Hostile media effect

Last updated

The hostile media effect, originally deemed the hostile media phenomenon and sometimes called hostile media perception, is a perceptual theory of mass communication that refers to the tendency for individuals with a strong preexisting attitude on an issue to perceive media coverage as biased against their side and in favor of their antagonists' point of view. [1] Partisans from opposite sides of an issue will tend to find the same coverage to be biased against them. [2] The phenomenon was first proposed and studied experimentally by Robert Vallone, Lee Ross and Mark Lepper. [2] [3]

Contents

Studies

In 1982, the second major study of this phenomenon was undertaken; [2] pro-Palestinian students and pro-Israeli students at Stanford University were shown the same news filmstrips pertaining to the then-recent Sabra and Shatila massacre of Palestinian refugees by Christian Lebanese militia fighters abetted by the Israeli army in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War. On a number of objective measures, both sides found that these identical news clips were slanted in favor of the other side. Pro-Israeli students reported seeing more anti-Israel references and fewer favorable references to Israel in the news report and pro-Palestinian students reported seeing more anti-Palestinian references, and so on. Both sides said a neutral observer would have a more negative view of their side from viewing the clips, and that the media would have excused the other side where it blamed their side.

Subsequent studies have found hostile media effects related to other political conflicts, such as strife in Bosnia, [4] immigration in the U.S. [5] and in U.S. presidential elections, [6] as well as in other areas, such as media coverage of the South Korean National Security Act, [7] the 1997 United Parcel Service Teamsters strike, [8] genetically modified food, [9] [10] and sports. [11]

The effect was originally dubbed "hostile media phenomenon" by Vallone et al., [2] and is occasionally referred to as "hostile media perception," since it seems to precipitate the effects of media. In a 2015 meta-analysis of the subject, [1] Perloff said "hostile media effect" is the most often used term:

The most common term is "hostile media effect," perhaps because scholars appreciate that the "effect" term cuts to the heart of the mass communication research enterprise and captures the theoretically intriguing aspect of the hostile media phenomenon. (703)

The effect appears to be something of a disconfirmation bias, or "a contrast bias – a deviation of judgment in which a partisan individual perceives or evaluates media content to be further away, in terms of valence, from his or her own point of view." [12] In other words, the intention of the reporter or the story is irrelevant – those "partisans" [2] who consume the content find the content that is hostile to their point of view on their own.

An oft-cited forerunner to Vallone et al.'s study was conducted by Albert Hastorf and Hadley Cantril in 1954. [13] Princeton and Dartmouth students were shown a filmstrip of a controversial Princeton-Dartmouth football game. Asked to count the number of infractions committed by both sides, students at both universities "saw" many more infractions committed by the opposing side, in addition to making different generalizations about the game. Hastorf and Cantril concluded that "there is no such 'thing' as a 'game' existing 'out there' in its own right which people merely 'observe.' ... For the 'thing' simply is not the same for different people whether the 'thing' is a football game, a presidential candidate, Communism, or spinach." [14]

Explanations

Cognitive

Three cognitive mechanisms for explaining the hostile media effect have been suggested: [15]

Partisans who have consistently processed facts and arguments in light of their preconceptions and prejudices [...] are bound to believe that the preponderance of reliable, pertinent evidence favors their viewpoint. Accordingly, to the extent that the small sample of evidence and argument featured in a media presentation seems unrepresentative of this larger "population" of information, perceivers will charge bias in the presentation and will be likely to infer hostility and bias on the part of those responsible for it. [16]

It is important to note that these criteria allow for specific measures beyond subjective generalizations about the media coverage as a whole, such as what might be expressed as "I thought that the news has been generally biased against this side of the issue." The research suggests the hostile media effect is not just a difference of opinion but a difference of perception (selective perception).

