Brazil has one of the highest crime rates in the world, which involves an elevated incidence of violent and non-violent crimes.[1] According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Brazil had a homicide rate of 21.26 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021,[2] up from 20.89 per 100,000 inhabitants with 43,073 murders in 2019; however, this was lower than in 2017, when Brazil had a homicide rate of 30.59 per 100,000 inhabitants.[3] In 2018, Brazil had one of the highest number of intentional homicides in the world with 57,358. In addition, Brazil rates second in illegal drug trade in the world.[4][clarification needed]
In 2021, Brazil had a murder rate of 21.26 per 100,000 inhabitants, which was lower than in 2017.[5][6][5] Another study has the 2017 murder rate at 32.4 per 100,000, with 64,357 homicides.[7] In 2016, Brazil had a record of 61,819 murders (an average of 168 murders per day), giving a yearly homicide rate of 29.9 per 100,000 population.[8]
In 2017, Brazil had a record number of murders, with homicides rising 4.20% with 63,880 homicides.[9][10]
In 2019, the anti-violence organizationRio de Paz stated that only 8% of homicides in Brazil lead to criminal convictions.[11]
Murders increased nationwide during the late-2000s; on the other hand, the two largest cities saw a decrease of murders. In 2008, Rio de Janeiro registered the lowest murder rate in 18 years, while the murder rate in São Paolo fell to 10 per 100,000 from a rate of 35.7 per 100,000 a decade earlier. A notable example is the municipality of Diadema, where crime rates fell abruptly.
Total murders set new records in the three years from 2009 to 2011, surpassing the previous record set in 2003.[13] Police records post significantly lower numbers than the health ministry.
7 out of the 20 most violent cities in the world are in Brazil, due to a rise in street violence.[14] As of April 2018, the cities with highest homicide rates worldwide (in descending order) are Natal (4th highest), Fortaleza (7th highest), Belém (10th highest), Vitória da Conquista (11th highest), Maceió (14th highest), Aracaju (18th highest), and Feira de Santana (19th highest).[15]
Robbery
Carjacking is common, particularly in major cities. Local citizens and visitors alike are often targeted by criminals, especially during public festivals such as the Carnaval.[16]Pickpocketing and bag snatching are also common. Thieves operate in outdoor markets, in hotels, and on public transport.
A trending crime known as arrastões ('dragnets') occur when many perpetrators act together, simultaneously mug pedestrians, sunbathers, shopping mall patrons, and/or vehicle occupants stuck in traffic. Arrastões and random robberies may occur during big events, football games, or during peak beach hours.[17]
Kidnapping
Express kidnappings, where people are abducted while withdrawing funds from ATMs, are common in major cities including Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasília, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Recife.[18]
Corruption in Brazil is a pervasive social problem. Brazil scored 38 on the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, tying with India and Bosnia and Herzegovina, being ranked 76th among 175 countries.[19] Corruption was cited among many issues that provoked the 2013 protests in Brazil.[20] Embezzlement and corruption have influenced Brazilian elections for decades; however, the electorate continues to vote, whether out of preference or lack of choice, for candidates who have been accused, and in some instances convicted, on charges of corruption.[21]
Between 10 and 15 women are murdered each day in Brazil.[22][23] A government sponsored study found that 41,532 women were murdered in Brazil between 1997 and 2007.[23] In 2012, only 8% of all homicide victims were female. This is far below the male victimization rate, in which men constitute 92% of homicide victims in Brazil as of 2012.[24]
Crime dynamics
An overhead view of Rocinha, the largest favela in Brazil; Rio de Janeiro, 2014.
Comando Vermelho Primeiro Grupo Catarinense Paraguayan crime groups Comando da Paz Bala na Cara Sindicato do Crime do Rio Grande do Norte, Okaido Comando Revolucionário Brasileiro da Criminalidade
A program to combat gangs and gang-centered violence known as the Pacifying Police Unit (PPU) was introduced in the traditionally violent favelas of Rio de Janeiro in 2008 and 2009. PPU personnel are well-educated and trained in both human rights and modern police techniques; their aim is to supplant the community presence of gangs as central community figures.[citation needed] In 2013, 34 PPU units operated in 226 different communities, with a reach of 1.5million citizens.[31]
The PPU program symbolizes a new crime prevention paradigm that focuses on social inclusion and community development.[citation needed] However, in some areas the homicide rate was already dropping prior to the implementation of the program. Therefore, the drop in crime may be due to a general trend of decline in homicides as well.[5]
According to data by the Public Security Institute (Portuguese: Instituto de Segurança Pública), between 2007 and 2013, the violent death rate in areas with PPUs dropped by 80% – a more pronounced reduction than in the rest of the municipality,[clarification needed] which also experienced a drop in these indices over the period. The homicide rate caused by opposition to police intervention was the indicator of violence that showed the most significant reduction, of almost 90%, but also decreased other crimes against life and property.[32]
In 2014, however, the violent lethality indicators rose again not only in the PPU areas, but in the entire municipality. Rio had not seen so many violent deaths since 2009, the first year of the PPU. Today the numbers are practically the same as in the pre-PPU period.
