Ethiopian civil war (2018–present) | ||||||||
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Part of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa | ||||||||
Territorial control as of November 2024. [a] (For a more detailed, up-to-date, interactive map, see here). Pro-federal government troops Anti-federal government rebels | ||||||||
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Belligerents | ||||||||
Arms suppliers: |
Fano militia (2023–) [24] | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
Ali Diyaar [26] Osman Abu Abdi Rahman [27] | ||||||||
Units involved | ||||||||
Unknown | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | ||||||||
10,383+ killed [28] 8,000 captured [29] [30] 2 MiG-23 lost [31] [32] 2 Mi-35 lost [33] [34] [35] 1 C-130 lost [36] 1,555+ killed [37] | 5,600 killed, 2,300 injured, 2,000 captured (Ethiopian military claim) [38] [39] | 800+ killed, 100 captured (Ethiopian claim) [40] | ||||||
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The ongoing Ethiopian civil conflict began with the 2018 dissolution of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERPDF), an ethnic federalist, dominant party political coalition. After the 20-year border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a decade of internal tensions, two years of protests, and a state of emergency, Hailemariam Desalegn resigned on 15 February 2018 as prime minister and EPRDF chairman, and there were hopes of peace under his successor Abiy Ahmed. [41] However, war broke out in the Tigray Region, with resurgent regional and ethnic factional attacks throughout Ethiopia. [42] [43] [44] [45] The civil wars caused substantial human rights violations, war crimes, and extrajudicial killings. [46]
In March 2018, the EPRDF nominated Abiy Ahmed to succeed Desalegn, and he was made Prime Minister by the Ethiopian parliament on 2 April. [47] The 42-year-old Abiy reformed the country's economy, released political opponents, allowed the return of exiles, relaxed press restrictions, and freed diverse political groups to organize. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for ending the war with Eritrea. He reversed the former regime's ethnic politics enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. However, his policies exacerbated competition among the former coalition parties and pushed the country toward further ethnic strife.
In November 2020, war broke out in Tigray between the federal government and the regional government. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) occupied Tigray's capital of Mekelle. The Tigray Defense Forces retook most of Tigray in mid-2021, and in late 2021 allied with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) [48] [18] along with seven smaller rebel groups including Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), forming the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces. [49] After two years of shifting alliances and conflicts, TPLF and the Ethiopian government signed a peace treaty in Pretoria on 2 November 2022. However. sporadic civil conflicts continued, such as the Gambela unrest, OLA insurgency, and War in Amhara, the latter two carried out by OLA and Fano militants against the federal government.
Most modern conflicts in Ethiopia are the result of Abyssinian expansionism in the late 19th- and 20th centuries under Emperor Menelik II, whose period saw the plurality of ethnicity in Ethiopia split into multiethnic states. Since then, the political system has failed as a result of not adequately recognising ethnolinguistic diversity. [50] In addition, Menelik II forced regional lords to pay taxes to the Shewan government for the sake of administering their lands. This was especially done by these other kingdoms in the present day: Jimma, Benishangul-Gumuz Region, Wellega and Bale. Historians correspond this type of system as a prototype of the current federalism in Ethiopia.
