Animal Ethics in the Wild: Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature is a 2022 book by philosopher Catia Faria, published by Cambridge University Press. It examines wild animal suffering as an ethical problem and argues that humans may have moral reasons to assist wild animals when doing so could reduce suffering without causing greater harm. Drawing on debates in animal ethics and environmental ethics, Faria evaluates arguments for and against intervention in nature and defends the view that, under certain conditions, such intervention can be morally justified.
The book analyses objections to helping wild animals, including perversity, futility, and jeopardy arguments, and responds by considering the expected balance of harms and benefits. It also discusses the moral relevance of speciesism, sentience, and well-being, and challenges anthropocentric approaches that limit moral concern to humans or domesticated animals. Reviews in journals such as Philosophy in Review and Utilitas described the work as a clear and detailed contribution to ongoing discussions on the ethics of intervening in nature.
Summary
Animal Ethics in the Wild explores wild animal suffering as a moral issue and argues that there is a moral obligation to intervene in nature to alleviate this. It begins by establishing two main assumptions: suffering is bad, and if we can prevent or reduce suffering without causing greater harm or without jeopardizing other important values, we have an ethical obligation to do so. The first chapter contends that nonhuman animals, including wild animals, are morally considerable beings due to their sentience and well-being, which should be valued regardless of species membership. The book contends that if death is bad for humans, it may also be bad for nonhuman animals, providing additional reasons to act on behalf of wild animals to prevent their suffering and death.
The subsequent chapters address various objections to intervening in nature. These include perversity and futility arguments, which suggest that intervention could make things worse or is bound to fail. The book rejects these objections, asserting that intervention should occur when the expected outcome is net positive for wild animals. Additionally, the concept of speciesism is examined, with the book arguing against unjustified disadvantages based on species membership. It rejects anthropocentrism as a justification for speciesism and criticizes flawed accounts of moral considerability, advocating for a broader understanding of positive obligations toward wild animals.
The book also discusses the prevalence of suffering in the lives of wild animals, detailing the ways their interests are systematically frustrated by natural events. It concludes that intervening to reduce wild animal suffering is both feasible and morally justified. Overall, the book calls for a more compassionate and proactive approach towards wild animals, urging readers to extend their ethical consideration beyond merely refraining from harm, and actively intervening to help animals in need.
Reception
In a review, Christopher Bobier praises Animal Ethics in the Wild for its engaging discussion of wild animal sentience and moral considerability. He asserts that it presents a compelling case for intervening in nature to mitigate the suffering experienced by wild animals and that scholars from various fields, including animal ethics, environmental ethics, ecology, conservation, and animal law, would find the book to be accessible and valuable. However, he notes that the book raises important questions about the practical implications of intervention, especially for individuals living in urban areas far removed from wilderness. Additionally, while the book does not address zoos directly, he queries whether they could serve as a means to reduce suffering for some wild animals, though ethical concerns about captivity should be explored further. Overall, he commends Faria's work for its contribution to the discourse on wild animal welfare, leaving readers with deeper insights and thought-provoking inquiries.[1]
Josh Milburn's review praises the book for providing a comprehensive and rigorous philosophical argument for the notion that humans have a moral obligation to intervene in nature to reduce wild animal suffering. Milburn draws attention to Faria's responses to various objections, including the perversity and futility objections, which is countered with the "reversal test." Additionally, he draws attention to the response to the jeopardy objection, which suggests that intervention could jeopardize other non-suffering-based values. The review commends Faria's adept handling of relational arguments, where she identifies tensions in certain relationalist views and how she explores the issue of priority, perfectionist challenges, and the tractability of reducing wild animal suffering. Overall, Milburn notes that the book offers a detailed and thought-provoking examination of the complex ethical considerations surrounding intervention in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering.[2]
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