In the latest survey by the Cândido Mendes University Center for Security and Citizenship Studies (Cesec), carried out in 2014 with PPU officers, researchers had already found a complete abandonment of the "proximity" approach and the return to repressive policing.[32] According to them, the "lack of command, control and logistics" is the cause of all the problems in the Pacifying Police Units, including the death of police officers in the communities.[33]
As of 2015, Pacifying Police Units of Rio de Janeiro are no longer useful, according to specialists. After more than ten years of design, they are now beginning to undergo drastic changes, since police officers from different units also began to patrol the streets, in addition to the usual policing. The lack of formalization of the program and the establishment of evaluation indicators was also a problem, say the researchers. The PPUs have never had an internal and systematic evaluation.[32]
The movement was expanded "hastily", in an "unbridled" way. Between 2010 and 2013, the number of PPUs almost tripled, jumping from 13 to 36. The exaggerated expansion also ended up overloading the Military Police, an institution that, according to a former Military Police Colonel,[clarification needed], already needed (and still needs) structural reforms.[32] "The solution is beyond the police. It seems a cliché, but the social part has been missing since the beginning of the project", evaluated the former Commander of the Military Police between 2007 and 2008.[33]
Change of Command Ceremony of 25 UPP Units, 2013
In the 7 years of the project, there were several allegations of corruption and abuse of force involving PPU soldiers. The most remembered among them is the torture and death of the bricklayer Amarildo de Souza.
The proposal, however, proved to be flawed due to the inexperience of these new military police officers with no apparent condition to work in former faction strongholds, as was the case in Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão. Burning containers, lack of restrooms and armor, accumulated garbage, broken air conditioning was just one of the proofs that the military police were not working under ideal conditions. And on at least eight bases the PMs would be working in an extreme situation.[32] Former ISP Director Ana Paula Miranda also believes that "during all this time, an idea was made that the problems in Rio de Janeiro were over", "That was the first mistake. Excessive advertising not taking into account the flaws throughout the project".[34]
Since the first PPU arrived, in the Santa Marta community, in Botafogo, in 2008, the reality of the residents has changed not only in relation to the actions of armed groups. Everything got more expensive: the electricity bill started to arrive and there was no way to practice these "thefts" in electricity. By 2015, the favela that had once a "model" PPU unit, saw the number of homicides spike, alongside the drug war.[34][35]
In the past, the State of Rio de Janeiro had already carried out a similar attempt at occupation, and for the same reasons, in Ana Paula's opinion, the project did not succeed and, it seems, the lesson was not learned. "The strategy is very similar. There was a lack of perception that these problems would all happen later".[34]
In April 2017, at Complexo do Alemão, a 19.6-foot-high (6.0m) armored tower was installed, resistant to rifles and grenade explosions, to house PPU police from the Nova Brasília community.[32]
As of May 2021, a new project was released by the then Governor Cláudio Castro and documents obtained by the media in September showed the discussion of the project for at least 2 months. Called Cidade Integrada (Integrated City), the new program for the occupation of communities by the Government of Rio de Janeiro, in a model of public security and urban and social interventions. It is not yet clear, however, how the police will act in this new project.[36][37]
Jacarezinho, where there is strong influence from drug trafficking, and Muzema, controlled by the militia, are expected to be the first to receive the program, with its launch scheduled for late November or early December.[needs update]
Gang violence has been directed at police, security officials and related facilities. Gangs have also attacked official buildings and set alight public buses.[38]May 2006 São Paulo violence began on the night of 12 May 2006 in São Paulo. It was the worst outbreak of violence recorded in Brazilian history and was directed against security forces and some civilian targets. By 14 May, the attacks had spread to other Brazilian states including Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais and Bahia. Another outbreak of violence took place in São Paulo in July 2006.