Throughout the 20th century, Ethiopia witnessed prolonged political turmoil. Starting from fascist Italian occupation (1935–1941), imperial Haile Selassie period (1930–1974) and Derg regime (1974–1991), political violence has been increasingly engendered Ethiopia to instability and severe human rights violations. [51]
Many scholars and authors believe that the current source of internal conflict in Ethiopia is the implementation of ethnic federalism since 1991. [52] Evidence suggests the implementation of ethnic federalism "politicized tribal identity" and scholars refuted its application on Ethiopian state context. [53] The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) believes by applying ethnic federalism, Ethiopia would be safer and peaceful if ethnolinguistic groups granted autonomy while maintaining unity of state. [54] This notion is actively opposed by Ethiopian nationalist groups, contending the present system of ethnic-based government should be changed to non-ethnic and consider individual as subject of political order. [55] Notwithstanding, the ruling coalition EPRDF under Meles Zenawi's premiership, took advantage to justify authoritarian dictatorship by initiating crackdowns and jailing opposition groups, concentrating mass media, violating democratic and human rights, and by committing electoral fraud in the 2005 general election. [56]
On 20 August 2012, Meles died in Brussels and was replaced by Hailemariam Desalegn as Prime Minister of Ethiopia, who remained in power as his party in control of every parliamentary seat. On 15 February 2018, Hailemariam resigned following years-long protests and a state of emergency. He was succeeded by Abiy Ahmed in April 2018. [57] Shortly afterwards, the 42-years old Abiy reformed the country's economy and politics, released political prisoners and opposition group members as well as return the exiled members, relaxed the press freedom and granted diverse political groups the freedom to mobilize and organize. In 2019, he was awarded Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution of ending the 20-years war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As opponent of ethnic federalism, his transformative politics saw the reversal of the former regime policies of ethnic-based politics enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. However, it exacerbated competition and resentment over the former coalition parties and pushes the country toward further interethnic tensions. [58] As noted in his 2019 book Medemer , Abiy's initial plan was to merge all ethnic based political parties into one national party what is called Prosperity Party, founded in 2019. [59] [60]
In 2014, the federal government under the EPRDF, redrew the boundary between the two regions of Afar Region and the Somali Region. As a result, the Afar Region gained three towns from the Somali Region which has tried to gain them back since. Border clashes in April 2021 killed around 100 civilians. [43]
On 10–11 January 2019, 58 Qemant people were killed by the Fano militia. The ENDF failed to intervene to stop the massacre. [61]
On 22 June 2019 elements of The Amhara Region's Peace and Security Bureau and allied militias loyal by Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige Chief of the Amhara Region security began a coup d'état. Starting with the targeted assassinations of political and military leaders including Se'are Mekonnen (Chief of the General Staff), Gizae Aberra (Aide-de-camp to the Chief of the General Staff), and Ambachew Mekonnen (Chief Administrator of the Amhara Region). The coup d'état ultimately failed with Asaminew Tsige being killed by police near Bahir Dar 36 hours after the start of the coup. [62] [63] [64] [65]
Throughout much of Western Tigray, security is mostly maintained by uniformed "special forces" from neighboring Amhara states and civil servants have also arrived from Amhara to take over the administration of some Tigrayan towns and cities, a move that risks inflaming ethnic tensions. [66] On 18 December 2020, looting was reported by EEPA, including 500 dairy cows and hundreds of calves stolen by Amhara forces. [67]
On 23 November 2020, a reporter of AFP news agency visited the western Tigray town of Humera, and observed that the administration of the conquered parts of Western Tigray was taken over by officials from Amhara region. [66] As of 1 March 2021, several geographical places had been renamed by the new authorities and many residents of Tigrayan ethnicity had been deported to Central Zone. [68] Eyewitnesses report ongoing ethnic cleansing and settlements void of inhabitants. [69]
The Humera massacres in 2020 that killed around 92 people of Tigrayan origin was attributed to Fano and ENDF. The Humera massacres in 2021 that killed Tigrayans were also attributed to Fano and possibly Eritrean soldiers. [70] [71] Fano are also accused of participating in the Mai Kadra massacre, which had both Amhara and Tigrayan victims, while Amnesty International, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council attributed it to local Tigrayan youths. [72] [73]
Starting in March 2021 clashes erupted in the town of Ataye after Amhara special forces killed a person on the steps of the main mosque in the city. This started off a wave of inter ethnic clashes that spread throughout the Oromia Zone leading to the deaths of 303 people. [74] [75] On 16 April Clashes once again started after OLA fighters attacked the city of Ataye, The clashes continued for two days leading to the deaths of 281 people and the destruction of a quarter of Ataye. [76] [77]
