United States in the Vietnam War

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U.S. soldiers disembark from a helicopter at the Battle of Ia Drang in Vietnam in November 1965 Bruce Crandall's UH-1D.jpg
U.S. soldiers disembark from a helicopter at the Battle of Ia Drang in Vietnam in November 1965

The involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War began in the 1950s and greatly escalated in 1965 until its withdrawal in 1973. The U.S. military presence in Vietnam peaked in April 1969, with 543,000 military personnel stationed in the country. [1] By the end of the U.S. involvement, more than 3.1 million Americans had been stationed in Vietnam, [2] [3] and 58,279 had been killed. [4]

Contents

After World War II ended in 1945, President Harry S. Truman declared his doctrine of "containment" of communism in 1947 at the start of the Cold War. U.S. involvement in Vietnam began in 1950, with Truman sending military advisors to assist France against Viet Minh guerrillas in the First Indochina War. The French withdrew in 1954, leaving North Vietnam in control of the country's northern half. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered covert CIA activities in South Vietnam. Opposition to the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in the South was quashed with U.S. help, but from 1957 insurgents known as the Viet Cong launched a campaign against the state. North Vietnam supported the Viet Cong, which began fighting the South Vietnamese army. President John F. Kennedy, who subscribed to the "domino theory" that communism would spread to other countries if Vietnam fell, expanded U.S. aid to South Vietnam, increasing the number of advisors from 900 to 16,300, but this failed to produce results. In 1963, Diem was deposed and killed in a military coup tacitly approved by the U.S. North Vietnam began sending detachments of its own army, armed with Soviet and Chinese weapons, to assist the Viet Cong.

After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnam, and Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized military intervention in defense of South Vietnam. From early 1965, U.S. involvement in Vietnam escalated rapidly, launching Operation Rolling Thunder against targets in the North and ordering 3,500 Marines to the region. It became clear that aerial strikes alone would not win the war, so ground troops were regularly augmented. General William Westmoreland, who commanded the U.S. forces, opted for a war of attrition. Opposition to the war in the U.S. was massive, and was strengthened as news reported on the use of napalm, a mounting death toll among soldiers and civilians, the effects of the chemical defoliant Agent Orange, and U.S. war crimes such as the My Lai massacre. In 1968, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive, after which Westmoreland estimated that 200,000 more U.S. troops were needed for victory. Johnson rejected his request, announced he would not seek another term in office, and ordered an end to Rolling Thunder. Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, adopted a policy of "Vietnamization", training the South Vietnamese army so it could defend the country and starting a phased withdrawal of American troops. By 1972, there were only 69,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, and in 1973 the Paris Peace Accords were signed, removing the last of the troops. In 1975, the South fell to an invasion from the North, and Vietnam was reunited in 1976.

The costs of fighting the war for the U.S. were considerable. In addition to the 58,279 soldiers killed, the expenditure of about US$168 billion limited Johnson's Great Society program of domestic reforms and created a large federal budget deficit. Some historians blame the lack of military success on poor tactics, while others argue that the U.S. was not equipped to fight a determined guerilla enemy. The failure to win the war dispelled myths of U.S. military invincibility and divided the nation between those who supported and opposed the war. As of 2019, it was estimated that approximately 610,000 Vietnam veterans are still alive, making them the second largest group of military veterans behind those of the war on terror. [3] The war has been portrayed in the thousands of movies, books, and video games centered on the conflict. [5]

Timeline

Early 20th-century (1913–1949)

1950s


1960s

UH-1D helicopters airlift members of a U.S. infantry regiment, 1966 UH-1D helicopters in Vietnam 1966.jpg
UH-1D helicopters airlift members of a U.S. infantry regiment, 1966

1970s

Under the Kennedy administration

In 1961, the new administration of President John F. Kennedy took a new approach to aiding anti-communist forces in Vietnam which differed from the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, who felt the neighboring country Laos was the "cork in the bottle" in combating the threat of Communism in southeast Asia. [27] Kennedy was fearful of the domino effect, that by allowing Vietnam to fall to Communism, the rest of South East Asia would follow suit. In 1961 he asserted:

I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaysia, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it. [28]

During 1961, his first year in office, Kennedy assigned $28.4M to the enlargement of the South Vietnamese army and $12.7M to enhance the civil guard. [29] He also found himself faced with a three-part crisis: The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba; the construction of the Berlin Wall by the Soviets; and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement. Fearing that another failure on the part of the U.S. to stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies, Kennedy realized, "Now we have a problem in making our power credible... and Vietnam looks like the place." [30]

The commitment to defend South Vietnam was reaffirmed by Kennedy on May 11 in National Security Action Memorandum 52, which became known as "The Presidential Program for Vietnam". Its opening statement reads:

U.S. objectives and concept of operations [are] to prevent communist domination of South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological, and covert character designed to achieve this objective. [31]

Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration held onto its fundamental belief in nation building. [28] Kennedy was intrigued by the idea of utilizing United States Army Special Forces for counterinsurgency conflicts in Third World countries threatened by the new "wars of national liberation". Originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by Special Forces would be effective in the "brush fire" war in South Vietnam. Thus, in May 1961, Kennedy sent detachments of Green Berets to South Vietnam. [32]

Kennedy had faced much international pressure against his increasing involvement in Vietnam, non the least from Charles De Gaulle on, but Kennedy held steadfast, stating on September 2:

We hope that he comes to see that, but in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake.

The Diệm regime had been initially able to cope with the insurgency of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF, or derogatively, Viet Cong) in South Vietnam with the aid of U.S. matériel and advisers, and, by 1962, seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Senior U.S. military leaders received positive reports from the U.S. commander, General Paul D. Harkins of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV. By the following year, however, cracks began to appear in the façade of success. In January, a possible victory that was turned into a stunning defeat for government forces at the Battle of Ap Bac caused consternation among both the military advisers in the field and among politicians in Washington, D.C. JFK also indicated to Walter Cronkite that the war may be unwinnable, and that it was ultimately a Vietnamese war, not an American war. [33]

Diệm was already growing unpopular with many of his countrymen because of his administration's nepotism, corruption, and its apparent bias in favor of the Catholic minority—of which Diệm was a part—at the expense of the Buddhist majority. This contributed to the impression of Diệm's rule as an extension of the French Colonial regime. Promised land reforms were not instituted, and Diệm's strategic hamlet program for village self-defense (and government control) was a disaster. The Kennedy administration grew increasingly frustrated with Diệm.

One major frustration among the Kennedy administration was the continued prominent role of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the younger brother of Diem, within the South Vietnamese regime. Nhu held a prominent role in the Diem government, to the chagrin of US officials. Following a meeting with Nhu, Hillsman surmised US frustrations with the Diem government, stating

The American military are still chasing Viet Cong and advising the Vietnamese to chase Viet Cong. They're not adopting the program the President has recommended, our own military are not. Diem has turned the strategic-hamlet program over to Nhu, who's taken the title, the name of it, and nothing else. And in fact, what Diem signed, what we persuaded him to, had not been adopted [34]

Frustrations boiled over following Nhu's American-trained special forces crackdown on Buddhist pagodas in Hue in 1963. More than fourteen hundred Buddhists were arrested. [35] Buddhist monks were protesting discriminatory practices and demanding a political voice. The repression of the protests sparked the so-called Buddhist crisis, during which several monks committed self-immolation, which was covered in the world press. The communists took full advantage of the situation and fueled anti-Diệm sentiment to create further instability. In August, the State Department stated:

We wish to give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu, but if he remaisn obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implications that we can no longer support Diem. You may tell appropriate military commanders that we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism [34]

It was never, however, the prerogative of the Kennedy administration to remove the Diem government from power. As the McNamara-Taylor report cautioned," Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears." [34]

Though reluctant to immediately launch full scale U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict, the Kennedy Administration would escalate the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam who acted as advisors to the South Vietnamese military. [36] At the time of Kennedy's assassination in 1963, the number of U.S. military advisors in Vietnam had grown to at least 16,000. [36] Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration had expressed desires to wind down US military intervention, without fully withdrawing from Vietnam. On October 2, 1963, the White House outlined its intentions to withdraw 1,000 men from Vietnam by then end of the year. [34]

