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![]() The Bundestag constituencies to be used at the election | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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A federal election will be held in Germany on 23 February 2025 to elect the 630 members of the 21st Bundestag. It is the fourth [1] snap election in the history of the post-war Federal Republic of Germany after those in 1972, 1983 and 2005.
The election had been prospectively scheduled for 28 September 2025, but was brought forward due to the collapse of the governing coalition during the 2024 German government crisis.
In the weeks prior to the election, media outlets such as Politico Europe , [2] The Guardian , [3] Financial Times , [4] and Euronews [5] have predicted the CDU/CSU to secure first place, with AfD in second place and the SPD third.
The Basic Law and the Federal Election Act provide that federal elections must be held on a Sunday or on a national holiday [c] no earlier than 46 and no later than 48 months after the first sitting of a Bundestag, unless the Bundestag is dissolved earlier. The 20th and sitting Bundestag held its first sitting on 26 October 2021. [6] Therefore, the next regular election was to take place on a Sunday between 31 August 2025 and 26 October 2025. In August 2024, the Federal Cabinet initially recommended 28 September 2025 as the date of the election, which was approved by President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. [7]
Federal elections can be held earlier if the President dissolves the Bundestag and schedules a snap election. They may only do so under two possible scenarios described by the Basic Law.
In both cases, federal elections would have to take place on a Sunday or national holiday no later than 60 days after the dissolution. [8] [9] [d]
Following a government crisis, FDP leader Christian Lindner was dismissed from the incumbent government by Olaf Scholz on 6 November 2024, triggering the collapse of the traffic light coalition and leaving the government without a majority. On the same day, Chancellor Scholz announced he would submit a motion of confidence in order to hold a snap election; this was initially planned for January 2025 but was brought forward after pressure from the opposition. [10] [11] [12]
Scholz submitted a motion of confidence to the Bundestag on 11 December 2024, which was brought to a vote on 16 December. [13] The motion required an absolute majority of 367 yes votes to pass. This was not achieved, with 207 yes votes, 394 no votes, 116 abstentions, and 16 absent or not voting. [9] Of those members who were present and voting, the SPD bloc unanimously voted for confidence, while all opposition blocs except for three members from the AfD voted against confidence. All Green members abstained to ensure the motion would fail without voting against its own coalition. [14]
After the vote's failure, Scholz went to Bellevue Palace to meet with President Steinmeier and recommend a dissolution. The governing parties and the CDU/CSU agreed that 23 February 2025 should be the date for the snap election. The President is not obliged to grant a dissolution, and the Basic Law allowed him 21 days to make a decision. The President also has the sole authority to set the election date, though he agreed with the parties' proposal. [15] [16] [17] Steinmeier first held consultations with all party leaders, as he has a constitutional duty to determine whether there is any possible majority in the current Bundestag. On 20 December, Steinmeier's office released a statement confirming that the talks were completed and that there was no possible majority. [18] [19] Steinmeier officially dissolved the Bundestag on 27 December, at the same time setting the election date as 23 February. [20] [21] [22]
Germany has a mixed-member proportional electoral system. Voters have two votes: the first vote is used to directly elect a candidate in their own constituency using first-past-the-post, and the second vote is for a party's electoral list. To enter the Bundestag, a party must either get five percent of the nationwide second vote or win three constituencies via first votes – passing the electoral threshold. [23] Either case results in that party entering the Bundestag, and it receives seats in proportion to its national share of the second vote. Parties representing recognized minorities which contest federal elections, currently only the SSW, are exempt from the threshold.
Initially, in an overall distribution, all 630 seats (except those won by independent candidates) are allocated proportionally at the federal level to parties clearing the threshold, then subsequently within each party to its candidates in each state. [24] Both calculations are done using the Webster/Sainte-Laguë method. The number of constituencies each party wins in each state are subtracted from its allocation to arrive at the final number of list seats. The list seats won by each party are allocated using closed lists drawn up by each party within each state. [23]
Independent candidates are elected if they receive a plurality of the vote in their constituency. The second votes of ballots on which a winning independent candidate is the first vote are not taken into account in the proportional distribution of seats in order to preserve voter equality. [24] However, these votes do count in determining whether a party has exceeded the 5% threshold.
