European Union submarine internet cables

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Europe's submarine cables network in May 2023 Submarine cables map Europe 20 May 2023.png
Europe's submarine cables network in May 2023

Submarine internet cables, also referred to as submarine communications cables or submarine fiber optic cables, are essential infrastructure that connect different locations and data centers to reliably exchange digital information at a high speeds.

Contents

They are significant providers of global internet connectivity: approximately 99% of international communications pass through submarine fiber optic cables, [1] along with US$10 trillion in daily financial transactions. [2] The European Union (EU), in particular, has a strong demand for connectivity, with 87% of EU citizens using the internet in 2021. [3]

Network description

External network

As of May 2023, the EU maintains direct connections via submarine cables to several regions: [4]

The EU is also highly connected to the United Kingdom (UK), with 23 undersea cables linking the two. [4] Although the EU lost a number of connections with North America following Brexit in 2016, it remains resilient due to strong collaboration and robust infrastructure independent of the UK. [5]

Internal network

As of May 2023, the EU had 39 undersea cables connecting Member States exclusively. [4] with three more under installation (Digital E4, Eastern Light Sweden-Finland II, Ionian). These cables mostly connect island states such as Malta or countries bordering the Baltic Sea.

International law

The legal framework governing submarine internet cables is principally the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). [6] Although research and development of the internet's physical infrastructure progressed during the 1970s, the internet and its underlying cable infrastructure came into widespread use only after UNCLOS was adopted in 1982. [6]

Laying cables is part of the "freedom of the seas" (Article 87). [7] Submarine cables are authorized everywhere except within territorial waters, where coastal states have sovereignty and may enforce their regulations. The laying, maintenance and repair of cables must consider existing infrastructure and respect the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of coastal states (Article 79). [7]

Ownership of submarine cables is primarily private, mostly by telecommunications companies. [8] with increasing investments by technology firms such as Meta and Google. Most cables are owned and managed by consortia of companies. [8] Under UNCLOS, owners are liable for damages to cables (Article 114). [6] They must also compensate fishermen or ships for damage caused by cable protection measures (Article 115). [6] States are obliged to criminalize intentional damage to submarine cables (Article 113), except when necessary to protect lives or ships. [6]

With growing concerns climate change and environmental impacts, sustainable protection of submarine cables is a developing priority, though UNCLOS currently lacks mandatory enforcement mechanisms. [7] [9]

The European Union

Initially, regulation of cyberspace and internet infrastructure in the EU was left largely to private companies, reflecting an early philosophy of the internet as "free" space, influenced heavily by the United States. [10] This approach shifted following cyberattacks on European governments (Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008), leading to increased state and EU involvement.

Given the importance of connectivity, especially with five Member States (France, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain) as major contributors, the EU has recently recognized submarine internet cables as strategic and geopolitical assets. [11] The Russo-Ukrainian War, and incidents such as the Nord Stream pipeline attack have further highlighted this importance.

However, submarine cable protection has not been a top priority; maritime security efforts focus more on piracy, people smuggling, and environmental issues. [12] Fisheries, significant in certain EU countries, [13] are linked to cable protection but have often viewed it as a lesser concern. [5]

Responsibility for cable protection generally resides with national governments. According to the 2023 report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), regulatory regimes vary:

Internet cables were not classified as Critical Infrastructure in the 2008 European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection(EPCIP), [16] but the 2013 update recognized cyberspace as a growing concern. [17] Today, submarine cables are categorized under "information and communication systems" critical infrastructure by the EU. [18]

Threats

Submarine internet cables are subject to threats and damages of different kinds, to which the EU is more or less vulnerable. Three categories can be distinguished: natural causes, unintentional human causes and intentional human causes.

Natural threats

The first kind of damages to internet cables are natural hazards. Overall, they account for less than 10% of all submarine internet cables damages. [19] Natural hazards comprise:

Climate change could constitute a new threat to undersea cables. It is characterised by its uncertainty – scenarios are only assumptions –, and its uneven consequences across the world. First, climate change creates more frequent and more intense storms and hurricanes. [24] These, as well as changes in precipitations, could make the seabed more unstable, which would influence currents and sediments movements. Cables would then be more vulnerable to erosion. [19] However, buried cables would be less or not impacted, if they are buried deep. Second, global warming increases seismic activities, [25] so the EU and its network could become more vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis. Last, cable landing stations are also threatened by climate change. Rising sea level will expose them (as well as a part of onshore cables) to floods, while hurricanes could increase power outages. [26] Northwest Europe is among the most exposed landing location to storm surges. However, the EU coastline is one of the least exposed to sea level rise, with sea level at landing stations even projected to lower by 2052. [27]

