During the Gaza war, societal and institutional breakdown occurred across the Gaza Strip caused by continual military assaults by the Israel Defense Forces on Palestinian law enforcement institutions as well as widespread starvation, famine, and lack of essential supplies created by the conflict and blockade of the Gaza Strip. Due to significant destabilization caused by military conflict and the ongoing Gaza humanitarian crisis, the United Nations reported in July 2024 that significant increases in looting, killing of law enforcement and humanitarian workers expanded across the Gaza Strip, and were emblematic of greater societal breakdown and spreading "anarchy" throughout the enclave. [1] [2]
Following the October 7 attacks, Israel announced on 9 October that it was blocking the entry of food into Gaza. [3] [4] The blockage, according to the Israeli government, is aimed to neutralize Hamas as a security threat, including preventing military resources from being smuggled under the guise of humanitarian aid. Because Gaza was already mostly reliant on food aid, the repercussions were felt immediately. [5]
In late June 2024 a leaked UN document said that 95% of the population of Gaza were in food insecurity, while almost 500,000 were facing near-famine hunger. The report found famine remained a possibility throughout the entirety of the Gaza Strip, and that the risk was "as high" as at any other time during the conflict. [6] [7] The UN stated one in five households went entire days without eating. [8]
Conflict and humanitarian researchers stated that the collapse of Gazan social order was a deliberate consequence of Israeli military destabilization to force life to be "unbearable" for its citizens. [9]
On 19 June 2024 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported the expansion and escalation of "anarchy" throughout the Gaza Strip as a result of the humanitarian crisis caused by the war, leading to documented "rampant looting, unlawful killings and shootings" of "local police and humanitarian workers". The head of the agency's Gaza and West Bank Ajith Sunghay stated that the significant increase in lawlessness was a result of "Israel's dismantling of local capacity to maintain public order and safety in Gaza". [1] The agency further reported on multiple instances of "mob justice, extortion of money, family disputes, random shootings, fighting for space and resources", and "youths armed with sticks manning barricades". [10]
The blockade and resulting lack of essential goods resulted in several instances of desperate citizens looting aid trucks. Many large families armed themselves with light weapons to facilitate raids on humanitarian convoys, blocking law enforcement from preventing looting. The lack of formal police protection led to many humanitarian truck drivers signing informal deals with armed citizens to protect their cargo from looting. [9]
In December 2023 several knife-wielding masked individuals raided a UNRWA flour distribution site at the Tal al-Sultan neighborhood in Rafah, causing police to shoot at and kill one of the attackers. The victim's family blocked streets and set tires on fire in Rafah in retaliation, before attacking the UNRWA flour distribution site and a police station. [9]
In February 2024 The Wall Street Journal reported that lawlessness in Gaza was hindering aid efforts. [11] Axios reported that armed gangs have been attacking and looting aid trucks since Hamas police have quit due to Israeli attacks. [12] A Palestine Red Crescent Society spokesman stated that the civil disorder "contributed to around a 50 percent decrease in the total number of aid trucks entering Gaza in February" and an Egyptian aid truck driver described people climbing and smashing aid trucks. [13] [14] In the middle of February, a Bedouin boy was shot during a confrontation where several citizens raided an aid truck to take its cargo. Dozens of the boy's family members retaliated by storming the Rafah Border Crossing courtyard and setting car tires on fire. [9]
Several countries including the United States initiated airdrops of humanitarian aid and food to mitigate famine, which resulted in several confrontations between desperate citizens trying to gather aid from the boxes in addition to several fatal injuries caused by falling aid boxes. Salama Marouf, the head of Gaza's media office, characterized the air drops as "humiliating and demeaning". [9]