Prior to this election, if a party won enough constituencies in a state to exceed its proportional entitlement, it was allowed to keep the so-called overhang seats. Combined with the addition of leveling seats for other parties in order to keep the composition of the Bundestag proportional, the 2017 and 2021 elections saw large numbers of additional seats.
After the 2021 election produced a Bundestag with 736 members –which made it the largest freely elected parliament in the world –renewed debate began over the system that had been in place since the 2013 election. The Bundestag passed a reform law in March 2023 to fix the size of any future Bundestag at 630 members. It introduced two major changes:
The principle of second vote coverage means that parties are no longer allowed to keep overhang seats; if a party wins overhang seats in a state, its constituency winners are excluded from the Bundestag in decreasing order of their first vote share. [25] Also, if a party wins one or two constituencies but does not pass the threshold – a scenario which has only happened once, to the PDS in 2002 – those winners are also now excluded and not elected as they would lack second vote coverage. However, the principle does not apply for independent candidates. If an independent wins a constituency (which has not happened since 1949), the candidate is still elected. [26]
Both the CSU and The Left opposed these changes. In the 2021 election, The Left fell short of the five percent threshold but remained in the Bundestag because it won three constituencies, whereas the CSU barely crossed the threshold with 5.2% of the nationwide second vote while winning 45 of the 46 constituencies in Bavaria. The CSU was also the only party to win overhang seats at that election. Both parties appealed to President Steinmeier to veto the proposed changes; nevertheless, Steinmeier signed the bill after his office concluded it was constitutional. [27] [28] Both party organizations, as well as the government of Bavaria controlled by the CSU, filed formal complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court. [29] [30]
Hearings were held on 23 and 24 April 2024. On 30 July 2024, the court largely upheld the new electoral law. However, it ruled that a five-percent threshold without any exceptions is unconstitutional; though it recognized the threshold is necessary to prevent fragmentation, it held there must be measures to minimize wasted votes. In order to settle electoral law in sufficient time for this election, as an interim measure the court re-introduced the basic mandate clause as it was "until there is a new regulation on the matter". [31] [25] As such, a party getting a plurality of first votes in at least three constituencies would still enter the Bundestag, obtaining seats in proportion to its national second vote share.
The table below lists the parties represented in the 20th Bundestag.
In contrast to the 2021 election, the Kanzlerfrage (chancellor question) for the CDU/CSU bloc was resolved relatively quickly. After good performances for the CDU in September 2024 state elections in Saxony and Thuringia, the two other prospective candidates – North Rhine-Westphalia Minister-President Hendrik Wüst and Bavaria Minister-President and CSU leader Markus Söder –expressed their full support for Friedrich Merz. [32] [33] Söder was thought to pursue another attempt at the nomination; many CDU rank-and-file, however, saw him in a negative light after a months-long battle with Armin Laschet for the nomination in 2021, followed by personal attacks on Laschet that were seen as undermining the Union campaign, as well as his categorical ruling-out of any coalition with the Greens after this election. [34] (The CSU has still only provided the Union bloc's lead candidate twice: in 1980 and 2002.)