By November 2021, fighting in the Tigray War had moved south of Tigray Region into Amhara Region, leading to a joint military campaign by the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) against federal forces, threatening Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. [78]
The killings continued through 2021, with people being tortured, tied up and thrown in the Tekeze River. The Italian weekly magazine Panorama published a graphic video in which Amhara soldiers killed a group of 9 people in Humera in August 2021 and then set fire to their bodies. The video also shows torturing of one man by Amhara soldiers, then tying him up, preparing to throw him in the river. [79]
A relation between Amhara militia Fano and the Ethiopian government in post-Tigray War worsened in 2023, culminated in War in Amhara. [80] By April 2023, major crackdowns and unrest was skyrocketed after the Ethiopian army raided to Amhara Region to disarm regional military force. The Fano militiamen played central role on fighting against the government force, pinnacling the major clashes with ENDF forces on 1 August. Fighting was intense in major hot spot of Debre Tabor, Kobo and Gondar. [81] [82] The Ethiopian government declared a six-month state of emergency on 4 August, imposing restrictions on public gathering, gun ownership and media outlets and arresting without providing arrest warrants. [83]
Benishangul-Gumuz is home to several different ethnicities including the Gumuz, Berta, Shinasha, Mao, Komo and Fadashi. The Gumuz have had tensions with agricultural Amhara, Oromos, Tigrayans and Agaw migrants, who in Metekel Zone constitute minority ethnic groups with some Amhara groups calling for Metekel to be incorporated into Amhara. Large scale land acquisitions by both local and foreign investors have also pushed the Gumuz off the land. [84] [85]
Gumuz are alleged to have formed militias such as Buadin and the Gumuz Liberation Front that have staged attacks against those seen as "settlers". [86] [87] [44] In the Metekel massacre in December 2020, about 200 [44] mostly Amharas, Oromos, and Shinashas were killed by a suspected Gumuz militia. [85] An unidentified armed group took over the county of Sedal Woreda in the Kamashi Zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region in April 2021. [88]
In March 2020, the leader of one of the groups called Fano, Solomon Atanaw, stated that the Fano would not disarm until Benishangul-Gumuz Region's Metekel Zone and the Tigray Region districts of Welkait and Raya are placed under the control of Amhara Region. [89]
The Gambela Region has seen sporadic fighting over decades between the Anuak, Nuer and migrants from the highlands in what is called the Gambela conflict with about 300 people being killed in 2002 in the Gambela massacre. In June 2022, the OLA and the Gambella Liberation Front (GLF) attacked the region's capital Gambella city. [90]
This section needs to be updated.(December 2022) |
On 13 September 2018, clashes broke out in the town of Burayu between various ethnic groups including the Oromo, Amharas, Dorzes, Gamos, Wolayitas, Gurages, and Silt'e. These clashes continued for three days leading to 55 people being killed and 670 people being injured. [91]
After the murder of Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa on 29 June 2020 in the Gelan Condominiums area of Addis Ababa, protests and riots broke out across the Oromia region. In Hachalu Hundessa's home town of Ambo 83 people were killed in riots. [92] In Shashamane, dozens of buildings were destroyed and at least 150 people were killed in ethnic riots and pogroms. [93]
On 2 November 2020, between 32 and 54 people were killed when an armed group of about 60 men suspected of being members of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) gathered 200 people in a schoolyard in the village of Gawa Qanqa before opening fire. The attacks were said to be targeted at Amhara people. [94]
On 5 March 2021, 29 people were killed when a suspected OLA fighter attacked a church in the village of Abo. The OLA denied responsibility saying that the attack was carried out by an OLA splinter group led by Faqadaa Abdiisaa. [95] [96]
On 5 November 2021, the Tigray Defense Forces and Oromo Liberation Army joined with other armed and opposition groups in declaring an alliance against the government known as the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces . The alliance includes the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Agaw Democratic Movement, Benishangul People's Liberation Movement, Gambella Peoples Liberation Army, Global Kimant People Right and Justice Movement/Kimant Democratic Party, Sidama National Liberation Front and the Somali State Resistance. [97] They further pledged to dismantle the government of Prime Minister Abiy, by force if necessary, and form a transitional government. [98] But analysts state that most of the groups “do not have a strong fighting force,” and some of the political groups “have even weaker political programs.” thus making their impact unclear. [99]
Between 30 and 31 August 2022, eyewitnesses said that militants from the Amhara Region (whom they claimed were Fano militias) massacred more than 60 people in Horo Guduru, Western Oromia, and displaced 20,000 more. On 6 September, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) confirmed this attack happened, though they declined to say whether the attackers were part of Fano. [100] [101]
