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Social choice and electoral systems |
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Mathematicsportal |
Coombs' method is a ranked voting system. Like instant-runoff (IRV-RCV), Coombs' method is a sequential-loser method, where the last-place finisher according to one method is eliminated in each round. However, unlike in instant-runoff, each round has electors voting against their least-favorite candidate; the candidate ranked last by the most voters is eliminated. [1]
The method fails most voting system criteria, including Condorcet's majority criterion, monotonicity, participation, and clone-independence. [2] [3] However, it does satisfy Black's single-peaked median voter criterion. [1] : prop. 2
The method was popularized by Clyde Coombs. [1] It was described by Edward J. Nanson as the "Venetian method" [4] (which should not be confused with the Republic of Venice's use of score voting in elections for Doge).
Each voter rank-orders all of the candidates on their ballot. Otherwise, the candidate ranked last by the largest number (plurality) of voters is eliminated, making each individual round equivalent to anti-plurality voting. Conversely, under instant-runoff voting, the candidate ranked first (among non-eliminated candidates) by the fewest voters is eliminated.
In some sources, the elimination proceeds regardless of whether any candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters, and the last candidate to be eliminated is the winner. [5] This variant of the method can result in a different winner than the former one (unlike in instant-runoff voting, where checking to see if any candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters is only a shortcut that does not affect the outcome).
Suppose that Tennessee is holding an election on the location of its capital. The population is concentrated around four major cities. All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible. The options are:
The preferences of each region's voters are:
42% of voters Far-West | 26% of voters Center | 15% of voters Center-East | 17% of voters Far-East |
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Assuming all of the voters vote sincerely (strategic voting is discussed below), the results would be as follows, by percentage:
City | Round 1 | Round 2 | ||
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First | Last | First | Last | |
Memphis | 42 | 58 | ||
Nashville | 26 | 0 | ||
Chattanooga | 15 | 0 | 15 | |
Knoxville | 17 | 42 | 17 |
The voting rounds used in the reality television program Survivor could be considered a variation of Coombs' method but with sequential voting rounds. Everyone votes for one candidate they support for elimination each round, and the candidate with a plurality of that vote is eliminated. A strategy difference is that sequential rounds of voting means the elimination choice is fixed in a ranked ballot Coombs' method until that candidate is eliminated.
Like anti-plurality voting, Coombs' rule is extremely vulnerable to strategic voting. As a result, it is more often used as an example of a pathological voting rule than a serious proposal. [6] The equilibrium position for Coombs' method is extremely sensitive to incomplete ballots and strategic nomination because the vast majority of voters' effects on the election come from how they fill out the bottom of their ballots. [6] As a result, voters have a strong incentive to rate the strongest candidates last to defeat them in earlier rounds. [7]
Plurality voting refers to electoral systems in which the candidates in an electoral district who poll more than any other are elected.
The two-round system, also called ballotage, top-two runoff, or two-round plurality, is a single winner voting method. It is sometimes called plurality-runoff, although this term can also be used for other, closely-related systems such as instant-runoff voting or the exhaustive ballot. It falls under the class of plurality-based voting rules, together with instant-runoff and first-past-the-post (FPP). In a two-round system, if no candidate receives a majority of the vote in the first round, the two candidates with the most votes in the first round proceed to a second round where all other candidates are excluded. Both rounds are held under choose-one voting, where the voter marks a single favored candidate.
A Condorcet method is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner or Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW). The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.
A Condorcet winner is a candidate who would receive the support of more than half of the electorate in a one-on-one race against any one of their opponents. Voting systems where a majority winner will always win are said to satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The Condorcet winner criterion extends the principle of majority rule to elections with multiple candidates.
The Borda count electoral system can be combined with an instant-runoff procedure to create hybrid election methods that are called Nanson method and Baldwin method. Both methods are designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, and allow for incomplete ballots and equal rankings.
In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion.
Bullet, single-shot, or plump voting is when a voter supports only a single candidate, typically to show strong support for a single favorite.
