People's Defense Units

Last updated

People's Defense Units
Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG)
‏وحدات حماية الشعب‎‎
People's Protection Units Flag.svg
Flag of the YPG
Active2011–present
AllegianceFlag of the Kurdish Supreme Committee.svg Kurdish Supreme Committee (2011–2013) [1]
De facto SA-NES Flag.svg Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (2013–present) [2]
Type Light infantry militia with several motorised battalions
Size78,000 (Including YPJ, 2017 estimate) [3]
Part ofFlag of Syrian Democratic Forces.svg Syrian Democratic Forces
Engagements Syrian Civil War/Rojava conflict

Iraqi Civil War

Website Official website
Commanders
General CommanderMahmoud Berkhadan
Spokesperson Nuri Mahmoud
Notable
commanders		Zainab Afrin

Nalîn Dêrik Sozdar Dêrik Serhildan Garisî

Rêdûr Khalil
SDF-controlled territory (green), claimed territory (orange), Turkish-occupied Afrin (red) in October 2018 Claimed and de facto territory of Rojava.png
SDF-controlled territory (green), claimed territory (orange), Turkish-occupied Afrin (red) in October 2018

The People's Defense Units (YPG), [a] also called People's Protection Units, is a Kurdish militant group in Syria and the primary component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). [4] [5] YPG provides updates about its activities through YPG Press Office Telegram channel and social media accounts.

Contents

The YPG mostly consists of Kurds, but also includes Arabs and foreign volunteers; it is closely allied to the Syriac Military Council, an Assyrian militia. The YPG was formed in 2011. It expanded rapidly in the Syrian Civil War and came to predominate over other armed Syrian Kurdish groups. A sister militia, the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), fights alongside them. The YPG is active in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava), particularly in its Kurdish regions.

In early 2015, the group won a major victory over the Islamic State (IS) during the siege of Kobanî, where the YPG began to receive air and ground support from the United States and other Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve militaries. Since then, the YPG has primarily fought against IS, as well as on occasion fighting other Syrian rebel groups and the Turkish Armed Forces. [6] In late 2015, the YPG became part of the SDF, an umbrella group intended to better incorporate Arabs and minorities into the war effort. In 2016–2017, the SDF's Raqqa campaign led to the liberation of the city of Raqqa, the Islamic State's de facto capital. Several western sources have described the YPG as the "most effective" force in fighting IS in Syria. [7] [8]

According to Turkey [9] and Qatar, [10] the YPG is a terrorist organization, [11] [12] [13] closely associated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization. The flag of the YPG is also a banned symbol in Germany as per Strafgesetzbuch section 86a, [14] [15] although the organization itself is not recognised as terrorist. [16] Finland and Sweden's alleged support for the YPG, is one of the points which caused Turkey to oppose Finland and Sweden's NATO accession bid. [17] [18] In June 2022, then–Finnish President Sauli Niinistö announced in Madrid, after the agreement with Turkey, that Finland does not see the YPG as a terrorist organization and that Finland will continue to support the YPG. [19] The Turkish terror classification is not shared by key international bodies in the fight against the Islamic State in which the YPG takes part. [20] Due to this Turkish view, US Army Special Operations Commander General Raymond Thomas suggested the YPG to change their name, after which the name of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was found. [21] [22]

History

Early origins

Kurdish activists attempted to unify themselves following the 2004 Qamishli riots. The riots began as clashes between rivaling football fans before taking a political turn, with Arab fans raising pictures of Saddam Hussein while the Kurdish fans reportedly proclaimed "We will sacrifice our lives for Bush". This resulted in clashes between the two groups who attacked each other with sticks, stones and knives. Government security forces entered the city to quell the riot, firing at the crowds. The riots resulted in around 36 dead, most of them Kurds.

They did not, however, emerge as a significant force until the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011. [23] [24]

Establishment

The self-defence committees that were to become the YPG were formed in July and August 2011 as the Self Protection units (YXG). [25]

Existing underground Kurdish political parties, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), joined to form the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC) and established the People's Protection Units (YPG) militia to defend Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria, i.e. Syrian Kurdistan and the Kurdish enclave of Sheikh Maqsood in Aleppo. [26] [1] Originally a wholly Kurdish force, the YPG began to recruit Arabs from at least 2012. [27]

Control of Kurdish areas

In July 2012, the YPG had a standoff with Syrian government forces in the Kurdish city of Kobanî and the surrounding areas. After negotiations, government forces withdrew and the YPG took control of Kobanî, Amuda, and Afrin. [1] [28]

By December 2012, it had expanded to eight brigades, which were formed in Qamishlo, Kobanî, and Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê), and in the districts of Afrin, al-Malikiyah, and al-Bab. [29]

Late 2012: Islamist attacks make YPG dominant

The YPG did not initially take an offensive posture in the Syrian Civil War. Aiming mostly to defend Kurdish-majority areas, it avoided engaging Syrian government forces, which still controlled several enclaves in Kurdish territory. The YPG changed this policy when Ras al-Ayn was taken by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front. At first the YPG conquered the surrounding government-controlled areas: al-Darbasiyah (Kurdish: Dirbêsî), Tel Tamer and al-Malikiyah (Kurdish: Dêrika Hemko). The subsequent Battle of Ras al-Ayn started in earnest when on 19 November 2012, the al-Nusra Front and a second al-Qaeda affiliate, Ghuraba al-Sham, attacked Kurdish positions in the town. The battle ended with a YPG victory in July 2013. [30]

While many rebel groups clashed with the YPG, jihadist and Salafist groups did so the most often. [31] The YPG proved to be the only Kurdish militia able to effectively resist the fundamentalists. [32] While the YPG protected the Kurdish communities it was able to extract a price: it prevented the emergence of new, rival militias and forced existing ones to cooperate with or join the YPG forces on its terms. [33] This was how the Islamist attacks enabled the YPG to unite the Syrian Kurds under its banner [34] and caused [35] it to become the de facto army of the Syrian Kurds. [36] [37] [38] [39]

2013: Kurdish control of al-Yaarubiyah/Til Koçer

In October 2013, YPG fighters took control of al-Yaarubiyah (Til Koçer) following intense clashes with IS. The clashes lasted about three days, with the Til Koçer border gate to Iraq being taken in a major offensive launched on the night of 24 October. [40] PYD leader Salih Muslim told Stêrk TV that this success created an alternative against efforts to hold the territory under embargo, [40] referring to the fact that the other border crossings with Iraq led to areas controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government, while al-Yaarubiyah led to areas controlled by the Iraqi central government.

2014: Fight against the Islamic State

YPG-controlled territory, February 2014 Rojava february 2014.png
YPG-controlled territory, February 2014

In 2014, the Syriac Military Council, a group of Assyrian units, was formally integrated into the YPG's command structure. The inter-rebel conflict during the Syrian Civil War led to open war between the Free Syrian Army and IS in January 2014. The YPG collaborated with FSA groups to fight IS in Raqqa province; [41] the group also formed an operations room with multiple FSA factions, called Euphrates Volcano. [42] However, the general outcome of this campaign was a massive advance by IS, which effectively separated the eastern part of Rojava from the main force of FSA rebels. IS followed up on its success by attacking the YPG and the FSA in Kobanî Canton in March and fighting its way to the gates of the city of Kobanî in September. The actual siege of Kobanî approximately coincided with an escalation in the American-led intervention in Syria. This intervention had started with aiding the FSA against the government, but when the FSA was getting defeated by IS in eastern Syria, it escalated to bombing IS on Syrian territory.

With the world fearing another massacre in Kobanî, American support increased substantially. The US gave intense close air support to the YPG, and in doing so, started military cooperation with one of the factions. While it expected that IS would quickly crush the YPG and the FSA, this alliance was not considered a problem for the US. [43] The YPG won the battle in early 2015.