The administrator of Kiramu district in the East Welega Zone, Fikadu Hunde, alleged that on 15 October 2022, Fano militias entered the district, killing 30 people and burning down over 50 houses. The EHRC learned of this information, but stated that there "was difficulty in verifying and obtaining accurate information due to the lack of network in the area," according to a statement they made to Addis Standard . [102]
Clashes between the two largest regions, the Oromia region, which constitutes primarily those of the Oromo ethnic group, and Somali region, which primarily constitutes those of the Somali ethnic group, began in December 2016 following territorial disputes. Somalis are mostly pastoralists and Oromos tend to be farmers, as well as pastoralists. It has been difficult to demarcate clear borders between the states as pastoral communities tend to cross borders in search of pasture for their animals. [103]
This has led to competition, such as for wells and grazing land, over the years, with tens of thousands of people being displaced in some conflicts. In 2004, a referendum to decide on the fate of more than 420 kebeles, the country's smallest administrative unit, gave 80% of them to Oromia, leading to Somali minorities fleeing those areas. [103]
By 2018, hundreds of people were killed [104] and 200,0000 fled their homes from the resulting conflict. [105] The regional special police of both states, called the Liyu in the Somali region and the Liyu Hail of Oromia state, were both accused of committing atrocities. [106]
With the succession of Abiy Ahmed to the position of Prime Minister friction began to build between the federal government and Somali regional governments due to Ahmed's reformist vision which clashed with Abdi Mohamed Omar (Abdi Illey) who had ruled over the region with an iron fist for the past 8 years. Despite attempts to negotiate a path forward, the tension between the two men would boil over, when in late July 2018, Abdi Illey ordered the Liyu police to enter into Dire Dawa, an Ethiopian city outside of the Somali region's jurisdiction. [107] The Liyu police, up to this point, had mainly been a counterinsurgency force created by the federal government in 2007 to help fight the Ogaden National Liberation Front and were commanded by then Somali regional security chief Abdi Mohammed Omar who would later become the region's president in 2010. Although he was no longer the region's security chief, the Liyu would still continue to report to him. [108] In response to the "illegal act," federal forces confronted the Liyu and entered Jijiga on August 4. [107]
In November 2021, the Somali State Resistance allied with the Tigray People's Liberation Front and UFEFCF. [109] [110] [111]
In July 2022, the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab launched an invasion from Somalia into Ethiopia's Somali Region; the invasion was the largest attack by al-Shabaab in Ethiopian territory to date. [112]
The Sidama zone split from the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) to become the Sidama region after the 2019 Sidama Region referendum. The South West Ethiopia Peoples' Region became its own region, splitting off from SNNPR following the 2021 South West Region referendum. After the South Ethiopia Regional State was formed following the 2023 South Ethiopia Region referendum, the remaining area of SNNPR became the Central Ethiopia Regional State.
In the Guraferda woreda of the Bench Maji Zone in the SNNPR in October 2020, about 30 people were killed by an unidentified armed group. The victims were said to have been Amhara. [45] [113]
In 2018, clashes began between the Gedeo Zone in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR), made up of mostly Gedeo people, and the Guji Zone in the Oromia region, made up of mostly Guji Oromos. The clashes led to about 800,000 mostly ethnic Gedeos fleeing their homes. This was a higher number of people and over a shorter period of time than occurred at the height of the more publicized Rohingya crisis in Myanmar the year before. The government pressured the refugees to return to their homes even though they fear for their lives, often by denying refugees access to humanitarian aid. [114]
The Segen Area Peoples' Zone, formerly a zone in the SNNPR, split in 2018 to form the Konso Zone, inhabited mostly by Konso people, as well as the Burji special woreda, Dirashe special woreda and Amaro special woreda and there has been intermittent violence since then. Violence in the latter half of 2020 attributed to Oromo and Konso communities [115] killed dozens of civilians and displaced at least 90,000 people. [116]
The Sidama Zone was previously part of the SNNPR and the Sidama people were the largest ethnic group in that region. In July 2019, clashes between groups on the issue of greater autonomy for Sidama led to deaths and internal displacement. [117] A vote in favor of greater autonomy in the 2019 Sidama Region referendum resulted in Sidama Zone becoming the country's 10th region. A number of other ethnic groups in the region are also pursuing demands to form their ethnic-based state. [118]
In the Wolayita Zone, at least 17 people were killed in August 2020 by security forces. This was following calls for making a separate region for the Welayta people in the same fashion as the Sidama region for the Sidama people. [45]
In the Gurage Zone, there is a call for gurage region since November 2018. This was following calls for making a separate region for the Gurage people in the same fashion as the Sidama region for the Sidama people. [45]
