Tianxia, 'all under Heaven', is a Chinese term for a historical Chinese cultural concept that denoted either the entire geographical world or the metaphysical realm of mortals, and later became associated with political sovereignty. In ancient China and imperial China, tianxia denoted the lands, space, and area divinely appointed to the Chinese sovereign by universal and well-defined principles of order. The center of this land was directly apportioned to the Chinese court, forming the center of a world view that centered on the Chinese court and went concentrically outward to major and minor officials and then the common subjects, tributary states, and finally ending with fringe barbarians.
The center of this world view was not exclusionary in nature,[dubious–discuss] and outer groups, such as ethnic minorities and foreign people, who accepted the mandate of the Chinese Emperor were themselves received and included into the Chinese tianxia. In classical Chinese political thought, the "Son of Heaven", having received the Mandate of Heaven, would nominally be the ruler of the entire world. Although in practice there would be areas of the known world which were not under the control of the Chinese monarch, in Chinese political theory the rulers of those areas derived their power from the Chinese monarch.
The larger concept of tianxia is closely associated with civilization and order in classical Chinese philosophy, and has formed the basis for the world view of the Chinese people and nations influenced by them since at least the first millennium BC. Tianxia has been applied by other realms in the Sinosphere.
The historical consensus is that a tianxia system existed at various points in Chinese history. Historical views differ, however, on exactly when it was in place. How a system of tianxia operated varied over time, ranging from vassal states accepted the authority of a Chinese emperor to when vassal states nominally paid tribute while in fact exercising their own authority. In the most expansive historical view, a tianxia system existed between the Zhou (1027–256 BC) and Qing dynasties (1644–1911).[2]
According to political scientist Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, "Given the then lack of a modern science of understanding geography, the Chinese notion of all under heaven meant all the land, sea, and people under heaven. The term all under heaven was virtually synonymous with the world."[3] As reconstructed by philosopher Zhao Tingyang, tianxia presupposed "inclusion of all" and implied acceptance of the world's diversities, emphasizing harmonious reciprocal dependence and ruled by virtue as a means for lasting peace.[4] According to Zhao, in the tianxia system, rulers relied on humane authority, as opposed to tyranny and military force, to win the hearts and minds of the people.[4]
The tianxiaworld view was not fully developed during the Shang dynasty. During the Zhou dynasty, it is first attested that Heaven took on anthropomorphic deity traits,[relevant?] and the concept of tianxia became common. Other political terms emerged during this time. These include 'four quarters' (四方; sìfāng)—referring to the territory established by the Zhou court and governed from the capital—and 'ten thousand states' (万邦; 萬邦; wànbāng), referring to both the territory as well as the Hua and barbarian subjects residing on it. The Zhou kings received and empowered these "Ten Thousand States" by virtue of the Mandate of Heaven.[citation needed]
During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods comprising the latter half of the Zhou dynasty, the power of local rulers developed rapidly, and several regions outside the Zhou cultural sphere became powerful states themselves.[5] As many of these states had shared cultural heritage and economic interests, the concept of a great nation centered on the Yellow River Plain gradually expanded. The term tianxia began to appear in classical texts such as the Zuozhuan[6] and Guoyu.[7]
The theme of unification applied to tianxia can be seen in Sun Tzu's The Art of War where the supreme goal of offensive strategy was to conquer without destroying that which you sought to conquer:
必以全爭於天下，故兵不頓而利可全，此謀攻之法也。
Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy.