Meanwhile, the situation had been stable in Afrin and Aleppo. The fight between the FSA and IS had led to a normalization in the relations between FSA and YPG since the end of 2013. In February 2015, the YPG signed a judicial agreement with the Levant Front in Aleppo. [44]

Spring 2015: Offensive operations with coalition support

Military situation in the Syrian Civil War in November 2015 Syrian civil war 01 11 2015.png
Military situation in the Syrian Civil War in November 2015
YPG-controlled territory, June 2015 Rojava june 2015.png
YPG-controlled territory, June 2015

The YPG was able and willing to offensively engage and put pressure on IS and had built up a track record as a reliable military partner of the US. In 2015, the YPG began its advance on Tel Abyad, a move they have planned for since November 2013. [45] With American close air support, offensives near Hasakah and from Hasakah westward culminated in the conquest of Tell Abyad, linking up Kobanî with Hasakah in July 2015. With the capture of Tell Abyad, the YPG has also broken a major supply route of fighters and goods for the Islamic State. [46]

With these offensives, the YPG had begun to make advances into areas that did not always have a Kurdish majority. When the YPG and the FSA entered the border town of Tell Abyad in June 2015, parts of the population fled the intense fighting and the airstrikes. [47]

Autumn 2015: foundation of the SDF

The Syrian Democratic Forces was established in Hasakah on 11 October 2015. [48] [49] It has its origins in the YPG-FSA collaboration against IS, which had previously led to the establishment of the Euphrates Volcano joint operations room in 2014. Many of the partners are the same, and even the logo / flag with the Blue Euphrates symbol has common traits with that of Euphrates Volcano. The primary difference is that Euphrates Volcano was limited to coordinating the activities of independent Kurdish and Arab groups, while the SDF is a single organisation made up of Kurds, Arabs, and Assyrians.

The first success of the SDF was the capture of the strategic ethnically Arab town of al-Hawl from IS during the al-Hawl offensive in November 2015. This was followed in December by the Tishrin Dam offensive. The dam was captured on 26 December. Participating forces included the YPG, the FSA group Army of Revolutionaries, the tribal group al-Sanadid Forces and the Assyrian Syriac Military Council. The coalition had some heavy weapons and was supported by intense US led airstrikes. [50] The capture of the hydroelectric dam also had positive effects on the economy of Rojava. [51]

2016

In February, the YPG-led SDF launched the al-Shaddadi offensive, followed by the Manbij offensive in May, and the Raqqa and Aleppo offensives in November. These operations extended SDF-controlled territory, usually at IS's expense.

On 7 April 2016, the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood in Aleppo was shelled with mortars that may have contained chemical agents (160 killed or wounded). [52] [53] Spokesperson for the YPG said that Saudi Arabia-backed Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) rebel group has attacked the Kurdish neighborhood of Aleppo with "forbidden weapons" many times since the war's start. [54]

2018: Turkish military intervention

Military situation in January 2019 Syrian civil war 01 11 2018.png
Military situation in January 2019

Women's Protection Units

Women's Protection Units in November 2014 YPJ fighters shake hands with one another.jpg
Women's Protection Units in November 2014

The Women's Protection Units (YPJ), also known as the Women's Defense Units, is the YPG's female brigade, which was set up in 2012. Kurdish media have said that YPJ troops became vital during the siege of Kobanî. [55] Consisting of approximately 20,000 fighters, they make up around 40% of the YPG. [56]

Organization

Flags

Flags of the People's Protection Units
People's Protection Units Flag (2011-2012, Vertical).svg
Vertical red flag of the YPG, used since 2011 until early 2013
People's Protection Units Flag (2011-2012).svg
Horizontal red flag of the YPG, used since 2011 until early 2013
People's Protection Units Flag (2011-2012) alternative.svg
Variant of the horizontal red flag, also used until early 2013
People's Protection Units Flag.svg
Yellow flag of the YPG, first used since late 2012, widely adopted in 2013 and since then the official flag of the militia

Units

In 2017, the YPG began to form units called regiments in translation, though they are smaller than comparable units in standard militaries:

CantonNumberNameDate EstablishedStrength
Afrin1Martyr Xebat Dêrik27 February 2017236 in 4 battalions
Afrin2Martyr Afrin20 April 2017235
Afrin3Martyr RojhiletEarly June? 2017236
Afrin4Martyr Mazloum2 July 2017234
Afrin5Martyr Alişêr27 August 2017303
Afrin7Martyr Jayan23 October 2017250
Afrin8Martyr Bahoz Afrin18 November 2017234
CantonNumberNameDate EstablishedStrength
Kobane1 ?13 February 201780
Kobane2Martyr Şevger Kobanî Regiment18 February 201790
Jazira – al-Hasakah1Jian Judy and Dogan Fadel20 July 2017500
Jazira – Girkê Legê3Qereçox Martyrs12 July 2017200
Aleppo1Martyr Shahid Baqour30 September 201755 (Martyr Abu Shayar battalion)
Tabqa (SDF)1Martyr Haboun Arab14 November 2017250

Tactics

According to a report in IHS Jane's regarding the YPG,

Relying on speed, stealth, and surprise, it is the archetypal guerrilla army, able to deploy quickly to front lines and concentrate its forces before quickly redirecting the axis of its attack to outflank and ambush its enemy. The key to its success is autonomy. Although operating under an overarching tactical rubric, YPG brigades are inculcated with a high degree of freedom and can adapt to the changing battlefield. [57]

The YPG relies heavily on snipers and backs them by suppressing enemy fire using mobile heavy machine guns. It also uses roadside bombs to prevent outflanking maneuvers, particularly at night. Its lines have generally held when attacked by Islamic State (IS) forces who have better equipment, including helmets and body armor. [58]

The YPG and People's Defense Forces (HPG) have also trained and equipped more than 1,000 Yazidis, who operate in the Mount Sinjar area as local defense units under their supervision. [58]

The YPG calls itself a people's army, and therefore appoints officers by internal elections. [59]

A 20-year-old female YPJ fighter named Zlukh Hamo (Nom de guerre: Avesta Khabur) was reported to have carried out a suicide attack towards Turkish troops and a tank during the early phase of the Afrin Offensive, killing herself and several soldiers in the process. [60] [61] The attack was commended by pro-SDF sources as a courageous attack against a tank using explosives, which killed her in the process. [62]

Equipment

YPG technical near Tell Tamer, 2015 YPG Tall Tamer 14 mai 2015.PNG
YPG technical near Tell Tamer, 2015

In comparison to the other major factions involved in the Syrian Civil War, the YPG has the least armor. [63] To compensate for the resulting capability gap, the YPG became heavily involved in the production of DIY armoured vehicles, typically based on bulldozers or large trucks. [64] The YPG has traditionally relied on vehicles captured from the Islamic State, AFVs left behind by the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), equipment turned over by the SyAA in exchange for a safe passage (for example, after retreating from Mennagh airbase in 2014), and armoured vehicles donated by the US for light armoured vehicles and true armour. [63]

While other Syrian Civil War factions, such as the Islamic State, amassed an arsenal of hundreds of tanks and other armored fighting vehicles captured from the Syrian Arab Army, the YPG, which frequently avoided combat with government forces, had to make do with scraps. [65] The YPG was able to acquire several vehicle types, including the BTR-60 and BRDM-2, that had been abandoned in government bases by their previous owners. [66] With no other option, even these abandoned vehicles would be repaired and repurposed by the YPG. [65] Even when the engine couldn't be repaired, the hulls of BTR-60s were strapped to the backs of trucks and used as improvised AFVs. [66]

With little armor and other heavy weaponry, the YPG relied almost entirely on Coalition airpower to destroy Islamic State vehicles and fighting positions. [67] While this meant that Islamic State-operated AFVs were frequently destroyed before they could inflict serious damage on YPG forces, it also meant that most AFVs were completely obliterated by Coalition aircraft, preventing their capture and further use with the YPG. [67]

In order to assist the SDF in its fight against Islamic State forces in northern Syria, the YPG received a large number of infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs) and mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) from the US, which appear to have replaced some of the YPG's more bizarre homemade armour designs. [65] Surprisingly, the YPG was permitted to keep these vehicles even after IS was defeated as a conventional military force. [65] Even so, there was little doubt that their most likely future application would be against a NATO member (Turkey). [68] Aside from a large fleet of Humvees, IAG Guardians, and M1224 Maxxpros, the US has reportedly transferred a number of M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to the YPG. [69] These reports appear to be based on the sighting of M2s with SDF flags and a video of YPG members training alongside M2s, and there is currently no evidence that such a transfer has occurred. [69]

The YPG's arsenal of ATGMs is without a doubt the most dangerous threat to the Turkish military. [65] Despite capturing only a small number of these missiles from the Syrian Arab Army, the YPG has managed to secure a steady supply of ATGMs obtained on the Syrian black market. [70] These have included models like the 9M113 Konkurs and 9M115 Metis-M, as well as more advanced models like the 9M133 Kornet and even the US TOW ATGM. [70] Despite frequently employing them against the Free Syrian Army and Turkish military, the YPG is likely to keep a significant stock of missiles on hand for future use against Turkish armour and troop concentrations. [70]

International outreach

Foreign volunteers

German, French, and Spanish fighters of the YPG in northern Syria. German, French, and Spanish YPG fighters.png
German, French, and Spanish fighters of the YPG in northern Syria.