Reasons for U.S. intervention in Vietnam

The Fear of Communism

A major factor that led President Lyndon B. Johnson to intervene into Vietnam militarily was the fear of communism due to Cold War tensions with communist countries such as China and the Soviet Union. South Vietnam was very important to the U.S. in Asia with it being perceived as a western democratic state. After the intervention of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong in the Indochina War, the U.S. was fearful of a repeat of the Korean War. Also, if the U.S. intervened, this would have increased the likelihood of China giving military support to the USSR and North Vietnam. [37] But, more importantly, the prevalent threat of communism drove President Truman and his advisers to intervene in Vietnam due to the domestic pressures to oppose and defeat communism and the fear of the consequences if communist expansion continued. [38]

Lyndon B. Johnson's role

A great deal of the blame for U.S. failures in Vietnam has been cast on Lyndon B. Johnson by historians. His decision making was motivated by a variety of reasons, including his personal fear of appearing soft on communism, but also his fear of engaging America in another stalemate like the Korean War. [39] It is largely agreed upon that Johnson inherited a complicated situation from his predecessor, John F. Kennedy. Consequently, Johnson faced a difficult situation regarding whether the costs of intervening outweighed the benefits. In essence, America had reached the point of no return. The pride of America and the pride of Johnson as a strong President means that the individual actions and responses of Johnson in Vietnam are somewhat responsible for the failures resulting from U.S. intervention. Johnson himself did not want to appear weak against communism as he feared the backlash from the U.S. public and his Republican rivals. However, he also did not want to engage America in a costly and humiliating war. Discussing Vietnam with Senator Russell in May 1964, he expressed serious concerns about countering guerrilla tactics, the likely ineffectiveness and probable domestic political impact of conducting a bombing campaign in the north, and a number of other factors. [40] Whilst these challenges would have been faced by any President in office at the time, it is ultimately Johnson's individual decisions and attitudes that brought America into the Vietnam War. Historians have been sympathetic towards Johnson's situation, but others believe that the inevitability of war and Johnson's trapping by previous Presidents like John F. Kennedy is a dubious proposal. Fredrick Logevall believes there were choices available to him debate and fluidity was more of a reality than a Cold War consensus as key figures such as Senator Richard Russell Jr. opposed the war: "exact numbers are hard to come by, but certainly in the Senate a clear majority of Democrats and moderate Republicans were either downright opposed to Americanisation or were ambivalent". [41]

Robert Dean says Robert Mcnamara recognises that Johnson could have avoided war in his 1995 memoirs. Dean believes "the basic explanation McNamara offers is that the Kennedy and Johnson policy makers were blinded by their own rigid anti-communist ideology". [42] Arnold R. Isaacs says that there was limited public pressure to escalate war whilst his political position was already safe because of an electoral vote of 486 in the 1964 presidential election. Isaacs says that engaging in the war would be more damaging politically to Johnson and the Democrats than disengagement because an expensive war meant Great Society reforms would be damaged. According to Isaacs, the view that Johnson was pushed into war by external factors like public pressure and political necessity can be hard to justify and was instead part of the masculine urge to solve international conflicts with war and "that if enough planes could drop enough bombs on a backward Asian country, victory must follow". [43]

Laos or Vietnam?

According to Seth Jacobs, during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a conceptualisation of Asian nations across a hierarchy of good and bad within the American imagination, which affected US policymakers view of how intervention would materialise. Jacobs states:

Americans at the mid century considered some Asians tough and therefore dependable anticommunist allies while consigning other to the ranks of those who, in the words of a State Department working paper "will not fight for themselves" much less for the free world. No Asian was rated lower in American eyes than the Lao [44]

Jacobs writes that Eisenhower and later Kennedy both "reduced the Lao to a set of stereotypes: childlike, lazy, submissive, unfit to fight the free world's battles". [45] Therefore, Kennedy was dissuaded from sponsoring a military intervention in Laos and instead compromised with the Pathet Lao communist forces, which Jacobs argues meant that Kennedy felt he had to intervene elsewhere in Southeast Asia in Vietnam and that the dovish attitude towards Laos was antithetical to the hawkish outlook towards Vietnam. Jacobs argues that Kennedy viewed the Vietnamese people more able to fight communism than the "unfit Lao". Jacobs argues the "American statesmen and the American media constructed a putative Lao national character that differed from South Vietnam's and that made Lao chances of withstanding communist pressure appeal negligible". [46]

Americanization

Gulf of Tonkin

Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene (left), III MAF commander General Robert Cushman (center), and General Westmoreland (right). Wallace Greene, Robert Cushman and William Westmoreland.jpg
Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene (left), III MAF commander General Robert Cushman (center), and General Westmoreland (right).

On July 27, 1964, 5,000 additional U.S. military advisers were ordered to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam), bringing the total American troop level to 21,000. Shortly thereafter an incident occurred off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) that was destined to escalate the conflict to new levels and lead to the full scale Americanization of the war.

On the evening of August 2, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox was conducting an electronic intelligence collection mission in international waters (even as claimed by North Vietnam) in the Gulf of Tonkin when it was attacked by three P-4 torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese Navy. [47] Reports later reached the Johnson administration saying that the Maddox was under attack. Two nights later, after being joined by the destroyer USS Turner Joy, the Maddox again reported that both vessels were under attack. [48] Regardless, President Johnson addressed Congress asking for more political power to utilize American military forces in South Vietnam, using the attack on the Maddox as cause to get what he wanted.

Confusion was abound around the circumstance of the attacks. The USS Turner Joy's reports of the second attack were met with Scepticism from many U.S. officials. [49] While it is 'indisputable' that the first attack occurred, the evidence of the second attack, McNamara contends, "appears probable but not certain". [50] This incited rampant confusion in Washington. Nevertheless, the incident was seen by the administration as the perfect opportunity to present Congress with "a pre-dated declaration of war" in order to strengthen weakening morale in South Vietnam through reprisal attacks by the U.S. on the North. [51] The attack was pivotal in justifying the Johnson administration's intensification of the war. [52] Even before confirmation of the phantom attack had been received in Washington, President Johnson had decided that an attack could not go unanswered. Johnson ordered attacks on North Vietnamese naval instalments almost immediately, and capitalised on the incident by convincing congress to accept intensified military action in Vietnam. [53]

Neither Congress nor the American people learned the whole story about the events in the Gulf of Tonkin until the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1969. It was on the basis of the administration's assertions that the attacks were "unprovoked aggression" on the part of North Vietnam, that the United States Congress approved the Southeast Asia Resolution (also known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) on August 7. The law gave the President broad powers to conduct military operations without an actual declaration of war. The resolution passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and was opposed in the Senate by only two members.

National Security Council members, including United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Maxwell Taylor, agreed on November 28 to recommend that Johnson adopt a plan for a two-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965–68

U.S. F-105 aircraft dropping bombs. Bombing in Vietnam.jpg
U.S. F-105 aircraft dropping bombs.

In February 1965, a U.S. air base at Pleiku, in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam, was attacked twice by the NLF, resulting in the deaths of over a dozen U.S. personnel. These guerrilla attacks prompted the administration to order retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam.

Operation Rolling Thunder was the code name given to a sustained strategic bombing campaign targeted against the North by aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and Navy that was inaugurated on March 2, 1965. Its original purpose was to bolster the morale of the South Vietnamese and to serve as a signaling device to Hanoi. U.S. airpower would act as a method of "strategic persuasion", deterring the North Vietnamese politically by the fear of continued or increased bombardment. Rolling Thunder gradually escalated in intensity, with aircraft striking only carefully selected targets. When that did not work, its goals were altered to destroying North Vietnam's will to fight by destroying the nation's industrial base, transportation network, and its (continually increasing) air defenses. After more than 300,000 sorties were flown and three-quarters of a million tons of bombs were dropped, Rolling Thunder was ended on November 11, 1968. [54]

Other aerial campaigns (Operation Barrel Roll, Operation Steel Tiger, Operation Tiger Hound, and Operation Commando Hunt) were directed to counter the flow of men and material down the PAVN logistical system that flowed from North Vietnam through southeastern Laos, and into South Vietnam known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These operations as a whole were an expensive failure - the bombings, desipte the devastation did not stop the flow of supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. [55]

Build-up

President Johnson had already appointed General William C. Westmoreland to succeed General Harkins as Commander of MACV in June 1964. Under Westmoreland, the expansion of American troop strength in South Vietnam took place. American forces rose from 16,000 during 1964 to more than 553,000 by 1969. With the U.S. decision to escalate its involvement it had created the Many Flags program to legitimize intervention and ANZUS Pact allies Australia and New Zealand agreed to contribute troops and material to the conflict. They were joined by the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines [ citation needed ]. The U.S. paid for (through aid dollars) and logistically supplied all of the allied forces. As the manpower demand increased to meet these obligations McNamara initiated Project 100,000 which witnessed a significant reduction in recruiting standards for the U.S. military.

