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The 2005 Chinese property bubble was a real estate bubble in residential and commercial real estate in China. The New York Times reported that the bubble started to deflate in 2011, [1] while observing increased complaints that members of the middle class were unable to afford homes in large cities. [2] The deflation of the property bubble is seen as one of the primary causes for China's declining economic growth in 2013. [2]
The phenomenon had seen average housing prices in the country triple from 2005 to 2009, [3] possibly driven by both government policies and Chinese cultural attitudes.[ citation needed ] High price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios for property and the high number of unoccupied residential and commercial units have been cited as evidence of a bubble. Later, average housing prices in the country increased between 2010 and 2013, [4]
Critics of the bubble theory point to China's relatively conservative mortgage lending standards and trends of increasing urbanization and rising incomes as proof that property prices are justified. [5]
There have been many factors that may have led to rising housing prices. Possible contributors include low interest rates and increased bank lending, [6] beginning in 2003 under Wen Jiabao which allowed cheap credit for the construction and purchase of property while making competing debt investments less appealing. During the bubble, local government relied on land sales for income (accounting for up to 50% of revenue), incentivizing the continued sale and development of land. [7] Limited access to foreign investments for Chinese citizens increased the appeal of domestic investments such as property. [8] Chinese citizens also faced cultural pressures encouraging home ownership, particularly for men seeking a wife. [9] [10] [11] [12]
Responding to the Great Recession, the spending from the China economic stimulus program may have found its way into real estate, contributing to the bubble. [13] [14]
Grey income: According to independent economist Andy Xie,[ citation needed ] the scale of China's grey income is very large- possibly one-tenth of GDP. Most grey incomes are invested in the real estate market of tier 1 and tier 2 cities, which contributes to the fact that the leverage rate of Chinese properties are small compared to the property bubbles in other countries. The normalization of grey incomes in China fed the property bubble in the long run.
Between 2005 and 2011, average housing prices rose rapidly in the Chinese real estate market. Analysts argued over whether this rise was a result of a speculative real estate bubble, or genuine increases in demand. Evidence for a bubble included significant numbers of vacant or under-performing commercial and residential properties [15] [16] [17] and the continued construction of property despite these facts, [18] [19] including an estimated 64 million vacant apartments. [20] There were high price-to-income ratios for real estate, such as in Beijing where the ratio was 27-to-1 for a double income household, five times the international average. There were also high price-to-rent ratios for real estate, such as in Beijing where the ratio was 500:1 months compared to the global ratio of 300:1 months [21] There was a weak secondary market for Chinese homes, with the ratio of secondary to primary residential property transactions at 0.26 for the first half of 2009 (four times as many new home purchases as secondary sales). Comparably, Hong Kong had a ratio of 7.25, and the U.S. had a ratio of 13.45. [22]
Contributing to the bubble were Chinese companies in the chemical, steel, textile and shoe industries opening real estate divisions, expecting higher returns than in their core businesses. [23] During this period, residential housing investment as a share of China's GDP has tripled from 2% in 2000 to 6% in 2011, similar to the peak of the U.S. housing bubble. [24]
Analysts, including Cao Jianhai, professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, [25] Andy Xie, a Shanghai economist, [26] and Zhang Xin, a CEO of Beijing real estate developer SOHO China [13] warned of the threat of a bubble and the economic stagnation that would follow. In response to fears of a bubble, in the summer of 2011, Standard & Poor's downgraded its outlook for China real estate development sector to negative from stable, following a tightening of credit conditions in the country and slower sales. [27]
However, trends of increasing urbanization and rising incomes [28] in China seemed to continue to support real estate prices. The World Bank stated in a November 2009 report that Chinese home prices had not outpaced increases in incomes on a nationwide level, which dispelled worries of a looming bubble. [28] However, in its 17 March 2010 quarterly report, the group said China needed to raise interest rates to contain the risk of a property bubble. [29] In China, there were comparatively conservative mortgage lending practices, particularly in contrast to those at the height of the United States housing bubble. [30]
The Economist Intelligence Unit's Access China service released a follow-up report to the October 2010 report "CHAMPS: China’s fastest-growing cities", entitled "Building Rome in a day: The sustainability of China’s housing boom". [31] The report forecasted the population and average income in close to 300 Chinese cities, and the subsequent demand for housing in China during the next decade. The report stated that "with China’s property market being an important global economic indicator, China’s housing boom will present opportunities for investors in sectors such as furniture, cars and building materials." Regarding China's urban population, the report forecasts that between 2011 and 2020 it will "increase by 26.1% or over 160 million people, while urban per head disposable incomes will increase by 2.6-fold to 51,310 RMB (about US$7,500 at current exchange rates)." [32]