Ex–U.S. Army soldier Jordan Matson was among the first foreign volunteers of the YPG. Injured by an IS suicide bomb, he developed the "Lions of Rojava" recruitment campaign for foreign volunteers, [71] launched on 21 October 2014 on Facebook. [72] More than 400 volunteers from Europe, the Americas and Australia have joined the YPG as of 11 June 2015, [73] including at least ten U.S. volunteers, three of which were U.S. Army veterans. [74] [75] [76] [77] People from both China and the Chinese diaspora have also joined. [78]

Other prominent foreign volunteers have included Brace Belden, Macer Gifford, [79] Ryan Lock, [80] Michael Israel, [81] Nazzarno Tassone, [82] Dean Evans, [83] Jac Holmes, [84] Konstandinos Erik Scurfield, [85] Anna Campbell, Lorenzo Orsetti and Haukur Hilmarsson.

Dozens of non-Kurdish Turks (from both Turkey and the European diaspora) have also joined. [74] The Turkish Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP) has been sending volunteers to fight in the YPG since 2012. At least four have been killed in battle as of February 2015—one during the Battle of Ras al-Ayn and three during the siege of Kobanî. The party released a video in late January 2015 showing several Spanish- and German-speaking volunteers from Europe among its ranks in Jazira Canton; they were reorganised into the International Freedom Battalion on 10 June 2015. [86]

Deaths

During the fight against IS and the defense of Afrin against the Turkish state, several of the international volunteers were wounded and killed. The Icelandic Haukur Hilmarsson, aged 31, was killed on 24 February 2018 in an artillery attack by the Turkish army in the village of Mabeta, Afrin. [87] As a YPJ fighter, the British woman Anna Campbell, 26, from Lewes in East Sussex, was killed in a Turkish airstrike in Afrin on 15 March 2018. [88] In the battle of Al-Baghuz Fawqani, an Italian man fighting for the YPG, Lorenzo Orsetti, was killed on Sunday, 17 March 2019. [89]

Politics

While most countries do not object in principle to their citizens joining the ranks of the YPG, Turkey has been vocal against YPG's foreign recruits. [90]

Several Australians, including former trade unionist and politician Matthew Gardiner, [91] have been involved with the YPG despite threats by Australia to prosecute any citizens involved in the Syrian Civil War. [92] Under Australian law it is a criminal offence to fight with any side in a foreign conflict. [93]

In 2017, Turkish court sentenced two Czech nationals to more than six years in prison for their reported ties to the YPG. [94] In Germany, the YPG leads to controversies as it is up to the police to begin a prosecution for showing a YPG flag. [95] In the state of Bavaria, fines for showing a YPG flag were issued, while the federal government declares that the YPG is not forbidden. [96]

Foreign government support

Because the YPG operates in a landlocked territory, rival opposition groups as well as the Turkish and Syrian government were able to physically prevent foreign aid from reaching it. The YPG's seizure of Til Koçer in October 2013 (cf. above) created an overland connection to more or less friendly groups in Iraq, but could not change the even more fundamental problem, that the YPG had no allies willing to provide equipment.

United States

A Delta Force officer and YPG and YPJ commanders tour an area hit by Turkish airstrikes in April 2017 US and YPG officers in northeastern Hasaka.png
A Delta Force officer and YPG and YPJ commanders tour an area hit by Turkish airstrikes in April 2017
U.S. Army M1126 Stryker armored vehicle in Al-Hasakah, May 2017 YPG and US army Hassaka 1-5-2017.jpg
U.S. Army M1126 Stryker armored vehicle in Al-Hasakah, May 2017

In August 2014 Mazlum Kobanî led negotiations with the US in Sulaymaniya, which led to a military alliance against IS. [97] The United States provided the YPG with air support during the siege of Kobanî [98] and during later campaigns, helping the YPG defend territory against attacks by the Islamic State. [99] Turkey has criticised US support. [100]

The YPG also received 27 bundles totalling 24 tons of small arms and ammunition and 10 tons of medical supplies from the United States and Iraqi Kurdistan during the siege of Kobanî. [101]

On 11 October 2015, the US began an operation to airdrop 120 tons of military supplies to the YPG and its local Arab and Turkmen allies to fight IS north of Raqqa. The first airdrop consisted of 112 pallets of ammunition and "other items like hand grenades", totaling 50 tons. [102] However, statements from the US that the aid did not contain TOW's or anti-aircraft weapons made it clear that the U.S. continued to have serious regard for the interests of Turkey, which has warned against continued US support for the YPG. On the other hand, the US also supported Islamist rebel groups who fought the YPG. During the Battle of Aleppo, the US-backed Mountain Hawks Brigade battled the YPG and the Army of Revolutionaries for control of the village of Maryamin. [103]

US aid to the YPG continued in late October with the deployment of up to 50 US special forces to assist the YPG, and an enhanced air campaign to support the YPG and local militia groups in their fight against IS. [104] [105] Some of these special forces participated in the al-Shaddadi offensive (2016) and coordinated airstrikes against IS. [106]

During the Battle of Tabqa (2017), YPG special forces were equipped with US-supplied combat helmets, AN/PVS-7 night vision devices, flashlights, and were armed with M4 carbines equipped with AN/PEQ-2 laser sights, holographic weapon sights, and STANAG magazines. [107]

On 9 May 2017, it was announced by the Pentagon that American President Donald Trump approved of a plan that would have the United States directly provide heavy armaments to the major SDF component group, the YPG; the plan came before a planned final offensive to capture Raqqa from ISIS. [108] [109] [110]

Russia

With Russia's entrance into the war in late 2015 backing the Syrian government, some reports have reported that the YPG coordinated with or received weapons from Russia, with rival opposition groups stating that the timing and targeting of Russian airstrikes were "suspiciously advantageous" to the Kurdish militias. [111]

Despite this, YPG officials have said they did not cooperate with Russia. [112] However, in July 2019, Rashid Abu Khawla the head of the Syrian Democratic Forces' Deir ez-Zor Military Council stated that the Syrian Democratic Forces had cooperated with Russia. [113]

Diplomatic relations

Russia's position towards the YPG is not clear, and the US actively supports it, but their diplomatic relations with the PYD are the opposite. In January 2016 Russia pushed for the inclusion of the PYD in the Geneva talks. [114] The YPG would like to open a representative branch in the US, but in March 2016 interview its leader implied that it was not allowed to do so. [115]

In February 2018, USA's Director of National Intelligence in the Trump administration described YPG as the Syrian wing of PKK in its new report. [116]

International media outreach

The YPG's press office media operation has been a particular focus of its opponents, with Turkey bombing its premises in Cizire Canton in April 2017, [117] and the Islamic State (IS) singling out its premises in Raqqa for a raid during the late stages of the Battle of Raqqa in September 2017. [118]

Allegations concerning violations of international law and war crimes

Accusations of ethnic cleansing and forced displacements

In June 2015 the Turkish government stated that the YPG was carrying out an ethnic cleansing as part of a plan to join the Jazira and Kobanî cantons into a single territory. [119]

The U.S. State Department reacted by starting an inquiry into the allegations. [120]

