State capture

Last updated

State capture is a type of systemic political corruption in which private interests significantly influence a state's decision-making processes to their own advantage.

Contents

The term was first used by the World Bank in 2000 to describe certain Central Asian countries making the transition from Soviet communism, where small corrupt groups used their influence over government officials to appropriate government decision-making in order to strengthen their own economic positions. [1]

Allegations of state capture have led to protests against the government in Bulgaria in 2013–2014 and in 2020–2021 and Romania in 2017, [2] and have caused an ongoing controversy in South Africa beginning in 2016. Turkey is considered as a recent example of state capture post-2002 period. [3]

Defining state capture

The original definition of state capture refers to the way formal procedures (such as laws and social norms) and government bureaucracy are manipulated by government officials, state-backed companies, private companies or private individuals, so as to influence state policies and laws in their favour. [4]

State capture seeks to influence the formation of laws, in order to protect and promote influential actors and their interests. In this way it differs from most other forms of corruption which instead seek selective enforcement of already existing laws. [4]

State capture is not necessarily illegal, depending on determination by the captured state itself, [5] and may be attempted through private lobbying and influence. The influence may be through a range of state institutions, including the legislature, executive, ministries, and the judiciary, or through a corrupt electoral process. It is similar to regulatory capture but differs in the scale and variety of influenced areas and, unlike regulatory capture, the private influence is never overt. [6]

A distinguishing factor from corruption is that, though in cases of corruption the outcome (of policy or regulatory decision) is not certain, in cases of state capture the outcome is known and is highly likely to be beneficial to the captors of the state. In 2017, a group of South African academics further developed the concept in a report on state capture in South Africa, titled "Betrayal of the Promise Report". [7] The analysis emphasised the political character of state capture, arguing that in South Africa a power elite violated the Constitution and broke the law in the service of a political project, which they believed unachievable in the existing constitutional/legal framework.

A 2023 academic paper argued that "the concept of state capture helps to structure our understanding of patterns of grand corruption seen around the world in varied contexts, and increasingly even in countries once regarded as secure democracies." [3]

Examples by country

Bulgaria

Protests in Bulgaria in 2013–14 against the Oresharski cabinet were prompted by allegations that it came to power due to the actions of an oligarchic structure (formerly allied to Boyko Borisov) which used underhand maneuvers to discredit the GERB party. [8] Conversely, in 2020 large anti-GERB protests broke out, accusing Borisov and his party of once again allying themselves with oligarchic organizations, permitting corruption and undermining political opposition. [9] Press freedom in Bulgaria diminished to the point it was rated worst in the EU; [10] one oligarch, Delyan Peevski, controls close to 80% of the newspaper distribution market. [11] Bulgaria's exposure to oligarchic networks has had a negative impact, most significantly in the area of energy policy. The close proximity between Bulgarian and Russian elites is largely underpinned by Russia's significant economic presence in Bulgaria, with Gazprom being Bulgaria's sole natural gas provider and Rosatom having a dominant position in the country's nuclear sector. As Russia has increased influence over Bulgaria's economy, it has used dominant positions in strategic sectors to strengthen relationships and cultivate new ones with corrupt businessmen and local oligarchs. This has allowed for access to prominent politicians, over which they are able to exert considerable control. [12]

Latin America

Instances where politics have been ostensibly deformed by the power of drug barons in Colombia and Mexico are also considered as examples of state capture. [1] Both Argentina and Bolivia have been the subject of Russian strategic corruption efforts by its usage of corrosive capital. While the Kremlin has used similar strategies in Argentina and Bolivia, it has adopted strategies that suit local conditions. In Argentina, political decision-making is more dispersed, while transfers of power are more frequent, making large-scale, long-term projects more difficult to implement. Therefore, in Argentina, Putin has used trade as a bargaining chip. In 2015 Argentina suspended the television license for RT, to which the Kremlin retaliated by threatening to ban Argentine beef exports and suspend investment projects; several weeks later, RT was officially allowed to continue operating. In Bolivia, power is concentrated, allowing Russian state-owned companies deeper traction, pushing through projets with no significant resistance. Therefore, the Kremlin strategy in Bolivia has been to maximise influence by focusing on strategic markets and long-term infrastructure deals. [13]

Western Balkans

State capture in the Western Balkans has been undermining the EU enlargement process, strengthening ruling parties and weakening independent institutions and political opposition. [14] [15]

For instance, through clientelist networks and loyalty-based appointments, the ruling party of Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party, has effectively captured the state, resulting in the country losing its status as a 'free' country according to the Freedom House Index. [16]

South Africa

In May 2017, a group of academics convened by Mark Swilling and including Ivor Chipkin, Lumkile Mondi, Haroon Bhorat and others, published the Betrayal of the Promise report, the first major study of state capture in South Africa. [7] It helped galvanise civil-society opposition to the unconstitutional developments in South African civil-society responses. [17] The analysis was further developed in the book Shadow State: The Politics of State Capture written by Chipkin and Swilling. [18]

The 2017 book How to Steal a City details state capture within the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa during the Zuma government.