At The Left's party convention in October, former lead candidate Gregor Gysi announced an effort called Mission Silberlocke ("Mission Silver Locks") to bolster the party's prospects in the face of infighting and faltering polling. Gysi committed to run for re-election in his constituency of Berlin-Treptow – Köpenick, with former parliamentary group leader Dietmar Bartsch running for a third time in Rostock – Landkreis Rostock II and former Minister-President of Thuringia Bodo Ramelow –the only Left member to have led a state government –contesting a Bundestag seat for the first time since 2005 in Erfurt – Weimar – Weimarer Land II. The goal is to capitalize on the three men's relatively high personal popularities and give The Left the best chance possible to win three constituencies and ensure they remain in the Bundestag, and the effort is nicknamed in humorous reference to the their advanced ages. Party co-leader Ines Schwerdtner is also running to replace the retiring longtime MdB Gesine Lötzsch in the stronghold of Berlin-Lichtenberg and parliamentary co-leader Sören Pellmann is seeking re-election in Leipzig II, which are both seen as likely holds for The Left. Experts also rated Gysi and Ramelow as favorites to win their respective constituencies, which combined would retain the bloc's representation. [35] [36] Jan van Aken was elected party co-chair alongside Schwerdtner on the same day; however, in November, van Aken and parliamentary co-leader Heidi Reichinnek were selected as The Left's dual lead candidacy for the campaign. [37]
In November, various SPD legislators and leading figures –most prominently former party leader Sigmar Gabriel –began publicly calling for defence minister Boris Pistorius to be designated the party's chancellor candidate owing to its and Scholz's poor polling. [38] Polling for ARD showed Pistorius as the most favorably viewed national politician: 60% of voters thought he would be a good chancellor, compared to 42% for Merz and 21% for Scholz. [39] In a video released on 21 November, Pistorius ended what had become two weeks of public debate by disavowing any interest in running for chancellor and expressing his full support for Scholz. [40] Such a protracted and public debate, and party leadership's apparent inability to quickly control or restrain it, was seen as embarrassing and damaging; Jusos president Philipp Türmer directly called out party leaders Saskia Esken and Lars Klingbeil for the "shitshow" at their national congress the following weekend. Nonetheless, Scholz was unanimously renominated as chancellor candidate by the party's executive, a group which includes Pistorius, on 25 November. [41] Scholz's nomination was confirmed at a party congress on 11 January; as is usual for sitting chancellors, the vote was by acclamation rather than secret ballot and he received little opposition. [42]
On 17 November, the Greens nominated sitting vice chancellor Robert Habeck as its chancellor candidate. Habeck and foreign minister Annalena Baerbock remain their co-lead candidates, though Baerbock was the chancellor candidate in 2021. Habeck's campaign does not use the term chancellor candidate and instead refers to him as a "Candidate for the people of Germany" (Kandidat für die Menschen in Deutschland), though the media uses the usual term. [43]
On 7 December, the AfD executive nominated Alice Weidel as its chancellor candidate. This is the first time the party has referred to its leader as a chancellor candidate (Kanzlerkandidat), a term which is normally reserved for the parties (SPD, Greens and CDU/CSU) which are seen as having a realistic chance of becoming a senior coalition partner and providing a chancellor, instead of the term lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat/in) which is normally used for smaller parties. Because other parties refuse to work with it, its chances of entering government are seen as unlikely. [44] [45] [46]
BSW also decided to nominate Sahra Wagenknecht as a chancellor candidate on 16 December. General secretary Christian Heye flatly conceded the party, which was polling between four and eight percent at the time, had no actual chance of providing a chancellor and said that "we are neither imagining things nor are we megalomanical". He blamed the "inflation" of the term's usage in forcing their hand to avoid a perceived disadvantage in the campaign, such as missing out on invitations to televised debates. [47]
A total of 41 parties have been approved to run in this election. Automatic approval is granted to so-called "established parties": those that have been continuously represented in the Bundestag with at least five members since the previous election (SPD, CDU, Greens, FDP, AfD, CSU and Left), or those that have been continuously represented in any state parliament with at least five members since that state's last election (Alliance Germany, BSW, and Free Voters). These parties also do not need to submit signatures to support their nominations. [48]
Other political organizations constitute "non-established parties" and must petition the Federal Electoral Committee for approval to run in the election. [48] The committee must determine whether these organizations meet the definition of a political party set forth by section 2 of the Political Parties Act: that it desires to influence politics and obtain parliamentary representation "either permanently or for an extended period of time", and in particular that its "scope and stability...its number of members, and public profile provide sufficient guarantees of the seriousness of this objective". In addition, a majority of both its membership and board of directors must be German citizens, and it must be based in and managed from within the country. [49]
31 parties were approved in this manner, but they must submit signatures to support their nominations. [48] Constituency nominations require 200 signatures of eligible voters residing in its boundaries. The number of signatures required to file a state list is set at 0.1% of the state's eligible voting population at the previous election, with a maximum of 2,000. [50] The 2023 electoral reform law added the restriction that parties can only run constituency candidates in states where it has a state list. [48]
The committee also determined the validity of a party's claim to represent a recognized minority, which not only exempts them from the five-percent hurdle but also the requirement to submit signatures. The SSW's claim was approved, while the claim of Die Sonstigen ("The Others") was not approved. [48]
On 22 January, Table.Media reported that an FDP member submitted complaints against the validity of 14 of the party's state lists (in all states except Berlin and Lower Saxony) which alleged that voting on nominations was not conducted by secret ballot as required by federal law. Instead of filling out a pre-printed ballot, delegates wrote "yes", "no", "abstention" or a candidate's name on a blank sheet of paper while in their seats, which the complaint argued could lead to the ballot being seen by others or the delegate being identified by their handwriting. The electoral committees of several states confirmed they were investigating a complaint, while federal party leaders denied any laws were broken. [51] All of the FDP's lists were ultimately approved. The state returning officer of Hesse, in calling the complaint "far-fetched", pointed to a 2017 court case which found that a minimum level of secrecy (e.g., getting up from one's seat or covering one's ballot with a hand) is sufficient in internal party votes. [52]
Ultimately, 29 of the 41 parties approved to run in the election, submitted a valid state list in at least one state. [53] In the table below, green indicates a party's statelist has been approved, while red indicates a state list has been rejected. The number in each box indicates how many direct candidates the party is running in the indicated state. Parties are ordered by its result at the 2021 election, then alphabetical order.