The Tigray Regional Government was led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which formerly dominated the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition. Hostilities between the central government and the TPLF escalated after the TPLF rejected the federal government's decision to postponing August 2020 elections to mid-2021 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, accusing the government of violating the Ethiopian constitution. [119]
The TPLF carried out its own regional elections, winning all contested seats in the region's parliament. [120] In the months before November 2020, Abiy moved troops toward Tigray and sent military cargo planes into Eritrea. Behind closed doors, his advisers and military generals debated the merits of a conflict. Those who disagreed were fired, interrogated at gunpoint or forced to leave. [121]
After attacks on the Northern Command by armed forces loyal to the TPLF, which the TPLF called a pre-emptive strike, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) launched an offensive, capturing Mekelle, the capital of Tigray in November 2020. [121] [122] The ENDF was assisted by forces from neighboring Eritrea. [123]
After half a year of guerilla campaign, the TPLF launched a counter-offensive and by July 2021 recaptured Mekelle in Operation Alula. By 31 October 2021, the TDF had claimed to have taken the strategically located city of Kombolcha, 380 kilometres from Addis Ababa, as well as the nearby city of Dessie. The government denied the claims, reporting that fighting was still going on in and around the two cities. [124] The Ethiopian government further claimed that as the TDF entered Kombolcha, they massacred more than 100 youths. TPLF spokesperson Getachew Reda denied the claim. [125]
The government of Ethiopia is the federal government of Ethiopia. It is structured in a framework of a federal parliamentary republic, whereby the prime minister is the head of government. Executive power is exercised by the government. The prime minister is chosen by the lower chamber of the Federal Parliamentary Assembly. Federal legislative power is vested in both the government and the two chambers of parliament. The judiciary is more or less independent of the executive and the legislature. They are governed under the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia. There is a bicameral parliament made of the 108-seat House of Federation and the 547-seat House of Peoples' Representatives. The House of Federation has members chosen by the regional councils to serve five-year terms. The House of Peoples' Representatives is elected by direct election, who in turn elect the president for a six-year term.
Ethiopian nationalism, also referred to as Ethiopianism or Ethiopianness, according to its proponents, asserts that Ethiopians are a single nation, and promotes the social equality of all component ethnic groups. Ethiopian people as a whole regardless of ethnicity constitute sovereignty as one polity. Ethiopian nationalism is a type of civic nationalism in that it is multi-ethnic in nature, and promotes multiculturalism.
The Oromo Liberation Army is an armed opposition group active in the Oromia Region of Ethiopia. The OLA consist primarily of former armed members of the pre-peace deal Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) who refused to disarm out of skepticism of the peace deal, and former youth protestors who grew disillusioned with nonviolent resistance.
The 2021 Ethiopian general election to elect members of the House of Peoples' Representatives was held on 21 June 2021 and 30 September 2021. Regional elections were also held on those dates.
The Prosperity Party is a ruling political party in Ethiopia that was established on 1 December 2019 as a successor to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front by incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
Fano is an ethno-nationalist Amhara militia and former protest movement. It has engaged in violent clashes throughout Ethiopia in the name of neutralizing perceived threats to the Amhara people. Fano has absorbed many units and personnel of the Amhara Regional Special Forces that did not integrate into the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Fano militias have been involved in armed conflicts with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and the ENDF. They have also clashed with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on the border of Ethiopia and Sudan.
The Benishangul-Gumuz conflict was an armed conflict mostly in the Metekel Zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region in Ethiopia that started in 2019, until peace agreement signed between the rebel groups and the government of Ethiopia in October 2022.
Events in the year 2021 in Ethiopia.
The OLA insurgency is an armed conflict between the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which split from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 2018, and the Ethiopian government, continuing in the context of the long-term Oromo conflict, typically dated to have started with the formation of the Oromo Liberation Front in 1973.
The United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces (UFEFCF) was a coalition of six Ethiopian rebel groups, including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) before 2022 and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), created in November 2021 during the Tigray War.