U.S. aircraft bombs NLF positions in 1965. Napalm.jpg
U.S. aircraft bombs NLF positions in 1965.

Meanwhile, political affairs in Saigon were finally settling down — at least as far as the Americans were concerned. On February 14 the most recent military junta, the National Leadership Committee, installed Air Vice-Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as prime minister. In 1966, the junta selected General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to run for president with Ky on the ballot as the vice-presidential candidate in the 1967 election. Thieu and Ky were elected and remained in office for the duration of the war. In the presidential election of 1971, Thieu ran for the presidency unopposed. With the installation of the Thieu and Ky government (the Second Republic), the U.S. had a pliable, stable, and semi-legitimate government in Saigon with which to deal[ citation needed ].

With the advent of Rolling Thunder, American airbases and facilities needed to be constructed and manned for the aerial effort[ citation needed ]. On March 8, 1965, 3,500 United States Marines came ashore at Da Nang as the first wave of U.S. combat troops into South Vietnam, adding to the 25,000 U.S. military advisers already in place. The US Government deployment of ground forces to Da Nang had not been consulted with the South Vietnamese government. [56] Instead the initial deployment and gradual build-up was a unilateral decision by the US government. [56] On May 5 the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade became the first U.S. Army ground unit committed to the conflict in South Vietnam. On August 18, Operation Starlite began as the first major U.S. ground operation, destroying an NLF stronghold in Quảng Ngãi Province [ citation needed ].

The North Vietnamese had already sent units of their regular army into southern Vietnam beginning in late 1964. Some officials in Hanoi had favored an immediate invasion of the South, and a plan was developed to use PAVN units to split southern Vietnam in half through the Central Highlands[ citation needed ]. The two imported adversaries first faced one another during Operation Silver Bayonet, better known as the Battle of the Ia Drang. During the savage fighting that took place, both sides learned important lessons. The North Vietnamese began to adapt to the overwhelming American superiority in air mobility, supporting arms, and close air support by moving in as close as possible during confrontations, thereby negating the effects of the above[ citation needed ].

Search and destroy, the strategy of attrition

President Lyndon B. Johnson in Vietnam, 1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson in Vietnam, Handshakes in a crowd of troops - NARA - 192517 - cropped, color corrected.jpg
President Lyndon B. Johnson in Vietnam, 1967

On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon declared that if the major operations needed to neutralize North Vietnamese and NLF forces were to succeed, U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam would have to be increased from 120,000 to 400,000. In a series of meetings between Westmoreland and the President held in Honolulu in February 1966, Westmoreland claimed that the U.S. presence had succeeded in preventing the immediate defeat of the South Vietnamese government but that more troops would be necessary if systematic offensive operations were to be conducted[ citation needed ]. The issue then became in what manner American forces would be used[ citation needed ].

The nature of the American military's strategic and tactical decisions made during this period colored the conflict for the duration of the American commitment. The logistical system in Laos and Cambodia should be cut by ground forces, isolating the southern battlefield[ citation needed ]. However, political considerations limited U.S. military actions, mainly because of the memory of Chinese reactions during the Korean War.[ citation needed ] Ever present in the minds of diplomats, military officers, and politicians was the possibility of a spiraling escalation of the conflict into a superpower confrontation and the possibility of a nuclear exchange. Therefore, there would be no invasion of North Vietnam, the "neutrality" of Laos and Cambodia would be respected, and Rolling Thunder would not resemble the bombing of Germany and Japan during the Second World War.

President Johnson conferring with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in July 1968. Lyndon B. Johnson meeting with President Nguyen van Thieu in Hawaii - 1968 - A6585-13.jpg
President Johnson conferring with South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu in July 1968.

These limitations were not foisted upon the military as an afterthought. Before the first U.S. soldiers came ashore at Da Nang, the Pentagon was cognizant of all of the parameters that would be imposed by their civilian leaders, yet they still agreed that the mission could be accomplished within them. Westmoreland believed that he had found a strategy that would either defeat North Vietnam or force it into serious negotiations. Attrition was to be the key. The general held that larger offensive operations would grind down the communists and eventually lead to a "crossover point" in PAVN/NLF casualties after which a decisive (or at least political) victory would be possible.

It is widely held that the average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old, as evidenced by the casual reference in a pop song ("19" by Paul Hardcastle); the figure is cited by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. of the Killology Research Group in his 1995 book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (p. 265). However, it is disputed by the Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network Website, which claims the average age of MOS 11B personnel was 22. [57] This compares with 26 years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one-year tour of duty. The average age of the U.S. military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years old. [58]

The one-year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer put it, "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times." [59] [ unreliable source? ] As a result, training programs were shortened. Some NCOs were referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which to get rest and relaxation.[ citation needed ] One unidentified soldier said to United Press International that there was nothing to do in Vietnam and therefore many of the men smoked marijuana. He said, "One of the biggest reasons that a lot of GIs do get high over here is there is nothing to do. This place is really a drag; it's a bore over here. Like right now sitting around here, we are getting loaded. Whereas, it doesn't really get you messed up; that's I guess the main reason why we smoke it." [60]

American forces would conduct operations against PAVN forces, pushing them further back into the countryside away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands. In the backcountry the U.S. could fully utilize its superiority in firepower and mobility to bleed the enemy in set-piece battles. The cleaning-out of the NLF and the pacification of the villages would be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese military. The adoption of this strategy, however, brought Westmoreland into direct conflict with his Marine Corps commander, General Lewis W. Walt, who had already recognized the security of the villages as the key to success. Walt had immediately commenced pacification efforts in his area of responsibility, but Westmoreland was unhappy, believing that the Marines were being underutilized and fighting the wrong enemy. In the end, MACV won out and Westmoreland's search and destroy concept, predicated on the attrition of enemy forces, won the day. [61]

Both sides chose similar strategies. PAVN, which had been operating a more conventional, large-unit war, switched back to small-unit operations in the face of U.S. military capabilities. The struggle moved to the villages, where the "hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese peasants, whose cooperation was absolutely necessary to military success, would be won or lost. The U.S. had given responsibility for this struggle to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), whose troops and commanders were notoriously unfit for the task.

For the American soldier, whose doctrine was one of absolute commitment to total victory, this strategy led to a frustrating small-unit war. Most of the combat was conducted by units smaller than battalion-size (the majority at the platoon level). Since the goal of the operations was to kill the enemy, terrain was not taken and held as in previous wars. Savage fighting and the retreat of the communists was immediately followed by the abandonment of the terrain just seized. Combined with this was the anger and frustration engendered among American troops by the effective tactics of the NLF, who conducted a war of sniping, booby traps, mines, and terror against the Americans.

As a result of the conference held in Honolulu, President Johnson authorized an increase in troop strength to 429,000 by August 1966. The large increase in troops enabled MACV to carry out numerous operations that grew in size and complexity during the next two years. For U.S. troops participating in these operations ( Operation Masher/White Wing , Operation Attleboro , Operation Cedar Falls , Operation Junction City and dozens of others) the war boiled down to hard marching through some of the most difficult terrain on the planet and weather conditions that were alternately hot and dry, or cold and wet. It was the PAVN/NLF that actually controlled the pace of the war, fighting only when their commanders believed that they had the upper hand and then disappearing when the Americans and/or ARVN brought their superiority in numbers and firepower to bear. North Vietnam, utilizing the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails, matched the U.S. at every point of the escalation, funneling manpower and supplies to the southern battlefields.

During the Vietnam War, the use of the helicopter, known as "Air Mobile", was an essential tool for conducting the war. In fact, the whole conduct and strategy of the war depended on it. Vietnam was the first time the helicopter was used on a major scale, and in such important roles. Search and destroy missions, for example, would have been nearly impossible without it. Helicopters allowed American commanders to move large numbers of troops to virtually anywhere, regardless of the terrain or roads. Troops could also be easily resupplied in remote areas. The helicopter also provided another new and vital capability: medical evacuation. It could fly wounded soldiers to aid stations very quickly, usually within the critical first hour. This gave wounded soldiers a higher chance of survival in Vietnam than in any previous war. The helicopter was also adapted for many other roles in Vietnam, including ground attack, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Without the helicopter, the war would have been fought very differently. [62]

Tactical nuclear weapons and cluster bombs

Although the use of nuclear weapons was proposed as a contingency plan by the military, President Johnson shut this idea down, approving instead the use of cluster bombs (termed Controlled Fragmentation Munition or COFRAM by the military) [63] [64] In the 1964 presidential campaign, Johnson presented himself as the candidate who would be less willing to use nuclear weapons (see "Daisy" ad). [65] As President, LBJ urged the military not to give the president the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Throughout the war, President Johnson did not change his stance on the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Vietcong.