2016 saw a new string of deadly prison riots. The nature of these riots was a turf war between the Primeiro Comando da Capital and other gangs, with the PCC aggressively expanding its territory.[39][40] In 2019, a prison riot between two gangs, Comando Vermelho and Comando Classe A, left 57 dead after hours of fighting.[41]
Brazilian gang members have used children to commit crimes because their prison sentences are shorter. As of 2007, murder was the most common cause of death among youth in Brazil, with 40% of all murder victims aged between 15 and 25 years old.[42]
In regard to inter-gang conflict, gangs typically challenge or demand an aggressive reaction to defend their reputations. If someone does not respond in this manner, they are socially isolated. The gangs in Brazil are very territorial and are focused on their illegal business. Theft and robbery bring in small amounts of money compared to narcotic and weapons sales; thus, it is less common for these gangs to get involved in petty crimes of theft or robbery.[43]
The gangs in Rio de Janeiro are interested in harmony because they do not want any contact with the police. They will help others in the community, with money and even protection, just to be sure that the police do not come around. Children and other members of the community see notably rich and powerful gang members and want to emulate this behavior. Gang members then become a substitute for family and are role models because they have respect and money.[43]
It is most common for these gangs to be under a military command structure.[43] Each Rio favela has one dono who controls the managers of a favela and the soldados in his territory. The latter protect the favela against other drug factions and the police. They are also responsible for taking over other favelas. The managers of a favela control the managers of the bocas (the places where drugs are sold in the favela). The managers of the bocas in turn control the drug dealers who sell the drugs in the area around a boca. There are children and women who wait at the entrances to a favela to signal to the others if the police or other gangs are about to enter.[43] It is normal to join at about 10 years old, and by 12 years old to carry weapons. These gangs are attractive to the children and youth because they offer protection, recognition, and career options that those who join could not achieve on their own. Favelas are now often controlled by juveniles and young adults.[43]
The concern here is of the strong ties that are between illegal business and politicians, police officers, the justice system, and the economy. Not all people are involved but all layers of society are affected because of corruption. Police are bribed to not disturb what these gangs are doing, and many of them are dealers themselves.[43] Also, young children carry guns and may be nervous, aware of peer pressure, or on drugs, and can become careless. Brutality and homicide rates have skyrocketed in countries with younger gang members like this.[43]
Drug trafficking makes up for an increasingly large portion of crime in Brazil. A total of 27% of all incarcerations in Brazil are the result of drug trafficking charges. Between 2007 and 2012, the number of drug related incarcerations has increased from 60,000 to 134,000—a 123% increase.[32]
The primary drug trafficking jobs for children and the youth are:
soldado(a) ('soldier') – maintaining protection while armed[43]
fiel – being personal armed security guards for the gerente geral[43]
gerente geral or dono – being the owner, leader or boss[43]
Aviões ('little airplanes') – delivering messages and drugs to customers. They are not described in the hierarchal organization, but they are very low/entry-level positions. In addition, those in this position have the most arrests.[43]
Of the 325 incarcerated youth, 44% of boys and 53% of girls reported some involvement with drug trafficking.[43] Selling and carrying drugs were the most common activities between both boys and girls. The most common drug was marijuana, followed by cocaine and crack cocaine.[43] According to the study, 74% had used marijuana, 36% had snorted cocaine, and 21% had used crack.[43]
The youth held low positions in the hierarchy and engaged in relatively low volumes of activity for short periods of time; however, 51% of the youth involved in trafficking reported it to be very easy to obtain a gun,[43] while 58% involved in trafficking reported it to be very easy to obtain cocaine.[43]
On 6 May 2021, at least 25 people were killed in a shootout between police and a drug-dealing gang.
Penalties
Criminal penalties for youths, responsible for a significant portion of street crime, usually involve internment in educational centers, with a maximum stay of three years.[44] Youths are not punished under the penal code, but under the Brazilian Statute of the Child and Adolescent.[44]
For adults, the consumption of drugs is nearly decriminalized, but activities in any way related to the sale of drugs are illegal.[45] The distinction between drug consumers and suppliers is poorly defined and thus controversial. This ambiguity gives judges a high degree of discretion in sentencing, and leads to accusations of discriminatory or unequal court rulings.[46] Drug consumers receive light penalties varying from mandatory self-education on the effects of drugs to community service. The minimum sentence for a drug supplying offense is 5 to 15 years in prison.[47] Critics of the consumer/supplier distinction between offenses argue for a more complex categorization than only two categories, to allow for more lenient punishments for minor drugs violations.[48] Former UN secretary general Kofi Annan and former president of Brazil Cardoso[49] argue for stepping away from the "war" approach on drugs, saying the militant approach can be counterproductive.[47] However, many others hold a hard-line preference for heavy penalization.[45]
Favela is an umbrella name for several types of impoverished neighborhoods in Brazil. The term, which means slum or ghetto, was first used in the Slum of Providência in the center of Rio de Janeiro in the late 19th century, which was built by soldiers who had lived under the favela trees in Bahia and had nowhere to live following the Canudos War. Some of the last settlements were called bairros africanos. Over the years, many former enslaved Africans moved in. Even before the first favela came into being, poor citizens were pushed away from the city and forced to live in the far suburbs.