Source factors

Characteristics of the message source may also influence the hostile media effect. A source perceived to be friendly to the partisan (usually because of agreeable ideology or geographic proximity to the group) is less likely to invoke the hostile media effect than a source that is disagreeable or geographically detached. [11] [17] In numerous studies, Albert C. Gunther and his associates have suggested that the ability of mass media to reach a large audience is what triggers the hostile media effect. Consistently, they found that a message appearing to originate from a newspaper was perceived as hostile by partisans, while an identical message appearing in a student essay was perceived as unbiased, or even favorable toward the partisan cause. [9] [10] [18]

The phenomenon also exists for personalities on television – partisans in a study were found to perceive significantly less bias in a host they perceive as like-minded. [19]

Consistent with a hostile media effect, issue partisans perceived less bias in opinionated news hosts whose viewpoints cohered with their own than did non-partisans and especially partisans on the opposing side of the issue. In most cases, these partisan differences were as big as—if not bigger than—the differences seen in response to non-opinionated news, indicating that even blatant deviations from journalistic norms do not quell partisan selectivity in news perceptions, at least when it comes to perceived bias in the host of opinionated programs.

While partisans can agree on the bias of a particular source, the reasons for that bias appears to account for the difference; that is, consumers on both sides of an issue may see bias in a particular story, but are more likely to attribute that story to a host they perceive as hostile to their own particular cause.

Partisanship

All of these explanatory mechanisms are influenced by partisanship. From the first studies, the hostile media effect has required an audience of partisans, with stronger beliefs correlating with stronger manifestations of the effect. [11] Increasing devotion to a particular side of an issue leads to increasing levels of biased information processing, whether out of protection of personal values [18] or a strong sense of group affiliation. [17]

Relative hostile media effect

Early hostile media effect studies measured perceptions of a media message designed to be unbiased. As ideologically diversified news outlets became more commonplace, later experiments began to use messages that were less objective. They found that while partisans on both sides of an issue recognized the bias, the group the message opposed perceived a greater degree of bias than the group the message supported. This variation is referred to as the relative hostile media effect, and has been demonstrated in media coverage of the use of primates for lab testing. [20] Gunther et al. [21] said, "the relative hostile media effect occurs when individuals with different attitudes toward the issue exhibit significantly different evaluations of the same media content.”

In fact, as Glass et al. noted in a 2000 study, [22] "partisans tend to see objectively biased articles as 'even-handed' if the bias impugns the opposition group." The study measured the responses of voters who support and oppose abortion rights, finding that "people with more extreme views on abortion sometimes evaluate biased news articles as being fair, but only when the opposing side is being gored." [23]

The effect appears to exist more among conservatives than liberals, according to multiple studies. When randomly assigned either a clip from Comedy Central's The Daily Show (liberal), or a similar program from Fox News (conservative), conservatives perceived significantly more bias in the program than liberal subjects. [23] It is entirely possible that the "relative hostile media effect," in this case, is a function of preconceived biases related to the program itself, rather than the content. In a 1998 study, Dalton et al., found that newspaper readers were best able to detect the partisan stands of their newspapers when the newspaper sent a clear and unambiguous political signal; otherwise, individual partisanship predominated in judgments. Unsurprisingly, studies related to media content that is strictly opinionated – that is, media content that is not intended to be unbiased – have shown that partisans are quite capable of identifying bias in those conditions.

Media literacy

Studies have been conducted to determine whether media literacy – competency in analyzing and evaluating messages from mass media – might affect a media consumer's HME, thus far to limited results. In a 2014 study, [24] participants watched a Media Literacy PSA prior to watching manipulated television programs, then asked to rate their perceptions of the relative hostility of the media afterwards. The effects were strong in some areas but less so in others. "Given that the digital media environment allows individuals to select their own media content – and people tend to choose what they find more credible – in some cases a news media literacy message may spur further selection into agreeable political enclaves, now seen as even more credible, and contribute to rising political polarization" (26). Besides media literacy messages, empathy was introduced to news messages to see whether the emotion can reduce HME. [5] People were found to perceive higher levels of media favorability toward their personal position, but not a reduction in media hostility toward the opposing side.