In October 2015, Amnesty International published a report [121] with reports that the YPG had driven at least 100 families from northern Syria and that in the villages of Asaylem and Husseiniya it had demolished resident homes. The report was made by Amnesty visiting the area contained in the report. It made local observations of destruction, and collected testimonies from former and actual residents of al-Hasakeh and Raqqa governorates. It found cases of YPG fighters forcibly displacing residents and using fire and bulldozers to raze homes and other structures. [122] [123]

In a report published by the United Nations' Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on 10 March 2017, the Commission refuted Amnesty International's reports of ethnic cleansing, stating that "'though allegations of 'ethnic cleansing' continued to be received during the period under review, the Commission found no evidence to substantiate reports that YPG or SDF forces ever targeted Arab communities on the basis of ethnicity." [124] [125] [126] Forced displacement of civilians and destruction of civilian property is not a war crime per se. These acts only become a war crime when there is no "imperative military necessity" for them. Amnesty International stated the report documents cases in which there was no such justification. [127] [ dead link ] It furthermore states that "the circumstances of some of these displacements suggested that they were carried out in retaliation for people's perceived sympathies with, or family ties to, suspected members of IS or other armed groups", [127] thus constituting "collective punishment, which is a violation of international humanitarian law".

In interviews, YPG spokespersons acknowledged that a number of families were in fact displaced. However, they placed the number at no more than 25, and stated military necessity. [128] They stated that the family members of terrorists maintained communications with them, and therefore had to be removed from areas where they might pose a danger. [128] They further stated that IS was using civilians in those areas to plant car bombs or carry out other attacks on the YPG. [129] By describing the events in Hammam al-Turkman before the village was evacuated, the Amnesty International report itself inadvertently supports these YPG reports of military necessity. [130]

Recruitment of minors

In June 2014, Human Rights Watch criticized the YPG for accepting minors into their ranks, picking up on multiple earlier reports of teenage fighters serving in the YPG, with a report by the United Nations Secretary General stating that 24 minors under age of 18 had been recruited by YPG, compared to 124 having been recruited by the Free Syrian Army and 5 by the Syrian Arab Army. [131] In response, the YPG and YPJ signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment protecting children in armed conflict, prohibiting sexual violence and against gender discrimination in July 2014. [132] Kurdish security forces (YPG and Asayish) began receiving human rights training from Geneva Call and other international organizations with the YPG pledging to demobilize all fighters under 18 within a month and began to enact disciplinary measures against commanders of the units that had involved in corruption and accepting recruit under age of 18 to their ranks. [133] [134] In October 2015 the YPG demobilized 21 minors from the military service in its ranks. [135]

According to the annual UN report of 2018, [136] [137] there were 224 cases of child recruitment by the YPG and its women's unit, the YPJ, in 2017, an almost fivefold increase from the previous year. This sparked immediate conversations with the anti-child-recruitment NGO Geneva Call which resulted in a broad new military directive strictly prohibiting all recruitment of persons under 18, ordering that any such persons within SDF be immediately removed from the payroll and transferred to the custody of the civilian Authority For Education, mandating the appointment of an ombudsman in each military service to receive and investigate reports of child recruitment, and ordering punitive measures by military police and by the SDF's Military Discipline Department against anyone found to be responsible for child recruitment. Geneva Call immediately praised the SDF's wide-ranging initiative to eliminate and prevent child recruitment throughout all of SDF's military organizations. [138]

In June 2020, United Nations reported the YPG/YPJ as the largest faction in the Syrian civil war by the number of recruited child soldiers with 283 child soldiers followed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham with 245 child soldiers. [139]

On 15 July 2020, SDF issued a new military order prohibiting child recruitment. The NGO Fight For Humanity conducted multiple training sessions with hundreds of SDF commanders about the UN-SDF Action Plan To Prevent Child Recruitment, and distributed informational posters and flyers about it written in both Arabic and Kurdish, as part of an ongoing educational process. Syria-based researcher Thomas McClure observed that “SDF are less likely to engage in such practices than any of the other forces in Syria, but seek to hold themselves to a higher standard of accountability and human rights.” [140]

On 29 August 2020, SDF announced the creation of a new system that anyone can use to confidentially report to specialized Child Protection offices any suspected case of child recruitment, in accordance with the action plan that the SDF signed with the United Nations in the summer of 2019. [141] [142]

On 23 April 2021, the UN released its third report on child recruitment in Syria, noting that the SDF's action plan had resulted in a significant decrease in child recruitment (from 216 cases in early 2019 to only 41 cases in early 2020), but that elsewhere in Syria, child recruitment continued to be systematic and widespread within Syrian government and non-government armed forces. [143]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rojava–Islamist conflict</span> Theater in the Syrian Civil War

The Rojava–Islamist conflict, a major theater in the Syrian civil war, started after fighting erupted between the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Islamist rebel factions in the city of Ras al-Ayn. Kurdish forces launched a campaign in an attempt to take control of the Islamist-controlled areas in the governorate of al-Hasakah and some parts of Raqqa and Aleppo governorates after al-Qaeda in Syria used those areas to attack the YPG. The Kurdish groups and their allies' goal was also to capture Kurdish areas from the Arab Islamist rebels and strengthen the autonomy of the region of Rojava. The Syrian Democratic Forces would go on to take substantial territory from Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic State (IS), provoking Turkish involvement in the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kurdish Front</span> Kurdish Organization

The Kurdish Front is a predominantly Kurdish Syrian rebel faction participating in the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa</span> Rebel group in the Syrian Civil War

Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa was a rebel group in the Syrian Civil War. It was formed in September 2012 in the Raqqa Governorate. Aligned with jihadist factions for its first years, at the end of 2015, it joined the Syrian Democratic Forces. During an interview by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi in 2015, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa's media director stated that the group wants a "civil democratic state". He also claimed that the group had no relations with the Syrian National Coalition based in Turkey.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Euphrates Volcano</span>

Euphrates Volcano was a joint operations room/coalition established during the Syrian Civil War. It mainly consisted of the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and certain factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The group fought to expel the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant from Aleppo and Raqqa provinces. In an October 2015 publication, the Washington D.C.-based Institute for the Study of War considered Euphrates Volcano as one of the "powerbrokers" in Aleppo Province, being primarily "anti-ISIS" but not necessarily "anti-regime".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Siege of Kobanî</span> 2014 IS offensive in northern Syria during the Syrian Civil War

The siege of Kobanî was launched by the Islamic State (IS) on 13 September 2014, in order to capture the Kobanî Canton and its main city of Kobanî in northern Syria, in the de facto autonomous region of Rojava.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Women's Protection Units</span> Ethnic Kurdish military unit

The Women's Protection Units or Women's Defense Units is an all-female militia involved in the Syrian civil war. The YPJ is part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the armed forces of Rojava, and is closely affiliated with the male-led YPG. While the YPJ is mainly made up of Kurds, it also includes women from other ethnic groups in Northern Syria.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Sarrin (March–April 2015)</span> Military operation

The Battle of Sarrin refers to a military operation during 2015 in the northeastern Aleppo Governorate, during the Syrian Civil War, conducted by Kurdish YPG and allied forces against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in the town of Sarrin, in an effort to capture the town and the surrounding region.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tell Abyad offensive</span> May 2015 military operation of the Syrian Civil War

The Tell Abyad offensive or Martyr Rubar Qamışlo operation was a military operation that began in late May 2015 in the northern Raqqa Governorate, during the Syrian Civil War. It was conducted by the Kurdish-majority People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The offensive took place from the end of May until July 2015. The campaign was the second phase of the Kurdish Operation Commander Rûbar Qamishlo, which began with the Al-Hasakah offensive, and involved the merger of the Kobanî offensive with the former. The focus of the campaign was to capture the key border town of Tell Abyad, and to link the Kobanî and Jazira Cantons in Northern Syria.

