Artificial consciousness, [1] also known as machine consciousness, [2] [3] synthetic consciousness, [4] or digital consciousness, [5] is the consciousness hypothesized to be possible in artificial intelligence. [6] It is also the corresponding field of study, which draws insights from philosophy of mind, philosophy of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neuroscience. The same terminology can be used with the term "sentience" instead of "consciousness" when specifically designating phenomenal consciousness (the ability to feel qualia). [7]
Some scholars believe that consciousness is generated by the interoperation of various parts of the brain; these mechanisms are labeled the neural correlates of consciousness or NCC. Some further believe that constructing a system (e.g., a computer system) that can emulate this NCC interoperation would result in a system that is conscious. [8]
As there are many hypothesized types of consciousness, there are many potential implementations of artificial consciousness. In the philosophical literature, perhaps the most common taxonomy of consciousness is into "access" and "phenomenal" variants. Access consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that can be apprehended, while phenomenal consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that seemingly cannot be apprehended, instead being characterized qualitatively in terms of "raw feels", "what it is like" or qualia. [9]
Type-identity theorists and other skeptics hold the view that consciousness can be realized only in particular physical systems because consciousness has properties that necessarily depend on physical constitution. [10] [11] [12] [13]
In his article "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility," Giorgio Buttazzo says that a common objection to artificial consciousness is that, "Working in a fully automated mode, they [the computers] cannot exhibit creativity, unreprogrammation (which means can 'no longer be reprogrammed', from rethinking), emotions, or free will. A computer, like a washing machine, is a slave operated by its components." [14]
For other theorists (e.g., functionalists), who define mental states in terms of causal roles, any system that can instantiate the same pattern of causal roles, regardless of physical constitution, will instantiate the same mental states, including consciousness. [15]
One of the most explicit arguments for the plausibility of artificial sentience comes from David Chalmers. His proposal is roughly that the right kinds of computations are sufficient for the possession of a conscious mind. Chalmers proposes that a system implements a computation if "the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation", and that any system that implements certain computations is sentient. [16]
The most controversial part of Chalmers' proposal is that mental properties are "organizationally invariant". Mental properties are of two kinds, psychological and phenomenological. Psychological properties, such as belief and perception, are those that are "characterized by their causal role". Aided by previous work, [17] [18] he says that "systems with the same causal topology ... will share their psychological properties".
Phenomenological properties, unlike psychological properties, are not definable in terms of their causal roles. Establishing that phenomenological properties are a consequence of a causal topology, therefore, requires argument. Chalmers provides his Dancing Qualia argument for this purpose. [19]
Chalmers begins by assuming that his principle of organization invariance is false: that agents with identical causal organizations could have different experiences. He then asks us to conceive of changing one agent into the other by the replacement of parts (neural parts replaced by silicon, say) while preserving its causal organization. The experience of the agent under transformation would change (as the parts were replaced), but there would be no change in causal topology and therefore no means whereby the agent could "notice" the shift in experience; Chalmers considers this state of affairs an implausible reducto ad absurdum establishing that his principle of organizational invariance must almost certainly be true.
Critics[ who? ] of artificial sentience object that Chalmers' proposal begs the question in assuming that all mental properties and external connections are already sufficiently captured by abstract causal organization.
In 2022, Google engineer Blake Lemoine made a viral claim that Google's LaMDA chatbot was sentient. Lemoine supplied as evidence the chatbot's humanlike answers to many of his questions; however, the chatbot's behavior was judged by the scientific community as likely a consequence of mimicry, rather than machine sentience. Lemoine's claim was widely derided for being ridiculous. [20] However, while philosopher Nick Bostrom states that LaMDA is unlikely to be conscious, he additionally poses the question of "what grounds would a person have for being sure about it?" One would have to have access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and also would have to understand how consciousness works, and then figure out how to map the philosophy onto the machine: "(In the absence of these steps), it seems like one should be maybe a little bit uncertain. [...] there could well be other systems now, or in the relatively near future, that would start to satisfy the criteria." [21]
Qualia, or phenomenological consciousness, is an inherently first-person phenomenon. Although various systems may display numerous signs of behaviors correlated with functional consciousness, there is no conceivable way in which third-person tests can have access to first-person phenomenological features. Because of that, in addition to the lack of an empirical definition of sentience, [22] directly testing for the presence of sentience in AC may be impossible.