Moderators

Reach

Gunther and Schmitt [25] attempted to discern why in some cases research subjects faulted ambiguous, contradictory information, and supported it in other cases. One conclusion they suggested was the reach of the publication – that is, the hostile media effect is likely to emerge when participants are estimating the effects on others of mass media with a large reach, but biased assimilation would occur when the participants are judging media with lower reach (in this case, a research report that presumably reaches only people in a particular field).

Involvement

Hansen and Kim [26] found that involvement is positively correlated with hostile media effect; that is, the effect increases as individuals become more involved with the issue. The study also found a significant effect that emerged with those who have low involvement. Other studies have found high correlations of the effect in value-relevant involvement [27] and in affective involvement. [28]

Social identity

Social identity theory suggests that media coverage of an ego-involving issue will activate group identity and increase the salience of the issue among members of a group that champions a particular political or social cause. This in turn triggers self-categorization processes, as ingroup members differentiate themselves from their counterparts in the outgroup, seeking to elevate their self-esteem by viewing the ingroup as superior to the disliked outgroup on core dimensions. [29] When exposed to controversial media coverage that contains unfavorable depictions of the ingroup, group members, concerned about the perceived inaccuracy of the portrayals and convinced that the portrayals undermine the group's legitimacy in the larger society, cope by derogating media coverage, viewing it as hostilely biased. In this way, they reduce the symbolic threat and restore valued social self-esteem.

A related potential moderator is the outgroup membership of the message source. Reid [30] found that more politically extreme Democratic students perceived less bias when a polemical assault on their group was attributed to a Democratic (ingroup) organization, but detected more bias when the attack was ascribed to a pro-Republican outgroup.

Mediators

Perloff [1] identified four factors as the reasons those individuals with strong attitudes towards a particular issue, as well as high involvement, might perceive hostile media bias: selective recall, which causes partisans to focus more on contradictory information; selective categorization, in which partisans categorize more content as unfair to their position than fair; different standards, in which partisans classify more of the content that reflects positively on their position as accurate, and information that reflects negatively as inaccurate; and prior beliefs about media bias , in which partisans judge media content unfairly based on a generalized negative set of beliefs about the media in general.

Hostile media online

Research around HME in the digital age is still in relative infancy. Partisan users of online media have abilities to interact with the mass media in a way they have never before. Some may attribute the effects of hostile media in the future to issue-specific social media messages, for example. [1] Relative effects may be higher, however, in the digital media future:

Partisans on both sides could easily agree that a series of posts is biased in one ideological direction, but those whose political ox is being gored should be more likely to presume bias and hostile intent. More generally, anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals perceive that social media messages have strong effects, frequently perceiving that negative communications will have deleterious influences on online third persons. (722)

Indeed, news audiences were found to perceive malicious intent based on their personal political stance, [31] contributing to hostile perceptions with Facebook news messages.

Consequences

Persuasive press inference

Gunther and Chia [20] invoked the concept of persuasive press inference in a 2001 study, in which individuals form impressions of the direction or slant of news coverage, extrapolate that news in general resembles the news stories they personally viewed, assume that high-reach news influences the public, and therefore presume that public opinion corresponds with the perceived directionality of news. Therefore, those partisans who begin with the belief in a hostile media will conclude that public opinion is opposed to their particular cause. Research for this hypothesis has produced mixed results. [32]

It is not clear if the hostile media effect translates into real-world effects. Some research has explored the ways in which individuals take action to "'correct' perceived 'wrongs'" [33] created by a perceived hostile media depiction of the individuals' group. This research has suggested that these individuals effectively feel disenfranchised, and may react by "defying the dominant public opinion climate, even engaging in undemocratic actions, and other times adopting a more passive approach, withdrawing from functional political or social activities." [1]

Motivated fake news perception

Tsang [34] has revealed that the hostile media perception can be applied to a fake news context. Partisans from opposing sides were found to perceive the exact same news message to be fake to significantly varying degrees.