Involuntary human threats

The biggest cause of submarine internet cables damage is fishing, which accounts for 44.6% of cable faults over 1959–2006. [21] The EU represents 3% of the fisheries and aquaculture production of the world and ranks as its fifth largest one. [28] The most widely used method of fishing, which is also the most damaging to submarine cables, is bottom trawling. It is extremely intense in the English Channel, the Strait of Dover, and the Skagerrak. [29] When the fishing gear is on the sea bottom, it can move the cable or get stuck underneath, eventually breaking it or damaging the waterproof protection and causing court-circuits. [30] This situation is also prejudicial to the fishermen, as such a collision often means loss of fish, time, and damage on their fishing gear. [31] Another damage caused by ships is anchoring, which was responsible for 14.6% of cable damages over 1959–2006. [21] This happens when ships drop anchor right on a cable. Overall, these damages happen in areas where the EU has a really high linkage, so data can easily be circumvented through another route.

Voluntary human threats

Undersea cables are also vulnerable to targeted attacks conducted by humans. Three categories can be distinguished: blue crime, terrorism, and state-sponsored attacks.

Blue crime

Blue crime refers to “serious organised crimes or offences that take place transnationally, on, in or across the maritime domain and cause or have the potential to inflict significant harm”. [32] It is close to the notion of transnational organised crimes at sea. The only aim of blue crime is monetary profit. One form of criminal activity against submarine cables is cable theft. An example is the cable between Singapore and Indonesia, which was partly robbed in 2013: 31,7 km and 418 tons of cables were removed. [33] Another scenario is a criminal group threatening to harm cables if no ransom is received. Last, cables could be damaged to cover an unrelated criminal attack, as it would diminish surveillance capacities. [34]

Terrorism

Terrorism is close to blue crime, except that its aim is political and not monetary. For now, no terrorist attack against submarine cables have been recorded. [35] Attacks could consist in targeting landing stations, [34] or dragging an anchor on the seabed in an area of high cable density. [35] However, the probability of a blackout in the EU or in one of its Member States is low, as it would require precision and coordination. Besides, terrorists themselves rely on internet cables to communicate, and to spread terror to the public, [34] so it is not in their interest to damage the whole network. Risks are higher for remote islands with less connectivity, such as EU Member States’ naval bases abroad (like in Djibouti), EU Islands, or Member States’ oversea territories (like La Réunion, which possesses 3 submarine cables [4] ).

State-led attacks

To date, no attack on submarine internet cables has been attributed to a State. However, the attack of the gas pipeline Nord Stream II in 2022, presumably United States-sponsored, underlines that this kind of sabotage is possible. Overall, the shadow of these attacks is part of hybrid threats. The EU defines them as: “when actors seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of the EU to their own advantage by using a mixture of measures (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological) while remaining below the threshold of formal warfare". [36] The greatest fear is hence that submarine internet cables vandalism might be used as part of a coordinate attack targeting other key infrastructures, like cyberspace. Despite Sweden and Denmark's lack of finding a culprit, Russia is often thought to have been involved in the Nords Stream sabotage due to the tensions with the EU and the presence of Russian ships around it days prior. [37] Russia has previously been associated with strategies such as the spread of fake news, [38] the sponsor of cyberattacks, [39] and navigation close to key EU infrastructures. [40] For example, in February 2022, Russia did a military exercise at the border of Ireland's EEZ, near undersea internet cables. An Irish officer notes "the intention is not to cut the cables but to send a message [to NATO] that they can cut them anytime they want". [34] However, the principle of hybrid threats is that attacks, when they happen, are non-attributable.

Another concern is China's ubiquity in the submarine internet cables network. 100 out of 400 global internet cables are managed or have been built by HMN Technologies, which also possesses 10% of market shares. [34] This gives China power over the current and upcoming infrastructure, but also gives it a potential for data interception. [41]

Protection

Physical

The EU lets the cables and fishery industries regulate themselves. It is about "talking to each other to raise awareness" or "changing the design of fishing gear". [31] However, the EU facilitates dialogue through its European Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) platform. It is also thinking about pushing for cable routes/corridors, or developing no-anchor/no-trawl zones. [30] It could also require cables to cross shipping lanes by the shortest route possible, and/or to be buried. [31]

EU protection measures especially target intentional damage, particularly state-sponsored hybrid threats. There is however no piece of legislation from the EU that only deals with submarine internet cables.