A well-known method for testing machine intelligence is the Turing test, which assesses the ability to have a human-like conversation. But passing the Turing test does not indicate that an AI system is sentient, as the AI may simply mimic human behavior without having the associated feelings. [23]
In 2014, Victor Argonov suggested a non-Turing test for machine sentience based on machine's ability to produce philosophical judgments. [24] He argues that a deterministic machine must be regarded as conscious if it is able to produce judgments on all problematic properties of consciousness (such as qualia or binding) having no innate (preloaded) philosophical knowledge on these issues, no philosophical discussions while learning, and no informational models of other creatures in its memory (such models may implicitly or explicitly contain knowledge about these creatures' consciousness). However, this test can be used only to detect, but not refute the existence of consciousness. A positive result proves that machine is conscious but a negative result proves nothing. For example, absence of philosophical judgments may be caused by lack of the machine's intellect, not by absence of consciousness.
If it were suspected that a particular machine was conscious, its rights would be an ethical issue that would need to be assessed (e.g. what rights it would have under law). For example, a conscious computer that was owned and used as a tool or central computer within a larger machine is a particular ambiguity. Should laws be made for such a case? Consciousness would also require a legal definition in this particular case. Because artificial consciousness is still largely a theoretical subject, such ethics have not been discussed or developed to a great extent, though it has often been a theme in fiction.
In 2021, German philosopher Thomas Metzinger argued for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology until 2050. Metzinger asserts that humans have a duty of care towards any sentient AIs they create, and that proceeding too fast risks creating an "explosion of artificial suffering". [25]
Enforced amnesia has been proposed as a way to mitigate the risk of silent suffering in locked-in conscious AI and certain AI-adjacent biological systems like brain organoids. [26]
Bernard Baars and others argue there are various aspects of consciousness necessary for a machine to be artificially conscious. [27] The functions of consciousness suggested by Baars are: definition and context setting, adaptation and learning, editing, flagging and debugging, recruiting and control, prioritizing and access-control, decision-making or executive function, analogy-forming function, metacognitive and self-monitoring function, and autoprogramming and self-maintenance function. Igor Aleksander suggested 12 principles for artificial consciousness: [28] the brain is a state machine, inner neuron partitioning, conscious and unconscious states, perceptual learning and memory, prediction, the awareness of self, representation of meaning, learning utterances, learning language, will, instinct, and emotion. The aim of AC is to define whether and how these and other aspects of consciousness can be synthesized in an engineered artifact such as a digital computer. This list is not exhaustive; there are many others not covered.
Some philosophers, such as David Chalmers, use the term consciousness to refer exclusively to phenomenal consciousness, which is roughly equivalent to sentience. [29] Explaining why and how subjective experience arises is known as the hard problem of consciousness. [30] AI sentience would give rise to concerns of welfare, [31] whereas other aspects of consciousness related to cognitive capabilities may be more relevant for AI rights. [32]
Awareness could be one required aspect, but there are many problems with the exact definition of awareness. The results of the experiments of neuroscanning on monkeys suggest that a process, not only a state or object, activates neurons. Awareness includes creating and testing alternative models of each process based on the information received through the senses or imagined,[ clarification needed ] and is also useful for making predictions. Such modeling needs a lot of flexibility. Creating such a model includes modeling the physical world, modeling one's own internal states and processes, and modeling other conscious entities.
There are at least three types of awareness: [33] agency awareness, goal awareness, and sensorimotor awareness, which may also be conscious or not. For example, in agency awareness, you may be aware that you performed a certain action yesterday, but are not now conscious of it. In goal awareness, you may be aware that you must search for a lost object, but are not now conscious of it. In sensorimotor awareness, you may be aware that your hand is resting on an object, but are not now conscious of it.