See also

Related Research Articles

Media bias occurs when journalists and news producers show bias in how they report and cover news. The term "media bias" implies a pervasive or widespread bias contravening of the standards of journalism, rather than the perspective of an individual journalist or article. The direction and degree of media bias in various countries is widely disputed.

The bandwagon effect is the tendency for people to adopt certain behaviors, styles, or attitudes simply because others are doing so. More specifically, it is a cognitive bias by which public opinion or behaviours can alter due to particular actions and beliefs rallying amongst the public. It is a psychological phenomenon whereby the rate of uptake of beliefs, ideas, fads and trends increases with respect to the proportion of others who have already done so. As more people come to believe in something, others also "hop on the bandwagon" regardless of the underlying evidence.

Agenda-setting theory suggests that the communications media, through their ability to identify and publicize issues, play a pivotal role in shaping the problems that attract attention from governments and international organizations, and direct public opinion towards specific issues. The theory suggests that the media can shape public opinion by determining what issues are given the most attention, and has been widely studied and applied to various forms of media. The way news stories and topics that impact public opinion are presented is influenced by the media. It is predicated on the idea that most individuals only have access to one source of information on most issues: the news media. Since they establish the agenda, they may affect how important some things are seen to be.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cultivation theory</span> Theory examining long-term effects of TV

Cultivation theory is a sociological and communications framework designed to unravel the enduring impacts of media consumption, with a primary focus on television. At its core, the theory posits a compelling hypothesis: individuals who invest more time in watching television are prone to perceive the real world through a lens aligning with the prevalent depictions in television messages, in contrast to their counterparts with lower television viewership but comparable demographic profiles.

The spiral of silence theory is a political science and mass communication theory which states that an individual's perception of the distribution of public opinion influences that individual's willingness to express their own opinions. Also known as the theory of public opinion, the spiral of silence theory claims individuals will be more confident and outward with their opinion when they notice that their personal opinion is shared throughout a group. But if the individual notices that his opinion is unpopular with the group he will be more inclined to be reserved and remain silent. In other words, from the individual's perspective, "not isolating himself is more important than his own judgement", meaning his perception of how others in the group perceive him is more important to himself than the need for his opinion to be heard.

In media studies, mass communication, media psychology, communication theory, and sociology, media influence and themedia effect are topics relating to mass media and media culture's effects on individuals' or audiences' thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. Through written, televised, or spoken channels, mass media reach large audiences. Mass media's role in shaping modern culture is a central issue for the study of culture.

Audience theory offers explanations of how people encounter media, how they use it, and how it affects them. Although the concept of an audience predates media, most audience theory is concerned with people’s relationship to various forms of media. There is no single theory of audience, but a range of explanatory frameworks. These can be rooted in the social sciences, rhetoric, literary theory, cultural studies, communication studies and network science depending on the phenomena they seek to explain. Audience theories can also be pitched at different levels of analysis ranging from individuals to large masses or networks of people.

Claims of media bias generally focus on the idea of media outlets reporting news in a way that seems partisan. Other claims argue that outlets sometimes sacrifice objectivity in pursuit of growth or profits.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mean world syndrome</span> Cognitive bias

Mean world syndrome is a proposed cognitive bias wherein people may perceive the world to be more dangerous than it is. This is due to long-term moderate to heavy exposure to violence-related content in mass media. In the early stages of research, mean world syndrome was only discussed as an effect of watching television. However, it became clear that social media platforms also play a major role in the spread of mean world syndrome.

The third-person effect hypothesis predicts that people tend to perceive that mass media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves, based on personal biases. The third-person effect manifests itself through an individual's overestimation of the effect of a mass communicated message on the generalized other, or an underestimation of the effect of a mass communicated message on themselves.

Social polarization is the segregation within a society that emerges when factors such as income inequality, real-estate fluctuations and economic displacement result in the differentiation of social groups from high-income to low-income. It is a state and/or a tendency denoting the growth of groups at the extremities of the social hierarchy and the parallel shrinking of groups around its middle.