Cables are the competency of Member States. [14] However, monitoring cables is very challenging and requires significant resources. States therefore seek for a "Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure". [42] The EU complements their action, by upgrading risk assessments and responses. [14]

The EU has a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which was last updated in 2013. Additional measures for Critical Infrastructure protection were on the EU Commission’s agenda in 2020. [43] Today, the EPCIP is complemented by other legal frameworks. Submarine internet cables protection is dealt with in the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). [44] The 2018 EUMSS already sought to enhance the critical infrastructures’ resilience, via risk assessment and management, and education and training. [45] The 2023 update implements common military exercises among voluntary Member States, to better address hybrid threats, both at sea and on land. The goal is to improve "both the physical and cyber resilience of critical entities and infrastructures". [46] The link between undersea cables and cyberspace is now more widely recognized. Internet cables are also mentioned in the NIS 2 directive, which deals with EU cybersecurity. It expects each State to issue a national cybersecurity strategy (which includes cable protection), and report issues to the European level. [47] In addition, by January 17, 2026, Member States should have drawn a list of critical entities for each recognized sector, and build up a national strategy for critical infrastructure protection. [48]

The EU also wants to enhance cooperation with its allies, particularly the US and NATO, in terms of information exchange and surveillance. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is one of their knowledge-building collaboration measures, in the area of hybrid threats. An EU-NATO Task Force was also created in March 2023 to work on critical infrastructure resilience (energy, transports, digital infrastructure, and space). [49] However, “technological sovereignty” is one of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s top priorities for her mandate (2019–2024). [10] The EU will aim at being ore independent from its allies such as the USA. The 2013 leak of pieces of US intelligence revealed that the USA were spying on their allies, while at that time 80–85% of data traffic between the EU and Latin America was going through North America. [50] Brazil and the EU created EllaLink because of this event.