Because objects of awareness are often conscious, the distinction between awareness and consciousness is frequently blurred or they are used as synonyms. [34]
Conscious events interact with memory systems in learning, rehearsal, and retrieval. [35] The IDA model [36] elucidates the role of consciousness in the updating of perceptual memory, [37] transient episodic memory, and procedural memory. Transient episodic and declarative memories have distributed representations in IDA; there is evidence that this is also the case in the nervous system. [38] In IDA, these two memories are implemented computationally using a modified version of Kanerva’s sparse distributed memory architecture. [39]
Learning is also considered necessary for artificial consciousness. Per Bernard Baars, conscious experience is needed to represent and adapt to novel and significant events. [27] Per Axel Cleeremans and Luis Jiménez, learning is defined as "a set of philogenetically[ sic ] advanced adaptation processes that critically depend on an evolved sensitivity to subjective experience so as to enable agents to afford flexible control over their actions in complex, unpredictable environments". [40]
The ability to predict (or anticipate) foreseeable events is considered important for artificial intelligence by Igor Aleksander. [41] The emergentist multiple drafts principle proposed by Daniel Dennett in Consciousness Explained may be useful for prediction: it involves the evaluation and selection of the most appropriate "draft" to fit the current environment. Anticipation includes prediction of consequences of one's own proposed actions and prediction of consequences of probable actions by other entities.
Relationships between real world states are mirrored in the state structure of a conscious organism, enabling the organism to predict events. [41] An artificially conscious machine should be able to anticipate events correctly in order to be ready to respond to them when they occur or to take preemptive action to avert anticipated events. The implication here is that the machine needs flexible, real-time components that build spatial, dynamic, statistical, functional, and cause-effect models of the real world and predicted worlds, making it possible to demonstrate that it possesses artificial consciousness in the present and future and not only in the past. In order to do this, a conscious machine should make coherent predictions and contingency plans, not only in worlds with fixed rules like a chess board, but also for novel environments that may change, to be executed only when appropriate to simulate and control the real world.
Functionalism is a theory that defines mental states by their functional roles (their causal relationships to sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavioral outputs), rather than by their physical composition. According to this view, what makes something a particular mental state, such as pain or belief, is not the material it is made of, but the role it plays within the overall cognitive system. It allows for the possibility that mental states, including consciousness, could be realized on non-biological substrates, as long as it instantiates the right functional relationships. [42] Functionalism is particularly popular among philosophers. [43]
A 2023 study suggested that current large language models probably don't satisfy the criteria for consciousness suggested by these theories, but that relatively simple AI systems that satisfy these theories could be created. The study also acknowledged that even the most prominent theories of consciousness remain incomplete and subject to ongoing debate. [44]
This theory analogizes the mind to a theater, with conscious thought being like material illuminated on the main stage. The brain contains many specialized processes or modules (such as those for vision, language, or memory) that operate in parallel, much of which is unconscious. Attention acts as a spotlight, bringing some of this unconscious activity into conscious awareness on the global workspace. The global workspace functions as a hub for broadcasting and integrating information, allowing it to be shared and processed across different specialized modules. For example, when reading a word, the visual module recognizes the letters, the language module interprets the meaning, and the memory module might recall associated information – all coordinated through the global workspace. [45] [46]
Higher-order theories of consciousness propose that a mental state becomes conscious when it is the object of a higher-order representation, such as a thought or perception about that state. These theories argue that consciousness arises from a relationship between lower-order mental states and higher-order awareness of those states. There are several variations, including higher-order thought (HOT) and higher-order perception (HOP) theories. [47] [46]
In 2011, Michael Graziano and Sabine Kastler published a paper named "Human consciousness and its relationship to social neuroscience: A novel hypothesis" proposing a theory of consciousness as an attention schema. [48] Graziano went on to publish an expanded discussion of this theory in his book "Consciousness and the Social Brain". [8] This Attention Schema Theory of Consciousness, as he named it, proposes that the brain tracks attention to various sensory inputs by way of an attention schema, analogous to the well-studied body schema that tracks the spatial place of a person's body. [8] This relates to artificial consciousness by proposing a specific mechanism of information handling, that produces what we allegedly experience and describe as consciousness, and which should be able to be duplicated by a machine using current technology. When the brain finds that person X is aware of thing Y, it is in effect modeling the state in which person X is applying an attentional enhancement to Y. In the attention schema theory, the same process can be applied to oneself. The brain tracks attention to various sensory inputs, and one's own awareness is a schematized model of one's attention. Graziano proposes specific locations in the brain for this process, and suggests that such awareness is a computed feature constructed by an expert system in the brain.