Gupta family

The pattern [of state capture] is a simple one. "You remove management, and put in compliant management. You remove boards, and put in boards that are compliant. The rest is very easy. That has been the scenario at state-owned enterprises.

- Mcebisi Jonas, former Deputy Finance Minister; explaining the process of state capture. [19]

In 2016, there were allegations of an overly close and potentially corrupt relationship between the wealthy Gupta family and the South African president Jacob Zuma, his family and leading members of the African National Congress (ANC). [20] [21] [22] [23]

South African opposition parties have made claims of "state capture" following allegations that the Guptas had inserted themselves into a position where they could offer Cabinet positions and influence the running of government. [24] These allegations were made in light of revelations by former ANC MP Vytjie Mentor and Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas that they had been offered Cabinet positions by the Guptas at the family's home in Saxonwold, a suburb in Johannesburg. [25]

A COSATU protester in Cape Town holding a protest placard calling for the prosecution of "all people involved in the state capture activities." The protest was against government corruption and state capture in the administration of South African President Jacob Zuma. State Capture COSATU protester.jpg
A COSATU protester in Cape Town holding a protest placard calling for the prosecution of "all people involved in the state capture activities." The protest was against government corruption and state capture in the administration of South African President Jacob Zuma.

Mentor claimed that, in 2010, the Guptas had offered her the position of Minister of Public Enterprises, provided that she arranged for South African Airways to drop their India route, allowing a Gupta-linked company (Jet Airways) to take on the route. [27] [28] She said that she declined the offer, which occurred at the Guptas' Saxonwold residence, while President Zuma was in another room. This came a few days before a cabinet reshuffle in which minister Barbara Hogan (then Minister of Public Enterprises) was dismissed by Zuma. The Gupta family denied that the meeting took place and also denied offering Vytjie Mentor a ministerial position, [29] while President Zuma claimed that he had no recollection of Mentor. [30]

Deputy Finance Minister Jonas said that he had been offered a ministerial position by the Guptas shortly before the dismissal of Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015, but had rejected the offer as "it makes a mockery of our hard-earned democracy‚ the trust of our people and no one apart from the President of the Republic appoints ministers." [31] The Gupta family denied offering Jonas the job of Finance Minister. [32] In 2016, Paul O'Sullivan's 'Forensics for Justice' published a report, which alleged that South Africa's criminal justice system had been "captured" by the underworld. [33]

Following a formal complaint submitted in March 2016 by a catholic priest, Father Stanslaus Muyebe, [34] the Guptas' alleged "state capture" was investigated by Public Protector Thuli Madonsela. President Zuma and Minister Des van Rooyen applied for a court order to prevent the publication of the report on 14 October 2016, Madonsela's last day in office. [35] Van Rooyen's application was dismissed, and the President withdrew his application, leading to the release of the report on 2 November 2016. On 25 November 2016, Zuma announced that the Presidency would be reviewing the contents of the state capture report. [36] He said it "was done in a funny way" with "no fairness at all," and argued he was not given enough time to respond to the public protector. [37]

Zuma and Van Rooyen denied any wrongdoing [38] whilst the Guptas disputed evidence in the report and also denied being involved in corrupt activities. [39] [40] [41] [42] In an exclusive interview with ANN7 (belonging to the Gupta Family), President Zuma said that 'state capture' was a fancy word used by media houses for propaganda proliferation. He said that a real state capture would include seizure of the three arms of the constitution—Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary—which has never been the case in South Africa. [43]

The report recommended establishment of a judicial commission of inquiry into the issues identified, [44] including a full probe of Zuma's dealings with the Guptas, with findings to be published within 180 days. In May 2017, Jacob Zuma denied the allegation of blocking an attempt to set up a commission of inquiry to probe state capture. [45] The report led to the establishment of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry in 2018, set up to investigate allegations of state capture in South Africa.