Relations between the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are unclear and varied among the different FSA factions. Both are opposed to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. However, several clashes between the two have taken place. Under pressure from the United States, some FSA groups coordinate with the YPG to battle ISIL under the name of the Syrian Democratic Forces, although some other FSA groups remained in conflict with the YPG and the SDF, including FSA groups in the SDF.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">AANES–Syria relations</span> Bilateral relations

AANES–Syria relations concern the military and political relations between the Ba'athist Syrian Arab Republic and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), a de facto autonomous multi-ethnic region in northern and eastern Syria. The Syrian government does not officially recognise the autonomy of the AANES, and advocates a centralist approach to the governance of Syria. The NES seeks the federalisation of Syria. For most of the Syrian civil war, there has been a non-aggression pact between the military of Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces, with occasional confrontations and some cooperation against Islamist groups, in particular against the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. While the two sides co-operated militarily under Russian supervision since 2019, with Syrian and Russian troops stationed along the Turkish border to prevent further advances, political negotiations have ended in failure. The Syrian government has no authority or institutions in North and East Syria outside of its two security boxes in Qamishli/Qamislo and Al-Hasakah/Heseke. The Autonomous Administration does not allow the Syrian Government to hold elections in areas under its control.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Syrian Democratic Forces</span> Alliance in the Syrian Civil War

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a Kurdish-led coalition formed by ethnic militias and rebel groups, and serves as the official military wing of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The SDF is allied to and supplied by the United States–led CJTF–OIR international alliance. Founded in 10 October 2015, the SDF claims that its mission is fighting to create a secular, democratic and federalized Syria. The SDF is opposed by Turkey, who claims the group has direct links to the PKK, which it recognizes as a terrorist group.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Al-Sanadid Forces</span> Militia in Syria

The Forces of the Brave, generally called the al-Sanadid Forces, are a militia formed by the Arab Shammar tribe to fight against the Islamic State. Even though the tribe's Syrian strongholds are mostly in the Jazira Canton of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, such as at al-Yaarubiyah and Tell Hamis, the militia operates throughout most of the AANES. The red colour in their flag represents blood while the yellow represents the light, calling themselves “marchers on the red death”. The al-Sanadid Forces are affiliated with the co-governor/co-president of Jazira Canton and tribal leader Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, and are led by Humaydi's son Bandar al-Humaydi.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rojava conflict</span> Military and political conflict in northern Syria

The Rojava conflict, also known as the Rojava Revolution, is a political upheaval and military conflict taking place in northern Syria, known among Kurds as Western Kurdistan or Rojava.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Descendants of Saladin Brigade</span>

The Descendants of Saladin Brigade was a Free Syrian Army group active in the northern Aleppo Governorate. The group was supported by Turkey and was initially funded and armed by the United States, mainly fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant but also opposing the Syrian government and the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) affiliates such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The brigade was largely disbanded by the Turkish Army in 2017, following disagreements over the participation in a planned Turkish-led offensive against Afrin Canton, although a small faction within the group remained active and participated in the offensive since January 2018.

The Northern Raqqa offensive was a 2016 military offensive launched by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in northern Raqqa Governorate, in order to prepare for a future attack on the city of Raqqa. The offensive was launched in coordination with airstrikes by the US-led Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. After 30 May, the offensive stalled, as the SDF shifted its focus and resources to another operation in the northern Aleppo Province.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Euphrates Shield</span> Turkish cross-border military operation

Operation Euphrates Shield was a cross-border military operation conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces in the Syrian Civil War which led to the Turkish occupation of northern Syria. Operations were carried out in the region between the Euphrates river to the east and the rebel-held area around Azaz to the west. The Turkish military and Turkey-aligned Syrian rebel groups, some of which used the Free Syrian Army label, fought against the forces of the Islamic State (IS) as well as against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from 24 August 2016. On 29 March 2017, the Turkish military officially announced that Operation Euphrates Shield was "successfully completed".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Tell Abyad (2013)</span> Military confrontation

The 2013 battle of Tell Abyad was a military confrontation in the town of Tell Abyad between the Kurdish Front and the Democratic Union Party-affiliated People's Protection Units and Women's Protection Units against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the al-Nusra Front, and Ahrar al-Sham, resulting in a Kurdish defeat and the jihadist capture of the town.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rojda Felat</span>

Rojda Felat is a Syrian Kurdish senior commander of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who has fought in the Rojava conflict since it began in 2012, and has led several major campaigns against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). A revolutionary feminist, Felat's stated goal is to achieve social transformation in the Middle East through the YPJ, "liberating the Kurdish woman and the Syrian woman in general from the ties and control of traditional society, as well as liberating the entirety of Syria from terrorism and tyranny".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Al-Hasakah Governorate campaign (2012–2014)</span> Syrian military campaign

The al-Hasakah Governorate campaign was a multi-sided military conflict between Syrian government forces, Kurdish forces, armed Syrian opposition groups, and Salafist jihadist forces, including al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the al-Nusra Front in the al-Hasakah Governorate as part of the Syrian Civil War. The clashes began with the People's Protection Units (YPG)'s entrance into the civil war in July 2012 and spread across the governorate.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Northern Democratic Brigade</span> Free Syrian Army unit

The Northern Democratic Brigade is a Free Syrian Army unit that is closely allied to the Syrian Kurdish YPG and YPJ in Afrin Region since 2014. Led by Absi Taha, Alexander Khalil, and Alexander Alaa, it also joined the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in November 2015. The initial members of the group originated from Jabal Zawiya in Idlib, and it has recruited Arabs from Idlib, Aleppo, and other cities in northern Syria since allying with the YPG. Since joining the SDF, the unit has begun to operate across much of northern and eastern Syria, participating in operations against anti-SDF Syrian opposition factions, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the Turkish Armed Forces, and the Syrian National Army.