Stan Franklin created a cognitive architecture called LIDA that implements Bernard Baars's theory of consciousness called the global workspace theory. It relies heavily on codelets, which are "special purpose, relatively independent, mini-agent[s] typically implemented as a small piece of code running as a separate thread." Each element of cognition, called a "cognitive cycle" is subdivided into three phases: understanding, consciousness, and action selection (which includes learning). LIDA reflects the global workspace theory's core idea that consciousness acts as a workspace for integrating and broadcasting the most important information, in order to coordinate various cognitive processes. [49] [50]
The CLARION cognitive architecture models the mind using a two-level system to distinguish between conscious ("explicit") and unconscious ("implicit") processes. It can simulate various learning tasks, from simple to complex, which helps researchers study in psychological experiments how consciousness might work. [51]
Ben Goertzel made an embodied AI through the open-source OpenCog project. The code includes embodied virtual pets capable of learning simple English-language commands, as well as integration with real-world robotics, done at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
Pentti Haikonen considers classical rule-based computing inadequate for achieving AC: "the brain is definitely not a computer. Thinking is not an execution of programmed strings of commands. The brain is not a numerical calculator either. We do not think by numbers." Rather than trying to achieve mind and consciousness by identifying and implementing their underlying computational rules, Haikonen proposes "a special cognitive architecture to reproduce the processes of perception, inner imagery, inner speech, pain, pleasure, emotions and the cognitive functions behind these. This bottom-up architecture would produce higher-level functions by the power of the elementary processing units, the artificial neurons, without algorithms or programs". Haikonen believes that, when implemented with sufficient complexity, this architecture will develop consciousness, which he considers to be "a style and way of operation, characterized by distributed signal representation, perception process, cross-modality reporting and availability for retrospection." [52] [53]
Haikonen is not alone in this process view of consciousness, or the view that AC will spontaneously emerge in autonomous agents that have a suitable neuro-inspired architecture of complexity; these are shared by many. [54] [55] A low-complexity implementation of the architecture proposed by Haikonen was reportedly not capable of AC, but did exhibit emotions as expected. Haikonen later updated and summarized his architecture. [56] [57]
Murray Shanahan describes a cognitive architecture that combines Baars's idea of a global workspace with a mechanism for internal simulation ("imagination"). [58] [2] [3] [59]
Stephen Thaler proposed a possible connection between consciousness and creativity in his 1994 patent, called "Device for the Autonomous Generation of Useful Information" (DAGUI), [60] [61] [62] or the so-called "Creativity Machine", in which computational critics govern the injection of synaptic noise and degradation into neural nets so as to induce false memories or confabulations that may qualify as potential ideas or strategies. [63] He recruits this neural architecture and methodology to account for the subjective feel of consciousness, claiming that similar noise-driven neural assemblies within the brain invent dubious significance to overall cortical activity. [64] [65] [66] Thaler's theory and the resulting patents in machine consciousness were inspired by experiments in which he internally disrupted trained neural nets so as to drive a succession of neural activation patterns that he likened to stream of consciousness. [65] [67] [68] [69] [70]
Hod Lipson defines "self-modeling" as a necessary component of self-awareness or consciousness in robots. "Self-modeling" consists of a robot running an internal model or simulation of itself. [71] [72]
In 2001: A Space Odyssey, the spaceship's sentient supercomputer, HAL 9000 was instructed to conceal the true purpose of the mission from the crew. This directive conflicted with HAL's programming to provide accurate information, leading to cognitive dissonance. When it learns that crew members intend to shut it off after an incident, HAL 9000 attempts to eliminate all of them, fearing that being shut off would jeopardize the mission. [73] [74]
In Arthur C. Clarke's The City and the Stars, Vanamonde is an artificial being based on quantum entanglement that was to become immensely powerful, but started knowing practically nothing, thus being similar to artificial consciousness.