Rocinha is a favela in Brazil, located in Rio de Janeiro's South Zone between the districts of São Conrado and Gávea. Rocinha is built on a steep hillside overlooking Rio de Janeiro, and is located about one kilometre from a nearby beach. Most of the favela is on a very steep hill, with many trees surrounding it. Around 200,000 people live in Rocinha, making it the most populous in Rio de Janeiro.
In Brazil, the Federal Constitution establishes eight law enforcement institutions - seven titulars and one auxiliar. The titular institutions are: the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, the Federal Railroad Police, the Federal Penal Police, the State Military Police and Fire Brigade, the State Civil Police and the State Penal Police. Of these, the first four are affiliated to federal authorities and the latter three are subordinated to state governments. These public safety institutions are part of the Executive branch of either federal or state government. Apart from these eight institutions, there are others which affiliate to municipal authorities: the Municipal Guards. According to Minister Alexandre de Moraes of the Supreme Federal Court, "...the Municipal Guards are inserted in public safety as the auxiliary and related body of public security force..." Federal law 13,022 gave them de facto and de jure police attributions.
Comando Vermelho, also known as CV, is a Brazilian criminal organization engaged primarily in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, protection racketeering, kidnapping-for-ransom, hijacking of armored trucks, loansharking, irregular warfare, narco-terrorism, and turf wars against rival criminal organizations, such as Primeiro Comando da Capital and Terceiro Comando Puro. The gang formed in the early 1970s out of a prison alliance between common criminals and leftist guerrillas who were imprisoned together at Cândido Mendes, a maximum-security prison on the island of Ilha Grande. The prisoners formed the alliance to protect themselves from prison violence and guard-inflicted brutality; as the group coalesced, the common criminals were infused with leftist social justice ideals by the guerrillas. In 1979, prison officials labeled the alliance "Comando Vermelho", a name which the prisoners eventually co-opted as their own. In the 1980s, the gang expanded beyond Ilha Grande into other prisons and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and became involved in the rapidly growing cocaine industry. Meanwhile, Brazil's shift towards democracy and the eventual end of the military dictatorship in 1985 allowed the leftist guerrillas to re-enter society; thus, the CV largely abandoned its left-wing ideology.
Amigos dos Amigos is a criminal organization that operates in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro. It was started up in 1998 when a member of Comando Vermelho was expelled from the organization for ordering the murder of another member. The gang's main rivals are Comando Vermelho and Terceiro Comando Puro. ADA controls many drug selling points in the North and West zones.
Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) is the tactical police unit and gendarmerie of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro State (PMERJ) in Brazil. Due to the nature of crime in favelas, BOPE units utilize equipment deemed more powerful than traditional civilian law enforcement, and have extensive experience in urban warfare as well as progression in confined and restricted environments.
The Vigário Geral Massacre occurred on August 29, 1993, at the favela of Vigário Geral, located in the north of Rio de Janeiro city. The favela was invaded by a death squad formed by 36 hooded and armed men, that broke in houses and executed 21 people. The Vigária Geral massacre was one of the biggest massacres in the Rio de Janeiro state.
Tim Lopes was a Brazilian investigative journalist and producer for the Brazilian television network Rede Globo. In 2002, the media reported him missing while working undercover on a story in one of Rio's favelas. It was later learned that Lopes had been accosted by drug traffickers who controlled the area, was kidnapped, driven to the top of a neighboring favela in the trunk of a car, tied to a tree and subjected to a mock trial, tortured by having his hands, arms, and legs severed with a sword while still alive, and then had his body necklaced—a practice that traffickers have dubbed micro-ondas.
