium dioxide (UO2), uranium trioxide (UO3) and UF4 stored in the basement of the Nuclear Chemistry Building at Inshas. Egypt reported that it had imported nuclear material and carried out uranium conversion using that material prior to the force entry of the Safeguards Agreement and granted the agency with access to the Nuclear Chemistry Building where the experiments on the uranium conversion had been conducted within the framework of staff development for the front end of the fuel cycle, and provided a list of the nuclear material that had been imported and the subsequent nuclear material that had been produced, which was unreported in the initial report in 1982. [20] [26]
Egypt notified the Agency that, the Nuclear Material Authority (NMA) had conducted a project to recover uranium ore concentrate as a by-product of activities at the Phosphoric Acid Purification Plant in Inshas but failed to separate uranium. Egypt presented to the agency the program for heap leaching of uranium ore in the Sinai and Eastern deserts and declared that none of the uranium ore concentrate produced as a result of the leaching activities had been of a purity and composition that required to be reported. [20]
In December 2004 investigation, Egypt acknowledged that between 1990 and 2003, about 12 unreported experiments to the IAEA performed using a total of 1.15 g of natural uranium compounds and 9 thorium samples had been irradiated and conducted at the ETRR-1 and between 1999 and 2003 about 4 unreported experiments using a total of 0.24 g of natural uranium compounds irradiated at the ETRR-2, these experiments involving the irradiation of small amounts of natural uranium in the reactor to test the production of fission product isotopes for medical purposes and the irradiated compounds had been dissolved in three laboratories located in the Nuclear Chemistry Building with no plutonium or U-233 was separated during these experiments. Egypt provided modified design information for the two reactors and submitted inventory change reports (ICRs). Also, Egypt declared that similar experiments had been conducted between 1982 and 1988, prior the entry of safeguards agreement into force. [23] [20] [27]
In March 2001 and July 2002, the IAEA was investigating on the environmental samples which was taken from the ETRR-1's hot cells that revealed traces of actinides and fission products, which was explained by Egypt in July 2003, that the presence of the particles was attributed by a damaged nuclear fuel cladding resulted in contamination of the reactor water that penetrated the hot cells from irradiated sample cans. [20]
In December 2004, Egypt declared that it failed to include in the initial report, a total gross weight (include cladding and containers) of one kilogram of imported unirradiated fuel rods containing 10% enriched U-235, which was used in experiments involved in laboratory scale testing of fuel dissolution prior to the development of a reprocessing laboratory (Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant) and presented to the agency one intact fuel rod enriched 10% U-235, a number of pieces of other fuel rods (natural and enriched uranium), and uranyl nitrate solution with uranium enriched 10% U-235. These experiments were conducted at the Nuclear Chemistry Building prior to force entry of the Safeguards Agreement. Egypt had agreed to correct its initial report to include these materials. [20] [27]
Egypt also declared that, at the end of the 1970s, it concluded several contracts with a foreign company to build the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant (HPP) and in 1982, laboratory 2 became operational. The Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant designed for conducting bench scale radiochemistry experiments involving the separation of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel elements of the ETRR-1 research reactor. In November 2004 and January 2005, Egypt acknowledged that, in 1987, it had carried out acceptance tests in the HPP using unirradiated uranyl nitrate in chemical reagents purchased on the local market while the uranyl nitrate had been mixed with a solution obtained from the dissolution of domestically produced scrap UO2 pellets (with 1.9 kg of uranium compounds). Egypt did not declare it to the IAEA for safeguarding, due to the fact that the facility was never completed and it was designed for bench scale experiments. Egypt had submitted the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant design information and had agreed to provide ICRs. [20] [28]
In 2004, Egypt shows the IAEA's inspectors the Radioisotope Production Facility at Inshas, which was a new facility under construction intended for the separation of radioisotopes from enriched 19.7% U-235 irradiated at the ETRR-2 reactor while Egypt should have reported the decision to construct the new facility no later than 1997. Egypt took a corrective measure, and provided the agency with the facility design information. [20] [29]
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.
The Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility adjacent to the Tuwaitha "Yellow Cake Factory" or Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center contains the remains of nuclear reactors bombed by Iran in 1980, Israel in 1981 and the United States in 1991. It was used as a storage facility for spent reactor fuel and industrial and medical wastes. The radioactive material would not be useful for a fission bomb, but could be used in a dirty bomb. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the facility was heavily looted by hundreds of Iraqis, though it is unclear what was taken.
The Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center (녕변원자력연구소) is North Korea's major nuclear facility, operating its first nuclear reactors. It is located in Nyongbyon County in North Pyongan Province, about 100 km north of Pyongyang. The center produced the fissile material for North Korea's six nuclear weapon tests from 2006 to 2017, and since 2009 is developing indigenous light water reactor nuclear power station technology.
Iran has several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.
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PLUTO was a materials testing nuclear reactor housed at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, a former Royal Air Force airfield at Harwell, Oxfordshire in the United Kingdom.
Research reactors are nuclear fission-based nuclear reactors that serve primarily as a neutron source. They are also called non-power reactors, in contrast to power reactors that are used for electricity production, heat generation, or maritime propulsion.
A nuclear fuel bank is reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for countries that need a backup source of LEU to fuel their nuclear reactors. Countries that do have enrichment technology would donate enriched fuel to a "bank", from which countries not possessing enrichment technology would obtain fuel for their power reactors.
This is the timeline of the nuclear program of Iran.
The MIT Nuclear Research Reactor (MITR) serves the research purposes of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It is a tank-type 6 megawatt reactor that is moderated and cooled by light water and uses heavy water as a reflector. It is the second largest university-based research reactor in the U.S. and has been in operation since 1958. It is the fourth-oldest operating reactor in the country.
Iran's nuclear program is made up of a number of nuclear facilities, including nuclear reactors and various nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
IR-40 also known as Arak Nuclear Complex is an Iranian 40 megawatt (thermal) heavy water reactor near Arak, adjacent to the 1990s era Arak Heavy Water Production Plant. Civil works for the construction began in October 2004. It was initially planned that the reactor would begin nuclear operations in 2014.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a United States federal agency responsible for safeguarding national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; works to reduce the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the United States Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad.
ETRR-1 or ET-RR-1, is the first nuclear reactor in Egypt supplied by the USSR in 1958. The reactor is owned and operated by Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, 40–60 kilometres (25–37 mi) northeast of Cairo.
ETRR-2 or ET-RR-2, or is the second nuclear reactor in Egypt supplied by the Argentine company Investigacion Aplicada (INVAP) in 1992. The reactor is owned and operated by Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA) at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, 60 kilometres (37 mi) northeast of Cairo.
The Fuel Manufacturing Pilot Plant (FMPP), also known as Fuel Element Fabrication Plant, is a nuclear fuel fabrication facility supplied by the Argentine company INVAP in 1998. The FMPP is considered a Material Testing Reactor (MTR)-type fuel element facility, that produces the fuel elements required for the research reactor ETRR-2.
The Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant (HPP) is a hot cell laboratory complex, dedicated to perform bench-scale radiochemistry experiments including the separation of plutonium and uranium from the spent fuel rods of the ETRR-1 research reactor and was established in 1982. The HPP is owned and operated by the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, northeast of Cairo.
Radioisotopes Production Facility (RPF), is a facility for the production of radioisotopes from irradiation of Low enriched uranium (LEU) in the Egyptian Second Research Reactor (ETRR-2) Complex. The RPF was supplied by the Argentine company Investigacion Aplicada (INVAP) and was commissioned during October and November 2011. The produced radioisotopes are used in medicine, industry and research activities for domestic market.
The Hot Laboratory and Waste Management Center (HLWMC), is dedicated for radioactive waste disposal as well as development of expertise in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and radioisotope production for medical and industrial applications. The HLWMC was established in 1980, owned and operated by the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) in Inshas, northeast of Cairo.
