In July 1956, Anthony Eden ordered his Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Gerald Templer, to begin planning for an invasion of Egypt.[1] Eden's plan called for the Cyprus-based 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to seize the canal zone.[2] The Prime Minister's plan was rejected by Templer and the other service chiefs, who argued that the neglect of parachute training in the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade rendered his plan for an airborne assault unsuitable.[1] Instead, they suggested the sea-power based Contingency Plan, which called for the Royal Marines to take Port Said, which would then be used as a base for three British divisions to overrun the canal zone.[1]
In early August, the Contingency Plan was modified by including a strategic bombing campaign that was intended to destroy Egypt's economy, and thereby hopefully bring about Nasser's overthrow.[1] In addition, a role was allocated to the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade, which would lead the assault on Port Said in conjunction with the Royal Marine landing.[3] The commanders of the Allied Task Force led by General Stockwell rejected the Contingency Plan, which Stockwell argued failed to destroy the Egyptian Armed Forces.[3]
Franco-Israeli planning
Israeli M4A4 Shermans were also used in the Sinai campaign.
In July 1956, IDF chief of staff General Moshe Dayan advised Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that Israel should attack Egypt at the first chance, but Ben-Gurion stated he preferred to attack Egypt with the aid of France.[4] On 7 August 1956 the French Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury asked Ben Gurion if Israel would attack Egypt together with France, to which he received a positive reply.[5] On 1 September 1956 the French government formally asked that France and Israel begin joint planning for a war against Egypt.[6] By 6 September 1956, Dayan's chief of operations General Meir Amit, was meeting with Admiral Pierre Barjot to discuss joint Franco-Israeli operations.[6] On 25 September 1956 Peres reported to Ben-Gurion that France wanted Israel as an ally against Egypt, and that the only problem was Britain, which was opposed to Israel taking action against Nasser.[7]
In late September 1956, the French Premier Guy Mollet had embarked upon a dual policy of attacking Egypt with Britain, and if the British backed out (as Mollet believed that they might), with Israel.[8] On 30 September 1956 secret Franco-Israeli talks on planning a war started in Paris, which were based on the assumption that Britain would not be involved.[9] The French very much wanted to use airfields in Cyprus to bomb Egypt, but being not certain about Britain's attitude, wanted to use Israeli airfields if the ones in Cyprus were not free.[10] Only on 5 October 1956 during a visit by General Maurice Challe to Britain where he met with Eden, were the British informed of the secret Franco-Israeli alliance.[11]
On 22 October 1956, during negotiations leading to the Protocol of Sèvres, Ben-Gurion gave an explanation to foreign dignitaries of Israel's overall strategy for the Middle East.[12][13][14] His main objection to the "English plan" was that Israel would be branded as the aggressor while Britain and France would pose as peace-makers.
Instead he presented a comprehensive plan, which he himself called "fantastic", for the reorganization of the Middle East. Jordan, he observed, was not viable as an independent state and should therefore be divided. Iraq would get the East Bank in return for a promise to settle the Palestinian refugees there and to make peace with Israel while the West Bank would be attached to Israel as a semi-autonomous region. Lebanon suffered from having a large Muslim population which was concentrated in the south. The problem could be solved by Israel's expansion up to the Litani River, thereby helping to turn Lebanon into a more compact Christian state. ... Israel declares its intention to keep her forces for the purpose of permanent annexation of the entire area east of the El Arish-Abu Ageila, Nakhl-Sharm el-Sheikh, in order to maintain for the long term the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Eilat and in order to free herself from the scourge of the infiltrators and from the danger posed by the Egyptian army bases in Sinai. ... "I told him about the discovery of oil in southern and western Sinai, and that it would be good to tear this peninsula from Egypt because it did not belong to her, rather it was the English who stole it from the Turks when they believed that Egypt was in their pocket. I suggested laying down a pipeline from Sinai to Haifa to refine the oil."