Human Rights

Recently, debates have risen regarding access to communication. Arguments state that the world has become too connected and dependent on internet to avoid needing it. Internet is important for emergency issues, to be able to communicate if something happens. [51] It is compared to other rights under the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights such as freedom of speech and, most importantly, the right to health and to communicate emergencies. [51] Protection of cables are, then, not just a duty to protect access to internet but one to protect Human Rights. [51] With 8% of the population with no access to internet in 2021, the rapid development of internet is an act to protect those rights. [52]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Nystro, M., Jouffray, J.B., Blasiak, R., & Norstro, A.V. (2020). The Blue Acceleration: The Trajectory of Human Expansion into the Ocean. One Earth, 2(1), p43–54.
  2. ↑ Guilfoyle, D., Paige, T., & McLaughlin, R. (2022). The final frontier of cyberspace: the seabed beyond national jurisdiction and the protection of submarine cables. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 71(3), p657-696.
  3. ↑ World Bank. (2021). Individuals using the internet. Accessed: 03 May 2023.
  4. 1 2 3 4 TeleGeography. Submarine cable map. Accessed: 04 May 2023.
  5. 1 2 Bueger, C., Liebetrau, T., & Franken, J. (2022, June). Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructures – consequences for the EU. EU Parliament.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 Burnett, D.R., Beckman, R., & Davenport, T.M. (2013). Submarine Cables: the Handbook of Law and Policy. Brill, p74-88.
  7. 1 2 3 Davenport, T. (2015). 'Submarine Communications Cables and Science: A new Frontier in Ocean Governance?', in Scheiber, H., Kraska, J., Kwon, M. (eds). Science, Technology, and New Challenges to Ocean Law. Brill
  8. 1 2 Wall, C., Morcos, P. (2021, June 11). 'Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security'
  9. ↑ You, Y. (2011). 'Using Submarine Communications Networks to Monitor the Climate – an ITU-T Technology Watch Report"
  10. 1 2 Claessen, E. (2020). Reshaping the internet – the impact of the securitisation of internet infrastructure on approaches to internet governance: the case of Russia and the EU, Journal of Cyber Policy, 5(1), p140-157.
  11. ↑ Bueger, C., Liebetrau, T., Franken, J. (2022, June). 'Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU. European Parliament
  12. ↑ Long, R. (2015). "A European Law Perspective: Science, Technology, and New Challenges to Ocean Law". In: Scheiber, H., Kraska, J., Kwon, M-S. (2015). Science, Technology, and New Challenges to Ocean Law.
  13. ↑ Facts and figures on the common fisheries policy: Basic statistical data : 2022. Publications Office of the European Union. 2022. ISBN   978-92-76-42605-9.
  14. 1 2 3 4 5 ENISA. (2023, July). 'Subsea Cables – What is at stake?'
  15. ↑ Raha, U. K., Raju, K. D. (2021). Submarine Cables Protection and Regulations: A Comparative Analysis and Model Framework.
  16. ↑ Council of the European Union. (2008, December 8). Council directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Annex I.
  17. ↑ European Commission. (2012, June 22). Commission staff working document on the review of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)
  18. ↑ European Commission. Critical infrastructure protection. Accessed: 20 May 2023.
  19. 1 2 3 ICPC, UNEP. (2009). Submarine cables and the oceans: connecting the world. p30, p39-41.
  20. ↑ Márquez, M.C. (2020, July 20). Our underwater world is full of cables… that are sometimes attacked by sharks. Forbes. Accessed: 10 May 2023.
  21. 1 2 3 4 Sunak, R. (2017). Undersea cables. Indispensable, insecure. Policy exchange. p21.
  22. ↑ Butler, B. (2014, August 13). Google wraps its trans-Pacific fiber cables in Kevlar to prevent against shark attacks. Network World. Accessed: 10 May 2023.
  23. ↑ International Cable Protection Committee. (2015, July 1). Sharks are not the Nemesis of the internet – ICPC findings
  24. ↑ Colbert, A. (2022, June 1). 'A force of Nature: Hurricanes in a Changing Climate'
  25. ↑ McGuire, B. in Climate change risks triggering catastrophic tsunamis, scientist warns. (2021). Financial Times.
  26. ↑ Clare, M. A. et alt. (2023, February). 'Climate change hotspots and implications for the global subsea telecommunications network'
  27. ↑ Clare, M. (2023, May). Submarine Cable Protection and the Environment. ICPC. Issue No. 6.
  28. ↑ European Commission. (2022). 'Facts and figures on the common fisheries policy – Basic statistical data'
  29. ↑ Eigaard et al. (2017) in European MSP Platform. Conflict fiche 2: Cables/pipelines and commercial fisheries/shipping. p4.
  30. 1 2 MSP. (2021, February 23). 'Cables and fisheries'
  31. 1 2 3 European MSP Platform. Conflict fiche 2: Cables/pipelines and commercial fisheries/shipping.
  32. ↑ Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2020, September). Blue crime: conceptualising organised crime at sea. Marine Policy, 119, 104067.
  33. ↑ The Jakarta Post. (2013, July 08). Ministry sets up submersible cable task force. Accessed: 15 May 2023.
  34. 1 2 3 4 5 Bueger, C., Liebetrau, T., & Franken, J. (2022, June). Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructures – consequences for the EU. EU Parliament. p31-34.
  35. 1 2 Burnett, D.R., Beckman, R., & Davenport, T.M. (2013). Submarine Cables: the Handbook of Law and Policy. Brill.
  36. ↑ European Commission. Hybrid Threats. Accessed: 15 May 2023.
  37. ↑ Camut, N. (2023, April 28)'Russian ship spotted near Nord Stream pipelines days before sabotage: Reports'
  38. ↑ Spidsboel Hansel, F. (2017).'Russian hybrid warfare: A study of disinformation'
  39. ↑ Cynersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, May 09). 'Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure'
  40. ↑ Siebold, S. (2023, May 03), 'NATO says Moscow may sabotage undersea cables as part of war on Ukraine
  41. ↑ Burdette, L. (2021, May 5). 'Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political Gain: U.S. Responses to Chinese Strategy'
  42. ↑ Council of the European Union. (2022, December 08). Council Recommendation 2023/C 20/01 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure
  43. ↑ European Commission. (2020). Commission Work Programme 2020. Annex 1, p4.
  44. ↑ Council of the European Union. (2018, June 26). Council conclusions on the revision of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan
  45. ↑ Council of the European Union. (2018, June 26). Council conclusions on the revision of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan. p18, p21.
  46. ↑ European Commission. (2023, March 10). Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan "An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats". p11.
  47. ↑ European Parliament, & Council of the European Union. (2022, December 14). Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)
  48. ↑ European Parliament, & Council of the European Union. (2022, December 14). Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC
  49. ↑ NATO. (2023, March 16). NATO and European Union launch task force on resilience of critical infrastructure. Accessed: 16 May 2023.
  50. ↑ Lazarou, E. (2015). EU-Brazil cooperation on internet governance and ICT issues. European Parliamentary Research Service.
  51. 1 2 3 Kirchner, S. (2020). 'Mobile Internet Access as a Human Right: A View from the European High North'. in: Salmien, M., Zojer, G., Hossain, K. (eds). Digitalisation and Human Security: New Security Challenges. Palgrave Macmillan.
  52. ↑ Jacobs, F. (2023, January 26). ' Europe's stunning digital divide, in one map'
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