Border battles and the Tet Offensive

By mid-1967, Westmoreland said that it was conceivable that U.S. forces could be phased out of the war within two years, turning over progressively more of the fighting to the ARVN. [66] That fall, however, savage fighting broke out in the northern provinces. Beginning below the DMZ at Con Tien and then spreading west to the Laotian border near Dak To, large PAVN forces began to stand their ground and fight. This willingness of the communists to remain fixed in place inspired MACV to send reinforcements from other sectors of South Vietnam. The Border Battles had begun.

Most of the PAVN/NLF operational capability was possible only because of the unhindered movement of men along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To threaten this flow of supplies, the Marine Corps established a combat base on the South Vietnamese side of the Laotian frontier, near the village of Khe Sanh. The U.S. used the base as a border surveillance position overlooking Route 9, the only east–west road that crossed the border in the province. Westmoreland also hoped to use the base as a jump-off point for any future incursion against the Trail system in Laos. During the spring of 1967, a series of small-unit actions near Khe Sanh prompted MACV to increase its forces. These small unit actions and increasing intelligence information indicated that the PAVN was building up significant forces just across the border.

Indeed, PAVN was doing just that. Two regular divisions (and later elements of a third) were moving toward Khe Sanh, eventually surrounding the base and cutting off its only road access. Westmoreland, contrary to the advice of his Marine commanders, reinforced the outpost. As far as he was concerned, if the communists were willing to mass their forces for destruction by American air power, so much the better. He described the ideal outcome as a "Dien Bien Phu in reverse". MACV then launched the largest concentrated aerial bombardment effort of the conflict (Operation Niagara) to defend Khe Sanh. Another massive aerial effort was undertaken to keep the beleaguered Marines supplied. There were many comparisons (by the media, Americans military and political officials, and the North Vietnamese) to the possibility of PAVN staging a repeat of its victory at Dien Bien Phu, but the differences outweighed the similarities in any comparison.

MACV used this opportunity to field its latest technology against the North Vietnamese. A sensor-driven, anti-infiltration system known as Operation Igloo White was in the process of being field tested in Laos as the siege of Khe Sanh began. Westmoreland ordered that it be employed to detect PAVN troop movements near the Marine base and the system worked well. By March, the long-awaited ground assault against the base had failed to materialize and communist forces began to melt back toward Laos. MACV (and future historians) were left with only questions. What was the goal of the PAVN? Was the siege a real attempt to stage another Dien Bien Phu? Or had the battles near the border (which eventually drew in half of MACV's maneuver battalions) been a diversion, meant to pull forces away from the cities, where another PAVN offensive would soon commence?

General Westmoreland's public reassurances that "the light at the end of the tunnel" was near were countered when, on January 30, 1968, PAVN and NLF forces broke the truce that accompanied the Tết holiday and mounted their largest offensive thus far, in hopes of sparking a general uprising among the South Vietnamese. These forces, ranging in size from small groups to entire regiments, attacked nearly every city and major military installation in South Vietnam. The Americans and South Vietnamese, initially surprised by the scope and scale of the offensive, quickly responded and inflicted severe casualties on their enemies. The NLF was essentially eliminated as a fighting force and the places of the dead within its ranks were increasingly filled by North Vietnamese.

The PAVN/NLF attacks were speedily and bloodily repulsed in virtually all areas except Saigon, where the fighting lasted for three days, and in the old imperial capital of Huế, where it continued for a month. During the occupation of the historic city, 2,800 South Vietnamese were murdered by the NLF in the single worst massacre of the conflict. The hoped-for uprising never took place; indeed, the offensive drove some previously apathetic South Vietnamese to fight for the government. Another surprise for the communists was that the ARVN did not collapse under the onslaught, instead turning in a performance that pleased even its American patrons.

After the Tet Offensive, influential news magazines and newspapers, including the Wall Street Journal, Time and The New York Times, increasingly began to characterize the war as a stalemate. What shocked and dismayed the American public was the realization that either it had been lied to or that the American military command had been dangerously overoptimistic in its appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. The public could not understand how such an attack was possible after being told for several years that victory was just around the corner. The Tet Offensive came to embody the growing credibility gap at the heart of U.S. government statements. These realizations and changing attitudes forced the American public (and politicians) to face hard realities and to reexamine their position in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the U.S. media coverage made it even more clear that an overall victory in Vietnam was not imminent. It also massively weakened the domestic support for the Johnson administration at the time. [67] The days of an open-ended commitment to the conflict were over.

The psychological impact of the Tet Offensive effectively ended the political career of Lyndon Johnson. On March 11, Senator Eugene McCarthy won 42 percent of the vote in the Democratic New Hampshire primary. Although Johnson was not on the ballot, commentators viewed this as a defeat for the President. Shortly thereafter, Senator Robert F. Kennedy announced his intention to seek the Democratic nomination for the 1968 presidential election. On March 31, in a speech that took America and the world by surprise, Johnson announced that "I shall not seek, and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President" and pledged himself to devoting the rest of his term in office to the search for peace in Vietnam. [68] Johnson announced that he was limiting bombing of North Vietnam to just north of the Demilitarized Zone and that U.S. representatives were prepared to meet with North Vietnamese counterparts in any suitable place "to discuss the means to bring this ugly war to an end". A few days later, much to Johnson's surprise, North Vietnam agreed to contacts between the two sides. On May 13, what became known as the Paris peace talks began. [69]

My Lai Massacre

U.S. Army photo of Vietnamese civilians killed during the My Lai massacre. My Lai massacre.jpg
U.S. Army photo of Vietnamese civilians killed during the My Lai massacre.

On March 16, 1968, three companies of Task Force Barker, part of the Americal Division, took part in a search and destroy operation near the village of My Lai, in Quang Ngai Province. Although not all of the members of the company participated, a significant number of them, led by Calley, did. He personally ordered the executions of hundreds of villagers in large groups. The killings ended only when an American helicopter crew, headed by Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, Jr., discovered Calley's unit in the act and threatened to attack them with his aircraft's weapons unless they stopped. One of the soldiers on the scene was Ron Haeberle, a photographer for the newspaper Stars and Stripes , who took unobtrusive official black-and-white photos of the operation through the lens of his military-issued camera and color shots of the massacre with his personal camera. Although the operation appeared suspicious to Calley's superiors, it was forgotten.

In 1969, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh exposed the My Lai massacre in print, and the Haeberle photos were released to the world media. The Pentagon launched an investigation headed by General William R. Peers to look into the allegations. After a flurry of activity, the Peers Commission issued its report. It declared that "an atmosphere of atrocity" surrounded the event, concluding that a massacre had taken place and the crime had been covered up by the commander of the Americal Division and his executive officer. Perhaps 400 Vietnamese civilians, mostly old men, women, and children had been killed by Charlie company. Several men were charged in the killings, but only Calley was convicted. He was given a life sentence by a court-martial in 1970, but after numerous appeals, he was finally set free; he had served just over three years of house arrest.

Although My Lai generated a lot of civilian recriminations and bad publicity for the military, it was not the only massacre. The Vietnam War Crimes Working Group Files made public in 1994 by the "Freedom of Information Act" reveals seven, albeit much smaller, massacres previously unacknowledged by the Pentagon, in which at least 137 civilians had died. [70] Cover-ups may have occurred in other cases, as detailed in the Pulitzer Prize-winning series of articles concerning the Tiger Force of the 101st Airborne Division by the Toledo Blade in 2003.

Vietnamization, 1969–73

Richard Nixon had campaigned in the 1968 presidential election under the slogan that he would end the war in Vietnam and bring "peace with honor". However, there was no plan to do this, and the American commitment continued for another five years. The goal of the American military effort was to buy time, gradually building up the strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and re-equipping it with modern weapons so that they could defend their nation on their own. This policy became the cornerstone of the so-called Nixon Doctrine. As applied to Vietnam, it was labeled Vietnamization.

Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse a cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson.

President Johnson in conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler (center) and General Creighton Abrams (right). President Lyndon B. Johnson, General Earle Wheeler, General Creighton Abrams at a meeting in the Cabinet Room - A5929-12a.jpg
President Johnson in conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler (center) and General Creighton Abrams (right).