Between 2010 and 2011, policies were enacted to curb the bubble from worsening or prevent it from occurring. The Chinese cabinet announced in 2010 it would monitor capital flows to "stop overseas speculative funds from jeopardizing China's property market" and also begin requiring families purchasing a second home to make at least a 40% down-payment. [33]
In early 2011, Beijing banned the sale of homes to those who have not lived in Beijing for five years. Beijing also limited the number of homes a native Beijing family could own to two, and allowed only one home for non-native Beijing families. [34] By July 2011, the Chinese Government raised interest rates for the third time that year. [35] A new nationwide real estate sales tax was introduced in China in late 2009 as a measure to curb speculative investing. [36] A mortgage discount for first-time property buyers – which had offered fixed, 5% 20-year mortgages at just above 4% – was also eliminated. [26]
The deflation of the bubble began in the summer of 2011, when home prices began to slow or fall in Chinese cities. [37] The end of the property bubble is seen as one of the primary causes for China's declining economic growth in 2012. [2] [ citation needed ]
As told in an Al Jazeera documentary called Chinese Dreamland by David Borenstein, China's technocrats planned to avoid the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession by creating the greatest housing boom in human history, with then-Premier Wen Jiabao proclaiming that "confidence is more important than gold or capital" to maintain employment and GDP growth. China ending up using more concrete in two years than the United States did during the entire 20th century. The property bubble peaked in 2009. By 2012, as large established population centers were saturated, developers were building new communities in rural areas in order to keep up the momentum. Since the best way to market countryside housing was "internationalisation" by depicting them as global commerce metropolises, real estate developers enlisted "rent-a-foreigner" companies to stage "dazzling spectacles where their foreign employees are presented as famous entertainers, important businessmen, top-20 models, diplomats, architects". Borenstein observed that these "erotic fantasies" [fueled a] speculative frenzy" which went hand-in-hand with overbuilding in order to maintain the facade of confidence, discouraging negative financial reports which showed that demand was well overstated or even not justified. By 2014 developers were facing a growing backlash, from rural farmers whose land was expropriated without proper compensation, and from buyers upset by the poor quality, or at other units in the same development being sold at steep discounts. [38] [39] [40] This bubble ended up creating ghost cities that were abandoned incomplete or finished but largely unoccupied. Most of these empty developments are found in minor cities where state-run industries and mines had closed down, and new housing projects were seen by local officials as a means of diversification as well as cashing in on the property bubble. [41]
The property bubble has resulted in poor quality design and construction, ending up in buildings often unfinished or unoccupied. Developers and contractors often cut corners to pocket money, while there is often a shortage of skilled labor, and projects often have short time constraints. Austin Williams wrote that this trend was consistent with capitalism where "Its early stages usually involve building shit, making a profit, and moving on to the next deal – even if the building falls down soon after". In addition, long-lasting buildings are less profitable than those buildings shoddily built and rebuilt during the same time span; indeed repeated demolition and construction counts toward GDP economic growth. [41] [42]
The 2000s United States housing bubble or house price boom or 2000shousing cycle was a sharp run up and subsequent collapse of house asset prices affecting over half of the U.S. states. In many regions a real estate bubble, it was the impetus for the subprime mortgage crisis. Housing prices peaked in early 2006, started to decline in 2006 and 2007, and reached new lows in 2011. On December 30, 2008, the Case–Shiller home price index reported the largest price drop in its history. The credit crisis resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble is an important cause of the Great Recession in the United States.
A housing bubble is one of several types of asset price bubbles which periodically occur in the market. The basic concept of a housing bubble is the same as for other asset bubbles, consisting of two main phases. First there is a period where house prices increase dramatically, driven more and more by speculation. In the second phase, house prices fall dramatically. Housing bubbles tend to be among the asset bubbles with the largest effect on the real economy because they are credit-fueled,,and a large number of households participate and not just investors, and because the wealth effect from housing tends to be larger than for other types of financial assets.
A real-estate bubble or property bubble is a type of economic bubble that occurs periodically in local or global real estate markets, and it typically follows a land boom. A land boom is a rapid increase in the market price of real property such as housing until they reach unsustainable levels and then declines. This period, during the run-up to the crash, is also known as froth. The questions of whether real estate bubbles can be identified and prevented, and whether they have broader macroeconomic significance, are answered differently by schools of economic thought, as detailed below.