References

  1. ↑ (Kurdish: یەکینەیێن پاراستنا گەل, romanized: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) pronounced [jɛkiːnɛjeːnpɑːɾɑːstɯnɑːɡɛl] ⓘ ; Arabic: وحدات حماية الشعب, romanized: Waḥdāt Ḥimāyat aš-Šaʽb)
  1. 1 2 3 "Armed Kurds Surround Syrian Security Forces in Qamishli". Rudaw. 22 July 2012. Archived from the original on 24 July 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  2. ↑ "PYD announces surprise interim government in Syria's Kurdish regions". Rudaw. 13 November 2013. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
  3. ↑ Rashid (2018), p. 16.
  4. ↑ Barfi, Barak (April 2016). "Ascent of the PYD and the SDF". Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
  5. ↑ Cook, Steven A. (25 February 2016). "Who Exactly Are 'the Kurds'?". The Atlantic. Retrieved 16 February 2017.
  6. ↑ "Kurdish Forces Bolster Assad in Aleppo". Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 29 July 2016. Retrieved 17 March 2017.
  7. ↑ "Turkey v Syria's Kurds v Islamic State". BBC. 23 August 2016.
  8. ↑ "US troops wearing YPG patches in Syria". Business Insider. 27 May 2016.
  9. ↑ "PKK / Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs". www.mfa.gov.tr. Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  10. ↑ "Syrian terrorist list produces 163 names and no agreement". Reuters. 16 January 2018.
  11. ↑ Lin, Christina (2015). "Turkey's Double Standard on Terrorism: Accuses BBC of supporting PKK, backs other groups from China, Russia and US" (PDF). Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy.
  12. ↑ Turak, Natasha (23 May 2022). "Conflict, politics and history: Why Turkey is standing in the way of both Sweden and Finland's NATO bids". CNBC . Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  13. ↑ Bayer, Lili (20 May 2022). "Sweden blasts Turkish 'disinformation' as Erdoğan delays NATO accession". Politico . Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  14. ↑ "German police raid leftist for posting Kurdish YPG flag | DW | 19 August 2017". Deutsche Welle . Retrieved 16 June 2022.
  15. ↑ "German lawmaker sparks criticism after displaying banned YPG flag in parliament". Daily Sabah . 21 November 2017. Retrieved 16 June 2022.
  16. ↑ Yücel, Deniz (24 February 2016). "Gute Kurden, böse Kurden. Wer ist Terrorist?" [Good Kurds, bad Kurds. Who is terrorist?]. Die Welt (in German). Berlin. Retrieved 4 February 2018.
  17. ↑ Kerem, Schamberger (24 May 2022). "Der türkische NATO-Krieg gegen Kurdistan". Jacobin (in German). Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  18. ↑ Richard, Milne (20 May 2022). "Sweden's Nato ambitions run into Kurdish row". Financial Times . Retrieved 26 May 2022.
  19. ↑ "Finlandiya: YPG'ye terör örgütü demedik, değişen bir şey yok" (in Turkish). Diken. 30 June 2022.
  20. ↑ Deewanee, Azad (March 2022). "The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People's Protection Units (YPG) in Turkish Official Discourse". World Affairs. 185 (1): 59–90. doi:10.1177/00438200211063520. ISSN   0043-8200. S2CID   244947795 – via SAGE.
  21. ↑ Ali, Sangar (22 July 2017). "We told YPG to change brand name in 2015: US General". Kurdistan 24 .
  22. ↑ "U.S. general told Syria's YPG: 'You have got to change your brand'". Reuters . 21 July 2017. Retrieved 9 January 2023.
  23. ↑ "UA 15/05 Torture and ill-treatment/ possible unfair trial" (PDF). Amnesty International. 19 January 2005.
  24. ↑ Gold, Danny (31 October 2012). "Meet the YPG, the Kurdish militia that doesn't want help from anyone". VICE . Retrieved 9 October 2014. A member of YPG's central command … said that the YPG formed in 2004 shortly after the Qamishlo riots, when a number of Kurdish youth realized that they needed to be able to defend themselves more efficiently. They did not officially declare themselves until the revolution started in 2011.
  25. ↑ Ayboga, Flach and Knapp, Ercan, Anja and Michael (2016). Revolution in Rojava; Democratic Autonomy and Women's liberation in Syrian Kurdistan. London, United Kingdom: Pluto Press. p. 51. ISBN   9780745336596.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  26. ↑ YPG. "About Us". ypgrojava.org. Retrieved 26 May 2019.
  27. ↑ "Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces". MERIP. 28 July 2020.
  28. ↑ "Kurds Give Ultimatum to Syrian Security Forces". Rudaw. 21 July 2012. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
  29. ↑ "The Kurdish Protection Units have formed a new brigade in the Al–Bab region". Scientia Humana. 4 December 2012. Archived from the original on 8 January 2013. Retrieved 18 December 2013. Kurdish Information Center
  30. ↑ "Kurds expel jihadists from flashpoint Syrian town: NGO". Al-Ahram Weekly. AFP. 17 July 2013. Retrieved 13 February 2015.
  31. ↑ International Crisis Group (8 May 2014). "Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 February 2016. Retrieved 20 March 2016. While rebel groups from across the ideological spectrum have clashed with the PYD, jihadi and Salafi groups have done so most aggressively and consistently
  32. ↑ "YPG Commander: Kurds Are Bulwark Against Islamic Extremism in Syria". Rudaw. 22 July 2013. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
  33. ↑ International Crisis Group (8 May 2014). "Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 February 2016. Retrieved 20 March 2016. The PYD's growing influence largely has come at the expense of other Kurdishgroups. In particular, it has prevented emergence of new, rival militias while forcing existing ones to cooperate with or join PYD forces on their terms
  34. ↑ International Crisis Group (8 May 2014). "Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 February 2016. Retrieved 20 March 2016. Crisis Group interview, Erbil, 4 July 2013: Intensified Islamist attacks in Kurdish areas shifted Kurdish public opinion toward the PYD. A resident of Tell Tamr, a partly Kurdish town targeted by armed Islamist groups, said, "in the aftermath of the battle of Ras al-Ayn, Islamists entered Tell Tamr. They began kidnapping and killing Kurds. I am not a YPG supporter, and I will never be. But if it weren't for the YPG, not a single Kurd would be left in the [al-] Jazeera region". Crisis Group interview, Erbil, July 2013. A journalist working for a pro-KDP channel commented: "I was the most critical person against the PYD. But at the moment, I have to admit that they are saving the people from the worst".
  35. ↑ International Crisis Group (8 May 2014). "Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 February 2016. Retrieved 20 March 2016. At the same time, Ankara turned a blind eye to the Islamist fighters crossing from Turkey into Syria, viewing them – in addition to helping bring down the Assad regime – as potential counterweights to the PYD. The strategy backfired; the PYD not only gained territory, but also bolstered its appeal among Kurds as their only protector from jihadis. In September 2013, a Turkish official acknowledged: 'We made the PYD stronger by trying to undermine it'
  36. ↑ N. Abboud, Samer (2015). Syria. John Wiley & Sons. p. 116. ISBN   978-0-7456-9801-4.
  37. ↑ "Kurdish Woman Leading Battle Against Islamic State in Kobane: Activists". NDTV . 2014. Retrieved 23 March 2016.
  38. ↑ "Woman leads Kurds in battle against Islamic State in Kobane: activists". Sydney Morning Herald . Retrieved 23 March 2016.
  39. ↑ "Kurdish woman leads fight against ISIS in Kobane" . Retrieved 23 March 2016.
  40. 1 2 "YPG takes control of Til Koçer". Firat News Agency. 27 October 2013. Archived from the original on 9 December 2013.
  41. ↑ "FSA and YPG cooperate against ISIL militants in Syria's Tel Abyad". ARA News. 12 May 2014. Archived from the original on 8 October 2014. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
  42. ↑ "YPG and FSA form a joint military chamber to combat ISIS in Syria". ARA News. 12 September 2014. Archived from the original on 14 October 2014. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
  43. ↑ "U.S. military: Airstrikes against ISIS won't save key city of Kobani". CNN. 9 October 2014. Retrieved 5 November 2016.
  44. ↑ "Kurdish YPG and Jabhat al-Shamiya Agreement on Judiciary Cooperation in Aleppo". Syrian Rebellion Observatory. 5 February 2015.
  45. ↑ van Wilgenburg, Wladimir. "Kurdish Strategy Towards Ethnically-Mixed Areas in the Syrian Conflict". Refworld. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
  46. ↑ "Is Tal Abyad a turning point for Syria's Kurds?". BBC News. 16 June 2015. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
  47. ↑ Pitarakis, Lefteris; Mroue, Bassem (14 June 2015). "Thousands of Syrians flee into Turkey amid intense fighting". AP. Archived from the original on 17 June 2015. Retrieved 14 June 2015. Thousands of Syrians cut through a border fence and crossed over into Turkey … fleeing intense fighting … between Kurdish fighters and jihadis.
  48. ↑ Abadi, Cameron (17 October 2019). "Why Is Turkey Fighting Syria's Kurds?". Foreign Policy . Retrieved 4 March 2020.