In the social sciences, framing comprises a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives on how individuals, groups, and societies organize, perceive, and communicate about reality. Framing can manifest in thought or interpersonal communication. Frames in thought consist of the mental representations, interpretations, and simplifications of reality. Frames in communication consist of the communication of frames between different actors. Framing is a key component of sociology, the study of social interaction among humans. Framing is an integral part of conveying and processing data daily. Successful framing techniques can be used to reduce the ambiguity of intangible topics by contextualizing the information in such a way that recipients can connect to what they already know.

Selective exposure is a theory within the practice of psychology, often used in media and communication research, that historically refers to individuals' tendency to favorite information which reinforces their pre-existing views while avoiding contradictory information. Selective exposure has also been known and defined as "congeniality bias" or "confirmation bias" in various texts throughout the years.

The hyperpersonal model is a model of interpersonal communication that suggests computer-mediated communication (CMC) can become hyperpersonal because it "exceeds [face-to-face] interaction", thus affording message senders a host of communicative advantages over traditional face-to-face (FtF) interaction. The hyperpersonal model demonstrates how individuals communicate uniquely, while representing themselves to others, how others interpret them, and how the interactions create a reciprocal spiral of FtF communication. Compared to ordinary FtF situations, a hyperpersonal message sender has a greater ability to strategically develop and edit self-presentation, enabling a selective and optimized presentation of one's self to others.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Echo chamber (media)</span> Situation that reinforces beliefs by repetition inside a closed system

In news media and social media, an echo chamber is an environment or ecosystem in which participants encounter beliefs that amplify or reinforce their preexisting beliefs by communication and repetition inside a closed system and insulated from rebuttal. An echo chamber circulates existing views without encountering opposing views, potentially resulting in confirmation bias. Echo chambers may increase social and political polarization and extremism. On social media, it is thought that echo chambers limit exposure to diverse perspectives, and favor and reinforce presupposed narratives and ideologies.

Reinforcement theory is a limited effects media model applicable within the realm of communication. The theory generally states that people seek out and remember information that provides cognitive support for their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs. The main assumption that guides this theory is that people do not like to be wrong and often feel uncomfortable when their beliefs are challenged.

In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased.

Sexism in American political elections refers to how sexism impacts elections in the United States, ranging from influences on the supply, demand, and selection of candidates to electoral outcomes. Sexism is inherently a product of culture, as culture instills a certain set of beliefs or expectations for what constitutes appropriate behavior, appearance, or mannerisms based on a person's sex. Sexism in American political elections is generally cited as a socially-driven obstacle to female political candidates, especially for non-incumbents, raising concerns about the representation of women in the politics of the United States. Such prejudice can take varying forms, such as benevolent or hostile sexism—the latter stemming from fears of women threatening the power or leadership of men.

The situational theory of problem solving attempts to explain why and how an individual communicates during a problematic situation. The situational theory of problem solving (STOPS) was proposed by Jeong-Nam Kim and James E. Grunig in 2011 though their article “problem solving and communicative action: A situational theory of problem solving.” The theory was developed from the situational theory of publics (STP) and claimed it is “an extended and generalized version” of STP. This theory has an assumption that “the more one commits to problem resolution, the more one becomes acquisitive of information pertaining to the problem, selective in dealing with information, and transmissive in giving it to others.”