Economic impact

On 11 September 2017, former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan estimated the cost of state capture at 250 billion rand (almost $17 billion USD), in a presentation at the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business. [46] The Daily Maverick, a South African news publication, estimated that state capture cost the country roughly R1.5 trillion (roughly US$100 billion) in the four years preceding 2019. [47] South African Reserve Bank economist David Fowkes stated that the negative impact of state capture on the country's economy was worse than expected, stating that it likely reduced GDP growth by an estimated 4% a year. [48]

Russian involvement in SA state capture

Allegations of state capture were also known to have increased as the relationship between South Africa and Russia grew, resulting in a partnership that increasingly impacted upon the decision-making process of the African state. Soon after President Zuma took office, Moscow attempted to make inroads into Africa, all the while capitalizing on a South African leader who had extensive Soviet Bloc connections. The transactional nature of the relationship began when Zuma pushed to be included in the BRIC grouping during the financial crisis, receiving important backing from the Kremlin which ultimately led to Zuma attending his first BRICS meeting in 2011. [49] The Kremlin also worked to establish ties between the two states’ security services, with some suggesting that Zuma had sought to implement state surveillance capabilities with Russia's help. [50] Finally, amid countrywide debate surrounding the future electrical need of South Africa, the Russian state nuclear cooperation, Rosatom, offered to provide up to nuclear reactors, despite it making little economic sense for the Russian company to intervene. [50]

Kenya

In May 2019, reports of state capture in Kenya started emerging. Inside Kenya's Inability to Fight Corruption, [51] which was published by Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) highlighted the issue, outlining why President Uhuru Kenyatta's anti-corruption measures were not working. This was attributed to state capture where state institutions had been repurposed for private profiteering mainly by the first family. [51] The study concluded that public-driven prosecutions, rampant in Kenya, were likely to worsen corruption rather than reduce it.

In June 2022, UDA presidential candidate William Ruto (now the current president) stated that he would end state capture in Kenya if he took office after the August 2022 General Elections. He claimed he would form a quasi-judicial public inquiry within 30 days to establish the extent of cronyism and state capture in the nation and make recommendations. [52]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jacob Zuma</span> President of South Africa from 2009 to 2018

Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma is a South African politician who served as the fourth president of South Africa from 2009 to 2018. He is also referred to by his initials JZ and clan names Nxamalala and Msholozi. Zuma was a former anti-apartheid activist, member of uMkhonto weSizwe, and president of the African National Congress (ANC) from 2007 to 2017.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Malusi Gigaba</span> South African politician

Knowledge Malusi Nkanyezi Gigaba is a South African politician who served as Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of South Africa appointed by President Cyril Ramaphosa from 27 February 2018 until his resignation on 13 November 2018. He also held the post from 25 May 2014 to 31 March 2017 as appointed by former President Jacob Zuma. He previously served as Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Public Enterprises and Minister of Finance in the government of South Africa. He is currently a member of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress.

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is the revenue service of the South African government. It administers the country's tax system and customs service, and enforces compliance with related legislation. It is governed by the SARS Act 34 of 1997, which established it as "an organ of state within the public administration, but as an institution outside the public service." It thus has a significant degree of administrative autonomy, although it is under the policy control of the Minister of Finance. Effectively, SARS manages, administers, and implements the tax regime as designed by the Minister and National Treasury.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in South Africa</span>

Corruption in South Africa includes the improper use of public resources for private ends, including bribery and improper favouritism. Corruption was at its highest during the period of state capture under the presidency of Jacob Zuma and has remained widespread, negatively "affecting criminal justice, service provision, economic opportunity, social cohesion and political integrity" in South Africa.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fikile Mbalula</span> South African politician (born 1971)

Fikile April Mbalula is a South African politician and current Secretary-General of the African National Congress (ANC) since December 2022. He was a cabinet minister between 2010 and 2023, most proximately as Minister of Transport from 2019 to 2023.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Zweli Mkhize</span> South African doctor and politician (born 1956)

Zwelini Lawrence Mkhize is a South African medical doctor and politician who served as the Minister of Health from May 2019 until his resignation on 5 August 2021. He previously served as the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs from 2018 to 2019. Before that, he was the fifth Premier of KwaZulu-Natal from 2009 to 2013.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Thuli Madonsela</span> South African public lawyer and anti-apartheid activist