Party | State [54] | ||||||||||||||||
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BW [55] | BY [56] | BE [57] | BB [58] | HB [59] | HH [60] | HE [61] | MV [62] | NI [63] | NW [64] | RP [65] | SL [66] | SN [67] | ST [68] | SH [69] | TH [70] | ||
1 | Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) | 38 | 47 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 30 | 64 | 15 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
2 | Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) | 38 | – | 12 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 30 | 64 | 15 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
3 | Alliance 90/The Greens (GRÜNE) | 37 | 47 | 12 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 30 | 64 | 15 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
4 | Free Democratic Party (FDP) | 38 | 47 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 30 | 64 | 15 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
5 | Alternative for Germany (AfD) | 38 | 45 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 30 | 62 | 15 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
6 | Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) | – | 47 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
7 | The Left (Die Linke) | 38 | 47 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 29 | 63 | 15 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
8 | Free Voters (FREIE WÄHLER) | 37 | 47 | 7 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 26 | 47 | 15 | 4 | 14 | 8 | 11 | 7 |
9 | Human Environment Animal Protection Party (Tierschutzpartei) | 4 | 11 | 5 | Rej. | – | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | – | 3 | – | – | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. |
10 | Grassroots Democratic Party of Germany (dieBasis) | 10 | 12 | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | – | Rej. | Rej. | – | 3 | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | – |
11 | Die PARTEI (Die PARTEI) | 11 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 1 | – | 4 | – | 3 | 12 | 1 | – | 6 | 2 | 1 | – |
12 | Team Todenhöfer (Team Todenhöfer) | Rej. | – | 2 | – | – | – | Rej. | – | – | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
13 | Pirate Party Germany (PIRATEN) | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | – | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | Rej. | 3 | Rej. | – | – | – | Rej. | – | Rej. |
14 | Volt Germany (Volt) | 29 | 35 | – | 5 | 2 | 3 | 19 | – | 21 | 32 | 13 | – | 5 | – | 11 | – |
15 | Ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP) | 2 | 30 | Rej. | – | – | – | Rej. | – | – | Rej. | 4 | Rej. | Rej. | – | – | Rej. |
16 | South Schleswig Voters' Association (SSW) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | – |
17 | Party for Rejuvenation Research (Verjüngungsforschung) | – | Rej. | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
18 | Party of Humanists (PdH) | Rej. | 2 | Rej. | – | – | – | – | – | – | Rej. | Rej. | – | 3 | – | – | – |
19 | Alliance C – Christians for Germany (Bündnis C) | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | Rej. | – | – | Rej. | – | – | Rej. | – | – | – |
20 | Bavaria Party (BP) | – | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
21 | Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) | 15 | 4 | 5 | – | 2 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 16 | – | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
22 | Human World (Menschliche Welt) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
23 | Party of Progress (PdF) | Rej. | – | – | Rej. | Rej. | – | – | – | Rej. | 2 | Rej. | – | – | – | – | Rej. |
24 | Socialist Equality Party (SGP) | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
25 | Civil Rights Movement Solidarity (BüSo) | – | – | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
26 | Alliance Germany (BÜNDNIS DEUTSCHLAND) | 5 | 12 | 11 | 2 | 2 | – | 4 | 3 | 5 | 15 | 5 | – | 11 | 4 | 4 | – |
27 | Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) | – | 5 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | 10 | – | 7 | – | – | 8 |
28 | MERA25 (MERA25) | Rej. | Rej. | 1 | Rej. | – | Rej. | Rej. | – | Rej. | – | – | – | Rej. | – | – | – |
29 | Values Union (WerteUnion) | – | Rej. | Rej. | – | – | – | – | Rej. | Rej. | 5 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
Non-party candidates | 5 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 1 | – | 5 | 2 | 7 | 10 | 1 | – | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