In social choice theory, the best-is-worst paradox occurs when a voting rule declares the same candidate to be both the best and worst possible winner. The worst candidate can be identified by reversing each voter's ballot, then applying the voting rule to the reversed ballots find a new "anti-winner".
The exhaustive ballot is a voting system used to elect a single winner. Under the exhaustive ballot the elector casts a single vote for his or her chosen candidate. However, if no candidate is supported by an overall majority of votes then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and a further round of voting occurs. This process is repeated for as many rounds as necessary until one candidate has a majority.
The contingent vote is an electoral system used to elect a single representative in which a candidate requires a majority of votes to win. It is a form of preferential voting. The voter ranks the candidates in order of preference, and when the votes are counted, the first preference votes only are counted. If no candidate has a majority of the votes cast, then all but the two leading candidates are eliminated and the votes received by the eliminated candidates are distributed among the two remaining candidates according to voters' preferences.
Later-no-harm is a property of some ranked-choice voting systems, first described by Douglas Woodall. In later-no-harm systems, increasing the rating or rank of a candidate ranked below the winner of an election cannot cause a higher-ranked candidate to lose. It is a common property in the plurality-rule family of voting systems.
Instant-runoff voting is a single-winner, multi-round elimination rule that uses ranked voting to simulate a series of runoff elections. In each round, the candidate with the fewest first-preferences is eliminated. This continues until only one candidate is left. Instant runoff falls under the plurality-with-elimination family of voting methods, and is thus closely related to rules like the two-round runoff system.
The majority loser criterion is a criterion to evaluate single-winner voting systems. The criterion states that if a majority of voters give a candidate no support, i.e. do not list that candidate on their ballot, that candidate must lose.
The 2009 Burlington mayoral election was the second mayoral election since the city's 2005 change to instant-runoff voting (IRV), also known as ranked-choice voting (RCV), after the 2006 mayoral election. In the 2009 election, incumbent Burlington mayor won reelection as a member of the Vermont Progressive Party, defeating Kurt Wright in the final round with 48% of the vote.
An electoral or voting system is a set of rules used to determine the results of an election. Electoral systems are used in politics to elect governments, while non-political elections may take place in business, non-profit organisations and informal organisations. These rules govern all aspects of the voting process: when elections occur, who is allowed to vote, who can stand as a candidate, how ballots are marked and cast, how the ballots are counted, how votes translate into the election outcome, limits on campaign spending, and other factors that can affect the result. Political electoral systems are defined by constitutions and electoral laws, are typically conducted by election commissions, and can use multiple types of elections for different offices.
Ranked voting is any voting system that uses voters' rankings of candidates to choose a single winner or multiple winners. More formally, a ranked system is one that depends only on which of two candidates is preferred by a voter, and as such does not incorporate any information about intensity of preferences. Ranked voting systems vary dramatically in how preferences are tabulated and counted, which gives them very different properties. In instant-runoff voting (IRV) and the single transferable vote system (STV), lower preferences are used as contingencies and are only applied when all higher-ranked preferences on a ballot have been eliminated or when the vote has been cast for a candidate who has been elected and surplus votes need to be transferred.
There are a number of different criteria which can be used for voting systems in an election, including the following
The later-no-help criterion is a voting system criterion formulated by Douglas Woodall. The criterion is satisfied if, in any election, a voter giving an additional ranking or positive rating to a less-preferred candidate can not cause a more-preferred candidate to win. Voting systems that fail the later-no-help criterion are vulnerable to the tactical voting strategy called mischief voting, which can deny victory to a sincere Condorcet winner.
The Tideman Alternative method, also called Alternative-Smithvoting, is a voting rule developed by Nicolaus Tideman which selects a single winner using ranked ballots. This method is Smith-efficient, making it a kind of Condorcet method, and uses the alternative vote (RCV) to resolve any cyclic ties.
Center squeeze is a kind of independence of irrelevant alternatives violation seen in a number of election rules, such as two-round and instant runoff, for example. In a center squeeze, the Condorcet winner is eliminated before they have the chance to face any of the other candidates in a one-on-one race. The term can also refer to tendency of such rules to encourage polarization among elected officials.