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The European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, EU MSS or EU Maritime Security Strategy) is a maritime security strategy of the European Union. [1] It was unanimously adopted by EU member states in June 2014. [2] The EUMSS provides a framework for the EU's actions within maritime security in order to promote broader and more coherent approaches to identified maritime security challenges. [1] [3] [4] Maritime security strategies have been adopted by a number of countries like France, India, United Kingdom and United States of America. [5] Such strategies are used to organise a country or region's actions within maritime security by identifying maritime security challenges and relevant actors. [6]
The EUMSS from 2014 defines maritime security as "a state of affairs of the global maritime domain in which international law and national law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected’". [1] It states the interests, aims, risks and threats identified by the EU, and it suggests five areas for EU action. [1] The EUMSS is complemented by an action plan which was adopted by the General Affairs Council in December 2014. [7] The action plan was later replaced by a revised version in June 2018. [8]
In March 2023, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy adopted a Joint Communication on "an enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats". [9] The updated EUMSS will be implemented through the updated action plan. [10]
The EUMSS is a 16 pages long strategy paper. It consists of the following sections: [1]
Maritime security is a concept that does not have just one meaning, and different actors will attribute different issues to the concept. [11] The EUMSS states that the EU seeks to “promote rules-based good governance at sea”. [1] The EU embraces a comprehensive understanding of the term, and among the listed issues are national and regional security, human safety, economic development and marine environment. [11]
The EUMSS is based on four guiding principles: a cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism. [1] It takes a “comprehensive, cross-sectoral, cross-border, coherent and cost-efficient approach” to maritime security and presents 11 aims. [1] These aims can be broadly summarised as: bringing together internal and external aspects of maritime security; ensuring rules-based good governance; improving coordination and co-operation among security actors at various levels; promoting economic growth and jobs; improving solidarity and information-sharing practices among member states; creating a stronger role for the EU as a global actor. [1]
The EUMSS lists the EU's strategic interests in eight areas. [1] These can broadly be categorised as: the preservation of international peace; the protection of the EU’s borders, citizens, infrastructure, and economic resources; sustainable use of the seas; the prevention of environmental degradation and biodiversity loss as well as management of the impact of climate change. [1]
The EUMSS lists multiple risks and threats to the EU’s strategic interests. [1] The nine main issues can be broadly summarised as: external aggression; cross-border and organised crime; regional insecurity at the EU’s external borders; terrorism and sabotage at sea and in ports; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the obstruction of sea lanes and access to the sea; pollution and over-exploitation of natural and marine resources; natural or man-made disasters, extreme events and climate change; illegal archaeological research and unregulated activities. [1]
The EUMMS advocates a strengthening of the EU’s response in five main areas: [1]
"The EU did not create new institutions but primarily sketched out how existing bodies can work more efficiently together." [6]
The EUMSS reflects previous work undertaken at the EU level. In January 2013, the European Parliament’s Directorate General published a study on the maritime dimension of Common Security and Defence Policy: “Geostrategic Maritime Challenges and their Implications for the European Union”. [12] It was requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence and conducted by researchers from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). [12]
The study presents four main trends that support the need for a strategy. [12] The first trend is an emerging threat to global maritime governance systems posed by non-state actors such as pirates, terrorists, and criminal syndicates. [12] The second trend is a growth in competitive tensions, pressures, and bottlenecks due to the interconnectedness of maritime infrastructures across regions. [12] The third trend is a shift in the global maritime balance due to the emergence of “rising powers”. [12] The fourth trend is increased difficulty in securing international cooperation and effective global governance in a complex environment. [12] The study concludes with the following suggestion: “The EU requires a comprehensive maritime security strategy that creates synergies between the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy and the maritime dimension of CSDP and that focuses more comprehensively on the security and management of global maritime flows and sea-based activities in the global maritime commons.” [12]
While the conclusion explicitly articulates the need for a strategy, the demand for a common approach to maritime security predates the study. Some scholars point to the launch of the EU’s first naval operation, Atalanta, in 2008 as an important contextual factor. [2] [4] [13] Others point to earlier developments that expanded the notion of security and influenced policy in the maritime sphere. [5] In 1998, the Independent World Commissioner on the Oceans report was published, and it described “a range of military and non-military threats” to international order. [5] In 2005, in response to attacks on the USS Cole and the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US published a National Strategy for Security Strategy. This was the first of its kind to treat maritime security as a complex in its own right. [5]
In 2010, the idea for a EUMSS was brought forward at a defence meeting by Spain, who held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union at the time. [14] The idea met resistance from Member States such as the UK and Germany who firmly opposed integration in areas of defence policy. They rejected any text that explicitly referenced a possible maritime security strategy for the EU. [14] In the end, Member States agreed upon the following formulation: “a possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain”. [14] In the following years, the European Commission and the European Union External Action (EEAS) were the main drivers of a possible maritime security strategy. [14]
In March 2014, a Joint Communication was published, and Greece, who held the EU Presidency at the time, pushed the idea further. [15] [14] It was discussed at several meetings, and the text was revised several times. Member States fell in one of two groups on the matter. [14] One group of Member States supported more references to NATO and fewer supranational regulations. This group included the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden and Denmark. The other group supported deeper integration on matters of maritime security, and of EU security in general. This group included France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg among others. In the final strategy, references to NATO were kept and four supranational regulations were removed. [14]
The EUMSS was followed by a detailed action plan adopted by the Council of the European Union in December 2014. [7] It is built on four principles: cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism. [2] [7] The aim of the plan is to deliver “cross-sectoral actions in a comprehensive and coordinated manner, mainstreaming maritime security into EU policies, strategies and instruments.” [7] It contains 130 actions across the five work-strands: external action; maritime awareness; capability development; risk management; protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response; and maritime security research and innovation, education, and training. [7] The plan specifics which actors are responsible for implementing the specific action. [6] [7]
The European Commission and the High Representative are jointly responsible for reporting on the implementation of the action plan. [16] Each implementation report is based on the contributions from EU member states. The result of the first two implementation reports was the adoption of a revised action plan. [16]
The Council adopted a revised action plan in June 2018 to ensure that the EU's policy response remains "fit for current and future challenges; in line with evolving political priorities; and consistent with ongoing work and legislation in the area of defence". [8] The revised action plan contains 90 actions and is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on “horizontal issues” that are identified in the EUMSS. The second, new part focuses on regional responses to global challenges in the maritime domain. [8] The revised action plan states that it is a “living document” that “operationalises the EUMSS” while also taking other EU policies into account. [8]
A third implementation report from 2020 evaluates the activities undertaken since the 2018 revision of the EUMSS action plan. [16] The purpose of the report is to take stock of the implementation process, suggest improvements to the reporting process, and "provide a clearer picture of the EU's coordinated approach to maritime security". [16] It contains a new section that outlines the achievements in civil-military cooperation across sectors and borders . [16] Only 11 contributions informed the report, and the report concludes that all member states must contribute to the reporting exercise to "get a full picture" of efforts made. [16] The report also concludes that more targeted reporting with specific details of actions is needed. Finally, the report invites member states to consider wider strategic agendas and communicate the importance of maritime security. [16]
The stated aim of the Joint Communication from 2023 is “to ensure a peaceful use of the seas and safeguard the maritime domain against new threats”. [10] Geopolitical developments, the climate crisis, environmental degradation, and hybrid and cyber-attacks are among the “evolving and growing threats” listed. [10] The Joint Communication presents an updated Strategy for maritime security which enables the EU to "take further action to protect its interests at sea, and to protect its citizens, values, and economy". [10]
The Joint Communication states that there is an increase in “strategic competition over power and resources”. [10] The threats posed by these “drastic changes” in the overall strategic environment are “increasingly complex and multi-layered”. [10] This is exemplified by Russia's military aggression against Ukraine and the negative spill-over effects on the European economy. [10] Other challenges to maritime security include violations of national sovereignty and threats to freedom of navigation and rights of innocent passage. Regional tensions are identified within and beyond Europe, including the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The Indo-Pacific is characterised as “an area of intense geopolitical competition” that undermines global security and affects key shipping routes. [10]
The Joint Communication recognises the long-term impacts of climate change and marine pollution. It refers to the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, listing impacts such as flooding and the depletion of global fish stocks. [10] These impacts are considered “risk multipliers” that amplify existing inequalities and aggravate maritime crime. [10] The EU’s climate-resilience work is therefore linked to the protection and reversal of damage to maritime ecosystems. These efforts may be undermined by current gaps in maritime security and by biodiversity loss caused by military conflict at sea. The Joint Communication stresses the importance of conducting new research on these interactions, towards the creation of "sustainable solutions". [10]
The Joint Communication addresses the threat of hybrid and cyber-attacks that target critical maritime infrastructure. [10] It mentions the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and activity around offshore installations in the North Sea as key examples. [10] The increase in complexity and potential vulnerability of infrastructure is partly attributed to the digital transformation of the maritime industry. The updated EUMSS outlines steps towards more effective protection of undersea cables, pipelines, ports, and ships. [10] This complements other EU initiatives towards improving the resilience of the union's physical and digital infrastructure, such as the Critical Entities Resilience Directive and the NIS2 Directive. [10]
The Joint Communication presents six strategic objectives for strengthening the EU's response under the updated EUMSS: [10]
Each section includes a list of key EU actions that are necessary to meet the stated objectives in the updated EUMSS. These actions include: [10]
The updated EUMSS will be implemented by EU member states through the adoption of the updated action plan from 2018. Together, they set out a path towards increasing the EU's international maritime security role, in line with the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. [10]
Operation Atalanta or EUNAVFOR Somalia was the European Union's first naval operation launched in 2008 to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia and Horn of Africa. The operation has been extended several times and is still active. Some scholars argue that Operation Atalanta was the beginning of the security dimension to EU's maritime policies [2] [4] [13] and that it paved the way for the EUMSS to be formed and adopted: “Since Atalanta, the development of EU maritime foreign and security policy issue has been substantial.” [2] Operation Atalanta made the security aspect of the maritime dimension more tangible, and before Operation Atalanta was launched, EU member states generally looked to NATO for maritime security issues and naval operations. [2] However, some member states were realising the need to act through the EU rather than NATO, [13] and it was a mix of different factors that ensured the launch of Operation Atalanta. Among these was “the recognition of the importance of the EU’s maritime frontiers, the unprecedented rise of piracy off Somalia, and a mixture of EU member states’ domestic and foreign interests”. [13]
Operation Sophia or EUNAVFOR Med was the second naval operation of the European Union. It was launched in 2015 in response to the refugee crisis with the aim to neutralise established smuggling routes for migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. [17] The operation ended on March 31, 2020, but was succeeded the same day by Operation Irini. Operation Irini operates in the same waters as Operation Sophia but has a different goal related to an arms embargo against Libya rather than migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea. [18] [19] [20] Operation Atalanta and Operation Sophia seemed to both be launched initially because of humanitarian issues - Operation Atalanta's goal was to protect humanitarian aid on its way to Somalia, and Operation Sophia was launched after a boat carrying migrants from Libya to Italy sank off the Italian island of Lampedusa in 2013, when more than 360 persons died. [21]
The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) is a policy from June 2016 that replaces the European Security Strategy from 2003. The EUGS puts emphasis on maritime security and refers to the EU as a “global maritime security provider”. [2] [22] [23] The EUGS underlines the global role the European Union wants to take in the global maritime domain, and maritime security is a theme throughout the EUGS.
“The existence of the MSS reflects the EU’s geopolitical interest in controlling the sea in its jurisdiction, as well as its intention to become a global maritime actor.” [24]
Scholarly debates have circled whether the EU is becoming a global humanitarian actor [25] or a traditional realist great power. [26] [27] Marianne Riddervold concludes that "the EU indeed is becoming maritime global power" that increasingly turns to military means to respond to "new security threats and challenges, also known as ‘soft threats’ such as piracy and migration". Riddervold does not, however, find evidence that supports a realist hypothesis. Rather, Riddervold concludes that the EUMSS demonstrates that the EU is moving towards a maritime foreign and security policy "more in line with a humanitarian foreign policy model". [21] In contrast, Basil Germond stresses the geopolitical dimension of the EU's efforts in the maritime domain and the collective interests of members states in increasing power projection. [26] Michael E. Smith concludes that it is still unknown whether the two milestones (Operation Atalanta and the EUMSS) indicate the rise of the EU as a global maritime power, rather than just a “high water mark". [28]
The scholarly debates are themselves subject to theoretical and conceptual developments. Conventional interpretations of maritime security in international relations (IR) largely draw on the theoretical frameworks of traditional realism and liberalism. They incorporate maritime security as an aspect of security, rather than “a crucible of international change and innovation in and of itself”. [5] In taking stock of the literature in 2017, Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds find that maritime security studies are fragmented and treat the topic within the scope of wider themes in IR. [5] Meanwhile, the EUMSS and similar strategies show that states are increasingly prioritising maritime security. Further, the US and EU initiatives stress a holistic approach by linking security, security institutions and the “wider political and socio-economic environments in which they sit”. [5]
Maritime security as a concept has no inherent meaning, and it has become a popular "buzzword". [11] Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds argue that the increase in observable initiatives and activities in the EU and elsewhere “call for a more substantial treatment of the matter in the academic discussion”. [5] To remedy the “seablindness” of security studies, they advocate more targeted attention to maritime governance mechanisms through which security is practised. [5] This new agenda for maritime security studies connects studies of maritime law and sea power with sociological perspectives that emphasise practice and knowledge. [5]
Several EU policies already had a maritime dimension before the adoption of the EUMSS, but they were spread across different policy areas. [4] The first big step on the way to a more coherent EU policy in the maritime field was when the European Commission proposed the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in 2007, but it was not until Operation Atalanta in 2008 and the EUMSS in 2014 that the security and defence aspect became clear. [2]
The European Union also has policies on maritime safety, marine pollution, energy security, fisheries control, illegal trafficking, immigration, maritime surveillance (Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)) and more. [4] [29] Security-related maritime policies and operations fall under the agreed foreign policy of the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
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