The Irish property bubble was the speculative excess element of a long-term price increase of real estate in the Republic of Ireland from the early 2000s to 2007, a period known as the later part of the Celtic Tiger. In 2006, the prices peaked at the top of the bubble, with a combination of increased speculative construction and rapidly rising prices; in 2007 the prices first stabilised and then started to fall until 2010 following the shock effect of the Great Recession. By the second quarter of 2010, house prices in Ireland had fallen by 35% compared with the second quarter of 2007, and the number of housing loans approved fell by 73%.
The Spanish property bubble is the collapsed overshooting part of a long-term price increase of Spanish real estate prices. This long-term price increase has happened in various stages from 1985 up to 2008. The housing bubble can be clearly divided in three periods: 1985–1991, in which the price nearly tripled; 1992–1996, in which the price remained somewhat stable; and 1996–2008, in which prices grew astonishingly again. The 2008–2014 Spanish real estate crisis caused prices to fall. In 2013, Raj Badiani, an economist at IHS Global Insight in London, estimated that the value of residential real estate has dropped more than 30 percent since 2007 and that house prices would fall at least 50 percent from the peak by 2015. Alcidi and Gros note; “If construction were to continue at the still relatively high rate of today, the process of absorption of the bubble would take more than 30 years”.
The American subprime mortgage crisis was a multinational financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2010 that contributed to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. The crisis led to a severe economic recession, with millions losing their jobs and many businesses going bankrupt. The U.S. government intervened with a series of measures to stabilize the financial system, including the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
Observers and analysts have attributed the reasons for the 2001–2006 housing bubble and its 2007–10 collapse in the United States to "everyone from home buyers to Wall Street, mortgage brokers to Alan Greenspan". Other factors that are named include "Mortgage underwriters, investment banks, rating agencies, and investors", "low mortgage interest rates, low short-term interest rates, relaxed standards for mortgage loans, and irrational exuberance" Politicians in both the Democratic and Republican political parties have been cited for "pushing to keep derivatives unregulated" and "with rare exceptions" giving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "unwavering support".
The Great Recession was a period of market decline in economies around the world that occurred in the late 2000s. The scale and timing of the recession varied from country to country. At the time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that it was the most severe economic and financial meltdown since the Great Depression. One result was a serious disruption of normal international relations.
The Australian property market comprises the trade of land and its permanent fixtures located within Australia. The average Australian property price grew 0.5% per year from 1890 to 1990 after inflation, however rose from 1990 to 2017 at a faster rate. House prices in Australia receive considerable attention from the media and the Reserve Bank and some commentators have argued that there is an Australian property bubble.
The 2008–09 Chinese economic stimulus plan was a RMB¥ 4 trillion stimulus package aiming to minimize the impact of the Great Recession on the economy of China. It was announced by the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 9 November 2008. The economic stimulus plan was seen as a success: While China's economic growth fell to almost 6% by the end of 2008, it had recovered to over 10% by in mid-2009. Critics of China's stimulus package have blamed it for causing a surge in Chinese debt since 2009, particularly among local governments and state-owned enterprises. The World Bank subsequently went on to recommend similar public works spending campaigns to western governments experiencing the effects of the Great Recession, but the US and EU instead decided to pursue long-term policies of quantitative easing.
The Australian property bubble is the economic theory that the Australian property market has become or is becoming significantly overpriced and due for a significant downturn. Since the early 2010s, various commentators, including one Treasury official, have claimed the Australian property market is in a significant bubble.
Andy Xie is an independent economist based in Shanghai, and the former Morgan Stanley star chief Asia-Pacific economist famous for his contrarian and provocative views. He left Morgan Stanley abruptly in October 2006 when an internal email that he penned was leaked. He derided Singapore as a money laundering centre for Indonesia, and the ASEAN group of nations as a failure.
The Lebanese housing bubble refers to an economic bubble affecting almost all of the Lebanese real estate sector, whereby property prices have risen exponentially since 2005, while the GDP has risen only around 52% during that same period.
Real estate in China is developed and managed by public, private, and state-owned red chip enterprises.
In recent years, housing development has ballooned in China as its economy has developed. Since 1978, the government has promoted the commercialization of housing in urban areas. Property development has become big business in China, with new cities and suburbs springing up with new apartments.
The Baltic states' housing bubble was an economic bubble involving major cities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The three Baltic countries had enjoyed a relatively strong economic growth between 2000 and 2006, and the real estate sectors had performed well since 2000. In fact, in between 2005Q1 and 2007Q1, the official house price index for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania recorded a sharp jump of 104.6%, 134.3% and 106.7%. By comparison, the official house price index for Euro Area increased by 11.8% for a similar time period.