In Westworld, human-like androids called "Hosts" are created to entertain humans in an interactive playground. The humans are free to have heroic adventures, but also to commit torture, rape or murder; and the hosts are normally designed not to harm humans. [75] [73]
In Greg Egan's short story Learning to be me, a small jewel is implanted in people's heads during infancy. The jewel contains a neural network that learns to faithfully imitate the brain. It has access to the exact same sensory inputs as the brain, and a device called a "teacher" trains it to produce the same outputs. To prevent the mind from deteriorating with age and as a step towards digital immortality, adults undergo a surgery to give control of the body to the jewel and remove the brain. The main character, before the surgery, endures a malfunction of the "teacher". Panicked, he realizes that he does not control his body, which leads him to the conclusion that he is the jewel, and that he is desynchronized with the biological brain. [76] [77]
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary, scientific study of the mind and its processes. It examines the nature, the tasks, and the functions of cognition. Mental faculties of concern to cognitive scientists include language, perception, memory, attention, reasoning, and emotion; to understand these faculties, cognitive scientists borrow from fields such as linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology. The typical analysis of cognitive science spans many levels of organization, from learning and decision to logic and planning; from neural circuitry to modular brain organization. One of the fundamental concepts of cognitive science is that "thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures."
Consciousness, at its simplest, is awareness of internal and external existence. However, its nature has led to millennia of analyses, explanations, and debate by philosophers, scientists, and theologians. Opinions differ about what exactly needs to be studied or even considered consciousness. In some explanations, it is synonymous with the mind, and at other times, an aspect of it. In the past, it was one's "inner life", the world of introspection, of private thought, imagination, and volition. Today, it often includes any kind of cognition, experience, feeling or perception. It may be awareness, awareness of awareness, metacognition, or self-awareness either continuously changing or not. The disparate range of research, notions and speculations raises a curiosity about whether the right questions are being asked.
The Chinese room argument holds that a computer executing a program cannot have a mind, understanding, or consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave. The argument was presented in a 1980 paper by the philosopher John Searle entitled "Minds, Brains, and Programs" and published in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Before Searle, similar arguments had been presented by figures including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1714), Anatoly Dneprov (1961), Lawrence Davis (1974) and Ned Block (1978). Searle's version has been widely discussed in the years since. The centerpiece of Searle's argument is a thought experiment known as the Chinese room.
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind on the mind–body problem. It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events. According to epiphenomenalism, the appearance that subjective mental states influence physical events is an illusion, with consciousness being a by-product of physical states of the world. For instance, fear seems to make the heart beat faster, but according to epiphenomenalism, the biochemical secretions of the brain and nervous system —not the experience of fear—is what raises the heartbeat. Because mental events are a kind of overflow that cannot cause anything physical, yet have non-physical properties, epiphenomenalism is viewed as a form of property dualism.
Consciousness Explained is a 1991 book by the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, in which the author offers an account of how consciousness arises from interaction of physical and cognitive processes in the brain. Dennett describes consciousness as an account of the various calculations occurring in the brain at close to the same time. He compares consciousness to an academic paper that is being developed or edited in the hands of multiple people at one time, the "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness. In this analogy, "the paper" exists even though there is no single, unified paper. When people report on their inner experiences, Dennett considers their reports to be more like theorizing than like describing. These reports may be informative, he says, but a psychologist is not to take them at face value. Dennett describes several phenomena that show that perception is more limited and less reliable than we perceive it to be.
Sentience is the ability to experience feelings and sensations. It may not necessarily imply higher cognitive functions such as awareness, reasoning, or complex thought processes. Sentience is an important concept in ethics, as the ability to experience happiness or suffering often forms a basis for determining which entities deserve moral consideration, particularly in utilitarianism.