  49. ↑ "Declaration of establishment by Syrian Democratic Forces". Kurdish Question. 15 October 2015. Archived from the original on 24 February 2016. Retrieved 15 October 2015.
  50. ↑ "U.S.-backed alliance captures key dam from Islamic State – alliance spokesman". Reuters . 28 December 2015. Archived from the original on 28 December 2015. Colonel Talal Selo ... said the rapid advance overnight by thousands of troops from the Democratic Forces of Syria had brought the dam ... under their control on Saturday.... Selo said ... the latest round of fighting ... involved several thousand fighters from the Democratic Forces of Syria with heavy armour.
  51. ↑ "Photos of Tishrin Dam, Liberated from ISIS". 1 February 2016. Tishrin is an incredible dam, not least of all because it sits cradled in a beautiful lush valley, in an otherwise dry and arid land. But also because of what Tishrin implies for the people of Rojava who have survived for the past two years under incredible economic and political conditions, exacerbated significantly by lack of access to water and electricity which Tishrin provides.
  52. ↑ "Mapping Militant Organizations: Jaish al-Islam". Stanford University. 31 August 2017.
  53. ↑ "Middle East Concerns grow about abuses, war crimes in Syria". Deutsche Welle. 25 May 2016.
  54. ↑ "Syrian rebels admit chemical use against Kurds". Kurdistan 24. 9 April 2016.
  55. ↑ Trieb, Erin (August 2014). "Meet the Kurdish Women Fighting ISIS in Syria". NBC News. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
  56. ↑ Moritz Baumstieger (9 November 2016). "Profil – Rojda Felat. Kommandeurin der Offensive gegen den IS in Raqqa und Bismarck-Fan. [Profile – Rojda Felat. Commander of the offensive against the IS in Raqqa and Bismarck-Fan]" (in German). Süddeutsche Zeitung . Retrieved 1 January 2017.
  57. ↑ "404 error – This is not the page you requested". Janes.com.{{cite web}}: Cite uses generic title (help)
  58. 1 2 Stephens, Michael (11 September 2014). "Analysis: YPG – The Islamic State's worst enemy". IHS Jane's 360 . Retrieved 13 March 2016.
  59. ↑ Ahmad, Rozh (6 August 2012). "A rare glimpse into Kurdish armed forces in Syrian Kurdistan". Ekurd.net . Erbil, Iraq.
  60. ↑ Nordland, Rod (28 January 2018). "Female Kurdish Fighter Kills Turkish Troops in Likely Suicide Bombing in Syria". The New York Times .
  61. ↑ "Turkish troops targeted in Afrin suicide attack". Arab News . 30 January 2018. Retrieved 18 June 2021.
  62. ↑ "Kurdish female fighter detonates herself to destroy a Turkish tank in Afrin, statement". Rudaw . Retrieved 18 June 2021.
  63. 1 2 "Turkey's high stakes in post-ISIL Syria". Hürriyet Daily News. 5 July 2017. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  64. ↑ Oryx. "Monsters Of Desperation: The YPG's Sturmpanzers". Oryx. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  65. 1 2 3 4 5 Oryx. "Kurdish Armour: Inventorising YPG Equipment In Northern Syria". Oryx. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  66. 1 2 "All About the YPG, the Syrian Kurds Dividing Turkey and the US". Bloomberg.com. 22 November 2022. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  67. 1 2 "The Tweet of Damocles". New America. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  68. ↑ "Factbox: What is the Syrian Kurdish YPG?". Reuters. 14 November 2022. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  69. 1 2 @worldonalert (13 October 2019). "Register" (Tweet) – via Twitter.
  70. 1 2 3 AA, Daily Sabah with (4 December 2022). "'Border Eagles' protect Türkiye-Syria boundary with domestic equipment". Daily Sabah. Retrieved 3 January 2023.
  71. ↑ Jennifer Percy (30 September 2015). "Meet the American Vigilantes Who Are Fighting ISIS". The New York Times . Retrieved 15 December 2015.
  72. ↑ "Kobani Kurds Use Facebook To Recruit Foreign Fighters in Struggle Against IS". Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 13 November 2014. Retrieved 15 November 2014.
  73. ↑ "SOHR". Syriahr.com. 11 June 2015. Retrieved 15 November 2015.
  74. 1 2 "Western "comrades" join Kurds, Arabs, secularists, Yezidis, and Syriac Christians against Islamic State". Your Middle East. 29 October 2014. Retrieved 13 February 2015.
  75. ↑ "Exclusive: American explains why he's fighting ISIL". USA Today. 7 October 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
  76. ↑ Muir, Jim (23 October 2014). "The US volunteers who fight with Syria's Kurds". BBC . Retrieved 23 October 2014.
  77. ↑ Zurutuza, Karlos (23 October 2014). "A Divorced Father-of-Two from Ohio Is Fighting the Islamic State in Syria". Vice News . Retrieved 13 February 2015.
  78. ↑ "The Chinese man fighting Islamic State with the YPG". BBC News. 8 December 2015.
  79. ↑ "British ex-trader who fought Isil describes escape from Syria" . Telegraph.co.uk. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved 24 March 2017.
  80. ↑ Blake, Matt (2 January 2017). "Briton killed while fighting against Isis in Syria". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 24 March 2017.
  81. ↑ Arab, The New. "Foreign volunteers fighting with Syrian-Kurdish forces killed 'by Turkey'". alaraby. Retrieved 24 March 2017.
  82. ↑ "Canadian man killed while fighting ISIS in Syria | Globalnews.ca". Global News.
  83. ↑ Blake, Matt (29 October 2016). "'It wasn't about killing people': what drove a British farmer to the Syrian frontline?". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 24 March 2017.
  84. ↑ "Three foreign YPG volunteers released from jail, going home". rudaw. Retrieved 24 March 2017.
  85. ↑ "Kurds pay tribute to 'hero' Erik Scurfield on anniversary of death". BBC News. 5 March 2017. Retrieved 17 April 2022.
  86. ↑ "Enternasyonal devrimciler: Her dilden devrimi savunuyoruz" (in Turkish). Etkin Haber Ajansı. 28 January 2015. Archived from the original on 2 March 2015. Retrieved 11 February 2015.
  87. ↑ "Internationalists martyred in Rojava remembered in Greece". ANF News.
  88. ↑ Blake, Matt (19 March 2018). "British woman killed fighting Turkish forces in Afrin". The Guardian– via www.theguardian.com.
  89. ↑ "Syrian fighters 'overrun IS encampment'". BBC News. 19 March 2019. Retrieved 9 March 2020.
  90. ↑ Metin Gurcan (28 June 2017). "Turkey increasingly vocal against YPG's foreign recruits". Al-Monitor. Archived from the original on 29 September 2017. Retrieved 28 September 2017.
  91. ↑ "Matthew Gardiner confirmed to be fighting Islamic State with Kurds". NTNews. Archived from the original on 1 August 2015. Retrieved 9 July 2015.
  92. ↑ "Australian man defends his actions fighting against Islamic State". Xinhua (Beijing). 11 June 2015. Former international junior bench press champion Ashley Dyball … wrote on Facebook, 'The s--- you see here is nothing like you see on the bias news reports, the Islamic state must be stopped and if it means I can't come home f--- it.' … Dyball faces prosecution if he returns.
  93. ↑ Lauren Williams. "Awkward contradictions in Australian foreign-fighter laws". lowyinterpreter.org. Retrieved 29 November 2015.
  94. ↑ "Turkish Supreme Court upholds six-year verdict imposed on two Czechs". Radio Praha. 24 July 2018.
  95. ↑ Peter, Erik (16 October 2019). "Kurdische Symbole in Deutschland: Rechtslage? Mal so, mal so". Die Tageszeitung: taz (in German). ISSN   0931-9085 . Retrieved 1 March 2020.
  96. ↑ "Ist das Zeigen einer YPG-Fahne strafbar?". ANF News (in German). Retrieved 1 March 2020.
  97. ↑ Wright, Robin (4 April 2019). "How Trump Betrayed the General Who Defeated ISIS". The New Yorker. ISSN   0028-792X . Retrieved 5 April 2019.
  98. ↑ "Kobane: Air strikes help Syria town curb IS". BBC News. BBC News. 8 October 2014. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
  99. ↑ Weaver, Matthew; Borger, Julian (1 December 2015). "Syria airstrikes: everything you need to know". The Guardian. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
  100. ↑ "Turkey's Erdogan denounces US support for Syrian Kurds". BBC News. BBC News. 10 February 2016. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
  101. ↑ "PUKmedia یەکێتیی نیشتمانیی کوردستان". pukmedia.com.
  102. ↑ "U.S. delivers 50 tons of ammunition to Syria rebel groups". 12 October 2015. Retrieved 1 February 2016.
  103. ↑ "YPG, allies clash with Syrian opposition groups in Aleppo". Middle East Eye. 29 November 2015.
  104. ↑ Steele, Jonathan (3 December 2015). "The Syrian Kurds are winning!". New York Review of Books. Turkey had told ... the US that YPG forces would not be permitted to proceed beyond the Euphrates. In an apparent rebuke ... Kerry [said]: "We're … enhancing our air campaign in order to help drive Da'esh, which once dominated the Syria–Turkey border, out of the last seventy-mile stretch..." Review of Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War, by Michael M. Gunter.
  105. ↑ "'Obama orders US special forces to 'assist' fight against Isis in Syria '". 30 October 2015. Retrieved 1 February 2016.