Political bias is a bias or perceived bias involving the slanting or altering of information to make a political position or political candidate seem more attractive. With a distinct association with media bias, it commonly refers to how a reporter, news organisation, or TV show covers a political candidate or a policy issue.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 Perloff, Richard M. (2015). "A Three-Decade Retrospective on the Hostile Media Effect". Mass Communication and Society. 18 (6): 701–729. doi:10.1080/15205436.2015.1051234. S2CID   142089379.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Vallone, Robert P.; Ross, Lee; Lepper, Mark R. (1985). "The hostile media phenomenon: Biased perception and perceptions of media bias in coverage of the Beirut massacre" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 49 (3): 577–585. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.49.3.577. PMID   4045697. summary.
  3. ↑ Vallone, R.E., Lepper, M.R., & Ross, L. (1981). Perceptions of media bias in the 1980 presidential election. Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University. As cited in Vallone et al. 1985
  4. ↑ Matheson, Kimberly; Dursun, Sanela (2001). "Social Identity Precursors to the Hostile Media Phenomenon: Partisan Perceptions of Coverage of the Bosnian Conflict". Group Processes & Intergroup Relations. 4 (2): 116–125. doi:10.1177/1368430201004002003. S2CID   146724078.
  5. 1 2 Tsang, Stephanie Jean (4 July 2018). "Empathy and the Hostile Media Phenomenon". Journal of Communication. 68 (4): 809–829. doi: 10.1093/joc/jqy031 . ISSN   0021-9916.
  6. ↑ Dalton, R. J.; Beck, P. A.; Huckfeldt, R. (1998). "Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election". American Political Science Review. 92 (1): 111–126. doi:10.2307/2585932. JSTOR   2585932. S2CID   144087798.
  7. ↑ Choi, J.; Park, H.S.; Chang, J.C. (2011). "Hostile media perception, involvement types, and advocacy behaviors". Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 88 (1): 23–39. doi:10.1177/107769901108800102. S2CID   143109686.
  8. ↑ Christen, C.T.; Kannaovakun, P.; Gunther, A.C. (2002). "Hostile media perceptions: Partisan assessments of press and public during the 1997 United Parcel Service strike". Political Communication. 19 (4): 423–436. doi:10.1080/10584600290109988. S2CID   55271105.
  9. 1 2 3 4 Gunther, A.C.; Liebhart, J.L. (2006). "Broad reach or biased source? Decomposing the hostile media effect". Journal of Communication. 56 (3): 449–466. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00295.x.
  10. 1 2 Gunther, A.C.; Schmitt, K. (2004). "Mapping boundaries of the hostile media effect". Journal of Communication. 54 (1): 55–70. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2004.tb02613.x.
  11. 1 2 3 4 Arpan, L.M.; Raney, A.A. (2003). "An experimental investigation of news source and the hostile media effect". Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 80 (2): 265–281. doi:10.1177/107769900308000203. S2CID   145744592.
  12. ↑ Gunther, Albert C.; Edgerly, Stephanie; Akin, Heather; Broesch, James A. (2012). "Partisan Evaluation of Partisan Information". Communication Research. 39 (4): 439–457. doi:10.1177/0093650212441794. S2CID   25481006.
  13. ↑ Hastorf, A. H.; Cantril, H. (1954). "They Saw a Game: A Case Study". Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 49 (1): 129–134. doi:10.1037/h0057880. PMID   13128974.
  14. ↑ Hastorf & Cantril 1954 , pp. 132–133. Emphasis as in original.
  15. 1 2 3 Giner-Sorolla, R.; Chaiken, S. (1994). "The causes of hostile media judgments". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 30 (2): 165–180. doi: 10.1006/jesp.1994.1008 .
  16. ↑ Vallone et al. 1985, p. 579.
  17. 1 2 Reid, S.A. (2012). "A self-categorization explanation for the hostile media effect". Journal of Communication. 62 (3): 381–399. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01647.x. S2CID   36856679.
  18. 1 2 Gunther, A.C.; Miller, N.; Liebhart, J.L. (2009). "Assimilation and contrast in a test of the hostile media effect". Communication Research. 36 (6): 747–764. doi:10.1177/0093650209346804. S2CID   41028804.