In June 2024 The New York Times reported that relief groups had stopped delivering aid to southern Gaza due to looting and attacks from armed gangs, with aid trucks being peppered by bullet holes on supply routes. Both commercial and aid agencies decided that they could not risk employees' lives. One aid worker described the daily attacks from armed criminal gangs in the Israel-Gaza border area as being coordinated and organized. The worker said that sometimes the aid truck drivers were beaten. [15] AP News spoke with an UN official who described thousands of aid trucks piled up, armed groups regularly obstructing convoys, and drivers being held at gunpoint. [16] A worker at a Palestinian trucking company said that aid was spoiling in the hot weather. To try to make up for the aid deficiency, Israel allowed more commercial trucks into Gaza from Israel and the Israeli-occupied West Bank, which unlike UN convoys, usually travel with armed protection. One Gazan businessman said that in the past he paid thousands of dollars to other Gazans to protect his trucks. [15] An Al-Azhar University associate professor of political science said the lawlessness resulted from increasing desperation and the resulting power vacuum left from Hamas' decreasing power over Gaza. [16]
In late June the UN warned that it would suspend aid operations in Gaza unless Israel increased efforts to protect humanitarian workers. A State Department spokesman said that in June, looting and other criminal attacks were the largest barriers to delivering aid, rather than Israeli strikes or Hamas' commandeering of aid convoys. [17] In July, the UN said that they would be bringing in more personal safety equipment and armored vehicles following approval from Israeli officials. [18]
On 16 November 2024, the Popular Forces carried out an attack on aid convoys at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, described by UNRWA as one of the worst instances of looting during the war. [19]
In June 2024, the UN estimated that armed gangs (which include those backed by Hamas), have stolen over $120 million from northern Gaza banks in two months. [20] [21]
Due to persistent attacks on law enforcement by Israeli troops, the majority of Gaza's police force stopped wearing uniforms to avoid being targeted, leading to greater instances of lawlessness due to the apparent lack of police presence in many areas. [9]
As of July 2025, Hamas has reportedly lost about 80% of its control over the Gaza Strip, according to a senior officer in the group's security forces. [22] Several forces have emerged to assert control amidst a widespread societal collapse and power vacuum. +972 Magazine has described Gaza as undergoing an "engineered disintegration — one in which Israel actively cultivates Gaza's collapse by empowering criminal militias, fragmenting authority, and dismantling every pillar of Palestinian social infrastructure." [23] Armed clans challenging Hamas rule have mostly been active in the southern Gaza Strip. [24] As of 30 September, up to a dozen new armed groups opposed to Hamas have emerged in Gaza. [25] According to a report by ACLED, more than 220 intra-Palestinian violent incidents have occurred since October 2023, resulting in the deaths of around 400 Palestinians. Furthermore, the report states that looting of aid, theft, and violent activity by gangs, clans, and armed groups have become widespread, and that 70% of these incidents have occurred after Israel broke the 2025 ceasefire with its attacks in March. [26]
In the days leading up to the October 2025 ceasefire, Palestinians linked to anti-Hamas armed groups reportedly began fearing persecution ahead of the withdrawal of Israeli troops. According to Israel Hayom , some Israeli intelligence officers advocated limited evacuation for "high-risk collaborators", but the army command blocked the idea, arguing that any organised extraction could inflame local anger and create political fallout. [27]
The Popular Forces, led by Yasser Abu Shabab, is an Israeli-backed group of around 300 men [28] that operate in the southern Gaza Strip. They presently control eastern Rafah, have freedom of movement throughout the wider Israeli-controlled Rafah area, [29] and have expanded into Khan Yunis. [30]
The group is also allegedly linked to the Islamic State (IS); this has been claimed by members of the Israeli opposition [31] [32] as well as by Hamas. [33] Popular Forces commanders Issam al-Nabahin and Ghassan al-Dahini were formerly in the Sinai Province branch of IS and the Gazan IS affiliate Jaysh al-Islam, respectively. [34]
Abu Shabab has described his group's operations as a humanitarian project, saying that "hundreds of families" are evacuating to areas under Popular Forces control daily to escape "war and famine". [35]
The Popular Forces first emerged in May 2024 at the beginning of Israel's Rafah offensive. [36] [37] They have been responsible for the Kerem Shalom aid convoy looting and allegedly participated in massacres of civilians during aid distributions by the Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). [38]