Newsreels about disturbances in North Africa and Egypt leading up to the Suez Crisis
In October 1956, Eden, after two months of pressure, finally and reluctantly agreed to French requests to include Israel in Operation Revise[specify].[2] The British alliances with the Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq had made the British very reluctant to fight alongside Israel, lest the ensuing backlash in the Arab world threaten London's friends in Baghdad and Amman.[2] The coming of winter weather in November meant that Eden needed a pretext to begin Revise as soon as possible, which meant that Israel had to be included.[2] This was especially the case as many Conservative backbenchers had expected Eden to launch operations against Egypt in the summer, and were disappointed when Eden had instead chosen talks. By the fall of 1956, many Tory backbenchers were starting to grow restive about the government's seeming inability to start military action, and if Eden had continued to put off military action for the winter of 1956–57, it is possible that his government might not have survived.[2]
Three months after Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal company, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for an alliance against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, purportedly to separate the warring Israeli and Egyptian forces, instructing both to withdraw to a distance of 16 kilometres from either side of the canal.[15]
The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and that it needed to be placed under Anglo-French management. David Ben-Gurion did not trust the British in view of their treaty with Jordan and he was not initially in favour of the plan, since it would make Israel alone look like the aggressor; however he soon agreed to it since such a good opportunity to strike back at Egypt might never again present itself.[15]
Stockwell offered up Operation Musketeer, which was to begin with a two-day air campaign that would see the British gain air superiority.[3] In place of Port Said, Musketeer called for the capture of Alexandria.[3] Once that city had been taken in assault from the sea, British armoured divisions would engage in a decisive battle of annihilation somewhere south of Alexandria and north of Cairo.[3]
Musketeer would require thousands of troops, leading the British to seek out France as an ally.[3] To destroy the 300,000-strong Egyptian Army in his planned battle of annihilation, Stockwell estimated that he needed 80,000 troops, while at most the British Army could spare was 50,000 troops; the French could supply the necessary 30,000 troops to make up the shortfall.[3]
On 11 August 1956, General Charles Keightley was appointed commander of Musketeer with French Admiral Pierre Barjot as his deputy commander.[3] The appointment of Stockwell as the Allied Task Force commander charged with leading the assault on Egypt caused considerable disappointment with the other officers of the Task Force.[16] One French officer recalled that Stockwell was
Extremely excitable, gesticulating, keeping no part of him still, his hands, his feet, and even his head and shoulders perpetually on the go, he starts off by sweeping objects off the table with a swish of his swagger cane or in his room by using it to make golf-strokes with the flower vases and ash-trays. Those are the good moments. You will see him pass in an instant from the most cheerfully expressed optimism to a dejection that amounts to nervous depression. He is a cyclothymic. By turns courteous and brutal, refined and coarse, headstrong in some circumstances, hesitant and indecisive in others, he disconcerts by his unpredictable responses and the contradictions of which he is made up. One only of his qualities remains constant: his courage under fire.[16]
By contrast, the majority of the officers of the Task Force, both French and British, admired André Beaufre as an elegant yet tough general with a sharp analytical mind who always kept his cool.[16] Most of the officers of the Anglo-French Task Force expressed regret that it was Beaufre who was Stockwell's deputy rather the other way around.[16] A major problem both politically and militarily with the planning for Musketeer was the one-week interval between sending troops to the eastern Mediterranean and the beginning of the invasion.[17] Additionally, the coming of winter weather to the Mediterranean in late November would render the invasion impossible, which thus meant the invasion had to begin before then.[17] An additional problem was Eden, who constantly interfered with the planning and was so obsessed with secrecy that he refused to tell Keightley what his political objectives were in attacking Egypt: namely, whether he wanted to retake the Suez Canal or topple Nasser, or both.[18] Eden's refusal to explain to Keightley just what exactly he was hoping to accomplish by attacking Egypt exasperated Keightley to no end, and greatly complicated the planning process.[18]
In late August 1956, Admiral Barjot suggested that Port Said once again be made the main target, which lessened the number of troops needed and thus reduced the interval between sending forces to the eastern Mediterranean and the invasion.[19] Beaufre was strongly opposed to the change, warning that Barjot's modification of merely capturing the canal zone made for an ambiguous goal, and that the lack of a clear goal was dangerous.[19] In early September, Keightley embraced Barjot's idea of seizing Port Said, and presented Revise.[19]
Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Louis Mountbatten strongly advised his old friend Prime Minister Anthony Eden against the Conservative plans to seize the Suez canal. He argued that such a move would destabilize the Middle East, undermine the authority of the United Nations, divide the Commonwealth and diminish Britain's global standing. His advice was not taken; he tried to resign but the political leadership of the Royal Navy would not let him. Instead he worked hard to prepare the Royal Navy for war with characteristic professionalism and thoroughness.[20][21]
Anglo-French Operation Revise
Operation Revise called for the following:
Phase I: Anglo-French air forces to gain air supremacy over Egypt's skies.[19]
Phase II: Anglo-French air forces were to launch a 10-day "aero-psychological" campaign that would destroy the Egyptian economy.[19]
Phase III: Air- and sea-borne landings to capture the canal zone.[19]
On 8 September 1956 Revise was approved by the British and French cabinets.[19]
Both Stockwell and Beaufre were opposed to Revise as an open-ended plan with no clear goal beyond seizing the canal zone, but was embraced by Eden and Mollet as offering greater political flexibility and the prospect of lesser Egyptian civilian casualties.[19]
Israeli preparations
Anglo-French para drops on the Suez Canal and Israeli conquest of Sinai
At the same time, Israel had been working on Operation Kadesh for the invasion of the Sinai.[2] Dayan's plan put an emphasis on air power combined with mobile battles of encirclement.[2] Kadesh called for the Israeli Air Force to win air superiority, which was to be followed up with "one continuous battle" in the Sinai.[2] Israeli forces would in a series of swift operations encircle and then take the main Egyptian strong points in the Sinai.[2]
Israeli military planning for the operation hinged on four main military objectives: Sharm el-Sheikh, Arish, Abu Uwayulah (Abu Ageila), and the Gaza Strip. Egyptian forces blockaded the Tiran Straits (based at Sharm el-Sheikh) since 1953, and by capturing the town, Israel would regain access to the Red Sea and trade benefits of secure passage to the Indian Ocean. The Gaza Strip was chosen as another military objective because Israel wished to remove the training grounds for Fedayeen groups, and because Israel recognised that Egypt could use the territory as a staging ground for attacks against the advancing Israeli troops. Israel advocated rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian flanking attack would present even more of a risk. Arish and Abu Uwayulah were important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and control of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai.[22] Capturing them would deal a deathblow to the Egyptians' strategic operation in the entire Peninsula. The capture of these four objectives were hoped to be the means by which the entire Egyptian Army would rout and fall back into Egypt proper, which British and French forces would then be able to push up against an Israeli advance, and crush in a decisive encounter.[22]
Reflecting this emphasis on encirclement was the "outside-in" approach of Kadesh, which called for Israeli paratroopers to seize distant points first, with those closer to Israel to be seized later.[2] Thus, the 202nd Paratroop Battalion commanded by Colonel Ariel Sharon was to land in the far-western part of the Sinai to take the Mitla Pass, and thereby cut off the Egyptian forces in the eastern Sinai from their supply lines.[2]
American intelligence
The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was taking high-altitude photos of the allied activities, and more details came from human sources in London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. CIA chief Allen Dulles said that "intelligence was well alerted as to what Israel and then Britain and France were likely to do ... In fact, United States intelligence had kept the government informed".[23]
To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by Britain and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft.
In the morning of 30 October Britain and France sent ultimatums to Egypt and Israel. They initiated Operation Musketeer on 31 October, with a bombing campaign.[28] Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal closing it to all shipping—shipping would not move again until early 1957. Despite the risk of an invasion in the canal zone, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer ordered Egyptian troops in the Sinai to stay put, as Amer confidently assured Nasser that the Egyptians could defeat the Israelis in the Sinai and then defeat the Anglo-French forces once they came ashore in the canal zone.[29]
Amer also advised Nasser to send more troops into the Sinai to inflict his promised defeat on Israel, even though the risk of their being cut off if the canal zone were seized by Anglo-French forces was enormous.[29] Not until late on 31 October did Nasser disregard Amer's rosy assessment and ordered his forces to disengage in the Sinai and to retreat back to the canal zone to face the expected Anglo-French invasion.[29] Eden and Mollet ordered Phase I of Operation Revise to begin 13 hours after the Anglo-French ultimatum.[30]
A Hawker Sea Hawk of 899 Naval Air Squadron, armed with rockets, about to be launched from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle for a strike on an Egyptian airfield