Soon after Tet, General Westmoreland was promoted to Army Chief of Staff and he was replaced by his deputy, General Creighton W. Abrams. Because of the change in American strategy posed by Vietnamization, Abrams pursued a very different approach. The U.S. was gradually withdrawing from the conflict, and Abrams favored smaller-scale operations aimed at PAVN/NLF logistics, more openness with the media, less indiscriminate use of American firepower, elimination of the body count as the key indicator of battlefield success, and more meaningful cooperation with South Vietnamese forces.

Vietnamization of the war, however, created a dilemma for U.S. forces: the strategy required that U.S. troops fight long enough for the ARVN to improve enough to hold its own against Communist forces. Morale in the U.S. ranks rapidly declined during 1969–1972, as evidenced by declining discipline, worsening drug use among soldiers, and increased "fraggings" of U.S. officers by disgruntled troops.

One of Nixon's main foreign policy goals had been the achievement of a breakthrough in U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. An avowed anti-communist since early in his political career, Nixon could make diplomatic overtures to the communists without being accused of being "soft on communism". The result of his overtures was an era of détente that led to nuclear arms reductions by the U.S. and Soviet Union and the beginning of a dialogue with China. In this context, Nixon viewed Vietnam as simply another limited conflict forming part of the larger tapestry of superpower relations; however, he was still determined to preserve South Vietnam until such time as he could not be blamed for what he saw as its inevitable collapse (or a "decent interval", as it was known). To this end he and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger employed Chinese and Soviet foreign policy gambits to successfully defuse some of the anti-war opposition at home and secured movement at the negotiations that had begun in Paris.

China and the Soviet Union had been the principal backers of North Vietnam's effort through large-scale military and financial aid. The two communist superpowers had competed with one another to prove their "fraternal socialist links" with the regime in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese had become adept at playing the two nations off against one another. Even with Nixon's rapprochement, their support of North Vietnam increased significantly in the years leading up to the U.S. departure in 1973, enabling the North Vietnamese to mount full-scale conventional offensives against the South, complete with tanks, heavy artillery, and the most modern surface-to-air missiles.

Pentagon Papers

The credibility of the U.S. government again suffered in 1971 when The New York Times , The Washington Post and other newspapers serially published The Pentagon Papers (actually U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967). This top-secret historical study of the American commitment in Vietnam, from the Franklin Roosevelt administration until 1967, had been contracted to the RAND Corporation by Secretary of Defense McNamara. The documents were leaked to the press by Daniel Ellsberg, a former State Department official who had worked on the study.

The Pentagon Papers laid out the missteps taken by four administrations in their Vietnam policies. For example, they revealed the Johnson administration's obfuscations to Congress concerning the Gulf of Tonkin incidents that had led to direct U.S. intervention; they exposed the clandestine bombing of Laos that had begun in 1964; and they detailed the American government's complicity in the death of Ngô Đình Diệm. The study presented a continuously pessimistic view of the likelihood of victory and generated fierce criticism of U.S. policies.

The importance of the actual content of the papers to U.S. policy-making was disputed, but the window that they provided into the flawed decision-making process at the highest levels of the U.S. government opened the issue for other questions. Their publication was a news event and the government's legal (Nixon lost to the Supreme Court) and extra-legal efforts (the "Plumbers" break-in at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist committed to gain material to discredit him, was one of the first steps on the road to Watergate) carried out to prevent their publication—mainly on national security grounds—then went on to generate yet more criticism and suspicion of the government by the American public.

Operation Menu and the Cambodian campaign, 1969–70

By 1969 the policy of non-alignment and neutrality had worn thin for Prince Sihanouk, ruler of Cambodia. Pressures from the right in Cambodia caused the prince to begin a shift away from the pro-left position he had assumed in 1965–1966. He began to make overtures for normalized relations with the U.S. and created a Government of National Salvation with the assistance of the pro-American General Lon Nol. Seeing a shift in the prince's position, President Nixon ordered the launching of a top-secret bombing campaign, targeted at the PAVN/NLF Base Areas and sanctuaries along Cambodia's eastern border.

President Nixon explains the expansion of the war into Cambodia. NixononCambodia.jpg
President Nixon explains the expansion of the war into Cambodia.

On March 18, 1970, Sihanouk, who was out of the country on a state visit, was deposed by a vote of the National Assembly and replaced by General Lon Nol. Cambodia's ports were immediately closed to North Vietnamese military supplies, and the government demanded that PAVN/NLF forces be removed from the border areas within 72 hours. On March 29, 1970, the Vietnamese had taken matters into their own hands and launched an offensive against the Cambodian army. A force of North Vietnamese quickly overran large parts of eastern Cambodia reaching to within 15 miles (24 km) of Phnom Penh allowing their allies, the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge to extend their power. Nixon ordered a military incursion into Cambodia by U.S. and ARVN troops in order to both destroy PAVN/NLF sanctuaries bordering South Vietnam and to buy time for the U.S. withdrawal. During the Cambodian Campaign, U.S. and ARVN forces discovered and removed or destroyed a huge logistical and intelligence haul in Cambodia.

The incursion also sparked large-scale demonstrations on and closures of American college campuses. The expansion of the conflict into Cambodia was seen as an expansion of the conflict into yet another country, nullifying Nixon's promises of de-escalating the war. During the ensuing protests, four students were killed and a score were wounded by Ohio National Guardsmen during a demonstration at Kent State University. Two other students were killed at Jackson State University in Mississippi. In an effort to lessen opposition to the U.S. commitment, Nixon announced on October 12 that the U.S. would withdraw 40,000 more troops from Vietnam before Christmas.

Following the coup, Sihanouk arrived in Beijing, where he established and headed a government in exile, throwing his substantial personal support behind the Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese, and the Laotian Pathet Lao.

Lam Son 719

In 1971 the U.S. authorized the ARVN to carry out an offensive operation aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos. Besides attacking the PAVN logistical system (which would buy time for the U.S. withdrawal) the incursion would be a significant test of Vietnamization. Backed by U.S. air and artillery support (American troops were forbidden to enter Laos), the ARVN moved across the border along Route 9, utilizing the abandoned Marine outpost of Khe Sanh as a jumping-off point. At first, the incursion went well, but unlike the Cambodian operation of 1970, the PAVN decided to stand and fight, finally mustering around 60,000 men on the battlefield.

The North Vietnamese first struck the flanks of the ARVN column, smashed its outposts, and then moved in on the main ARVN force. Unlike previous encounters during the conflict, the PAVN fielded armored formations, heavy artillery, and large amounts of the latest anti-aircraft artillery. After two months of savage fighting, the ARVN retreated back across the border, closely pursued by the North Vietnamese. One half of the invasion force was killed or captured during the operation, and Vietnamization was seen as a failure.

On August 18, Australia and New Zealand decided to withdraw their troops from the conflict. The total number of U.S. forces in South Vietnam dropped to 196,700 on October 29, 1971, the lowest level since January 1966. On November 12, 1971, Nixon set a February 1, 1972 deadline for the removal of another 45,000 troops.

Easter Offensive

Vietnamization received another severe test in the spring of 1972 when the North Vietnamese launched a massive conventional offensive across the Demilitarized Zone. Beginning on March 30, the Easter Offensive (known as the Nguyễn Huệ Offensive to the North Vietnamese) quickly overran the three northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, including the provincial capital of Quảng Trị City. PAVN forces then drove south toward Huế.

Early in April, PAVN opened two additional operations. The first, a three-division thrust supported by tanks and heavy artillery, advanced out of Cambodia on April 5. The North Vietnamese seized the town of Loc Ninh and advanced toward the provincial capital of An Lộc in Bình Long Province. The second new offensive, launched from the tri-border region into the Central Highlands, seized a complex of ARVN outposts near Dak To and then advanced toward Kon Tum, threatening to split South Vietnam in two.

The U.S. countered with a buildup of American airpower to support ARVN defensive operations and to conduct Operation Linebacker, the first offensive bombing of North Vietnam since Rolling Thunder had been terminated in 1968. The PAVN attacks against Huế, An Lộc, and Kon Tum were contained and the ARVN launched a counteroffensive in May to retake the lost northern provinces. On September 10, the South Vietnamese flag once again flew over the ruins of the Citadel of Quảng Trị City, but the ARVN offensive then ran out of steam, conceding the rest of the occupied territory to the North Vietnamese. South Vietnam had countered the heaviest attack since Tet, but it was very evident that it was totally dependent on U.S. airpower for its survival. Meanwhile, the withdrawal of American troops, who numbered less than 100,000 at the beginning of the year, was continued as scheduled. By June only six infantry battalions remained. On August 12, the last American ground combat division left the country. However, the U.S. continued to operate the base at Long Binh. Combat patrols continued there until November 11 when the U.S. handed over the base to the South Vietnamese. After this, only 24,000 American troops remained in Vietnam and President Nixon announced that they would stay there until all U.S. POW's were freed.