A northern Gaza militia, which has been referred to by the names "The People’s Army – Forces of Northern Gaza" [39] or "People’s Army Northern Forces" [40] is reportedly operating in Beit Lahia and Jabalia as part of the Popular Forces. [41] The militia is led by the Gaza City resident Ashraf al-Mansi. Following the 10 October ceasefire, Hamas forces redeployed in Jabalia and its refugee camp, where they reportedly launched a crackdown on the al-Mansi group, arresting and killing its members. [41] However, on 14 October, al-Mansi released a video where he denied that a Hamas crackdown had taken place, announced that his group managed to take control of several areas in northern Gaza, and warned Hamas forces against approaching their territories. [42]
The Counter-Terrorism Strike Force (CSF), which is reportedly linked to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Shin Bet, [43] declared its formation on 21 August 2025, stating it aims to combat the "repression and terrorism practiced by Hamas". It is based in the village of Kizan al-Najjar, just south of Khan Yunis. The CSF and the Popular Forces are reportedly in contact with one another but work independently. [44]
The group is led by Husam al-Astal, a Palestinian Bedouin who worked in Israel and then worked for the Palestinian Authority security forces when they still controlled Gaza. He has spoken favorably about the era of direct Israeli military rule in Gaza prior to the 2005 disengagement. Astal was previously imprisoned and given a death sentence by Hamas for his involvement with Israel, and was accused of involvement in the 2018 assassination of a Hamas-associated engineer in Malaysia. [44] According to Hamas, Astal is linked to Mossad. [43]
The CSF says it operates "within a national framework coordinated with legitimate Palestinian entities" and is committed to upholding international humanitarian law. It also says it has received funding from "honest national businessmen" and Palestinians both domestically and internationally. [43]
As of July 2025, Israel has reportedly been arming two Fatah-affiliated clans that are operating against Hamas and are backed by the Palestinian Authority (PA). [45] However, this claim has been disputed. [46]
Ynet reported that the Khalas clan, led by Fatah activist Rami Khalas, has been receiving Israeli protection and operational cover and is active in the Shuja'iyya neighborhood in eastern Gaza City, where Israel carried out an offensive. It is one of the largest clans in the Gaza Strip and has been hostile towards Hamas since the 2007 Battle of Gaza. Another prominent member of the Khalas clan is Ahmad Khalas, also known by the kunya "Abu Maher", who is a member of the Fatah Central Committee and the representative of PA president Mahmoud Abbas in Gaza. [45]
The Khalas clan, however, issued a statement condemning any form of cooperation with Israeli forces and distancing the clan from the Ynet report. [46]
The Khanidak clan is led by Yasser Khanidak, a Fatah operative, and operated in Khan Yunis during Israel's 2025 offensive in the city. Ynet reported that the clan is said to be receiving weapons and aid from Israel. [45] However, Yasser Khanidak has denied collaboration with Israel or the PA, and said he supports Hamas and its allies. [46]
The Fatah-aligned [47] Al-Mujaida clan reportedly began warring with Hamas in late 2025 after Hamas operatives shot several family members in the leg for unclear reasons. Hamas reportedly claims the clan is collaborating with Israel and stealing humanitarian aid. [48]
On 3 October 2025, clashes in Khan Yunis erupted between Hamas' Arrow Unit and gunmen from the al-Mujaida clan. Hamas stated its forces launched a raid to detain supposed collaborators with Israel. Hamas forces reportedly killed 5 members of the clan, and armed clan members reportedly killed 11 Hamas men. [49] The CSF said they fought the Hamas forces alongside clan members, with Israeli air support. [48] The situation deescalated following the mediation of local elders and an exchange of deceased bodies. [49]
The Barbakh clan, based in Khan Yunis and Rafah, reportedly opposes both Hamas and Israel. On 17 June 2025 the clan published a video showing armed members escorting Gazan civilians carrying GHF aid packages from Rafah to Khan Yunis. On 26 June, the clan engaged in armed clashes with Hamas forces at the Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis. However, Hamas later claimed that it retains the support of the Barbakh clan, and that the clan had condemned its members who participated in the hospital battle. [24]
The Abu Ziyad clan is based in the village of Zawaida near Deir al-Balah. In June the clan accused Hamas of killing a clan member who had supposedly tried to prevent the group from stealing humanitarian aid. It has demanded that Hamas hand over the operatives responsible for the killing and has threatened to "go to war" against the group. [24]
The Abu Werda clan clashed with Hamas forces near the Port of Gaza on 10 October 2025; the battle left three Hamas fighters and two clan members dead, as well as dozens wounded. [50]