British bombers based in Cyprus and Malta took off to Cairo with the aim of destroying Cairo airport, only to be personally ordered back by Eden when he learned that American civilians were being evacuated at Cairo airport.[30] Fearful of the backlash that might result if American civilians were killed in a British bombing attack, Eden sent the Valiant bombers back to Malta while the Canberras were ordered to hit Almaza airbase outside of Cairo.[30] British night bombing proved ineffective.[30]
Starting on the morning of 1 November, carrier-based de Havilland Sea Venoms, Chance-Vought Corsairs and Hawker Sea Hawks began a series of daytime strikes on Egypt.[30] By the night of 1 November the Egyptian Air Force had lost 200 planes.[30] With the destruction of Egypt's air force, Keightley ordered the beginning of Revise Phase II.[31] As part of Revise Phase II, a wide-ranging interdiction campaign began.[32] On 3 November F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the French carriers Arromanches and La Fayette, attacked the aerodrome at Cairo. One French Corsair was shot down by Egyptian anti-aircraft fire and the pilot was killed. He was reportedly captured alive and subsequently executed in captivity.[33][34]
The very aggressive French General Beaufre suggested at once that Anglo-French forces seize the canal zone with airborne landings instead of waiting the planned ten days for Revise II to be worked through, and that the risk of sending in paratroopers without the prospect of sea-borne landings for several days be taken.[35] By 3 November, Beaufre finally convinced Keightley and Stockwell of the merits of his approach, and gained the approval for Operation Telescope as Beaufre had code-named the airborne assault on the canal zone.[36]
On 2 November 1956 the First Sea Lord Admiral Mountbatten sent a letter to Eden telling him to stop the invasion before troops landed in the canal zone as the operation had already proved to be too costly politically.[37] The next day, Mountbatten made a desperate phone call to Eden asking for permission to stop the invasion before it began, only to be refused.[38] Mountbatten's views led to clash of personalities with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Gerald Templer who supported the invasion.[39] In response to Mountbatten's call to cancel the invasion, Templer penned a memo, which read:
Some people in England today say that what we're[sic?] done in the Middle East will have terrible effects in the future. ... The reality is that we have checked a drift. With a bit of luck we're not only stopped a big war in the Middle East, but we're halted the march of Russia through the Middle East and on to the African continent.[40]
Telescope modified: the paratroops land
Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, 5 November 1956.
In the early morning of 5 November, an advance element of the 3rd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment dropped on El Gamil Airfield, a narrow strip of land, led by Brigadier M.A.H. Butler.[41] The "Red Devils" could not return Egyptian fire while landing, but once the paratroopers landed, they used their Sten guns, three-inch mortars and anti-tank weapons with great effect.[42] Having taken the airfield with a dozen casualties, the remainder of the battalion flew in by helicopter. The Battalion then secured the area around the airfield.[42]
During the ensuing street fighting, the Egyptian forces engaged in methodical tactics, fighting on the defence while inflicting maximum casualties and retreating only when overwhelming force was brought to bear.[42] In particular, the SU-100 tank destroyers proved to be a formidable weapon in urban combat.[42] The British forces moved up towards Port Said with air support before digging in at 13:00 to hold until the beach assault.[43] With close support from carrier-based Hawker Sea Hawks and Westland Wyverns, the British paratroopers took Port Said's sewage works, after which they captured the cemetery in a battle during which they killed about 30 Egyptians without losing a man in return, and became engaged in a pitched battle for the Coast Guard barracks, during which withering fire from the defenders stalled the advance. An attack by supporting Wyverns inflicted heavy casualties on the defenders, although the lead aircraft was shot down during the attack.[43] Overall, the British paratroopers had managed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Egyptians for the loss of 4 dead and 32 wounded.[44]
At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Chateau-Jobert landed with a force of the 2nd RPC at Raswa.[43] Raswa imposed the problem of a small drop zone surrounded by water, but General Jacques Massu of the 10th Parachute Division assured Beaufre that this was not an insolvable problem for his men.[36] 500 heavily armed paratroopers of the French 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Nord Noratlas 2501 transports of the Escadrille de Transport (ET) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company.[45]
The paratroopers swiftly secured the western bridge at the cost of two soldiers, putting Egyptian positions out of action with bazookas and mortars, and F4U Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions, destroying several SU-100s. F-84Fs also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions fighting back until destroyed, while others were abandoned with little resistance. The French paratroopers stormed and took Port Said's waterworks that morning, an important objective to control in a city in the desert.[43] Chateau-Jobert followed up this success by beginning an attack on Port Fuad.[46] Derek Varble, the American military historian, later wrote "Air support and fierce French assaults transformed the fighting at Port Fuad into a rout".[46] During the fighting in the canal zone, the French paratroopers often practised their "no-prisoners'" code and executed Egyptian POWs.[47]