The TDF–OLA joint offensive was a rebel offensive in the Tigray War and the OLA insurgency starting in late October 2021 launched by a joint rebel coalition of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) against the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and government. The TDF and OLA took control of several towns south of the Amhara Region in the direction of the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in late October and early November. Claims of war crimes included that of the TDF extrajudicially executing 100 youths in Kombolcha, according to deral authorities.
This Timeline of the Tigray War is part of a chronology of the military engagements of the Tigray War, a civil war that began in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia in early November 2020.
The Persecution of Amhara people is the ongoing persecution of the Amhara and Agew people of Ethiopia. Since the early 1990s, the Amhara people have been subject to ethnic violence, including massacres by Tigrayan, Oromo and Gumuz ethnic groups among others, which some have characterized as a genocide. Large-scale killings and grave human rights violations followed the implementation of the ethnic-federalist system in the country. In most of the cases, the mass murders were silent with perpetrators from various ethno-militant groups—from TPLF/TDF, OLF–OLA, and Gumuz armed groups.
The 1995 Ethiopian Federal Constitution formalizes an ethnic federalism law aimed at undermining long-standing ethnic imperial rule, reducing ethnic tensions, promoting regional autonomy, and upholding unqualified rights to self-determination and secession in a state with more than 80 different ethnic groups. But the constitution is divisive, both among Ethiopian nationalists who believe it undermines centralized authority and fuels interethnic conflict, and among ethnic federalists who fear that the development of its vague components could lead to authoritarian centralization or even the maintenance of minority ethnic hegemony. Parliamentary elections since 1995 have taken place every five years since enactment. All but one of these have resulted in government by members of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) political coalition, under three prime ministers. The EPRDF was under the effective control of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which represents a small ethnic minority. In 2019 the EPRDF, under Abiy, was dissolved and he inaugurated the pan-ethnic Prosperity Party which won the 2021 Ethiopian Election, returning him as prime minister. But both political entities were different kinds of responses to the ongoing tension between constitutional ethnic federalism and the Ethiopian state's authority. Over the same period, and all administrations, a range of major conflicts with ethnic roots have occurred or continued, and the press and availability of information have been controlled. There has also been dramatic economic growth and liberalization, which has itself been attributed to, and used to justify, authoritarian state policy.
On 18 June 2022, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) was accused of massacring over 500 Amhara civilians in the Gimbi county of Oromia Region, Ethiopia. Witnesses said that the OLA intentionally targeted ethnic Amhara people. This attack is part of a series of Amhara massacres that occurred in 2022.
The Amhara Association of America (AAA) (Amharic: የዐማራ ማህበር በአሜሪካ) is a non-profit Amhara nationalist organization based in Charlotte, North Carolina, focused on advocating for the human rights of the Amhara people in Ethiopia.
Events in the year 2023 in Ethiopia.
Political repression is a visible scenario under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed after 2018, characterized by severe human rights violation, restriction of press, speeches, dissents, activism and journalism that are critical to his government. Similar to TPLF-led EPRDF regime, there was a raise of censorship in the country, particularly internet shutdowns under the context of anti-terror legislation labelling them "disinformation and war narratives" since the raise of armed conflict in Ethiopia. In June 2018, Abiy unblocked 64 internet access that include blogs and news outlets.
The Gida Kiremu massacres refers to a series of attacks between 18 and 20 August 2021 when the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) targeted Amhara civilians in Gida Kiremu, Oromia Region, Ethiopia, killing over 210. The attack on 18 August killed 150 Amhara civilians, and reprisal attacks by Amhara militias killed 60 mostly-Oromo civilians the day after.
The War in Amhara escalated into Oromia Region and the Western Zone in Tigray Region with asymmetric involvement of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLF), the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Some sources predicted that the war could lead into a civil war. After the bloody Tigray War, both TPLF and the Ethiopian government signed peace agreement in Pretoria on 2 November 2022. After the Nairobi agreement, Tigrayan forces ordered to disarm, and the full sovereignty of the region restored which allowed humanitarian access. In January 2023, Tigrayan officials reported that Amhara and Eritrean troops yet not leaving the Western Tigray. The Amhara officials claim the area after the restoration of its people and consequent referendum held.