  19. ↑ Feldman, Lauren (2011). "Partisan Differences in Opinionated News Perceptions: A Test of the Hostile Media Effect". Political Behavior. 33 (3): 407–432. doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9139-4. S2CID   143646679.
  20. 1 2 Gunther, A.C.; Chia, S.C. (2001). "Predicting pluralistic ignorance: The hostile media perception and its consequences". Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 78 (4): 688–701. doi:10.1177/107769900107800405. S2CID   143660001.
  21. ↑ Gunther, Albert C.; Christen, Cindy T.; Liebhart, Janice L.; Chia, Stella Chih-Yun (2001). "Congenial Public, Contrary Press, and Biased Estimates of the Climate of Opinion". Public Opinion Quarterly. 65 (3): 295–320. doi:10.1086/322846. PMID   11600967.
  22. ↑ Glass, J. E., Peffley, M., & Avery, J. M. (2000). Perceiving Bias in the News: The Hostile Media Phenomenon Revisited. Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, Illinois, 18.
  23. 1 2 Coe, Kevin; Tewksbury, David; Bond, Bradley J.; Drogos, Kristin L.; Porter, Robert W.; Yahn, Ashley; Zhang, Yuanyuan (2008). "Hostile News: Partisan Use and Perceptions of Cable News Programming". Journal of Communication. 58 (2): 201–219. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00381.x.
  24. ↑ Vraga, Emily K.; Tully, Melissa (2015). "Media Literacy Messages and Hostile Media Perceptions: Processing of Nonpartisan Versus Partisan Political Information". Mass Communication and Society. 18 (4): 422–448. doi:10.1080/15205436.2014.1001910. S2CID   143132807.
  25. ↑ Gunther, Albert C.; Schmitt, Kathleen (2004). "Mapping Boundaries of the Hostile Media Effect". Journal of Communication. 54: 55–70. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2004.tb02613.x.
  26. ↑ Hansen, Glenn J.; Kim, Hyunjung (2011). "Is the Media Biased Against Me? A Meta-Analysis of the Hostile Media Effect Research". Communication Research Reports. 28 (2): 169–179. doi:10.1080/08824096.2011.565280. S2CID   145256611.
  27. ↑ Choi, Jounghwa; Yang, Myengja; Chang, Jeongheon JC (2009). "Elaboration of the Hostile Media Phenomenon: The Roles of Involvement, Media Skepticism, Congruency of Perceived Media Influence, and Perceived Opinion Climate". Communication Research. 36: 54–75. doi:10.1177/0093650208326462. S2CID   45139437.
  28. ↑ Matthes, Jörg (2013). "The Affective Underpinnings of Hostile Media Perceptions". Communication Research. 40 (3): 360–387. doi:10.1177/0093650211420255. S2CID   35569383.
  29. ↑ Hartmann, Tilo; Tanis, Martin (2013). "Examining the Hostile Media Effect as an Intergroup Phenomenon: The Role of Ingroup Identification and Status". Journal of Communication. 63 (3): 535–555. doi:10.1111/jcom.12031.
  30. ↑ Reid, Scott A. (2012). "A Self-Categorization Explanation for the Hostile Media Effect". Journal of Communication. 62 (3): 381–399. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01647.x. S2CID   36856679.
  31. ↑ Tsang, Stephanie Jean (1 June 2020). "Issue stance and perceived journalistic motives explain divergent audience perceptions of fake news". Journalism. 23 (4): 823–840. doi:10.1177/1464884920926002. S2CID   225870518.
  32. ↑ Huge, Michael; Glynn, Carroll J. (2010). "Hostile Media and the Campaign Trail: Perceived Media Bias in the Race for Governor". Journal of Communication. 60 (1): 165–181. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01473.x.
  33. ↑ Barnidge, M.; Rojas, H. (2014). "Hostile Media Perceptions, Presumed Media Influence, and Political Talk: Expanding the Corrective Action Hypothesis". International Journal of Public Opinion Research. 26 (2): 135–156. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edt032.
  34. ↑ Tsang, Stephanie Jean (31 August 2020). "Motivated Fake News Perception: The Impact of News Sources and Policy Support on Audiences' Assessment of News Fakeness". Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 98 (4): 1059–1077. doi:10.1177/1077699020952129. S2CID   225260530.

Further reading

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.