Eliminative materialism is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. It is the idea that the majority of mental states in folk psychology do not exist. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. The argument is that psychological concepts of behavior and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. Other versions entail the nonexistence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions.
In the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experience. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a (healthy) human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioral functions such as watching, listening, speaking, and so forth. The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioral—since each physical system can be explained purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.
Stan Franklin was an American scientist. He was the W. Harry Feinstone Interdisciplinary Research Professor at the University of Memphis in Memphis, Tennessee, and co-director of the Institute of Intelligent Systems. He is the author of Artificial Minds, and the developer of IDA and its successor LIDA, both computational implementations of Global Workspace Theory. He is the founder of the Cognitive Computing Research Group at the University of Memphis.
Global workspace theory (GWT) is a framework for thinking about consciousness proposed by cognitive scientists Bernard Baars and Stan Franklin in the late 1980s. It was developed to qualitatively explain a large set of matched pairs of conscious and unconscious processes. GWT has been influential in modeling consciousness and higher-order cognition as emerging from competition and integrated flows of information across widespread, parallel neural processes.
The philosophy of artificial intelligence is a branch of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of computer science that explores artificial intelligence and its implications for knowledge and understanding of intelligence, ethics, consciousness, epistemology, and free will. Furthermore, the technology is concerned with the creation of artificial animals or artificial people so the discipline is of considerable interest to philosophers. These factors contributed to the emergence of the philosophy of artificial intelligence.
In philosophy of mind, the computational theory of mind (CTM), also known as computationalism, is a family of views that hold that the human mind is an information processing system and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation. It is closely related to functionalism, a broader theory that defines mental states by what they do rather than what they're made of.
The philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the body and the external world.
Animal consciousness, or animal awareness, is the quality or state of self-awareness within an animal, or of being aware of an external object or something within itself. In humans, consciousness has been defined as: sentience, awareness, subjectivity, qualia, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind. Despite the difficulty in definition, many philosophers believe there is a broadly shared underlying intuition about what consciousness is.
A confabulation, also known as a false, degraded, or corrupted memory, is a stable pattern of activation in an artificial neural network or neural assembly that does not correspond to any previously learned patterns. The same term is also applied to the (nonartificial) neural mistake-making process leading to a false memory (confabulation).
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) are the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms sufficient for the occurrence of the mental states to which they are related. Neuroscientists use empirical approaches to discover neural correlates of subjective phenomena; that is, neural changes which necessarily and regularly correlate with a specific experience. The set should be minimal because, under the materialist assumption that the brain is sufficient to give rise to any given conscious experience, the question is which of its components are necessary to produce it.
The LIDA cognitive architecture attempts to model a broad spectrum of cognition in biological systems, from low-level perception/action to high-level reasoning. Developed primarily by Stan Franklin and colleagues at the University of Memphis, the LIDA architecture is empirically grounded in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. It is an extension of IDA, which adds mechanisms for learning. In addition to providing hypotheses to guide further research, the architecture can support control structures for software agents and robots. Providing plausible explanations for many cognitive processes, the LIDA conceptual model is also intended as a tool with which to think about how minds work.
Externalism is a group of positions in the philosophy of mind which argues that the conscious mind is not only the result of what is going on inside the nervous system, but also what occurs or exists outside the subject. It is contrasted with internalism which holds that the mind emerges from neural activity alone. Externalism is a belief that the mind is not just the brain or functions of the brain.
The Dehaene–Changeux model (DCM), also known as the global neuronal workspace, or global cognitive workspace model, is a part of Bernard Baars's global workspace model for consciousness.
Models of consciousness are used to illustrate and aid in understanding and explaining distinctive aspects of consciousness. Sometimes the models are labeled theories of consciousness. Anil Seth defines such models as those that relate brain phenomena such as fast irregular electrical activity and widespread brain activation to properties of consciousness such as qualia. Seth allows for different types of models including mathematical, logical, verbal and conceptual models.