The practical syllogism is an instance of practical reasoning which takes the form of a syllogism, where the conclusion of the syllogism is an action. [1]
Aristotle discusses the notion of the practical syllogism within his treatise on ethics, his Nicomachean Ethics . A syllogism is a three-proposition argument consisting of a major premise stating some universal truth, a minor premise stating some particular truth, and a conclusion derived from these two premises. [2] The practical syllogism is a form of practical reasoning in syllogistic form, the conclusion of which is an action. An example might be that the major premise food cures hunger and the minor premise I am hungry leads to the practical conclusion of my eating food. Note that the conclusion here is not a third proposition, like I will eat, or the occurrence of an utterance like "I will eat," but is simply the act of eating. For this reason, practical syllogisms are only called syllogisms analogically. Since they do not consist of at least three propositions, they are not syllogisms properly speaking.
The theoretical reason gives no commands. The practical reason operates in the form of a practical syllogism, whose conclusion is epitactic or imperative.
Aristotle describes this syllogism as follows: All deliberate action is resolvable into a major and minor premise, from which the given action logically issues. The major premise is a general conception or moral maxim; the minor premise is a particular instance: and the conclusion is an action involved in subsuming the particular instance under the general conception or law. The conclusion is not an abstraction, as in the case of a theoretical syllogism, but consists in an action and is jussive, e.g.
Major premise: All men should take exercise;
Minor premise: I am a man;
Conclusion: I should take exercise;
or,
Major premise: Good students take notes;
Minor premise: I want to be a good student;
Conclusion: I should take notes.
Our English phrase 'acting on principle' is, as Sir Alexander Grant pointed out,[ citation needed ] the equivalent of Aristotle's practical syllogism. The practical syllogism operates in the sphere of conduct, of choice and the variable the sphere of necessary truth as is the case with the speculative reason, whose aim is demonstrable truth, whereas the aim of the practical reason is the good, the prudent, the desirable. The content of the conclusion as knowledge is the essential matter for the former; the content of the conclusion as motive is the essential matter for the latter. The main business of the former is with the understanding, of the latter, with the will; the principle of ' sufficient reason' is related to the understanding as the principle of ' final cause' or motive is related to the will. In the practical syllogism obligation is vested in the conclusion, and the particular or minor premise is more cogent than the major, i.e. it is not the general law, but the application of the general law to a particular person, that stimulates to action.
The virtue characteristic of the practical reason is prudence or practical insight. "Prudence is neither a science nor an art; it cannot be a science because the sphere of action is that which is variable; it cannot be an art, for production is generically different from action;" and although Aristotle rejects the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge (the sphere of moral life is pleasure and pain, rather than knowledge), he goes on to say that the "presence of the single virtue of prudence implies the presence of all the moral virtues. Prudence, however, is not itself the whole of moral virtue: "moral virtue makes us desire the end, while prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end." Although men act on general principles and laws, they do not perform general acts; all acts are particular; and so Aristotle, in describing the practical reason and its characteristic moral quality of prudence, further differentiates it from the theoretic reason by saying it is concerned immediately with particulars. [3]
Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that "involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior". The field of ethics, along with aesthetics, concerns matters of value, and thus comprises the branch of philosophy called axiology.
Reason is the capacity of consciously making sense of things, applying logic, and adapting or justifying practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing information. It is closely associated with such characteristically human activities as philosophy, science, language, mathematics, and art, and is normally considered to be a distinguishing ability possessed by humans. Reason is sometimes referred to as rationality.
A syllogism is a kind of logical argument that applies deductive reasoning to arrive at a conclusion based on two or more propositions that are asserted or assumed to be true.
Prudence is the ability to govern and discipline oneself by the use of reason. It is classically considered to be a virtue, and in particular one of the four Cardinal virtues. Prudentia is an allegorical female personification of the virtue, whose attributes are a mirror and snake, who is frequently depicted as a pair with Justitia, the Roman goddess of Justice.
Eudaimonia is a Greek word commonly translated as 'happiness' or 'welfare'; however, more accurate translations have been proposed to be 'human flourishing, prosperity' and 'blessedness'.