The Doghmush clan has historically been hostile to Hamas, [51] [52] and tensions escalated during the Gaza war. In March 2024, clan leader Saleh Doghmush was killed. [53] Israeli news outlets reported that Hamas had clashed with the family during the war and executed Doghmush. The family issued a statement denying the claim. [54]
Later, after the announcement of the 2025 October ceasefire, clashes erupted between the clan and Hamas forces. the clan killed two Hamas members in Gaza City, including the son of a military intelligence head. A day later, Hamas killed a clan member and arrested 30 others. [55] A clan source accused Hamas of having started the conflict by evicting family members from a building where they had taken refuge. [56] One report states that at least 64 people died in the fighting, including 52 Doghmush fighters and 12 Hamas militants, [57] [58] though other sources have reported at least 27 deaths,19 of whom belong to the Doghmush clan and 8 to Hamas. [59] Each side of the conflict accused the other for the triggering of the clashes. [59]
Some reports from inside Gaza have portrayed the clan as being backed by Israel, but the claims are heavily disputed, with clan leaders denying any collaboration. [60]
The Arrow Unit or Sahm Unit is a special police unit of the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Civil Police Force in the Gaza Strip. It was formed in 2024 during the ongoing Gaza war and has participated in the Hamas–Popular Forces conflict. It aims to promote internal stability and is primarily involved in pursuing looters and collaborators with Israel. [61] [62] It often carries out extrajudicial executions. [63] [64]
The unit originated as informal groups of Gazan youths, led by an unknown police officer, which would deploy to public areas often subject to unrest, such as bread lines, ATMs, and markets. News reports at the time frequently described them arresting suspected thieves and beating them severely in marketplaces, publicly proclaiming that this was the punishment for looters. [61] [64]
The Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Gaza Strip officially adopted the unit in March 2024, with the objectives of promoting internal stability and cooperating with local tribal committees to protect aid convoys. Police officers, members of the Al-Qassam Brigades, and members of local tribes joined the Arrow Unit's ranks. [61]
On 27 July 2025, a new Hamas affiliated security force, the "Rad'a Force", executed six Popular Forces militants in Khan Yunis. The Popular Forces denied any of its members had been attacked. [65] [66]
After the ceasefire deal that was done on 10 October 2025, the Rad'a Force appeared in Gaza City together with the Palestinian Police, maintaining law and order in the city and in the area. [67]
Several initiatives arose to try and maintain order in regions where Hamas withdrew, some of whom cooperated with the Israel Defense Forces. Law enforcement shifted to more "improvisational" strategies towards resolving interpersonal issues between citizens, regulating traffic, and keeping the peace at markets and public spaces. Law enforcement also implemented strategies to improve effective humanitarian aid distribution such as assisting distribution, fending off looters or desperate citizens, and working to prevent rapid price increases for market goods. Large families assisted with food and aid distribution in collaboration with aid convoys. [9]
Several Palestinian factions hosted by Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad worked with regional clans and families to create protection committees to maintain security, help with regulating markets, preventing overcrowding around aid trucks, and preventing looting or uncoordinated aid delivery. Many members of these committed were masked men armed with heavy sticks or automatic firearms, with some committees including children on active duty. [9]
During the war, Hamas killed and maimed people who they said were looters. [68]
Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on 10 October, Hamas internal security forces began killing and arresting members of rival armed groups throughout the territory. [69] Hamas recalled 7,000 of its security and police forces to reassert control of the Strip. [70]
On 11 October, it was reported that Hamas forces redeployed in Jabalia and its refugee camp, where they launched a violent crackdown on the Ashraf al-Mansi group, arresting and killing its members. [71]
On 12 October, news reported that Hamas encircled the neighborhood of the Dughmush family, killing several family members and deploying a large group of masked, armed men around Gaza City's Jordanian hospital. [68] The clashes between Hamas and the Dughmush family killed 27 people. [72]
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