On 15 November, the newspapers Die Zeit and Süddeutsche Zeitung independently reported that the collapse of the traffic light coalition on 6 November was the result of a deliberate strategy in which the FDP had been planning its exit from the coalition for several weeks. [71] [72] They reported on the existence of a detailed working paper which used controversial militaristic language: the 18-page economic report that resulted in Lindner's firing was called "the torpedo", and the upcoming election campaign was described as "open battle". Most contentious was that the day of the report's publication was referred to as "D-Day" –which in German is used exclusively in reference to the Allied invasion of Normandy and has a violent connotation. The use of the language of war to refer to the political process led to heavy criticism. [73] [74]
This also contradicted Lindner's assertion that the end of the government was a "calculated break" on the part of Scholz. [73] Criticism came from the SPD upon the revelation that their coalition partner had apparently not been acting in good faith for weeks: parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich described himself as "feeling deceived and disappointed" and "horrified" by the controversial language. [75] In an 18 November interview with RTL and n-tv, FDP general secretary Bijan Djir-Sarai flatly denied the use of the term "D-Day" and stated the party's leadership was not aware of the paper. Lindner did not deny the paper's existence but simply replied to reporters "We are in a campaign. Where is the news here?" [75]
Media speculation continued as to what degree the FDP was responsible for the coalition's end. On the morning of 28 November, the online news portal Table.Media published excerpts of an eight-page document alleged to be the working paper; it was indeed titled "D-Day Scenarios and Actions" and laid out a strategy as detailed as the original reporting surmised, including strategies to undermine the coalition, communication tactics, and pre-written quotations for Lindner. SZ confronted party leaders with the excerpts and gave them a 1:30 p.m. deadline to respond to questions. The party did not, but instead officially released the full paper at 6 p.m. with a statement from Djir-Sarai claiming it was "to prevent false impressions ... of the paper" by the media. [76]
According to the party, the paper was first prepared by Federal Managing Director Carsten Reymann on 24 October "to deal with the questions surrounding how the exit of the FDP from the government could be communicated", and the "purely technical paper" was not presented to legislators or members of the government. [77] Djir-Sarai and Reymann resigned the next day to take responsibility for the paper's contents. SPD acting general secretary Matthias Miersch described Djir-Sarai as "a transparent scapegoat" to protect Lindner and called it "unimaginable" that the party leader would not know of the paper's existence. [78] In a written statement released that evening, Lindner again denied any knowledge of the paper and stated he would not have approved of it, and that it was only circulated among internal party staffers and not any elected officials. [79]
Marco Buschmann, who served as justice minister until the traffic light coalition's collapse, was appointed to succeed Djir-Sarai as general secretary of the FDP on 1 December. [80]
The political parties released manifestos. [81] The CDU propose support for Ukraine. [82] The FDP propose pension reform. [83] The Greens propose support for immigrants. [84] Die Linke proposed a return to their roots of democratic socialism following the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance split. [85] Wind energy has been a policy. [86]
Immediately after the confidence vote's failure, public broadcasters ARD and ZDF announced their plans to hold two debates featuring chancellor candidates from four parties. Scholz and Merz were invited to a debate on 9 February, while Habeck and Weidel were invited to a separate face-off on 10 February. This represented a change from the 2021 campaign, when ARD and ZDF held a three-way debate between the Union, SPD and Green chancellor candidates. Representatives of AfD and the Greens complained about their candidates' exclusions and claimed the public broadcasters had been biased in their decision. Habeck's campaign spokesperson announced he would decline the invitation and accused ARD and ZDF of "intervening" in the campaign in favor of the two established parties. Weidel's spokesperson demanded her inclusion in a three-way debate based on the AfD's second place in opinion polls, and said the party was reviewing legal action against the broadcasters. Lindner and Wagenknecht both offered to take Habeck's place in the second debate. [87] [88] [89]