  106. ↑ "EXCLUSIVE: Interethnic coalition takes on the IS group in Syria". France 24. 22 April 2016 – via YouTube.
  107. ↑ Shawn Snow (7 May 2017). "Syrian Kurds are now armed with sensitive US weaponry, and the Pentagon denies supplying it". Military Times.
  108. ↑ "Trump to Arm Syrian Kurds, Even as Turkey Strongly Objects". The New York Times . 9 May 2017.
  109. ↑ "In blow to U.S.-Turkey ties, Trump administration approves plan to arm Syrian Kurds against Islamic State". Washington Post. 9 May 2017.
  110. ↑ "Trump OKs arms for Syrian Kurds, despite Turkish objections". ABC News. 9 May 2017. Archived from the original on 9 May 2017.
  111. ↑ "Britain says uneasy after evidence of Kurdish coordination with Syria and Russia". Reuters UK. 23 February 2016. Archived from the original on 23 February 2016. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
  112. ↑ "Kurdish fighters in Aleppo deny receiving Russian military support". ARA News. Archived from the original on 28 March 2016. Retrieved 19 March 2016.
  113. ↑ "Abu Khawla: We coordinate with Russia and I brought thousands of opposition fighters to our areas". npasyria.com.
  114. ↑ "Russia: Kurds should be included in Geneva talks". Rudaw. Retrieved 20 March 2016.
  115. ↑ "Salih Muslim: Time Has Proved Us Right". The Kurdistan Tribune. 16 March 2016. Retrieved 20 March 2016. The West is fully aware that the Syrian Democratic Forces are an important and reliable active on the ground, hence the military support. Unfortunately, they have not yet approached us at a political level while they keep their ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey ... However, we do hope political relations to materialize among us in the future.
  116. ↑ Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community, 13 February 2018. Quote: "The Kurdish People's Protection Unit—the Syrian militia of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—probably will seek some form of autonomy but will face resistance from Russia, Iran, and Turkey."
  117. ↑ "Turkey air strikes on Kurds in Syria and Iraq spark US concern". BBC News. BBC News. 25 April 2017.
  118. ↑ Matt Blake (27 September 2017). "British film-maker killed by Isis militants in Syria". The Guardian.
  119. ↑ "Turkey accuses Kurdish forces of 'ethnic cleansing' in Syria". Agence France-Presse. 16 June 2015. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Sunday said he was troubled by the advance of Kurdish forces, saying they could in the future create a structure to threaten Turkey.
  120. ↑ Saeed, Yerevan (14 October 2015). "US voices concern over allegations of rights violations by YPG". Rudaw . Retrieved 20 October 2015. We'll look closely at all these accusations to determine whether there's any veracity to the claims ... We call on those who actually are or will participate in administering these areas to do so inclusively and with respect for all groups regardless of ethnicity
  121. ↑ "We had nowhere else to go, Forced displacement and demolition in northern Syria" (PDF). October 2015. In July and August 2015 Amnesty International investigated the forced displacement of residents from 10 villages and towns in areas under the control of the Autonomous Administration
  122. ↑ "Syria: US ally's razing of villages amounts to war crimes". Amnesty International. 13 October 2015. Retrieved 17 October 2015.
  123. ↑ "Syria Kurds 'razing villages seized from IS' – Amnesty". BBC News. 13 October 2015. Of 225 buildings visible [in Husseiniya] in June 2014, only 14 were still standing by June 2015.
  124. ↑ "Syria and Islamist groups guilty of war crimes, YPG cleared: UN report". Kom News. 15 March 2017. Archived from the original on 17 March 2017.
  125. ↑ Antonopoulos, Paul (15 March 2017). "UN report counters Amnesty International's claim that Kurds are ethnically cleansing in Syria". Archived from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 9 May 2017.
  126. ↑ "UN report refutes ethnic cleansing claims against Syrian Kurdish YPG, SDF". 14 March 2017. Retrieved 9 May 2017.
  127. 1 2 "We had nowhere else to go, Forced displacement and demolition in northern Syria" (PDF). October 2015. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 December 2015. Retrieved 27 March 2016. The circumstances of some of the instances of forced displacement documented in this report suggest that they were carried out in retaliation for people's perceived sympathies with, or family ties to, suspected members of IS or other armed groups. This would constitute collective punishment, which is a violation of international humanitarian law.
  128. 1 2 "We had nowhere else to go, Forced displacement and demolition in northern Syria" (PDF). Amnesty International . October 2015. p. 28. Retrieved 20 October 2021. In some dangerous areas there are some specific cases that are very small, resulting from the terrorist threat, where families were sent away from the area ... Only 25 families were forced to leave across Rojava ... (They are told) 'Folks, remove your things please, and if you leave from this area until the war ends it will be a good thing ...' You have terrorists in al-Raqqa and their families – the uncle, and brother, and sister – are here, and they are in communication, giving them information. We were forced to distance these families. Not detain them. Distance them. Take them outside of the area.
  129. ↑ "We had nowhere else to go, Forced displacement and demolition in northern Syria" (PDF). Amnesty International . October 2015. p. 29. Retrieved 20 October 2021. He added that IS was benefiting from the presence of civilians in these areas, and using them to plant car bombs or carry out other attacks on the YPG.
  130. ↑ "We had nowhere else to go, Forced displacement and demolition in northern Syria" (PDF). Amnesty International . October 2015. p. 17. After the YPG took the village, on 15 June, a car bomb killed three YPG fighters 4 km from Hammam al-Turkman at a checkpoint in Damishli. The following day there were skirmishes between the YPG and IS in the village before IS was pushed back. A second car bomb went off at a YPG checkpoint at the health clinic in the village on 18 June killing a YPG fighter and injuring one civilian and three days later IS shot and killed a second YPG fighter near the clinic. It was after the death of this fighter that the residents were told by the YPG that they had to leave the village.
  131. ↑ U.N. Security Council (5 June 2015). Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict (Report). para. 191. Actual numbers are expected to be higher.... A number of pro-Government groups, including Hizbullah, also reportedly recruited children in small numbers.
  132. ↑ "Syria: 4 brigades of the Free Syrian Army commit to prohibit sexual violence and the use of child soldiers [EN/AR] – Syrian Arab Republic". ReliefWeb. 3 July 2017.
  133. ↑ "Syria: Kurdish Forces Violating Child Soldier Ban Despite Promises, Children Still Fight". Human Rights Watch. 15 July 2015. Retrieved 15 July 2015.
  134. ↑ Perry, Tom; Malla, Naline (10 September 2015). "Western states train Kurdish force in Syria, force's leader says". Reuters . Amnesty International this month faulted the Kurdish administration for arbitrary detentions and unfair trials.... [Ciwan] Ibrahim said ... efforts were underway to improve its human rights record.... The Geneva Call ... promotes good treatment of civilians in war zones...
  135. ↑ YPG demobilizes 21 children under the age of 18 from the military service in its ranks (Report). Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 28 October 2015. Archived from the original on 21 November 2015.
  136. ↑ "Syria: Armed Group Recruiting Children in Camps". Human Rights Watch. 3 August 2018. Retrieved 14 September 2018.
  137. ↑ U.N. Security Council (16 May 2018). Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict (Report). Retrieved 23 October 2019.
  138. ↑ van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (7 September 2018). "SDF command issues order banning child recruitment". Kurdistan24 . Retrieved 20 October 2021.
  139. ↑ "General Assembly Security Council Seventy-fourth session Seventy-fifth year Agenda item 66 (a) Promotion and protection of the rights of children" (PDF). United Nations. Retrieved 16 June 2020.
  140. ↑ van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (15 July 2020). "SDF issues new directives to protect schools, children from military conflict". Kurdistan24 . Retrieved 17 July 2020.
  141. ↑ "SDF announce new measure to tackle recruitment of child soldiers". Rudaw. 29 August 2020. Retrieved 20 October 2021.
  142. ↑ van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (30 August 2020). "New mechanism allows civilians to report child recruitment in northeast Syria". Kurdistan24.
  143. ↑ van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (22 May 2021). "Child recruitment by SDF down significantly since 2019, UN says". Kurdistan24.

Bibliography

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.