Summability criterion

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The summability criterion is a voting system criterion, used to objectively compare electoral systems. The criterion states:

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Each vote should be able to be mapped onto a summable array, such that its size at most grows polynomially with respect to the amount of candidates, the summation operation is associative and commutative and the winner could be determined from the array sum for all votes cast alone.

Summability of various methods

In plurality voting, the number of ballots for each candidate may be counted, and these totals reported from each precinct.

Some other methods that are summable:

In approval voting, Borda count, and score voting, each ballot contains votes for more than one candidate, and, with the last two, these votes may have different values. However, the sum of all values for each candidate may be found at each precinct and reported.

With Bucklin voting, the precinct totals for each candidate at each rank may be summed and reported.

In many Condorcet methods, each ballot can be represented as a two-dimensional square array referred to as a pairwise matrix. The sum of these matrices may be reported from each precinct.

Instant-runoff voting does not comply with the summability criterion. [4]

Related Research Articles

Score voting or range voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections, in which voters give each candidate a score, the scores are added, and the candidate with the highest total is elected. It has been described by various other names including evaluative voting, utilitarian voting, interval measure voting, point-sum voting, ratings summation, 0-99 voting, and average voting. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system that aims to approximate the utilitarian social choice rule.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Condorcet method</span> Pairwise-comparison electoral system

A Condorcet method is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner. The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Copeland's method</span> Single-winner ranked vote system

Copeland's method, also called Llull's method or round-robin voting, is a ranked-choice voting system based on scoring pairwise wins and losses.

Bucklin voting is a class of voting methods that can be used for single-member and multi-member districts. As in highest median rules like the majority judgment, the Bucklin winner will be one of the candidates with the highest median ranking or rating. It is named after its original promoter, the Georgist politician James W. Bucklin of Grand Junction, Colorado, and is also known as the Grand Junction system.

In an election, a candidate is called a Condorcet, beats-all, or majority winner if more than half of all voters would support them in any one-on-one matchup with another candidate. Such a candidate is also called an undefeated or tournament champion, by analogy with round-robin tournaments. Voting systems where a majority choice will always win the election are said to satisfy the Condorcetcriterion.

The majority criterion is a voting system criterion. The criterion states that "if only one candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters, then that candidate must win."

The mutual majority criterion, also known as majority for solid coalitions or the generalized majority criterion, is a voting system criterion that says that if a political faction or party wins a majority of the vote, they should win the election.

The Borda count electoral system can be combined with an instant-runoff procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called Nanson method and Baldwin method. Both methods are designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings.

In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion.

Reversal symmetry is a voting system criterion which requires that if candidate A is the unique winner, and each voter's individual preferences are inverted, then A must not be elected. Methods that satisfy reversal symmetry include Borda count, ranked pairs, Kemeny–Young method, and Schulze method. Methods that fail include Bucklin voting, instant-runoff voting and Condorcet methods that fail the Condorcet loser criterion such as Minimax.

The plurality criterion is a voting system criterion devised by Douglas R. Woodall for ranked voting methods with incomplete ballots. It is stated as follows:

The Kemeny–Young method is an electoral system that uses ranked ballots and pairwise comparison counts to identify the most popular choices in an election. It is a Condorcet method because if there is a Condorcet winner, it will always be ranked as the most popular choice.

The later-no-harm criterion is a voting system criterion first formulated by Douglas Woodall. Woodall defined the criterion by saying that "[a]dding a later preference to a ballot should not harm any candidate already listed." For example, a ranked voting method in which a voter adding a 3rd preference could reduce the likelihood of their 1st preference being selected, fails later-no-harm.

The Borda count is a family of positional voting rules which gives each candidate, for each ballot, a number of points corresponding to the number of candidates ranked lower. In the original variant, the lowest-ranked candidate gets 0 points, the next-lowest gets 1 point, etc., and the highest-ranked candidate gets n − 1 points, where n is the number of candidates. Once all votes have been counted, the option or candidate with the most points is the winner. The Borda count is intended to elect broadly acceptable options or candidates, rather than those preferred by a majority, and so is often described as a consensus-based voting system rather than a majoritarian one.

The majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters prefers every other candidate over a given candidate, then that candidate must not win.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Electoral system</span> Method by which voters make a choice between options

An electoral system or voting system is a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums are conducted and how their results are determined. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, non-profit organisations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result. Political electoral systems are defined by constitutions and electoral laws, are typically conducted by election commissions, and can use multiple types of elections for different offices.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ranked voting</span> Family of electoral systems

The term ranked voting, also known as preferential voting or ranked-choice voting, pertains to any voting system where voters indicate a rank to order candidates or options—in a sequence from first, second, third, and onwards—on their ballots. Ranked voting systems vary based on the ballot marking process, how preferences are tabulated and counted, the number of seats available for election, and whether voters are allowed to rank candidates equally.

Homogeneity is a common property for voting systems. The property is satisfied if, in any election, the result depends only on the proportion of ballots of each possible type. Specifically, if every ballot is replicated the same number of times, then the result should not change.

A major branch of social choice theory is devoted to the comparison of electoral systems, otherwise known as social choice functions. Viewed from the perspective of political science, electoral systems are rules for conducting elections and determining winners from the ballots cast. From the perspective of economics, mathematics, and philosophy, a social choice function is a mathematical function that determines how a society should make choices, given a collection of individual preferences.

Black's method is an election method proposed by Duncan Black in 1958 as a compromise between the Condorcet method and the Borda count. This method selects a Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the candidate with the highest Borda score is selected.

References

  1. Hogben, G. (1913). "Preferential Voting in Single-member Constituencies, with Special Reference to the Counting of Votes". Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New Zealand. 46: 304–308.
  2. Nanson, E. J. (1882). "Methods of election". Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria. 19: 197–240.
  3. "Compare STAR and IRV - Equal Vote Coalition". Equal Vote Coalition. Retrieved 2018-11-12.
  4. Gaming the Vote, Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do About It), William Poundstone, New York: Hill and Wang, 2008, p. 170.

See also