The Egyptian commander at Port Said, General Salahedin Moguy then proposed a truce.[46] His offer was taken up, and in the ensuring meeting with General Butler, Chateau-Jobert and General Massu, was offered the terms of surrendering the city and marching his men to the Gamil airfield to be taken off to prisoner-of-war camps in Cyprus.[48] Moguy had no interest in surrendering and had only made the truce offer to buy time for his men to dig in;[48] when fighting began again vans with loudspeakers travelled through the city encouraging resistance against the invaders, by announcing that London and Paris had been bombed by the Russians and that World War III had started. As the paratroopers alone were not enough,[49]:173 Beaufre and British Admiral Manley Laurence Power urged that the sea-borne landings be accelerated and that Allied forces land the very next day.[48]
Stockwell and Knightley, who wished to stick with the original plan, opposed this.[50] Stockwell was always in favour of rigidly following already agreed to plans, and was most reluctant to see any changes, whereas Beaufre was all for changing plans to match with changed circumstances.[51] The differences between Stockwell and Beaufre were summarised by the American historian Derek Varble as: "Stockwell favored existing plans; their methodical construction and underlying staff work reduced risks. Beaufre, by contrast an opportunist, saw plans merely a means to an end, without much inherent value. For him, altered circumstances or assumptions provided adequate justification to jettison part or all of the original plan".[51]
Royal Marines come ashore at Port Said
Troops of the Parachute Regiment escort a captured Egyptian soldier at Port Said2ème RPC paratroopers patrol in Port Said, October 1956
At first light on 6 November, Royal Marines of No. 42 and 40 Commando stormed the beaches, using landing craft of World War II vintage (Landing Craft Assault and Landing Vehicle Tracked).[52] The battle group standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.[52]
The men of 42 Commando as much as possible chose to by-pass Egyptian positions and focused on trying to break through inland.[52] The Royal Marines of 40 Commando had the advantage of being supported by Centurion tanks as they landed on Sierra Red beach.[53] Upon entering downtown Port Said, the Marines became engaged in fierce urban combat as the Egyptians used the Casino Palace Hotel and other strongpoints as fortresses.[53]
Nasser proclaimed the Suez War to be a "people's war".[54] As such, Egyptian troops were ordered to don civilian clothes while guns were freely handed out to Egyptian civilians.[55] From Nasser's point of view, a "people's war" presented the British and French with an unsolvable dilemma.[56] If the Allies reacted aggressively to the "people's war", then that would result in the deaths of innocent civilians and thus bring world sympathy to his cause while weakening morale on the home front in Britain and France.[56] If the Allies reacted cautiously to the "people's war", than that would result in Allied forces becoming bogged down by sniper attacks, who had the advantage of attacking "with near impunity by hiding among crowds of apparent non-combatants".[56]
These tactics worked especially well against the British.[56] British leaders, especially Eden and the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Louis Mountbatten were afraid of being labelled "murderers and baby killers", and sincerely attempted to limit Egyptian civilian deaths.[56] Eden frequently interfered with Revise Phase I and II bombing, striking off various targets that he felt were likely to cause excessive civilian deaths, and restricted the gun sizes that could be used at the Port Said landings, again to minimise civilian deaths.[56]
The American historian Derek Varble has commented that the paradox between Eden's concern for Egyptian civilians and the object of Revise Phase II bombing, which was intended to terrorise the Egyptian people, was never resolved.[57] Despite Eden's best efforts, British bombing still killed hundreds of Egyptian civilians during Revise II, though these deaths were due more to imprecise aiming rather than a deliberate policy of "area bombing" such as that employed against Germany in World War II.[58] At Port Said, the heavy fighting in the streets and the resulting fires destroyed much of the city, killing many civilians.
In the afternoon, 522 additional French paratroopers of the 1er REP (Régiment Étranger Parachutiste, 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port Fuad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale, which flew very intensive operations: for example, although the French carrier La Fayette developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat sorties were completed. The French were aided by AMX-13 light tanks.[59] While clearing Port Fuad, the 1er Regiment Etranger Parachutiste inflicted 100 casualties on the Egyptians.[59] After securing Port Fuad, the French continued to face sporadic sniper fire and fought a pitched battle for an Egyptian police post a mile to the east of the town, losing two soldiers while killing or capturing all of its 72 defenders.