During Qin's wars of unification, the concept of tianxia was adapted to act as an actual geographic entity. Qin Shi Huang's goal to 'unify all under Heaven' was in fact representative of his desire to control and expand Chinese territory. At the founding of the Han dynasty, the equivalence of tianxia with the Chinese nation evolved due to the practice of enfeoffment of imperial relatives in return for military assistance. Although many areas enjoyed great autonomy, the practice established and spread Chinese language and culture throughout an even wider territory.[citation needed] Scholars including Dong Zhongshu sought to standardize the meaning of tianxia.[10]:45 Dong described tianxia as a world order in three concentric layers: "The nation is on the inside and the various feudal kingdoms are on the outside; the feudal kingdoms are on the inside while the barbarians are on the outside."[10]:45
By the time of the Song dynasty, northern China was ruled by the Khitan-led Liao dynasty, the Jurchen-led Jin dynasty, and the Tangut-led Western Xia dynasty. After being threatened by these northern states and realizing the possible effects of a war to the country and people, the Song rulers invented a false concept of kinship with the Jurchens in an attempt to improve relations.[citation needed] The Mongol-led Yuan dynasty divided Chinese subjects into two types: those of the south, and those of the north. When the Ming dynasty overthrew the Yuan dynasty and reunited China under ethnic Han rule, the concept of tianxia returned largely as it was during the Han dynasty.[citation needed]
At the end of the Ming dynasty, criticisms of Neo-Confucianism and its mantras of 'cultivation of moral character, establishment of family, ordering the state, and harmonizing tianxia', a quote from the Great Learning,[12] became widespread, producing large shifts in Confucianism. The philosopher Wang Fuzhi believed that tianxia was of a fixed, unchangeable dimension, notwithstanding the fact that the Great Learning's mentioning of harmonizing tianxia was actually in reference to government. Using these arguments, Wang was highly critical of Neo-Confucianism. On the other hand, the collapse of the Ming dynasty and the establishment of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty by the, people previously considered "fringe barbarians", heavily influenced people's views of tianxia. Gu Yanwu, a contemporary of Wang Fuzhi, wrote that the destruction of the State was not equivalent to the destruction of tianxia. He argued that the Manchus simply filled the role of Emperor, and that the tianxia of traditional Chinese culture was thus carried on.[citation needed]
The idea of the absolute authority of the Chinese emperor and the extension of tianxia by the assimilation of vassal states began to fade for good with George Macartney's embassy to China in 1793. George Macartney hoped to deal with China as Great Britain would with other European nations of the time, and to persuade the Emperor to reduce restrictions on trade. The Qianlong Emperor rejected his request, and stated that China was the foremost and most divine nation on Earth and had no interest in foreign goods. In the early 19th century, Britain's victory over Qing China in the First Opium War forced China to sign an unequal treaty. This marked the beginning of the end for the tianxia concept.[citation needed]
Following their defeat in the Second Opium War, China was forced to sign the Treaty of Tianjin, in which China was made to refer to Great Britain as a "sovereign nation", equal to itself. This made it impossible for China to continue dealing with other nations under the traditional tianxia system, and forced it to establish a foreign affairs bureau.[citation needed]
Due to the liberal international order arguably being based on Westphalian sovereignty, the idea that sovereign nations deal with each other as equals, China's traditional tianxia worldview collapsed.[13] After China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese terminated Korea's traditional status as a tributary state of China, and the system of feudal enfeoffment and vassalage that had been practiced since the Han dynasty came to an end, a move that greatly changed attitudes toward the tianxia concept. At the end of the 19th century, Chinese Ambassador to Britain Xue Fucheng took the traditional Hua-Yi distinction in the tianxia world view and replaced it with a Chinese-foreigner distinction.[citation needed]
In the 21st century, some academics have criticized contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang for "aggrandising" the concept of tianxia and being vague on details of what it may entail in the contemporary world.[14]
Based on epitaphs dating to the 4th and 5th centuries, Goguryeo had concepts of Son of Heaven (天帝之子) and independent tianxia.[15] The rulers of Goryeo used the titles of emperor and Son of Heaven, and positioned Goryeo at the center of the haedong 'east of the sea', which encompassed the historical domain of the Three Kingdoms of Korea.[16]
During the 17th century, with the fall of the Ming dynasty in China, a concept of Korea as the cultural center of Confucianism, or "Little China" emerged among the Confucian literati of the Joseon dynasty.[17]
Contemporary China
Chinese state media frequently portrays general secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping as having the tianxia perspective to seek "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and peaceful development of humanity".[4] Under this contemporary view, China's re-emergence as a great power presents an opportunity to reshape the liberal international order into a hub-and-spoke pattern around a single, central state.[18][19] In this contemporary discourse on tianxia, proponents argue that tianxia's moral appeal distinguishes it from realpolitik, which they submit as creating discord. Similarly, this modern treatment toward tianxia purports to be superior to the United Nations system, which is characterized as more akin to a political market, in which political operations are limited and constrained by parochial national interests. Historian Steve Tsang states that the concept of Community of Common Destiny presumes a vision of tianxia over and above the liberal international order.[20][4]
Applying the tianxia system to a modern framework, Chinese political scientist Yan Xuetong argues that great powers seeking international respect must use "humane authority" instead of seeking to impose hegemony.[4] These concepts influence the Chinese school of international relations.[21]
Various academics have noted that the current discourse of tianxia has been produced for domestic consumption and risks alienating foreigners.[14][22] Danish academics Klaas Dykmann and Ole Bruun state, "[f]oreign observers, particularly in democratic societies, will further note the glaring inconsistencies between the “harmonious world” conception and the tough realities of the domestic harmonious society, and between China's global media outreach and its increasing domestic control, digital surveillance, blacklisting, and media isolation of the Chinese public."[14]
Western calques
The expression 'all under heaven' inspired literary expressions with reference to China in a number of Western languages, such as the Russian ПоднебеснаяPodnebesnaya. The English term "Celestial Empire" is possibly derived from the title "Son of Heaven".[23]
Other usage
In 2013, the Singaporean historian Wang Gungwu coined the term "American Tianxia" to refer to the contemporary world order led by the United States.[24]
Confucianism, also known as Ruism or Ru classicism, is a system of thought and behavior originating in ancient China, and is variously described as a tradition, philosophy, religion, theory of government, or way of life. Confucianism developed from teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE), during a time that was later referred to as the Hundred Schools of Thought era. Confucius considered himself a transmitter of cultural values inherited from the Xia (c. 2070–1600 BCE), Shang (c. 1600–1046 BCE) and Western Zhou (c. 1046–771 BCE) dynasties. Confucianism was suppressed during the Legalist and autocratic Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), but survived. During the Han dynasty, Confucian approaches edged out the "proto-Taoist" Huang–Lao as the official ideology, while the emperors mixed both with the realist techniques of Legalism.