Thulisile Nomkhosi "Thuli" Madonsela is a South African advocate and professor of law, holding a chair in social justice at Stellenbosch University since January 2018. She served as the Public Protector of South Africa from 19 October 2009 to 14 October 2016. In 1996, she helped draft the final constitution of South Africa promulgated by then-President Nelson Mandela.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nkandla homestead</span> Building in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

The private residence of former South African President Jacob Zuma is situated about 24 km (15 mi) south of the rural town of Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal and is commonly referred to as the Nkandla homestead. During Zuma's presidency, the homestead was the subject of a major public controversy, sometimes referred to as Nkandlagate, concerning what were ostensibly security upgrades to Zuma's compound, at a cost of over R246 million. The use of public funds to make these improvements received significant media coverage and political opposition.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mcebisi Jonas</span> South African politician and businessman (born 1960)

Mcebisi Hubert Jonas is a South African politician and businessman who was the Deputy Minister of Finance of South Africa between May 2014 and March 2017. He is best known as a state capture whistleblower. In 2016, he publicly alleged that the Gupta brothers had offered him the post of finance minister under President Jacob Zuma.

The Gupta family is a wealthy and influential business family from India, with close ties to former South African President Jacob Zuma and his administration. The family's most notable members are the brothers Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh "Tony" Gupta—as well as Atul's nephews Varun, and US-based Ashish and Amol.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Presidency of Jacob Zuma</span> South African administration, 2009–2018

Jacob Zuma's tenure as South Africa's fourth post-apartheid president began on 9 May 2009 and ended on 14 February 2018. He held office under a mandate from the parliamentary caucus of the African National Congress (ANC), which had governed South Africa since 1994 and which won comfortable majorities in the 2009 and 2014 national elections. His presidency was beset by controversy, and he faced, and defeated, an impeachment attempt and a record eight motions of no confidence in the South African Parliament, four of which went to a vote. His party asked him to resign in February 2018, ahead of the constitutional end of his second term.

Hlaudi Motsoeneng is the leader of African Content Movement (ACM) who served as the acting Chief operating officer of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) from 2011 to 2013. Motsoeneng was removed from his position as Chief operating officer after his dishonesty was revealed, and he was found to have lied about his qualifications. After being removed as acting Chief operating officer it was announced that Motsoeneng would move back to his previous position as Group Executive Editor of Provinces and Corporate Affairs of the SABC. In December 2016, the Western Cape High Court ruled that Motsoeneng's appointment as Group Executive was illegal and that he was "not entitled to occupy any position at the SABC". In June 2022 the state capture commission proposed criminal investigations into possible contraventions of the Public Finance Management Act when group CEO Lulama Mokhobo and COO Motsoeneng concluded an SABC agreement with the Gupta owned TNA newspaper. In July 2022 the High Court dismissed Motsoeneng's bid to appeal the repayment, with interest, of R11.5 million obtained unlawfully when the SABC concluded a deal with MultiChoice.

White monopoly capital is a term that originated in South Africa and is often used to describe a perceived concentration of economic power and wealth among White South Africans. It suggests that a small number of white-owned businesses dominate various sectors of the South African economy, thereby controlling significant resources and influencing economic policies to their advantage.

<i>The Republic of Gupta</i> 2017 book by Pieter-Louis Myburgh

The Republic of Gupta: A Story of State Capture is a 2017 book by South African investigative journalist Pieter-Louis Myburgh.

Bosasa was a South African company specialising in providing services to government, most notably correctional services. It consisted of Bosasa Group, Bosasa Youth Development Centres, and African Global Operations. The company was liquidated in 2019 after whistleblower Angelo Agrizzi revealed the malfeasance in prolonged scandal about its allegedly corrupt relationship with members of the governing African National Congress (ANC), aired during the Zondo Commission of Inquiry.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Zondo Commission</span> 2018 South African corruption investigation

The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State, better known as the Zondo Commission or State Capture Commission, was a public inquiry established in January 2018 by former President Jacob Zuma to investigate allegations of state capture, corruption, and fraud in the public sector in South Africa.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse</span>

Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA) is a registered non-profit Civil Action Organisation, located in Johannesburg, South Africa. The anti-corruption advocacy organisation focuses on tackling government corruption and misappropriation of public funds. It is crowd funded by the public and businesses within the Republic of South Africa.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Vytjie Mentor</span> South African politician (1963–2022)

Mabel Patronella Mentor, known as Vytjie Mentor, was a South African politician, who served as a member of the National Assembly from 2002 until 2014. She represented the African National Congress and served as the party's caucus chairperson between 2004 and 2008. She was chairperson of the portfolio committee on public enterprises from 2009 to 2010. She is credited to be one of the first people to break ranks with the ANC and raise the alarm on state capture.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Dina Pule</span> South African politician (born 1960)

Dina Deliwe Pule is a South African politician who represents the African National Congress (ANC) in the National Assembly of South Africa. She has been the Deputy Secretary-General of the ANC Women's League since July 2023. Before that, she was Minister of Communications under President Jacob Zuma from October 2011 to July 2013.