British Royal Marines of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft also mistakenly hit 45 Commando and HQ. One Marine was killed and 15 wounded when a carrier-based Wyvern mistakenly fired into a concentration of Marines.[60][61] The helicopter-borne assault of 45 Commando was the first time helicopters were used by British forces to lift men directly into a combat zone.[62] Lieutenant Colonel Norman Tailyour, who was leading 45 Commando was landed by mistake in a stadium still under Egyptian control resulting in a very hasty retreat.[63] Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.[64] Most Egyptian soldiers now wore civilian clothing and operated in small groups, but remained organized. Civilians who took up arms as guerrillas were organized into eight groups with five additional groups joining them from outside the city. The Egyptians were gradually pushed back as the British took key objectives.
Especially fierce fighting took place at Port Said's Customs House and Navy House.[63] The Egyptians destroyed Port Said's Inner Harbour, which forced the British to improvise and use the Fishing Harbour to land their forces.[65] The 2nd Bn of the Parachute Regiment landed by ship in the harbour. Centurion tanks of the British 6th Royal Tank Regiment were landed and by 12:00 they had reached the French paratroopers.[65] The link-up of British and French forces occurred close to the offices of the Suez Canal Company. While the building was captured with ease, the surrounding warehouses were heavily defended and were only taken in fierce fighting during which two British soldiers were killed. The warehouses were overrun with the help of supporting fire from Centurion tanks firing at point-blank range. While the British were landing at Port Said, the men of the 2 RPC at Raswa fought off Egyptian counter-attacks featuring SU-100 self-propelled guns.[66]
After establishing themselves in a position in downtown Port Said, 42 Commando headed down the Shari Muhammad Ali, the main north–south road to link up with the French forces at the Raswa bridge and the Inner Basin lock.[66] While doing so, the Marines also took Port Said's gasworks.[67] Meanwhile, 40 Commando supported by the Royal Tank Regiment remained engaged in clearing the downtown of Egyptian snipers.[67] Colonel Tailyour arranged for more reinforcements to be brought in via helicopter.[67]
Hearing rumours that Moguy wished to surrender, both Stockwell and Beaufre left their command ship HMS Tyne for Port Said.[59] Upon landing, they learned the rumours were not true.[59] Instead of returning to the Tyne, both Stockwell and Beaufre spent the day in Port Said, and were thus cut off from the news.[59] Only late in the day did Beaufre and Stockwell learn of the acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire.[59] Rather than focusing on breaking out to take al-Qantarah, the Royal Marines became bogged down in clearing every building in Port Said of snipers.[59] The Centurions of the Royal Tank Regiment supported by the paratroopers of 2 RPC began a slow advance down to al-Qantarah on the night of 6 November.[68]
Egyptian sniper attacks and the need to clear every building led 3 Para to be slowed in their attempts to link up with the Royal Marines.[69] When Stockwell learned of the ceasefire to come into effect in five hours' time at 9:00pm, he ordered Colonel Gibbon and his Centurions to race down and take al-Qantarah with all speed to improve the Allied bargaining position.[70] What followed was a confused series of melee actions down the road to al-Qantarah that ended with the British forces at al-Cap, a small village four miles north of al-Qantarah at 2:00am, when the ceasefire came into effect.[71] Total Royal Marine casualties in the Port Said landings were 9 killed and 60 wounded.[61]
↑ Adrian Smith, "Rewriting History? Admiral Lord Mountbatten's Efforts to Distance Himself From the 1956 Suez Crisis." Contemporary British History 26.4 (2012): 489-508 online; Adrian Smith, "Resignation of a First Sea Lord: Mountbatten and the 1956 Suez Crisis." History 98.329 (2013): 105-134 online.
↑ Kaufman, Bill, Slettedahl Macpherson, Heidi(2005) Britain and the Americas: culture, politics, and history. ABC-CLIO,p. 939. ISBN1851094318
↑ Brown, Neville (2013) Global Instability and Strategic Crisis. Routledge, p. 40. ISBN1134409605
↑ Dunbabin, J.P.D. (1994). International Relations Since 1945: The post-imperial age: the great powers and the wider world. Longman, p. 294. ISBN0582227194
↑ Smith, Peter C. (2007). Midway: Dauntless Victory:Fresh Perspectives on America's Seminal Naval Victory of World War II. Pen & Sword, p. 277. ISBN1844155838
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