Evolutionary debunking

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An evolutionary debunking, sometimes referred to as an evolutionary debunking argument or evolutionary debunking thesis, is a philosophical argument which holds that, because humans (like all organisms) have an evolutionary origin, the principles of ethics and morality that we have devised are invalid and cannot be considered objective knowledge. [1] [2] Proponents of such arguments argue that they refute, or at least cast doubt on, moral realism and/or theism. [3] [4] [5] However, critics have argued that these arguments are themselves invalid. [2] [3] [6]

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References

  1. Kahane, Guy (March 2011). "Evolutionary Debunking Arguments". Noûs . 45 (1): 103–125. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x. PMC   3175808 . PMID   21949447.
  2. 1 2 Wielenberg, Erik J. (April 2010). "On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality". Ethics . 120 (3): 441–464. doi:10.1086/652292. ISSN   0014-1704. S2CID   144853113.
  3. 1 2 FitzPatrick, William J. (April 2015). "Debunking evolutionary debunking of ethical realism". Philosophical Studies . 172 (4): 883–904. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0295-y. ISSN   0031-8116. S2CID   170086133.
  4. Jong, Jonathan; Visala, Aku (December 2014). "Evolutionary debunking arguments against theism, reconsidered". International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 76 (3): 243–258. doi:10.1007/s11153-014-9461-6. ISSN   0020-7047. S2CID   170394509.
  5. Vavova, Katia (February 2015). "Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism: Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism". Philosophy Compass . 10 (2): 104–116. doi:10.1111/phc3.12194.
  6. Vavova, Katia (2006). "Debunking Evolutionary Debunking". Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Clarendon Press. ISBN   978-0-19-870930-5.

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