Ivor Chipkin is a South African academic studying democracy and public management in the post-apartheid context.

References

  1. 1 2 Crabtree, John; Durand, Francisco (2017). Peru: Elite Power and Political Capture. London, United Kingdom: Zed Books Ltd. p. 1. ISBN   978-1-78360-904-8.
  2. ↑ "Romanian Democracy at Grave Danger". 14 December 2017.
  3. 1 2 Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth (2023). "State capture and development: A conceptual framework". Journal of International Relations and Development. 26 (2): 224–244. doi:10.1057/s41268-023-00290-6. PMC   10034251 . PMID   37363285.
  4. 1 2 Hellman, Joel S.; Jones, Geraint; Kaufmann, Daniel (September 2000). "Policy Research Working Paper 2444: "Seize the State, Seize the Day": State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition" (PDF). The World Bank.
  5. ↑ Kaufmann, Daniel; Vicente, Pedro C. "Legal Corruption (October 2005)" (PDF). Retrieved 7 April 2017.
  6. ↑ World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition: Contribution to the Policy Debate. World Bank Publications. ISBN   9780821348024.
  7. 1 2 State Capacity Research Group. 2017. "Betrayal of the Promise Report." Johannesburg: Public Affairs Research Institute
  8. ↑ "Политическата криза и дневният ред на промяната (pp.1–2)" (PDF) (in Bulgarian). iris.bg. 17 June 2013. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 2 March 2014.
  9. ↑ "Bulgarian PM reshuffles government in bid to quell protests". Reuters. 2020-07-23. Retrieved 2020-07-23.
  10. ↑ "They will leave me jobless.’ Why declining press freedom in Bulgaria should worry us all". Retrieved: 7 June 2021.
  11. ↑ Bulgarian independent media operating in a ‘captured state’, International Press Institute (18 February 2020). Retrieved: 7 June 2021.
  12. ↑ Conley, Heather A.; Stefanov, Ruslan; Mina, James; Vladimirov, Martin (2016). "Appendix" (PDF). The Kremlin Playbook: 36–63. doi:10.5771/9781442279599-36. JSTOR   resrep23311.13.
  13. ↑ Stefanov, Ruslan; Vladimirov, Martin (November 2020). "Deals in the Dark: Russian Corrosive Capital in Latin America" (PDF). National Endowment for Democracy.
  14. ↑ Lemstra, Maarten. "The Destructive Effects of State Capture in the Western Balkans" (PDF). Clingendael.
  15. ↑ Djokić, Katarina; Djordjević, Saša; Ignjatijević, Marija (2020). "State Capture in Serbia — A Conceptual and Contextual Introduction". Security Sector Capture in Serbia. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy: 11–19.
  16. ↑ "Nations in Transit 2020" (PDF). Freedom House.
  17. ↑ Chipkin, Ivor. n.d. "The end of tyranny: South Africa’s civil society fights back." OpenGlobalRights. Retrieved on 2021 March 21.
  18. ↑ Chipkin, Ivor, and Mark Swilling, et al. 2018. Shadow State: The Politics of State Capture. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
  19. ↑ Cairns, Patrick (12 October 2017). "Jonas: All institutions in SA are under threat". Moneyweb.co.za. Retrieved 2017-10-12.
  20. ↑ "Zuma allies 'break ranks' with him over Guptas". Rand Daily Mail. 1 February 2016. Retrieved 9 February 2016.
  21. ↑ Wild, Franz (17 December 2015). "Gupta family seen as symbol of Zuma's failing rule". Sunday Times. Retrieved 9 February 2016.
  22. ↑ "Who are the Guptas?". BBC. 14 May 2013. Retrieved 7 February 2016.
  23. ↑ Munusamy, Ranjeni (1 February 2016). "Keeping Up with the Guptas: What's behind the anti-Saxonwold revolt". Daily Maverick . Retrieved 9 February 2016.
  24. ↑ "Parliament must deal with 'state capture' – DA". News24.com. 27 March 2016. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2016.
  25. ↑ "Zuma defends relationship with Guptas – report". News24.com. 23 March 2016. Archived from the original on 4 December 2019. Retrieved 30 March 2016.