Virtue ethics is a class of normative ethical theories which treat the concept of moral virtue as central to ethics. Virtue ethics is usually contrasted with two other major approaches in normative ethics, consequentialism and deontology, which make the goodness of outcomes of an action (consequentialism) and the concept of moral duty (deontology) central. While virtue ethics does not necessarily deny the importance of goodness of states of affairs or moral duties to ethics, it emphasizes moral virtue, and sometimes other concepts, like eudaimonia, to an extent that other theories do not.
In philosophy, term logic, also known as traditional logic, syllogistic logic or Aristotelian logic, is a loose name for an approach to logic that began with Aristotle and was developed further in ancient history mostly by his followers, the peripatetics, but largely fell into decline by the third century CE. Term logic revived in medieval times, first in Islamic logic by Alpharabius in the tenth century, and later in Christian Europe in the twelfth century with the advent of new logic, and remained dominant until the advent of modern predicate logic in the late nineteenth century. This entry is an introduction to the term logic needed to understand philosophy texts written before it was replaced as a formal logic system by predicate logic. Readers lacking a grasp of the basic terminology and ideas of term logic can have difficulty understanding such texts, because their authors typically assumed an acquaintance with term logic.
Synderesis or synteresis, in scholastic moral philosophy, is the natural capacity or disposition (habitus) of the practical reason to apprehend intuitively the universal first principles of human action.
The is–ought problem, as articulated by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, arises when a writer makes claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between positive statements and prescriptive or normative statements, and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. Hume's law or Hume's guillotine is the thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral and non-evaluative factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements.
The Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to Aristotle's best-known work on ethics. The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, consists of ten books, originally separate scrolls, and is understood to be based on notes from his lectures at the Lyceum. The title is often assumed to refer to his son Nicomachus, to whom the work was dedicated or who may have edited it. Alternatively, the work may have been dedicated to his father, who was also called Nicomachus.
Phronesis is an ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence relevant to practical action, implying both good judgement and excellence of character and habits. Sometimes referred to as "practical virtue", phronesis was a common topic of discussion in ancient Greek philosophy.
Intellectual virtues are qualities of mind and character that promote intellectual flourishing, critical thinking, and the pursuit of truth. They include: intellectual responsibility, perseverance, open-mindedness, empathy, integrity, intellectual courage, confidence in reason, love of truth, intellectual humility, imaginativeness, curiosity, fair-mindedness, and autonomy. So-called virtue responsibilists conceive of intellectual virtues primarily as acquired character traits, such as intellectual conscientiousness and love of knowledge. Virtue reliabilists, by contrast, think of intellectual virtues more in terms of well-functioning mental faculties such as perception, memory, and intuition. Intellectual virtues are studied extensively in both critical thinking and virtue epistemology.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church defines virtue as "a habitual and firm disposition to do the good." Traditionally, the seven Christian virtues or heavenly virtues combine the four classical cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and courage with the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. These were adopted by the Church Fathers as the seven virtues.
The Posterior Analytics is a text from Aristotle's Organon that deals with demonstration, definition, and scientific knowledge. The demonstration is distinguished as a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, while the definition marked as the statement of a thing's nature, ... a statement of the meaning of the name, or of an equivalent nominal formula.
The Topics is the name given to one of Aristotle's six works on logic collectively known as the Organon. The treatise presents the art of dialectic — the invention and discovery of arguments in which the propositions rest upon commonly held opinions or endoxa. Topoi (τόποι) are "places" from which such arguments can be discovered or invented.
Aristotle first used the term ethics to name a field of study developed by his predecessors Socrates and Plato. In philosophy, ethics is the attempt to offer a rational response to the question of how humans should best live. Aristotle regarded ethics and politics as two related but separate fields of study, since ethics examines the good of the individual, while politics examines the good of the City-State, which he considered to be the best type of community.
In philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic. It is defined as a deductive argument that is invalid. The argument itself could have true premises, but still have a false conclusion. Thus, a formal fallacy is a fallacy where deduction goes wrong, and is no longer a logical process. This may not affect the truth of the conclusion, since validity and truth are separate in formal logic.
A premise or premiss is a statement that an argument claims will induce or justify a conclusion. It is an assumption that something is true.
Roger Stephen Crisp is fellow and tutor in philosophy at St. Anne’s College, Oxford. He holds the university posts of Professor of Moral Philosophy and Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy. His work falls principally within the field of ethics, in particular metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. In addition, he is chairman of the Management Committee of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics.