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Long title | Division C of "An Act making omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes". |
---|---|
Acronyms (colloquial) | IIRAIRA |
Enacted by | the 104th United States Congress |
Effective | April 1, 1997 [1] |
Citations | |
Public law | Pub. L. 104–208 (text) (PDF) |
Statutes at Large | 110 Stat. 3009-546 |
Codification | |
Acts amended | Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 Immigration Act of 1990 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 |
Titles amended | 8 U.S.C.: Aliens and Nationality |
U.S.C. sections amended |
|
Legislative history | |
| |
United States Supreme Court cases | |
List
|
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA or IIRIRA) [2] [3] , enacted as division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, made major changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). IIRAIRA's changes became effective on April 1, 1997. [1]
Former United States President Bill Clinton asserted that the legislation strengthened "the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system — without punishing those living in the United States legally". [4] However, IIRAIRA has been criticized as overly punitive "by eliminating due process from the overwhelming majority of removal cases and curtailing equitable relief from removal". [5] A range of critiques have emerged concerning the provisions enacted with IIRAIRA, such as the expansion of aggravated felonies, creation of the 287(g) program, reduction in due process rights, and intensified funding of border militarization. [5] [6] [7] [8] With IIRAIRA, all noncitizens, regardless of legal status and including long-term legal permanent residents, became subject to removal and greatly expanded the offenses that could lead to formal deportation. [9]
Proponents of the IIRAIRA present the case that the policy provided a much needed end to numerous loopholes present beforehand in US immigration policy, which ultimately undermined their efficacy. [10] The ultimate goal of the IIRAIRA has been to deter further illegal immigration into the US, and despite a noticeable increase in annual deportations since the policy was enacted in 1996 from around 50,000 to over 200,000 by the beginning of the 2000s, [11] overall illegal immigration has increased since the policy's enactment according to data compiled by the Pew Research Center. [12]
Before IIRAIRA, nonimmigrants who overstayed their visas or violated their status could pay a fine that would allow them to adjust their status to permanent residence status. [13] With IIRAIRA, however, lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who overstay their visas by one day or longer became ineligible for a new nonimmigrant visa. [13] If the period of overstay ranged from 180 to 365 days, the noncitizen would face a 3-year bar to reentry, and an overstay of more than 365 days would require a 10-year bar. These provisions impact noncitizens who were admitted before and after the enactment of IIRAIRA. [13] In these circumstances, a noncitizen who falls under these categories would be subject to summary removal if attempting to reenter the United States. In these removal proceedings, the noncitizen does not have a right to a hearing or a lawyer and is subject to a 5-year bar of entry. [13]
IIRAIRA imposed new regulations concerning public charge determinations for noncitizens seeking admission. IIRAIRA requires that the individual(s) petitioning a family-sponsored immigrant must provide an affidavit of support. [14] In the affidavit, the petitioner must "agree to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines" until the noncitizen naturalizes as a U.S. citizen [14] or the noncitizen, the noncitizen's parent, or the noncitizen's spouse has worked for 40 qualifying quarters. [15]
With IIRAIRA, the US Congress expanded the definition of the term aggravated felony. Aggravated felonies were first initiated with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and aggravated felonies consisted of murder, drug trafficking, and illicit firearm trafficking. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after their entry into the United States deportable. The Immigration Act of 1990, Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 and Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 increased the types of offenses considered aggravated felonies. In addition, with these laws, crimes with a penalty of 5 years or longer would be considered an aggravated felony. [16] [17]
After IIRAIRA, however, the penalty was changed so that any crime with a penalty of one year or longer would be considered an aggravated felony. [18] Any noncitizen who is convicted of an aggravated felony can face collateral immigration consequences: "noncitizens who have been convicted of an 'aggravated felony' are prohibited from receiving most forms of relief that would spare them from deportation, including asylum, and from being readmitted to the United States at any time in the future". [19] There is a "presumption of deportability" for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies, in which noncitizens "convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States". [20]
Importantly, aggravated felony charges can be applied retroactively, so if a change in the law deems a new category of offense an aggravated felony, any noncitizen previously convicted of that offense can then face removal. [19]
Under IIRAIRA, any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony is categorically barred from cancellation of removal and placed in a form of expedited removal proceedings (but these are distinct from expedited removal). Under IIRAIRA, expedited removal proceedings for noncitizens with aggravated felony charges are under the purview of the Attorney General who "shall provide for the initiation and, to the extent possible, the completion of removal proceedings, and any administrative appeals thereof, in the case of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony before the alien's release from incarceration for the underlying aggravated felony". [21] Under these expedited removal proceedings, noncitizens do attend immigration court, and they are afforded the right to counsel (at no expense to the government) for their immigration court proceedings and judicial review of their determination of removal. [22]
IIRAIRA merged exclusion and deportation proceedings into removal proceedings. [23] All noncitizens who are removable are subject to removal proceedings. [13] Prior to IIRAIRA, noncitizens were subject to either deportation proceedings or exclusion proceedings. [23] [13] Deportation was reserved for noncitizens who "made an 'entry' into the U.S.", whereas exclusion proceedings were reserved for noncitizens who had not made entry into the United States. [24] The consolidation of exclusion and deportation proceedings into removal proceedings was an attempt to streamline the process of deportation and exclusion. Under IIRAIRA, noncitizens "admitted to the United States, [noncitizens] applying for admission, and [noncitizens] present in the United States without being inspected and admitted" were all subject to removal proceedings. [24] Removal proceedings are adjudicated by immigration judges, which fall under the purview of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, which is part of the Department of Justice.
Post-IIRAIRA removal proceedings are initiated with a notice to appear (NTA) that is sent to the noncitizen. NTAs replaced Order to Show Cause and Notice of Time and Place documents. [25] [13] NTAs specify, among other things, "the nature of the proceedings against the alien", "the legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted", "the acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of the law" and "the charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated". [26] IIRAIRA established the authority of immigration judges in removal proceedings. [27] Immigration judges "shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses. The immigration judge may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence". [28]
Noncitizens have the right to a "reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien's own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government" but not the right "to an application by the alien for discretionary relief under this Act". [29] Further, under IIRAIRA, noncitizens "have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the [noncitizen's] choosing". [22] Therefore, noncitizens can have legal representation in immigration court, but they not entitled to legal representation provided by the Government if they cannot afford an attorney.
IIRAIRA established a removal period of 90 days for noncitizens determined to be removable by an immigration judge. [30] The removal period can begin when "the date the order of removal becomes administratively final", "the date of the court's final order" or if the date at which the noncitizen is released from detention (only in cases of non-immigration related detention). [31] Noncitizens can file one motion to reconsider the decision of an immigration judge, which must be filed within 30 days of the final order being issued. [32] Noncitizens can also file 1 motion for reopening their case, which must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal. [33]
IIRAIRA restricted noncitizens' access to cancellation of removal, which is a form of relief from deportation. Prior to IIRAIRA, noncitizens could receive cancellation of removal through discretionary relief from the Attorney General (this relief is carried out by immigration judges within Executive Office of Immigration Review. [34] In general, before IIRAIRA noncitizens could become eligible for cancellation of removal if they "established seven years continuous physical presence in the U.S., good moral character during that period, and that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the individual or to his or her spouse, parent, or child who was a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident". [34] Cancellation of removal resulted in individuals becoming lawful permanent residents. [34]
IIRAIRA restricted the requirements for individuals to become eligible for cancellation of removal and capped the number of cancellations available to 4,000 annually. [35] With IIRAIRA, cancellation required continuous physical presence in the U.S. for 10 years prior to the initiation of removal proceedings, which is called the stop-time rule. [36] In 1997, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals ruled that the stop-time rule can also be applied retroactively to individuals who began removal proceedings prior to IIRAIRA's implementation. [37] An additional IIRAIRA mandated requirement for cancellation of removal is that noncitizens must demonstrate that removal would lead to "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the individual's spouse, parent, or child who is a U.S. citizen or noncitizen with legal permanent residence status. IIRAIRA eliminated the possibility of cancellation due to the hardship an individual themselves could face. [38]
IIRAIRA established expedited removal, in which immigration officials gained the authority to summarily remove certain noncitizens. [39] This is different from the expedited removal proceedings for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. Noncitizens subject to expedited removal include noncitizens "who are inadmissible because they lack valid entry documents or have sought admission through fraud (may also include aliens inadmissible on same grounds if they are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and have been in the country less than two years)". [40]
Expedited removals can be considered removals without hearings: these removals do not require judicial review by immigration judges within the Executive Office of Immigration Review unless the individual plans to apply for asylum or indicates fear of persecution. [41] [42] Therefore, noncitizens subject to expedited removal do not have the right to administrative review or the right to administrative appeal and judicial review. [40] Because expedited removals do not require judicial or administrative review, noncitizens who are subject to expedited removals are not afforded the right to an attorney during their interviews with immigration officials. [40]
IIRAIRA initiated stipulated removal, which is a type of plea agreement for noncitizens who are convicted of crimes in criminal court. [43] Stipulated removal orders under IIRAIRA can be enacted for noncitizens facing felony and misdemeanor convictions that are considered aggravated felonies. [13] [43] Stipulated removal allocated to United States federal district court judges "jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of removal pursuant to the terms of such stipulation". [43]
Orders of stipulated removal "constitute a conclusive determination of the [noncitizen's] removability from the U.S." [24] The plea agreements for stipulated removal orders make a "judicial order of removal form the United States […] a condition of the plea agreement" for the criminal conviction or a "condition of probation or supervised release, or both". [43] With stipulated removal, noncitizens "waive the right to notice and hearing" for a determination of their removability. [13]
IIRAIRA initiated exceptions for stipulated removal for individuals in "exceptional circumstances": serious illness of the alien or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien. [24]
IIRAIRA implemented a process called reinstatement of removal. Reinstatement of removal concerns the reentry of undocumented immigrants who previously left through voluntary departure or who were previously issued orders of removal who entered without lawful admission. [44] With reinstatement of removal, "the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed" and the immigrant is ineligible for applying for or receiving any relief from removal. [44] Reinstatement of removal allows for the individual to "be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry". [44]
IIRAIRA expanded the authority of the Attorney General to detain noncitizens who are facing removal. Under IIRAIRA, noncitizens "may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States". [45] IIRAIRA did not impose any limitations on the length of detention, but IIRAIRA did restrict these noncitizens' access to release from detention. Release could be granted with a "bond of at least $1,500" or on "conditional parole". [45] Noncitizens without legal permanent residence or prior work authorizations would be ineligible for receiving a work authorization during their release from detention. [45]
IIRAIRA stipulated mandatory detention for noncitizens who furnished fraudulent documents or have convictions for aggravated felonies, including "crimes involving moral turpitude", as well as noncitizens found to have "membership in a terrorist organization". [46] [47] Demore v. Kim (2003) upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory detention of noncitizens with qualifying convictions.
The provisions of IIRAIRA concerning detention were initially conceptualized as allowing for indefinite detention of noncitizens. [24] However, court decisions have added clarity to the length of time a noncitizen can be detained. In Diouf v. Napolitano (2011), the Ninth Circuit held that an individual facing prolonged immigration detention under section 241(a)(6), inadmissible criminal aliens, of IIRAIRA is entitled to be released on bond unless the government establishes the individual is a flight risk or a danger to the community. [48] [24] In addition, these individuals entitled to the same procedural safeguards against prolonged detention as individuals detained under section 236(a) of the Act, including an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. [24] The court in Diouf v. Napolitano (2011) acknowledged that it was extending its holding in Casas-Castrillon v. DHS (2008). [49]
Various bars for reentry of noncitizens were established by IIRAIRA.
The 3-year bar to entry concerns noncitizens without lawful present status for more than 180 days but less than 365 days who returned to their home country voluntarily before the initiation of removal proceedings in immigration court. [50] [51] The 3-year bar begins on the date of the individual's departure or removal from the U.S. [50]
The 10-year bar to entry applies to any noncitizen who was ordered removed in immigration court or to any noncitizen who returned to their home country prior to the final adjudication of their removal proceedings in immigration court who were in the United States without lawful immigration status for one or more years. [52] Individuals in either of these categories are summarily found ineligible for entry for 10 years. [52] If a noncitizen gains admission after the 10-year bar and is subsequently deported, IIRAIRA imposed a 20-year bar to entry. [52]
Lifetime bars to reentry were established for any noncitizen who was deported due to criminal convictions of aggravated felonies. [50] These individuals face a lifetime bar to reentry. [50]
IIRAIRA initiated the 287(g) program. The 287(g) program allows state and local law enforcement agencies to enter into agreements with Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement). These agreements allocate to certain agents the ability to "perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers)". [53] Under 287(g), law enforcement officers are deputized to gain immigration enforcement authority, such as investigating, apprehending, and detaining noncitizens whom the officer believes to be removable. When agencies enter into 287(g) agreements, the individuals deputized are under the direction of ICE, but they are not considered federal officials. [53]
Local law enforcement is not allowed to enforce immigration law—that authority is vested in the federal government as immigration enforcement is a civil matter. [54] [55] State local law enforcement officials, such as sheriffs' agencies and municipal law enforcement, are only allowed to enforce criminal matters. The 287(g) program has received considerable pushback from immigration scholars and immigrant advocacy groups, who expressed that the program increases racial profiling and undermines immigrants' rights. [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] As of November 2021, there were 142 agencies with signed 287(g) agreements in the United States. [61]
Among other changes, IIRAIRA gave the United States Attorney General broad authority to construct barriers along the Mexico–United States border, and it authorized the construction of a secondary layer of border fencing to support the already-completed 14-mile primary fence. Construction of the secondary fence stalled because of environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission.
IIRAIRA substantially increased funding directed toward the Mexico-United States Border. IIRAIRA appropriated $12 million of funding for multilayered fencing starting near San Diego, California and extending east for 14 miles. [62] This funding was used to supplement existing fencing and add second and third layered fencing along that portion of the border. [62]
In addition to the multilayered fencing near San Diego, California, IIRAIRA allocated additional technology and funding for the Border Patrol. Included in this allocation were "fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, four-wheel drive vehicles, sedans, night vision goggles, night vision scopes, and sensor units". [63] (section 103). IIRAIRA required that the number of full-time, active-duty border patrol agents would increase by at least 1,000 "in each of the fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001". [64] IIRAIRA also funded an increase of 300 supportive personnel in each of the fiscal years of 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. [64] These new border patrol agents were to be stationed at areas with high proportions of illegal crossing, as measured within the previous year. [64] Such areas were largely concentrated at the southern border (Mexico-United States Border). [65] [66]
IIRAIRA targeted funding for agents and militarized technology to "areas of the border identified as areas of high illegal entry into the United States in order to provide a uniform and visible deterrent to illegal entry on a continuing basis". [67] In doing so, IIRAIRA appropriated consistent funding that supported a border enforcement strategy known as "prevention through deterrence". Prevention through deterrence was first initiated in the early 1990s, and it aimed to reduce the number of migrants entering without authorization at high-traffic urban areas. [65] [66] According to reports by the Government Accountability Office, prevention through deterrence increased the number of migrants that died while crossing into the United States. [68] [65] Such strategies have been criticized as unconstitutional and deemed in violation of human rights. [69]
IIRAIRA expanded the restrictions on federally distributed post-secondary education funds that were initially enacted with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). PRWORA denied federal funding for post-secondary education to most groups of noncitizens. IIRAIRA extended these restrictions, applying them to state-level funding decisions. [70] Under IIRAIRA, states cannot make undocumented immigrants eligible for post-secondary education benefits unless all citizens and nationals are also eligible, regardless of their state of residence. However, IIRAIRA does not define post secondary education benefits as tuition rates which are matriculation costs. [70]
Several states have passed tuition-equality laws by allowing anyone regardless of legal status to apply for in-state tuition if they meet the state's eligibility requirements. [71] States have overcome these restrictions by basing eligibility on in-state tuition on factors besides residence, such as attendance at a high school in the state. Nevertheless, tuition rates which include student fees and matriculation costs are not defined as post-secondary education benefits. [72] These provisions allow anyone, regardless of their immigration or citizenship status, to apply for in-state tuition if they meet the eligibility requirements. [72] In doing so, the states have complied with the mandates established by IIRAIRA and PRWORA. [73]
IIRAIRA made it a criminal offense for a noncitizen to vote in a federal election. [74] This, however, does not apply to those who have resided in the United States as non-citizen U.S. nationals or permanent residents while they were under the age of 16 years, and both of their parents are U.S. citizens. [75]
A 2018 paper found that the Act reduced the health and mental health outcomes of Latin-American undocumented immigrants in the United States by escalating their fear that they would be deported. [76]
In addition, this policy has been criticized by the Journal on Migration and Human Security for imposing overwhelming hurdles on refugees seeking asylum in the United States. These hurdles, such as mandatory detention and application deadlines, are argued to undermine the obligations the United States has under the Refugee Convention Protocols of 1967. [77] Furthermore, a paper in the Journal on Migration and Human Security analyzed a 2011 test conducted by the Migration Policy Institute aimed at exploring any negative externalities the 287(g) program had on the communities of Frederick County, Maryland. The journal found that, after recording arrests by the Frederick County Sheriff's Office, there was evidence pointing towards racial profiling against Hispanics in the area. [78] [79]
The scope of the law's authority was judged by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2022 Biden v. Texas (Removal of the 'Remain in Mexico' policy) ruling, which found in a 5-4 decision that the President had the direct authority to regulate the law's Migrant Protection Protocols without approval from Congress. [80] [81]
8 U.S. Code § 1228: Expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing aggravated felonies--(c) Presumption of deportability: An alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States
(5) Stipulated judicial order of removal: The United States Attorney, with the concurrence of the Commissioner, may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, enter into a plea agreement which calls for the alien, who is deportable under this chapter, to waive the right to notice and a hearing under this section, and stipulate to the entry of a judicial order of removal from the United States as a condition of the plea agreement or as a condition of probation or supervised release, or both. The United States district court, in both felony and misdemeanor cases, and a United States magistrate judge in misdemeanor cases, may accept such a stipulation and shall have jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of removal pursuant to the terms of such stipulation.
Among other things, federal law specifies categories of aliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8 U. S. C. §1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status, §§1304(e), 1306(a); imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a; and specifies which aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so, see §1227. Removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials, who must decide whether to pursue removal at all. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing illegal aliens.
In the United States, the power to exclude or to expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the National Government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the Judicial Department is authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to intervene. The power of Congress to expel, like the power to exclude, aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the Judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to remain in the country has been made by Congress to depend.
Currently, adoptees who were over the age of 18 on February 27, 2001, do not automatically acquire citizenship.(emphasis added)
The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act was a United States Senate bill introduced in the 109th Congress (2005–2006) by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) on April 7, 2006. Co-sponsors, who signed on the same day, were Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Sen. Mel Martínez (R-FL), Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS).
Title 8 of the United States Code codifies statutes relating to aliens and nationality in the United States Code.
Cancellation of removal is a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States that allows some aliens who are in removal proceedings, who have lived in the United States for a long period of time and meet certain other conditions, to apply to remain in the United States and have the removal proceedings terminated. Cancellation of removal was crafted by the U.S. Congress to replace "suspension of deportation," a similar form of relief available prior to April 1, 1997.
At law, criminal deportation is where a person is ordered deported or physically removed from a country by reason of such alien's criminal conduct.
The term aggravated felony was used in the United States immigration law to refer to a broad category of criminal offenses that carry certain severe consequences for aliens seeking asylum, legal permanent resident status, citizenship, or avoidance of deportation proceedings. Anyone convicted of an aggravated felony and removed from the United States "must remain outside of the United States for twenty consecutive years from the deportation date before he or she is eligible to re-enter the United States." The supreme court ruled 5-4 in Sessions v. Dimaya that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague limiting the term.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), is a United States Supreme Court case involving habeas corpus and INA § 212(c) relief for deportable aliens.
In the United States, removal proceedings are administrative proceedings to determine an individual's removability under federal immigration law. Removal proceedings are typically conducted in Immigration Court by an immigration judge (IJ).
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case that considered Humberto Fernandez-Vargas, a Mexican citizen who, after being deported, illegally reentered the United States in 1982, and remained undetected for over 20 years, fathering a son in 1989 and marrying the boy's mother, a U.S. citizen, in 2001. He filed an application to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident, but the Government began proceedings to reinstate his 1981 deportation order under §241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and deported him.
The United States government holds tens of thousands of immigrants in detention under the control of Customs and Border Protection and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. The court ruled that the plenary power doctrine does not authorize the indefinite detention of immigrants under order of deportation whom no other country will accept. To justify detention of immigrants for a period longer than six months, the government was required to show removal in the foreseeable future or special circumstances.
The Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law 103–416, 108 Stat. 4305, enacted October 25, 1994, was an act by the United States Congress "to amend title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act to make changes in the laws relating to nationality and naturalization." Introduced by Romano Mazzoli, the act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act by allowing the acquisition of United States citizenship from either parent for persons born abroad to parents, only one of whom is a United States citizen.
Deportation and removal from the United States occurs when the U.S. government orders a person to leave the country. In fiscal year 2014, Immigration and Customs Enforcement conducted 315,943 removals. Criteria for deportations are set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
Expedited removal is a process related to immigration enforcement in the United States where an alien is denied entry to and/or physically removed from the country, without going through the normal removal proceedings. The legal authority for expedited removal allows for its use against most unauthorized entrants who have been in the United States for less than two years. Its rollout so far has been restricted to people seeking admission and those who have been in the United States for 14 days or less, and excludes first-time violators from Mexico and Canada.
Reinstatement of removal refers to an immigration enforcement procedure in the United States in which a previously deported immigrant can be again deported for subsequent illegal entries with no required judicial review except in very limited circumstances.
Stipulated removal is a summary deportation procedure used in immigration enforcement in the United States. Stipulated removal occurs when a noncitizen who is facing removal proceedings and is scheduled for a hearing with an immigration judge signs a document stipulating that he/she is waiving the right to trial and to appeal, and is prepared to be removed immediately. The stipulation of removal must still be signed off by the judge before whom the hearing is to take place, but the noncitizen need not be physically presented to the judge. It is authorized under Section 240(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 According to the United States Code of Federal Regulations: "A stipulated order shall constitute a conclusive determination of the alien’s removability from the United States." Stipulated removal applies only to those who are scheduled for regular removal proceedings, and does not apply to people who are being removed through other summary procedures such as expedited removal, reinstatement of removal, or administrative removal for aggravated felons.
Voluntary departure in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of the United States is a legal remedy available to certain aliens who have been placed in removal proceedings by the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or the now Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court found that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution forbid the imprisonment at hard labor without a jury trial for noncitizens convicted of illegal entry to or presence in the United States.
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case involving whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which limits habeas corpus judicial review of the decisions of immigration officers, violates the Suspension Clause of Article One of the U.S. Constitution. In the 7–2 opinion, the Court ruled that the law does not violate the Suspension Clause.
Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. __ (2020) is a Supreme Court of the United States ruling which upheld a decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that permanent residents rendered "inadmissible" for some crimes committed under §1182(a)(2) within the initial seven years of continuous residence were ineligible for §1229b cancellation of removal relief.
United States v. Palomar-Santiago, No. 20-437, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the three requirements under which a deportation order may be dismissed, as listed in 8 USC § 1326(d). The question brought before the Court was whether Palomar-Santiago may be excused from meeting all three requirements, given that the offense he was initially deported for was subsequently found no longer deportable. The Court held that all three requirements must be met in order to dismiss a deportation order.