  26. ↑ "Cosatu Protest: Future of the alliance on the line | Daily Maverick". www.dailymaverick.co.za. 26 September 2017. Retrieved 2017-09-27.
  27. ↑ "Vytjie Mentor: I can prove Zuma was with me in the Gupta house". Rand Daily Mail. 17 March 2016. Retrieved 10 April 2016.
  28. ↑ "'Zuma said it's OK Ntombazana,' says former ANC MP Vytjie Mentor". Times Live. 18 March 2016.
  29. ↑ Khoza, Amanda (15 March 2016). "Gupta family denies offering former ANC MP top job". news24. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  30. ↑ Khoza, Amanda; Tandwa, Lizeka (15 March 2016). "Zuma has 'no recollection' of Mentor - Presidency". news24. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  31. ↑ "Full statement by Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas on Gupta job offer". The Sowetan. 16 March 2016.
  32. ↑ "Gupta family denies offering Jonas South Africa's finance minister role". Reuters. 16 March 2016. Archived from the original on August 17, 2016. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  33. ↑ "Joining the dots: Capture of the criminal justice system". Forensics for Justice. Paul O'Sullivan. 13 July 2017. Retrieved 12 February 2019.
  34. ↑ "State Capture Report 2016". Scribd. Retrieved 7 May 2019.
  35. ↑ "Zuma halts Madonsela's state capture report". eNCA. 13 October 2016.
  36. ↑ "Zuma to take state capture report on review". CityPress. Retrieved 2016-12-08.
  37. ↑ Williams, Denise. "Zuma to launch a review on Madonsela's state capture report". The Citizen. Retrieved 2016-12-08.
  38. ↑ Parkinson, Joe; Steinhauser, Gabriele (6 November 2016). "South Africa report cites 'worrying' signs of government corruption". Wall Street Journal . Retrieved 1 December 2016.
  39. ↑ "#StateCapture report: Molefe-Gupta ties revealed | IOL" . Retrieved 2016-12-25.
  40. ↑ Reuters Editorial. "South Africa's Guptas to challenge influence-peddling report at inquiry". Reuters India. Archived from the original on November 4, 2016. Retrieved 2016-12-25.{{cite news}}: |author= has generic name (help)
  41. ↑ Macharia, James (3 Nov 2016). "South Africa's Guptas to challenge state capture report at inquiry". CNBC Africa. Retrieved 1 December 2016.
  42. ↑ Dzonzi, Mike Cohen, Thembisile Augustine. "Gupta bombshell: Zuma on the ropes after Gordhan's gloves come off". The M&G Online. Retrieved 2016-12-25.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  43. ↑ Africa News Network 7 TV (2017-11-13), #StraightTalk: ANN7 exclusive interview with Pres Jacob Zuma , retrieved 2017-11-21{{citation}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  44. ↑ "State Capture Report: What John Cena Wants Inquiry to Probe". EWN. 3 November 2016.
  45. ↑ "Zuma denies blocking state capture probe | IOL News" . Retrieved 2017-10-16.
  46. ↑ reporter, Citizen. "R250bn lost to state capture in the last three years, says Gordhan". The Citizen. Retrieved 2017-11-29.
  47. ↑ Merten, Marianne (28 February 2019). "ANALYSIS: State Capture wipes out third of SA's R4.9-trillion GDP – never mind lost trust, confidence, opportunity". Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2019-06-09.
  48. ↑ Maguban, Khulekani (2019-06-06). "Damage from state capture 'worse than suspected' - SARB". Fin24. Retrieved 2019-07-29.
  49. ↑ Weiss, Andrew S.; Rumer, Eugene (1 December 2019). "Nuclear Enrichment: Russia's Ill-Fated Influence Campaign in South Africa" (PDF). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 6 January 2021.
  50. 1 2 Weiss & Rumer 2019, p. 9
  51. 1 2 Maina, Wachira (May 2019). "State Capture: Inside Kenya's Inability to Fight Corruption". Africa Centre for Open Governance. Retrieved 2022-07-20.
  52. ↑ "Kenya Kwanza Manifesto: DP Ruto promises to end state capture". Citizen Digital. 2022-06-30. Retrieved 2022-07-20.

Further reading

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.