At the beginning of the North Vietnamese invasion, the media, including conservative commentator William F. Buckley, predicted the downfall of the Republic of Vietnam; Buckley even called for the firing of General Creighton Abrams as an incompetent military leader. But the ARVN succeeded in defeating General Giap and his huge invading army. His forces were shattered at the Battle of An Lộc, where he threw several divisions at the entrenched South Vietnamese forces, ultimately losing over half of his army as casualties. General Giap's loss and subsequent retreat was viewed as so great a failure by the North Vietnamese Communist Party that Giap was relieved of his command. Although ARVN troops withstood and repelled the massive PAVN attack at An Lộc, American air power seems to have been a key to the ARVN success, just as it had been a key factor in supporting U.S. ground forces when they operated in South Vietnam prior to 1972. Thus, the 1973 withdrawal of U.S. military support and passage of Congressional resolutions cutting off U.S. funding for combat activities in Indochina (H.R. 9055 and H.J.Res. 636) opened the way for the 1975 defeat of the Republic of Vietnam.

Election of 1972 and Operation Linebacker II

During the run-up to the 1972 presidential election, the war was once again a major issue. An antiwar Democrat, George McGovern, ran against President Nixon. The president ended Operation Linebacker on October 22 after the negotiating deadlock was broken and a tentative agreement had been hammered out by U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives at the peace negotiations in Paris. The head of the U.S. negotiating team, Henry Kissinger, declared that "peace is at hand" shortly before election day, dealing a death blow to McGovern's already doomed campaign. Kissinger had not, however, counted on the intransigence of South Vietnamese President Thieu, who refused to accept the agreement and demanded some 90 changes in its text. These the North Vietnamese refused to accept, and Nixon was not inclined to put too much pressure on Thieu just before the election, even though his victory was all but assured. The mood between the U.S. and North further turned sour when Hanoi went public with the details of the agreement. The Nixon Administration claimed that North Vietnamese negotiators had used the pronouncement as an opportunity to embarrass the President and to weaken the United States. White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler told the press on November 30 that there would be no more public announcements concerning U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam since force levels were down to 27,000.

Because of Thieu's unhappiness with the agreement, primarily the stipulation that North Vietnamese troops could remain "in place" on South Vietnamese soil, the negotiations in Paris stalled as Hanoi refused to accept Thieu's changes and retaliated with amendments of its own. To reassure Thieu of American resolve, Nixon ordered a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam utilizing B-52s and tactical aircraft in Operation Linebacker II, which began on December 18 with large raids against both Hanoi and the port of Haiphong. Nixon justified his actions by blaming the impasse in negotiations on the North Vietnamese. Although this heavy bombing campaign caused protests, both domestically and internationally, and despite significant aircraft losses over North Vietnam, Nixon continued the operation until December 29. He also exerted pressure on Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement reached in October.

Return to Paris

On January 15, 1973, citing progress in peace negotiations, Nixon announced the suspension of all offensive actions against North Vietnam, to be followed by a unilateral withdrawal of all U.S. troops. The Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" were signed on January 27, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

The agreement called for the withdrawal of all U.S. personnel and an exchange of prisoners of war. Within South Vietnam, a cease-fire was declared (to be overseen by a multi-national, 1,160-man International Commission of Control and Supervision force) and both ARVN and PAVN/NLF forces would remain in control of the areas they then occupied, effectively partitioning South Vietnam. Both sides pledged to work toward a compromise political solution, possibly resulting in a coalition government. To maximize the area under their control, both sides in South Vietnam almost immediately engaged in land-grabbing military operations, which turned into flashpoints. The signing of the Accords was the main motivation for the awarding of the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize to Henry Kissinger and to leading North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. A separate cease-fire had been installed in Laos in February. Five days before the signing of the agreement in Paris, President Lyndon Johnson, whose presidency had been tainted with the Vietnam issue, died.

The first U.S. prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam on February 11, and all U.S. military personnel were to leave South Vietnam by March 29. As an inducement for Thieu's government to sign the agreement, Nixon had promised that the U.S. would provide financial and limited military support (in the form of air strikes) so that the South would not be overrun. But Nixon was fighting for his political life in the growing Watergate scandal and facing an increasingly hostile Congress that withheld funding. The President was able to exert little influence on a hostile public long sick of the Vietnam War.

Thus, Nixon (or his successor Gerald Ford) was unable to fulfill his promises to Thieu. At the same time, aid to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union increased. With the U.S. no longer heavily involved, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union no longer saw the war as significant to their relations. The balance of power shifted decisively in North Vietnam's favor, and the North subsequently launched a major military offensive, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, against the South that culminated in the surrender of the Republic of Vietnam to PAVN forces on April 30, 1975.

Views on the war

In the post-war era, Americans struggled to absorb the lessons of the military intervention. General Maxwell Taylor, one of the principal architects of the war, noted:

First, we didn't know ourselves. We thought that we were going into another Korean War, but this was a different country. Secondly, we didn't know our South Vietnamese allies ... And we knew less about North Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody really knew. So, until we know the enemy and know our allies and know ourselves, we'd better keep out of this kind of dirty business. It's very dangerous. [71] : 23 

President Ronald Reagan coined the term "Vietnam Syndrome" to describe the reluctance of the American public and politicians to support further military interventions abroad after Vietnam. According to a 2004 Gallup poll, 62 percent of Americans believed it was an unjust war. [72] US public polling in 1978 revealed that nearly 72% of Americans believed the war was "fundamentally wrong and immoral." Nearly a decade later, the number fell to 66%. In the past three decades, surveys have consistently shown that only around 35% of Americans believe that the war was fundamentally wrong and immoral. [73] : 10  When surveyed in 2000, one third of Americans believed that the war was a noble cause. [73] : 10 

Failure of the war is often placed at different institutions and levels. Some have suggested that the failure of the war was due to political failures of U.S. leadership. [74] The official history of the United States Army noted that "tactics have often seemed to exist apart from larger issues, strategies, and objectives. Yet in Vietnam the Army experienced tactical success and strategic failure ... success rests not only on military progress but on correctly analysing the nature of the particular conflict, understanding the enemy's strategy, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of allies. A new humility and a new sophistication may form the best parts of a complex heritage left to the Army by the long, bitter war in Vietnam." [75]

A young Marine private waits on the beach during the Marine landing, Da Nang, 3 August 1965 Marine da nang.jpg
A young Marine private waits on the beach during the Marine landing, Da Nang, 3 August 1965

Others point to a failure of U.S. military doctrine. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that "the achievement of a military victory by U.S. forces in Vietnam was indeed a dangerous illusion." [76] : 368  The inability to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table by bombing also illustrated another U.S. miscalculation, and demonstrated the limitations of U.S. military abilities in achieving political goals. [71] : 17  As Army Chief of Staff Harold Keith Johnson noted, "if anything came out of Vietnam, it was that air power couldn't do the job." [77] Even General William Westmoreland admitted that the bombing had been ineffective. As he remarked, "I still doubt that the North Vietnamese would have relented." [77] U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memo to President Gerald Ford that "in terms of military tactics, we cannot help draw the conclusion that our armed forces are not suited to this kind of war. Even the Special Forces who had been designed for it could not prevail." [78]

Hanoi had persistently sought unification of the country since the Geneva Accords, and the effects of U.S. bombings had negligible impact on the goals of the North Vietnamese government. [79] : 1–10  The effects of U.S. bombing campaigns had mobilised the people throughout North Vietnam and mobilised international support for North Vietnam due to the perception of a super-power attempting to bomb a significantly smaller, agrarian society into submission. [79] : 48–52 

The Vietnam War POW/MIA issue, concerning the fate of U.S. service personnel listed as missing in action, persisted for many years after the war's conclusion. The costs of the war loom large in American popular consciousness; a 1990 poll showed that the public incorrectly believed that more Americans lost their lives in Vietnam than in World War II. [80]

U.S Civil Rights Leaders' Opposition to U.S Involvement

In the earlier stages of his career as a prominent civil rights activist, Martin Luther King Jr. focused largely on addressing issues pertaining to racial segregation and unfair treatment of black people. However, in the later stages, he extended his activism to addressing large-scale issues such as his opposition and condemnation of the Vietnam War. In 1967, King addressed the issues he found with the Vietnam War in his speech titled "Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence." Although King was initially hesitant to speak about the U.S. government's decision to go to war with Vietnam, he would condemn them and their actions in his speech. [81] Delivered in the heart of New York City, King gave his many reasons as to why the War was an irrational decision, noting how it had moral and ethical implications. King correspondingly touched on how the escalating violence was very destructive and had infinite consequences on the Vietnamese people. In the speech, King also expressed how the war had broader implications for America's moral standing in the world.