Chinese philosophy originates in the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period, during a period known as the "Hundred Schools of Thought", which was characterized by significant intellectual and cultural developments. Although much of Chinese philosophy begun in the Warring States period, elements of Chinese philosophy have existed for several thousand years. Some can be found in the I Ching, an ancient compendium of divination, which dates back to at least 672 BCE.
The Zhou dynasty was a royal dynasty of China that existed for 789 years from c. 1046 BC until 256 BC, the longest of all dynasties in Chinese history. During the Western Zhou period, the royal house, surnamed Ji, had military control over ancient China. Even as Zhou suzerainty became increasingly ceremonial over the following Eastern Zhou period (771–256 BC), the political system created by the Zhou royal house survived in some form for several additional centuries. A date of 1046 BC for the Zhou's establishment is supported by the Xia–Shang–Zhou Chronology Project and David Pankenier, but David Nivison and Edward L. Shaughnessy date the establishment to 1045 BC.
The Chinese sovereign was the ruler of a particular monarchical regime in the historical periods of ancient China and imperial China. Sovereigns ruling the same regime, and descended from the same paternal line, constituted a dynasty. Several titles and naming schemes have been used throughout Chinese history.
Throughout Chinese history, "Emperor" was the superlative title held by the monarchs who ruled various imperial dynasties or Chinese empires. In traditional Chinese political theory, the emperor was the "Son of Heaven", an autocrat with the divine mandate right to rule all under Heaven. Emperors were worshiped posthumously under an imperial cult. The lineage of emperors descended from a paternal family line constituted a dynasty, and succession in most cases theoretically followed agnatic primogeniture. The emperor of China was an absolute monarch.
The names of China include the many contemporary and historical designations given in various languages for the East Asian country known as Zhōngguó in Standard Chinese, a form based on the Beijing dialect of Mandarin.
Sinocentrism refers to a worldview that China is the cultural, political, or economic center of the world. Sinocentrism was a core concept in various Chinese dynasties. The Chinese considered themselves to be "all-under-Heaven", ruled by the emperor, known as Son of Heaven. Those that lived outside of the Huaxia were regarded as "barbarians". In addition, states outside of China, such as Japan or Korea, were considered to be vassals of China.
The Mandate of Heaven is a Chinese political ideology that was used in Ancient China and Imperial China to legitimize the rule of the king or emperor of China. According to this doctrine, Heaven bestows its mandate on a virtuous ruler. This ruler, the Son of Heaven, was the supreme universal monarch, who ruled Tianxia. If a ruler was overthrown, this was interpreted as an indication that the ruler was unworthy and had lost the mandate. It was also a common belief that natural disasters such as famine and flood were divine retributions bearing signs of Heaven's displeasure with the ruler, so there would often be revolts following major disasters as the people saw these calamities as signs that the Mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn.
For most of its history, China was organized into various dynastic states under the rule of hereditary monarchs. Beginning with the establishment of dynastic rule by Yu the Great c. 2070 BC, and ending with the abdication of the Xuantong Emperor in AD 1912, Chinese historiography came to organize itself around the succession of monarchical dynasties. Besides those established by the dominant Han ethnic group or its spiritual Huaxia predecessors, dynasties throughout Chinese history were also founded by non-Han peoples.
Son of Heaven, or Tianzi, was the sacred monarchial and imperial title of the Chinese sovereign. It originated with the Zhou dynasty and was founded on the political and spiritual doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. Since the Qin dynasty, the secular imperial title of the Son of Heaven was "Huangdi".
Celestial Empire is an old name used to refer to China or the Chinese Empire, from a literary and poetic translation of the Chinese term, one of many names for China. The name was used in reference to the status of the Emperor of China as the Son of Heaven in the Sinosphere.