On 18 December, Table.Media reported that Scholz had agreed to participate in the ARD–ZDF debate on the condition that he would face off only against Merz, which was accepted by the public broadcasters. Green chief whip Irene Mihalic demanded an explanation from the broadcasters. An ARD spokesperson denied the report and claimed there was no influence by politicians or conditions involved in the decision. According to the spokesperson, the two-way debate would feature the incumbent as well as the challenger with the best chances to succeed him. [90] Habeck declined his invitation in writing to ARD on 20 December, and the broadcasters cancelled the planned second debate. [91]
The broadcasters also announced plans for two further four-way interview programmes. Scholz, Merz, Habeck and Weidel would separately face questions from an audience in two programmes to be held on 13 and 17 February. [92] [93] They will also hold their usual "closing roundtable" (Schlussrunde) with the leaders of all parties currently represented in the Bundestag on 20 February. [93] [94]
RTL also announced plans for a debate between Merz and Scholz on the Sunday before the proposed election date. The channel ultimately plans two additional head-to-head debates between other parties' leading candidates on the same night. A spokesperson for the broadcaster said "we are convinced that one debate with the current five chancellor candidates would be nothing more than a talk show". [94] The Left, which was not invited, stated it was considering legal action against its omission. RTL claimed in a statement that The Left had not been invited due to trailing in opinion polls behind the other parties. [95]
Axel Springer SE media brands Welt and Bild announced a joint debate between Scholz and Merz to be held on 19 February, the last Wednesday before the election. [96]
ProSiebenSat.1 Media were the final major broadcaster to announce a debate or interview program, scheduling what it calls "citizen speed dating" on the night before the election. Ten voters are given three minutes each to ask the four leading candidates their own questions. [97]
![]() |
2025 German federal election debates and interviews | ||||||||||
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Date | Broadcasters | P Present S Surrogate I Invited NI Not invited N Not present | ||||||||
CDU | SPD | Greens | AfD | FDP | Left | CSU | BSW | FW | ||
28 January 2025 [i] [98] [99] | ZDF | P Frei | P Klingbeil | P Baerbock | P Weidel | P Lindner | P van Aken | P Dobrindt | P Wagenknecht | NI |
6 February 2025 [100] [101] | ZDF | NI | NI | P Banaszak | S Chrupalla | P Lindner | P van Aken | P Dobrindt | P Wagenknecht | NI |
9 February 2025 [102] | ARD, ZDF | P Merz | P Scholz | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI |
10 February 2025 [103] | ARD | NI | NI | NI | NI | P Lindner | P van Aken | P Bär | P Wagenknecht | NI |
12 February 2025 [104] | BR | NI | NI | NI | P Protschka | NI | P Gürpinar | NI | P Ernst | P Aiwanger |
12 February 2025 [105] | MDR | P Müller | P Schneider | P Lemke | P Chrupalla | P Herbst | P Ramelow | NI | P Lüders | NI |
12 February 2025 [106] | SWR | P Warken | P Schmid | P Brantner | P Frohnmaier | P Skudelny | P Mirow | NI | P Tatti | NI |
13 February 2025 [i] [98] | ZDF | P Merz | P Scholz | P Habeck | P Weidel | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI |
16 February 2025 [102] [107] | RTL, n-tv | P Merz | P Scholz | P Habeck | P Weidel | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI |
17 February 2025 [i] [92] | ARD | P Merz | P Scholz | P Habeck | P Weidel | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI |
19 February 2025 [96] | Welt | P Merz | P Scholz | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI |
20 February 2025 [94] [93] | ARD, ZDF | I Linnemann | I Miersch | I Baerbock | I Weidel | I Lindner | I van Aken | I Dobrindt | I Wagenknecht | NI |
22 February 2025 [j] [i] [108] [109] | Sat.1, ProSieben | N Merz | I Scholz | I Habeck | I Weidel | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI |
A renewal of the outgoing traffic light coalition is not seen as desirable by any of the three parties, and Lindner of the FDP categorically disavowed any prospects of his party joining such a coalition in November following his removal from the government. [110] [111]
A government led by the CDU/CSU is seen as most likely, given its large polling lead. [112] Merz has shown willingness to discuss a coalition with the SPD, FDP as well as the Greens; however, CSU leader Söder has openly refused to enter a government with the Greens. Representatives of both parties have stated that a black–green coalition would be difficult to manage at the present time. [113] A fifth grand coalition in Germany's history between the CDU and SPD can thus be seen as the most realistic possibility. [114] [115] Such a coalition is also preferred by the voters, being the most popular government arrangement. [116] [117] However, Söder stipulated that he would only support the black-red [118] coalition so long as incumbent SPD chancellor Scholz is not included in the next cabinet. [119]