Malcolm X was a prominent spokesperson for the black community in America but also did not fear speaking out against larger issues such as the Vietnam War. In 1964, Malcolm X gave his infamous speech titled "The Ballot or the Bullet," where he condemned the war and labeled the United States as hypocrites. [82] In the speech, he declared his philosophy of black nationalism and used the war as an example of how his country and government continue to make irrational decisions. Malcolm X goes as far as saying how his own country has failed him and his people, as the black community still struggles for equal rights yet is being shipped abroad to go to war in places like Korea and Southern Vietnam. He notes how he is himself a victim of America’s so-called democracy, and calls the white people in attendance his "enemies." He noted how the United States was fighting for international freedom in Vietnam, yet was still denying full rights and equality to African Americans at home, labeling them as hypocrites.

Financial cost

United States expenditures in South Vietnam (SVN) (1953–1974) Direct costs only. Some estimates are higher. [83]
U.S. military costsU.S. military aid to SVNU.S. economic aid to SVNTotalTotal (2015 dollars)
$111 billion$16.138 billion$7.315 billion$134.53 billion$1.020 trillion

Between 1953 and 1975, the United States was estimated to have spent $168 billion on the war (equivalent to $1.65 trillion in 2023). [84] This resulted in a large federal budget deficit. Other figures point to $138.9 billion from 1965 to 1974 (not inflation-adjusted), 10 times all education spending in the US and 50 times more than housing and community development spending within that time period. [85] General record-keeping was reported to have been sloppy for government spending during the war. [85] It was stated that war-spending could have paid off every mortgage in the US at that time, with money leftover. [85]

More than 3 million Americans served in the Vietnam War, some 1.5 million of whom actually saw combat in Vietnam. [86] James E. Westheider wrote that "At the height of American involvement in 1968, for example, 543,000 American military personnel were stationed in Vietnam, but only 80,000 were considered combat troops." [87] Conscription in the United States had been controlled by the president since World War II, and men were drafted every year except 1947 until it was ended in 1973. 1,857,304 people were conscripted into military service from August 1964 to February 1973. [88]

As of 2013, the U.S. government is paying Vietnam veterans and their families or survivors more than $22 billion a year in war-related claims. [89] [90]

Impact on the U.S. military

A marine gets his wounds treated during operations in Hue City, in 1968 OperationHueCity1967wounded.jpg
A marine gets his wounds treated during operations in Huế City, in 1968

By the war's end, 58,220 American soldiers had been killed, more than 150,000 had been wounded, and at least 21,000 had been permanently disabled. [91] The average age of the U.S. troops killed in Vietnam was 23.11 years. [92] According to Dale Kueter, "Of those killed in combat, 86.3 percent were white, 12.5 percent were black and the remainder from other races." Approximately 830,000 Vietnam veterans suffered some degree of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). [91] Vietnam veterans suffered from PTSD in unprecedented numbers, as many as 15.2% of Vietnam veterans, because the U.S. military had routinely provided heavy psychoactive drugs, including amphetamines, to American servicemen, which left them unable to process adequately their traumas at the time. [93] An estimated 125,000 Americans left for Canada to avoid the Vietnam draft, [94] and approximately 50,000 American servicemen deserted. [95] On January 21, 1977, United States president Jimmy Carter, a day after his assuming office, granted a full and unconditional pardon to all Vietnam-era draft dodgers (but not deserters who were on active duty) with Proclamation 4483. [96]

As the Vietnam War continued inconclusively and became more unpopular with the American public, morale declined and disciplinary problems grew among American enlisted men and junior, non-career officers. Drug use, racial tensions, and the growing incidence of fragging—attempting to kill unpopular officers and non-commissioned officers with grenades or other weapons—created severe problems for the U.S. military and impacted its capability of undertaking combat operations. By 1971, a U.S. Army colonel writing in the Armed Forces Journal declared:

By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and non commissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous ....The morale, discipline, and battle-worthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States. [97]

Between 1969 and 1971 the U.S. Army recorded more than 900 attacks by troops on their own officers and NCOs with 99 killed. [98] : 44–47 

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Westmoreland talk with General Tee on conditions of the war in Vietnam. Robert S. McNamara and General Westmoreland in Vietnam 1965.png
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and General Westmoreland talk with General Tee on conditions of the war in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War called into question the U.S. Army doctrine. Marine Corps general Victor H. Krulak heavily criticised Westmoreland's attrition strategy, calling it "wasteful of American lives ... with small likelihood of a successful outcome." [77] In addition, doubts surfaced about the ability of the military to train foreign forces. Furthermore, throughout the war there was found to be considerable flaws and dishonesty by officers and commanders due to promotions being tied to the body count system touted by Westmoreland and McNamara. [99] And behind the scenes Secretary of Defense McNamara wrote in a memo to President Johnson his doubts about the war: "The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one." [100]

Ron Milam has questioned the severity of the "breakdown" of the U.S. armed forces, especially among combat troops, as reflecting the opinions of "angry colonels" who deplored the erosion of traditional military values during the Vietnam War. [101] : 172  Although acknowledging serious problems, he questions the alleged "near mutinous" conduct of junior officers and enlisted men in combat. Investigating one combat refusal incident, a journalist declared, "A certain sense of independence, a reluctance to behave according to the military's insistence on obedience, like pawns or puppets ... The grunts [infantrymen] were determined to survive ... they insisted of having something to say about the making of decisions that determined whether they might live or die." [102] The morale and discipline problems and resistance to conscription were important factors leading to the creation of an all-volunteer military force by the United States and the termination of conscription. The last conscript was inducted into the army in 1973. [103] The all-volunteer military moderated some of the coercive methods of discipline previously used to maintain order in military ranks. [98] : 183 

Drug usage

The earliest reported use of drugs among US troops in Vietnam was recorded in 1963. During this time the most commonly used drug was marijuana, which was sometimes used in the form of hashish. Soldiers mainly used the drug during downtime in rear areas and commanders expressed concern that it would hinder combat operations. Heroin consumption was also common among US troops and, according to historians such as Robins, was a large problem as an estimated 34% of servicemen consumed it at least once. [104]

Towards the end of US involvement in Vietnam, heroin use spiked. Morale dropped toward the end of US involvement due to lack of support at home, and a feeling that the war was purposeless. Troops used heroin and other drugs to pass time, and to deal with the mental stresses of combat, boredom, and feelings of hopelessness. Robert Steele and Morgan Murphy toured Vietnam in 1971 and discovered that 15% of the US military said they were addicted to heroin. [105]

The military had launched education programs to deal with the growing drug abuse problem among the troops. When it failed, the military began to court martial offenders in large numbers. When the number of courts-martial became too high, the military began to discharge troops from the service. The Marines especially believed in punishment to curb drug use. The Marine Commandant at the time, General Wilson Jr., believed it was better for its strength to diminish than to allow heroin-addicted Marines to continue to serve. This method was effective at preventing new troops from becoming users because new troops had become users due to existing troops introducing them to the drugs. [106] [ irrelevant citation ]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">People's Army of Vietnam</span> Combined military forces of Vietnam

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), officially the Vietnam People's Army, also recognized as the Vietnamese Army, the People's Army or colloquially the Troops, is the national military force of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the armed wing of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The PAVN is the backbone component of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces and includes: Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Border Guard and Coast Guard. Vietnam does not have a separate and formally-structured Ground Force or Army service. Instead, all ground troops, army corps, military districts and special forces are designated under the umbrella term combined arms and are belonged to the Ministry of National Defence, directly under the command of the CPV Central Military Commission, the Minister of National Defence, and the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army. The military flag of the PAVN is the National flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam defaced with the motto Quyết thắng added in yellow at the top left.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Vietnam War</span> War in Southeast Asia from 1955 to 1975