The economy of Beijing ranks among the most developed and prosperous cities in China. In 2013, the municipality's nominal gross domestic product (GDP) was CN¥1.95 trillion. It was about 3.43% of the country's total output, and ranked 13th among province-level administrative units. Per capita GDP, at CN¥93,213 (US$15,051) in nominal terms and Int $21,948 at purchasing power parity, was 2.2 times the national average and ranked second among province-level administrative units.
The 2015-2016 Chinese stock market turbulence began with the popping of a stock market bubble on 12 June 2015 and ended in early February 2016. A third of the value of A-shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange was lost within one month of the event. Major aftershocks occurred around 27 July and 24 August's "Black Monday". By 8–9 July 2015, the Shanghai stock market had fallen 30 percent over three weeks as 1,400 companies, or more than half listed, filed for a trading halt in an attempt to prevent further losses. Values of Chinese stock markets continued to drop despite efforts by the government to reduce the fall. After three stable weeks the Shanghai index fell again by 8.48 percent on 24 August, marking the largest fall since 2007.
The Canadian property bubble refers to a significant rise in Canadian real estate prices from 2002 to present. The Dallas Federal Reserve rated Canadian real estate as "exuberant" beginning in 2003. From 2003 to 2018, Canada saw an increase in home and property prices of up to 337% in some cities. In 2016, the OECD warned that Canada's financial stability was at risk due to elevated housing prices, investment and household debt. By 2018, home-owning costs were above 1990 levels when Canada saw its last housing bubble burst. Bloomberg Economics ranked Canada as the second largest housing bubble across the OECD in 2019 and 2021. Toronto scored the highest in the world in Swiss bank UBS' real estate bubble index in 2022, with Vancouver also scoring among the 10 riskiest cities in the world.
SOHO China is a Chinese building developer, primarily in the office and commercial sector, with some residential and mixed-use properties in its portfolio. The company, which uses the name "SOHO" in both English and Chinese contexts, was founded in 1995 by Chairman Pan Shiyi (潘石屹) and CEO Zhang Xin (张欣). The name SOHO comes from the phrase "Smart Office, Home Office" as the company decided to combine office rooms and residential apartments in the same building to facilitate a comfortable and productive environment.
the popping of China's real estate bubble over the past year depressed demand for steel, cement and other materials
China's leaders deliberately popped a real estate bubble last summer because of concerns that middle-class families had been priced out of homeownership in many cities
Chinese investors don't have a lot of options that they're allowed. They can't invest overseas unless they already have money overseas. There is -- a lot of markets in China aren't well developed -- like there's no bond market in China. So, they can put their money in a bank and not earn very much. They can put their money in government bonds and not earn very much. They can put their money in the stock market, but they've seen over the past two years, if not before, that the stock market goes down as well as up....So, viewing these limited investment opportunities, people look at real estate and they say, 'You can't lose'. (9:50 - 11:00)
If you're not able to settle down in Beijing, that's considered a big failure. In order not to fail, you have to buy an apartment in the city.
We don't really have a view on when it will end; [but] we do have a view that this is a bubble. Real estate is very much driven by government policy. This year we have RMB 4 trillion through the stimulus package, another RMB 6 trillion from municipality bonds, another RMB 10 trillion from bank loans: We have RMB 20 trillion in the system and it all finds its way to real estate.
The government announced a big stimulus package that was about 486 billion U.S. dollars, but that actually was not the big stimulus. The big stimulus was they told the banks, 'Go out and lend', and the banks lent 1.4 trillion U.S. dollars this year and actually increased the money supply by more than a third in the process of doing that. A lot of this money, the evidence seems to indicate, made its way, whether intentionally or unintentionally, into the construction and property sector. (4:38 - 5:20)
And the bears also keep a close eye on anecdotal reports from the ground level in China, like a recent posting on a blog called The Peking Duck about shopping at Beijing's 'stunningly dysfunctional, catastrophic mall, called The Place.'
In Beijing, vast swaths of commercial space sit vacant – including floors of retail space right next to the iconic Water Cube, the swimming venue for the 2008 Olympics.
In Shanghai, the central business district appears to have high vacancy rates, yet building continues.
As is typical in the later stages of property booms, many investors in China appear to have discarded rental yields as a measure of how much a building is worth in favor of greater-fool pricing. In downtown Beijing office towers sold this year for $400 per square foot, despite the fact that many were unleased and many more are under construction.
Companies in the chemical, steel, textile and shoe industries have started up property divisions, too: The chance of a quick return is much higher than in their primary business.
Tianjin, a gritty metropolis not far from Beijing, will soon have more prime office space than will be filled in a quarter-century at the current absorption rate.