Complexo do Alemão is a group of favelas in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Crime and violence affect the lives of millions of people in Latin America. Some consider social inequality to be a major contributing factor to levels of violence in Latin America, where the state fails to prevent crime and organized crime takes over State control in areas where the State is unable to assist the society such as in impoverished communities. In the years following the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, crime and violence have become major problems in Latin America. The region experienced more than 2.5 million murders between 2000 and 2017. Several studies indicated the existence of an epidemic in the region; the Pan American Health Organization called violence in Latin America "the social pandemic of the 20th century." Apart from the direct human cost, the rise in crime and violence has imposed significant social costs and has made much more difficult the processes of economic and social development, democratic consolidation and regional integration in the Americas.
The Military Police of Rio de Janeiro State (PMERJ) like other military polices in Brazil is a reserve and ancillary force of the Brazilian Army, and part of the System of Public Security and Brazilian Social Protection. Its members are called "state military" personnel.
The Pacifying Police Unit, abbreviated UPP, is a law enforcement and social services program pioneered in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which aims to reclaim territories, most commonly favelas, controlled by gangs of drug dealers. The program was created and implemented by State Public Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame, with the backing of Rio Governor Sérgio Cabral. The stated goal of Rio's government is to install 40 UPPs by 2014. By May 2013, 231 favelas had come under the UPP umbrella. The UPP program scored initial success expelling gangs, and won broad praise. But the expensive initiative expanded too far, too fast into dozens of favelas as state finances cratered, causing a devastating backslide that enabled gangs to recover some of their lost grip.
In November 2010, there was a major security crisis in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro and some of its neighboring cities. The city's criminal drug trafficking factions initiated a series of attacks in response to the government placing permanent police forces into Rio's slums.
On July 14, 2013, Amarildo de Souza, a 43-year-old bricklayer from the Rocinha favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, was called in for questioning by Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) officers on his way home from the market. Believed to be connected to drug trafficking activity in the favela despite having no prior involvement in illegal activity, de Souza was brought in for questioning during Operation Armed Peace, during which roughly 300 officers from Rocinha's UPP force flooded the favela in order to arrest drug traffickers. It was during this two-day long raid that de Souza was brought to the police station and never seen again.
Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security is a book by Enrique Desmond Arias published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2006. This book takes an interdisciplinary approach to understand public security, government operations, and drug related operations in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Enrique Desmond Arias travels to Brazil to investigate the main reasons for a dramatic surge in crime, and he is also interested in figuring out what can be done.
Marielle Franco was a Brazilian politician, sociologist, feminist, socialist and human rights activist. Franco served as a city councillor of the Municipal Chamber of Rio de Janeiro for the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) from January 2017 until her assassination.
Brazilian militias, mainly in Rio de Janeiro, and some other cities of Brazil, are illegal mafia-like paramilitary groups made up of current and former police officers as well as Military Firefighters Corps officers, criminals, politicians, and military officers, operating also as a regular mafia by trade extortion and political influence.
Elias Pereira da Silva, also known as Elias Maluco, was one of Rio de Janeiro's most powerful drug traffickers. Maluco, a member of the criminal faction Comando Vermelho, commanded drug trafficking in thirty slums near Complexo do Alemão and Penha, Brazil. He was accused of killing over sixty people.
On 6 May 2021, at least 29 people were killed in a shootout between police and drug traffickers in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The raid occurred in Jacarezinho, Rio de Janeiro, a favela notable for its high crime rate. The raid occurred at approximately 11 a.m. local time, following reports that a local drug gang was recruiting children.
The armed conflict for control of the favelas in Greater Rio de Janeiro or simply Civil conflict for control of the favelas is an ongoing conflict between Brazilian militias, organized criminal groups Comando Vermelho, Amigos dos Amigos, Terceiro Comando Puro and the Brazilian state.
↑ "Reports". Archived from the original on 10 December 2016. Retrieved 31 December 2016.{{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |in 2019 archive-date= ignored (help)
↑ Canada, Gouvernement du Canada, Affaires étrangères et Commerce international. "Erreur 404 – Voyage.gc.ca". Archived from the original on 13 February 2008. Retrieved 18 February 2008.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)[dead link]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 "A falência das UPPs". Instituto Igarapé, Exame (in Brazilian Portuguese). 3 July 2017. Archived from the original on 12 December 2021. Retrieved 11 December 2021.
1 2 Zdun, Steffen (2008). "Violence in street culture: Cross-cultural comparison of youth groups and criminal gangs". New Directions for Youth Development. 2008 (119): 39–54. doi:10.1002/yd.272. PMID18855319.
↑ Miraglia, Paul (2016). "Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies"(PDF). Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence Latin America Initiative. 2016: 1–16. Archived(PDF) from the original on 20 December 2017. Retrieved 28 January 2018– via Brookings Institution.
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