The Vietnam War was an armed conflict in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia fought between North Vietnam and South Vietnam and their allies. North Vietnam was supported by the Soviet Union and China, while South Vietnam was supported by the United States and other anti-communist nations. The conflict was the second of the Indochina Wars and a major proxy war of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and US. Direct US military involvement greatly escalated from 1965 until its withdrawal in 1973. The fighting spilled over into the Laotian and Cambodian Civil Wars, which ended with all three countries becoming communist in 1975.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Viet Cong</span> Revolutionary organization active in South Vietnam and Cambodia from 1960 to 1977

The Viet Cong (VC) was an epithet and umbrella term to refer to the communist-driven armed movement and united front organization in South Vietnam. Formally organized as and led by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and nominally conducted military operations under the name of the Liberation Army of South Vietnam (LASV), the movement fought under the direction of North Vietnam against the South Vietnamese and United States governments during the Vietnam War. The organization had both guerrilla and regular army units, as well as a network of cadres who organized and mobilized peasants in the territory the VC controlled. During the war, communist fighters and some anti-war activists claimed that the VC was an insurgency indigenous to the South that represented the legitimate rights of people in South Vietnam, while the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments portrayed the group as a tool of North Vietnam. It was later conceded by the modern Vietnamese communist leadership that the movement was actually under the North Vietnamese political and military leadership, aiming to unify Vietnam under a single banner.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ho Chi Minh trail</span> Network of roads in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia used by the Viet Cong from 1959 to 1975

The Ho Chi Minh Trail, also called Annamite Range Trail was a logistical network of roads and trails that ran from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. The system provided support, in the form of manpower and materiel, to the Viet Cong and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), during the Vietnam War. Construction for the network began following the North Vietnamese invasion of Laos in July 1959. At the time it was believed to be the main supply route, however it later transpired that the Sihanouk Trail which ran through Cambodia was handling significantly more material.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Army of the Republic of Vietnam</span> Defunct South Vietnamese ground forces

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam composed the ground forces of the South Vietnamese military from its inception in 1955 to the Fall of Saigon in April 1975. At the ARVN's peak, an estimated 1 in 9 citizens of South Vietnam were enlisted, composed of Regular Forces and the more voluntary Regional Forces and the Popular Force militias. It is estimated to have suffered 1,394,000 casualties during the Vietnam War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tet Offensive</span> Military campaign during the Vietnam War (1968)

The Tet Offensive was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War. The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies. It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán, with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions.

During the Cold War, the Indochina Wars were a series of wars which were waged in Indochina from 1946 to 1991, by communist forces against the opponents. The term "Indochina" referred to former French Indochina, which included the current states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In current usage, it applies largely to a geographic region, rather than to a political area. The wars included:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cambodian campaign</span> Invasion of Cambodia by US and South Vietnamese forces (April–July 1970)

The Cambodian campaign was a series of military operations conducted in eastern Cambodia in mid-1970 by South Vietnam and the United States as an expansion of the Vietnam War and the Cambodian Civil War. Thirteen operations were conducted by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) between April 29 and July 22 and by U.S. forces between May 1 and June 30, 1970.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Central Office for South Vietnam</span> Political and military HQ (1962–1976)

Central Office for South Vietnam, officially known as the Central Executive Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party from 1962 until its dissolution in 1976, was the American term for the North Vietnamese political and military headquarters inside South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. It was envisaged as being in overall command of the communist effort in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam, which included the efforts of both People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), the Viet Cong, and the People's Revolutionary Party. Some doubted its existence but in his memoirs the American commander in South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, spoke of it as something whose existence and importance were not in doubt.

During the Vietnam War, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), used a distinctive land warfare strategy to defeat their South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and American opponents. These methods involved closely integrated political and military strategy – what was called dau tranh – literally "to struggle".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">NLF and PAVN logistics and equipment</span>

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) used well-organized logistics methods to supply and equip their fighting forces. This logistics organization helped greatly in their war against the American and South Vietnamese military during the Vietnam War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cao Văn Viên</span> South Vietnamese general (1921–2008)

Cao Văn Viên was a four-star army general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. He rose to the position of Chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Considered one of "the most gifted" of South Vietnam's military leaders, he was previously called an "absolute key figure" and one of "the most important Vietnamese military leaders" in the U.S.-led fighting during the Vietnam War. Along with Trần Thiện Khiêm he was one of only two four-star generals in the entire history of South Vietnam.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">War in Vietnam (1959–1963)</span> Phase of the war between North and South Vietnam

The 1959 to 1963 phase of the Vietnam War started after the North Vietnamese had made a firm decision to commit to a military intervention in the guerrilla war in the South Vietnam, a buildup phase began, between the 1959 North Vietnamese decision and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which led to a major US escalation of its involvement. Vietnamese communists saw this as a second phase of their revolution, the US now substituting for the French.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969</span> Part of the Vietnam War

During the Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and South Vietnam began a period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as the "Americanization" of joint warfare in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the assassination of both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy close to the end of 1963 and Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in the South, the Lyndon Johnson Administration made a policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist SEATO countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The People's Army of Vietnam and the allied Viet Cong fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while the anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968 Tet Offensive, a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of the South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until the election of Richard Nixon and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization, or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1971 in the Vietnam War</span>

At the start of 1971 South Vietnamese troops continued operations against the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Vietcong (VC) base areas in eastern Cambodia. The ill-conceived and poorly executed Operation Lam Son 719 against PAVN supply lines in eastern Laos showed the weaknesses within the South Vietnamese military command and the limited ability of South Vietnam's armed forces to conduct large-scale combined arms operations. The U.S. continued its unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam despite the lack of any progress in the Paris Peace Talks and by November U.S. forces had ceased offensive operations. The U.S. withdrawal and antiwar sentiment within the military led to an ongoing decline in morale and discipline within the U.S. forces and growing drug use, particularly of heroin. As U.S. combat units withdrew, security in their former operational areas deteriorated and the PAVN/VC began a series of attacks on ARVN positions in Quảng Trị province and the Central Highlands. In Cambodia the Cambodian government continued to lose ground to the PAVN despite extensive U.S. air support and training and periodic attacks into Cambodia by the ARVN. While the bombing of North Vietnam had ceased in November 1968, U.S. aircraft continued to conduct reconnaissance flights over the North and responded to radar-tracking and antiaircraft fire with "protective reaction" strikes which numbered more than 100 by the year-end and culminated in a five-day bombing campaign in late December.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1961 in the Vietnam War</span>

The year 1961 saw a new American president, John F. Kennedy, attempt to cope with a deteriorating military and political situation in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong (VC) with assistance from North Vietnam made substantial gains in controlling much of the rural population of South Vietnam. Kennedy expanded military aid to the government of President Ngô Đình Diệm, increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, and reduced the pressure that had been exerted on Diệm during the Eisenhower Administration to reform his government and broaden his political base.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1964 in the Vietnam War</span>

South Vietnam was in political chaos during much of the year, as generals competed for power and Buddhists protested against the government. The Viet Cong (VC) communist guerrillas expanded their operations and defeated the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in many battles. North Vietnam made a definitive judgement in January to assist the VC insurgency with men and material. In November, North Vietnam ordered the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) to infiltrate units into South Vietnam and undertake joint military operations with the VC.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1960 in the Vietnam War</span>

In 1960, the oft-expressed optimism of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam that the Viet Cong (VC) were nearly defeated proved mistaken. Instead the VC became a growing threat and security forces attempted to cope with VC attacks, assassinations of local officials, and efforts to control villages and rural areas. Throughout the year, the U.S. struggled with the reality that much of the training it had provided to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during the previous five years had not been relevant to combating an insurgency. The U.S. changed its policy to allow the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to begin providing anti-guerrilla training to ARVN and the paramilitary Civil Guard.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1959 in the Vietnam War</span>

1959 saw Vietnam still divided into South and North. North Vietnam authorized the Viet Cong (VC) to undertake limited military action as well as political action to subvert the Diệm government. North Vietnam also authorized the construction of what would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply the VC in South Vietnam. Armed encounters between the VC and the government of South Vietnam became more frequent and with larger numbers involved. In September, 360 soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were ambushed by a force of about 100 VC guerrillas.

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  96. ↑ "Proclamation 4483: Granting Pardon for Violations of the Selective Service Act, August 4, 1964 To March 38, 1973". January 21, 1977. Retrieved June 11, 2008.
  97. ↑ Heinl, Robert D. Jr. (June 7, 1971). "The Collapse of the Armed Forces" (PDF). Armed Forces Journal.
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Declassified primary sources

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