During the late Zhou dynasty, the inhabitants of the Central Plains began to make a distinction between Hua and Yi, referred to by some historians as the Sino–barbarian dichotomy. They defined themselves as part of cultural and political region known as Huaxia, which they contrasted with the surrounding regions home to outsiders, conventionally known as the Four Barbarians. Although Yi is usually translated as "barbarian", other translations of this term in English include "foreigners", "ordinary others", "wild tribes" and "uncivilized tribes". The Hua–Yi distinction asserted Chinese superiority, but implied that outsiders could become Hua by adopting their culture and customs. The Hua–Yi distinction was not unique to China, but was also applied by various Vietnamese, Japanese, and Koreans regimes, all of whom considered themselves at one point in history to be legitimate successors to the Chinese civilization and the "Central State" in imitation of China.
Zhao Tingyang is a political philosopher credited with modernising the ancient Chinese concept of Tianxia. He argues that the concept of a new Tianxia or all-under-heaven can offer an alternative blueprint for creating a more peaceful and inclusive world.
"Four Barbarians" was a term used by subjects of the Zhou and Han dynasties to refer to the four major people groups living outside the borders of Huaxia. Each was named for a cardinal direction: the Dongyi, Nanman, Xirong, and Beidi. Ultimately, the four barbarian groups either emigrated away from the Chinese heartland or were partly assimilated through sinicization into Chinese culture during later dynasties. After this early period, "barbarians" to the north and the west would often be designated as "Hu" (胡).
Chinese theology, which comes in different interpretations according to the Chinese classics and Chinese folk religion, and specifically Confucian, Taoist, and other philosophical formulations, is fundamentally monistic, that is to say it sees the world and the gods of its phenomena as an organic whole, or cosmos, which continuously emerges from a simple principle. This is expressed by the concept that "all things have one and the same principle". This principle is commonly referred to as Tiān 天, a concept generally translated as "Heaven", referring to the northern culmen and starry vault of the skies and its natural laws which regulate earthly phenomena and generate beings as their progenitors. Ancestors are therefore regarded as the equivalent of Heaven within human society, and therefore as the means connecting back to Heaven which is the "utmost ancestral father". Chinese theology may be also called Tiānxué 天學, a term already in use in the 17th and 18th centuries.
American Tianxia is a term coined by the historian Wang Gungwu in 2013 to refer to the contemporary global order centered on the United States. It was further developed by sociologist Salvatore Babones to analyze today's millennial world-system through the lens of the Chinese concept of tianxia, meaning "all under heaven." While the United States is often called an "empire," this is a historically loaded term that is associated with perceptions of American imperialism. The concept of tianxia has a different set of meanings attached to it that Wang suggests and Babones argues are closer to what the United States actually displays in its contemporary approach to foreign affairs.
Imperial titles were used in various historical Korean states before the 14th century and at the turn of the 20th century: Early Korean states used "great king", "greatest king", and "holy king"; later Korean states used "emperor". Korean monarchs who used imperial titles had political and religious authority over a realm or domain. The Chinese concept of tianxia, pronounced "cheonha" in Korean, was variously adopted and adapted to Korean views of the world from period to period.
Emperor at home, king abroad was a system of conducting relations between states within the Chinese cultural sphere. Rulers of lesser regimes would adopt the title of emperor and/or other imperial titles domestically, and adopt the title of king when dealing with the dominant Chinese regime. Instead of using the styles Imperial Majesty and Majesty (陛下), rulers of lesser realms were styled as Highness (殿下). This system was applicable to Japan, Korea and Vietnam, as well as less powerful Chinese states, among others.
Religious Confucianism is an interpretation of Confucianism as a religion. It originated in the time of Confucius with his defense of traditional religious institutions of his time such as the Jongmyo rites, and the ritual and music system.
The Chinese school of international relations is a theoretical framework which draws from Realism and Chinese historical concepts including tianxia, Confucian ethics, and moral international leadership.
↑ For tianxia in the Zuozhuan, the first appearance in the text is in Zhuang 12, in the narrative portion; the first appearance in the annalistic portion is in Xi 24 (636 BCE). Durrant, Stephen; Li, Wai-yee; Schaberg, David, eds. (2016). Zuo Tradition. Zuozhuan. 左傳: Commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals". University of Washington Press. pp.168, 372. ISBN978-0-295-999159.
↑ Liu Yitang (1997). Studies of Chinese Western Regions. Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company. p.79. ISBN957-09-1119-0.
↑ Zhu Xi, ed. (1100s). "Passages from the Da Xue". 四書章句集註[Collected Passages from the Four Books, with Annotations] (in Chinese). 物格而后知至。知至而后意誠。意誠而后心正。心正而后身脩。身脩而后家齊。家齊而后國治。國治而后天下平。
↑ Babones, Salvatore (25 September 2019). "From Tianxia to Tianxia: The Generalization of a Concept". Chinese Political Science Review. 5 (2): 131–147. doi:10.1007/s41111-019-00139-9. ISSN2365-4244.
Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. Stanford University Press. ISBN978-1-503-63088-8.
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