FDP leader Lindner has indicated his desire to form a government with the CDU/CSU, a frequent coalition throughout modern German history and last represented in the second Merkel cabinet. [120] Merz stated that only if the FDP's polling figures increased to six or seven percent then "a stable majority would be in reach". FDP Bundestag vice-president Wolfgang Kubicki has voiced support for a black-red-yellow "Germany coalition" including the SPD. [121]
Whether two parties are sufficient for a majority coalition may depend on the number of parties entering the Bundestag. While the SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens, and the AfD are all polling well above the 5% threshold, the fates of the FDP, The Left, BSW, and the Free Voters are uncertain. This means that the number of parties in the Bundestag could be as few as four or reach as many as eight, making the exact seat distribution harder to predict. [122]
The CDU, SPD, Greens and FDP all refuse to form a coalition including BSW on the federal level, despite the SPD-BSW coalition ( Red–purple coalition ) in office in Brandenburg and a CDU-SPD-BSW coalition ( blackberry coalition ) in Thuringia. [123] [124]
All other parties also refuse to form a coalition with or cooperate in any way with the AfD. The CDU has passed a "resolution of incompatibility" regarding the AfD and The Left, prohibiting any cooperation with either party at the federal level; the FDP will also not work with The Left. [125]
Following a stabbing attack in Aschaffenburg on January 22, in which a rejected Afghan asylum seeker mortally wounded two people, [126] Merz announced that the Union would introduce two non-binding resolutions on migration policy and homeland security to the Bundestag, appealing to SPD and Green lawmakers for their support. [127] Despite high-ranking members of both parties rejecting these initiatives, Merz's "five point plan" on migration was adopted on January 29 with votes from the Union, FDP and AfD, marking a historic first on the federal level. [128] Lawmakers from the SPD, Greens and Left party strongly criticized Merz for his alleged cooperation with the AfD, which the Union denied; similar concerns were voiced by Catholic, Protestant and Jewish representatives, as well as by retired CDU chancellor Angela Merkel. Following the vote, hundreds of thousands of protesters attended demonstrations against Merz's decisions accross Germany. [129] [130] [131] Subsequently, a similar bill proposed by the Union to limit migrant intake was defeated in the Bundestag on January 31, in spite of the AfD's support. [132]
While the debate on the cordon sanitaire dominated political discourse the following weeks, Politbarometer data suggested popular opinion to be evenly split between approval and criticism of Merz's course of action, resulting in no major polling shifts. [133]
According to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, foreign powers may attempt to discredit candidates seen as undesirable or raise doubts about the legitimacy of the election. German security authorities say that they expect interference in the federal election campaign from abroad. The focus is on officially controlled disinformation campaigns from Russia. [240] The European Digital Media Observatory at the European University Institute cites [241] an investigation from German outlet Correctiv that found over 100 websites had been established with the help of artificial intelligence to spread disinformation regarding electoral candidates. [242]
American businessman Elon Musk has repeatedly posted in favor of the AfD on his platform X. [243] [244] He also endorsed AfD in an op-ed published in Welt am Sonntag . [245] This was indirectly criticized by President Steinmeier [246] and directly by CDU, [247] The Greens, [248] SPD, FDP, and The Left, [249] the German Journalists Association [250] as well as other German media as unacceptable external influence. [251] [252] [253] Similarly, United States Vice President JD Vance met with AfD leadership and criticized other German parties for refusing to cooperate with the party. [254] Vance's comments were criticized by both Scholz and Merz. [255] [256]
Results in different subdivisions | ||
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Distribution of party-list seats by State | Highest-polling party in each State. | Highest-polling party in each constituency. |
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